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ABSTRACT 
THE MAKING OF SULTAN SÜLEYMAN:  
A STUDY OF PROCESS/ES OF IMAGE-MAKING AND REPUTATION 
MANAGEMENT  
Yelçe, Nevin Zeynep 
Ph.D., History 
Supervisor: Metin Kunt 
June 2009, xv+558 pages  
 
This dissertation is a study of the processes involved in the making of Sultan 
Süleyman’s image and reputation within the two decades preceding and following his 
accession, delineating the various phases and aspects involved in the making of the 
multi-layered image of the Sultan. Handling these processes within the framework of 
Sultan Süleyman’s deeds and choices, the main argument of this study is that the 
reputation of Sultan Süleyman in the 1520s was the result of the convergence of his 
actions and his projected image. In the course of this study, main events of the first ten 
years of Sultan Süleyman’s reign are conceptualized in order to understand the elements 
employed first in making a Sultan out of a Prince, then in maintaining and enhancing 
the sultanic image and authority. As such, this dissertation examines the rhetorical, 
ceremonial, and symbolic devices which came together to build up a public image for 
the Sultan. Contextualized within a larger framework in terms of both time and space, 
not only the meaning and role of each device but the way they are combined to create an 
image becomes clearer. This dissertation argues that Süleyman started his sultanic 
career with the inherited elements of dynastic and divine legitimation. He took over an 
already established model, and put deliberate effort in the actualization of this model 
through pursuing an active and visible mode of sovereignty in the 1520s. 
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ÖZET 
SULTAN SÜLEYMAN OLMAK:  
ĐMAJ YARATIMI VE ĐTĐBAR YÖNETĐMĐ SÜREÇLERĐ ÜZERĐNE BĐR 
ĐNCELEME 
 Yelçe, Nevin Zeynep 
Doktora, Tarih 
Danışman: Metin Kunt 
Haziran 2009, xv+558 sayfa 
 
Bu doktora tezi Sultan Süleyman’ın tahta çıkmasından önceki ve sonraki onar yıl içinde 
imajını ve itibarını oluşturan süreçleri ve Sultan’ın çok katmanlı imajının oluşumunda 
etkili olan aşamaları ve unsurları incelemektedir. Söz konusu süreçlerin Sultan 
Süleyman’ın eylemleri ve kararları çerçevesinde incelendiği bu çalışmanın temel 
argümanı Sultan Süleyman’ın 1520’lerdeki itibarının eylemleri ile yansıtılan imajın 
birleşmesinden kaynaklandığıdır. Bu çalışmada öncelikle şehzadenin Sultan’a 
dönüşümünde, ardından sultanın imajının ve otoritesinin muhafazası ve 
geliştirilmesinde rol oynayan unsurların anlaşılması açısından Sultan Süleyman’ın 
saltanatının ilk on yılında meydana gelen temel olaylar kavramsal çerçeveye 
yerleştirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu doktora tezi Sultan’ın kamusal imajını oluşturmak 
üzere bir araya getirilen retorik, törensel ve sembolik araçları incelemektedir. Bu araçlar 
zaman ve coğrafya çerçevesinde daha geniş bir bağlama yerleştirildiğinde, her aracın 
anlamı ve rolü kadar imajı oluşturmak üzere ne şekilde bir araya getirildikleri de 
aydınlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma ışığında, Sultan Süleyman’ın kariyerine hanedana ve ilahi 
desteğe dayalı meşruiyet unsurlarını miras alarak başladığı, 1520’ler boyunca aktif ve 
görünür bir hükümdarlık biçimi izleyerek devir almış olduğu mevcut modeli 
gerçekleştirmeye bilinçli bir çaba gösterdiği anlaşılmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Süleyman I, Osmanlı Tarihi, 16. Yüzyıl, Hükümdarlık, Meşruiyet 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION 
 
Turkish orthography are used to transliterate Ottoman Turkish words, regardless 
of their origin. Diacritical marks are used to indicate long vowels, ayns (‘) and hemzes 
(’). For well-known place names, English versions are used in spellings (such as 
‘Aleppo’ ‘Egypt’) and the like, though there are exceptions to the usage. For the names 
of institutions, titles, and concepts both the English and Ottoman Turkish equivalents 
are given. Translations of quotes belong to the author of this dissertation, unless 
otherwise stated. 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Think of Tinkerbell; fairies do not exist if children don’t clap their hands.1 
 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to uncover the process/es of image-
making and reputation management for Sultan Süleyman within the two decades 
preceding and following his accession. Through delineating a contemporary “public 
relations”2 program, a second purpose is to investigate how the image/s of the Sultan, as 
projected to the contemporary target audience, corresponded to his actions. The main 
argument of this study is that the reputation of Sultan Süleyman was the result of the 
convergence of these two aspects of his reign. 
In the course of this study, main events of the first ten years of Sultan Süleyman’s 
reign are conceptualized in order to understand the elements employed first in making a 
Sultan out of a Prince, then in maintaining and enhancing the sultanic image created. 
This task requires an examination of rhetorical, ceremonial, and symbolic devices which 
came together to build up a public image for the Sultan. When seen in isolation most of 
these devices may be viewed as mere pomp or flattery. The deeper and wider meanings 
concealed as a consequence often leave the impression of the “magnificence” associated 
with Sultan Süleyman to be a unique case. However, when contextualized within a 
larger framework in terms of both time and space, not only the meaning and role of each 
device but the way they are combined to create an image becomes clearer.  
Sultan Süleyman’s reign lasted forty six years witnessing numerous campaigns 
directed to both West and East, the relative fixation of the natural borders of the 
Ottoman realm, two major  uprising as well as minor ones, two major scandalous 
assassinations sponsored by the sultan, an open internal struggle for succession and the 
                                               
1
 Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (Dover: The Consortium Inc., 1992), p.49. 
2
 The concept “public” is intended to mean “audience”, in other words those 
people or parties whom the projected image meant to influence and/or impress. In the 
context of the sixteenth century this would be the ruling elite and their clients, non-
Ottoman representatives, non-Ottoman rulers whether they be hostile or friendly, 
tributary rulers, the soldiery in general, and only then, if at all, the ordinary subjects of 
the Sultan. 
2 
 
assassination of yet another heir to the throne as well the rise of orthodoxy both in terms 
of religion and law, increasing complexity of loyalties, networks and factionalism and 
the expansion of bureaucracy. Throughout the forty six years, various people and 
attitudes passed through the story, and only one remained from the beginning to the end, 
namely Süleyman. Acknowledging the fact that history did not happen solely by his 
agency, however, does not overshadow the fact that the story of these forty six years 
was largely related to what he represented, and that not as Süleyman but Sultan 
Süleyman. Therefore, I believe in the need to re-construct the image of Sultan 
Süleyman, the dynamics and the strategies underlying the image-making and 
management process. The unrealistic approach viewing Sultan Süleyman’s 46-year 
reign as a fixed, non-mutable, massive block is gradually fading away. Rhoads Murphey 
has recently argued that “the early part of Süleyman’s reign represents an era not of 
immutability, but of exploration, consolidation, and evolving imperatives formulated in 
response to pressures (both domestic and international) whose character changed and 
whose intensity fluctuated over time.”3  
Furthermore, although a surface reading of contemporary sources gives one the 
impression of a just and omnipotent ruler whose almost autocratic power is deeply felt 
by those around him, it is not possible to assume that things always went as smoothly 
and orderly as chronicles generally tend to reflect. A closer reading of these sources 
along with other documents such as imperial edicts and accounts of “others” brings 
forth an insight also about what was not running smoothly. Once put under question in 
this manner, it becomes possible to underline the main problems facing Sultan 
Süleyman and his closer circle, as well as identify the strategies they employed for 
dealing with them. The orderly appearance of a not-so-orderly world seems to have 
impressed, and at times misled, many generations of historians and I believe that 
observing the process/es of image-making and management contributes to our 
understanding of Sultan Süleyman’s reign as well as to conceptions of change and 
transformation in later times.   
                                               
3
 Rhoads Murphey, “Süleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest 
Destiny or a Delayed Reaction to Charles V’s Universalist Vision,” Journal of Early 
Modern History, vol.5, no.3 (2001), p.197.  
3 
 
Literature Review 
It was only in late 1980s that any serious thought was given to the image of Sultan 
Süleyman, with individual focus on the various components producing the overall 
image. In 1987 two conferences focusing on the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth 
century were held at the University of Chicago and at Princeton University, coinciding 
with the large-scale exhibition “The Age of Süleyman the Magnificent” held at the 
National Gallery of Art. In 1990 a similar conference focusing on Süleyman the 
Magnificent and his times was organized at L’Ecole du Louvre in Paris accompanying 
an exhibition at the Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais. The proceedings of these 
conferences were then published as Süleyman the Second and His Time4 (1993) and 
Soliman Le Magnifique et Son Temps5 (1992) respectively. Both volumes besides 
approaching the reign of Sultan Süleyman from a variety of angles ranging from 
personal aspects and foreign policies to trade, literature and architecture pay 
considerable attention to the image of Sultan Süleyman. Another edited volume, 
Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern 
World, appeared in 1995. Inspired by another exhibition, namely “Süleyman the 
Magnificent” held at the British Museum in 1988, this volume brought together the 
proceedings of a seminar, organized by the University of Cambridge Centre of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies, focusing on Ottoman state and society; and of another 
seminar, organized by University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, on 
“The ‘golden age’ of Süleyman: myth and reality”. This volume is the first scholarly 
study to deliberately devote full attention on the process of image-making and idealism, 
strictly pronouncing the need for a re-evaluation of the period which has been regarded 
conventionally as a “golden age.”6 What these three volumes share is the 
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interdisciplinary and critical approach directed to the understanding of the reign of 
Sultan Süleyman, and through this approach they have heralded a re-orientation from 
the more empirical, document-based, and narrowly political approach which can be 
observed, for instance, in an earlier collection of articles like Kanunî Armağanı,7 which 
too aimed at analyzing the reign of Sultan Süleyman. 
The path-breaking study regarding the process of image-making, as far as Sultan 
Süleyman is concerned, is Gülru Necipoğlu’s “Süleyman the Magnificent and the 
Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry”. 
Necipoğlu presented a shorter version at the 1987 Princeton conference, and the article 
was first published in The Art Bulletin in 1989 before appearing in Süleyman the Second 
and His Time. The immediate impact of this study can be discerned from the fact that in 
1991 this article won Necipoğlu the Ömer Lütfi Barkan best article prize awarded by 
the Turkish Studies Association. The article is actually about a Venetian-made helmet-
crown commissioned by Đbrahim Paşa for Sultan Süleyman, which was then taken along 
to the 1532 “German” campaign. Necipoğlu analyzes artistic policies, patronage 
networks, the relationship between art and power, change and transformation of artistic 
policies with the change of political focus and ideology. She suggests that around 
1540’s and 1550’s cultural policies changed as to exclude internationalism with the 
deliberate intention to “attempt its unique identity”. The article also introduces the 
phenomenon of cultural orientation at the time of Đbrahim and thereafter.8 Necipoğlu’s 
method is not conventional either. Although she draws solidly on documentary and 
empirical information, she adopts a problem-oriented approach addressing questions 
about the audience and the sources underlying the helmet-crown. She also dwells on the 
iconography of the helmet-crown, thus she manages to place the item into a clearer 
context. She contextualizes the whole issue so accurately that she builds a theory of 
change and orientation around one single item.  
Necipoğlu pursues the matter of representation and ideology in other works as 
well. “A Kanun for the State, A Canon for the Arts: Conceptualizing the Classical 
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Synthesis of Ottoman Arts and Architecture,” brings into this picture architecture and 
decorative arts as sources through which identities and ideologies can be expressed. She 
traces the changes in the number and composition of court artists and the employment 
of artistic patterns in various media to track change in expression of ideology. In this 
article Necipoğlu also examines the dissemination of artistic change as it contributed to 
centralization and a unique and unified Ottoman style and a distinctive artistic 
vocabulary. She firmly comes to the conclusion that through a process of state 
formation and self-imaging by the ruling elite a transformation was on the go in mid-
sixteenth century as fluid borders gave way to rigid borders and universalism to 
orthodoxy, so did the eclectic style in arts and architecture gave way to standardized 
form.9 As the title suggests, the article made a main contribution to the area by 
introducing a firm conceptualization of artistic policies. Necipoğlu’s perspective, further 
demonstrated by other indispensible works,10 has definitely contributed a lot to Ottoman 
image studies – if there is yet anything as such.  
If one thread of thought stems from historians with a more artistic bent, a second 
thread is found in historians more concerned with ideology and mentality. This line of 
investigation stems from arguments about the so-called “decline” paradigm and the 
concept of the “golden age”. Late sixteenth and seventeenth century writers such as  
Mustafa Ali, Koçi Bey and Katip Çelebi generally believed that going back to the old 
way and doing things as they used to be done in the past would provide the solution to 
their problems. The ideas of these Ottoman writers, though not ignoring the problems 
faced especially during the later part of Süleyman’s reign, tended to promote his 
example as well as that of Selim I. In a way this literature can be taken as a reception of 
the image created during the reign of Sultan Süleyman. An authoritative representative 
of this thread would be Cemal Kafadar. In his article “The Myth of the Golden Age”, 
Kafadar challenges the application of the concept of “golden age” to the reign of Sultan 
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Süleyman and discusses where the image of Süleyman stood in contemporary “decline” 
literature. And he arrives at the dual nature of Süleyman’s reign: “the paradigmatic 
balancing at between imperial magnificence and law-abiding justice vis-à-vis the 
subject” and the gradual breaking of that balance.11 Kafadar’s article is enlightening 
with regards to the reception and re-creation of the image of Sultan Süleyman in later 
times. 
Barbara Fleming’s “Public Opinion under Süleyman” may be considered a text-
based “reception” study and it too has been presented at the Princeton Conference. 
Fleming warns against the temptation to idealize Sultan Süleyman’s reign as “a golden 
age” and suggests that his popularity declined in the 1540’s. She takes as her subject the 
Câmi u’l-meknûnât dated 1543 of Mevlana Đsa, an unofficial voice. Fleming finds that 
the age of Selim I was hailed as a golden age in Đsa’s work. A striking example was 
what Đsa saw as the reason for the “first tribal disturbance”. Whereas official historians 
blamed Safavi disruption for the unrest in certain provinces, Đsa thought the actual 
reason was “deportation and forced settlement”.12 Such an example suggests that the 
projection or reflection of an image or message did not guarantee its reception as 
desired. This relatively brief article, though not exclusively on the image of Sultan 
Süleyman, helps pave the way for at least trying our hand at “reception” of the projected 
image. 
Soliman Le Magnifique et Son Temps features at least three contributions to the 
study of the image of Sultan Süleyman, besides Gülru Necipoğlu’s article “A Kanun for 
the State, A Canon for the Arts.” Cornell Fleischer’s “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The 
Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleyman” directly addresses the 
dynamics of the image-making process. Aiming to re-evaluate the reign based on 
analysis of ideological and bureaucratic change, Fleischer challenges descriptions of 
Süleyman’s reign as “unified”, “unitary” and “coherent”. Instead of characterizing the 
period by “consistency of system or orderliness of actual process”, he argues for the 
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validity of rapid change, innovation and experimentation.13 He contextualizes the issue 
through comparing strategies and legitimation processes of competitors Süleyman had 
in his claims on universal rulership. In this sense, Fleischer also draws on the messianic 
literature of the time which helped create an image of the sultan as a sacred and 
universal ruler. Fleischer’s study presents a breaking point regarding the image of the 
Sultan. According to the author, this breaking point has to do with a change of policy 
after the death of Đbrahim Paşa, suggesting to try looking at Đbrahim as Süleyman’s 
alter-ego. Tracing the use of titles, Fleischer puts forth the transformation of the image 
from that of the conqueror to that of the protector as the title sâhibkırân [conqueror of 
the world] lends its popularity to ‘âlempenâh [refuge of the world].14  
Another important contribution in the same volume is Alberto Tenenti’s “la 
Formation de l’image de Soliman a Venise”. Emphasizing the continuous cultural and 
commercial exchange between the Muslim and the Christian worlds in the sixteenth 
century, Tenenti draws on Venetian accounts to understand how an image for Sultan 
Süleyman in the Christian premises of Venice was built.15 “Sultan Süleyman: The Man 
and the Statesman” by Halil Đnalcık in Soliman Le Magnifique et Son Temps is not 
directly engaged with the image of Sultan Süleyman, but is an attempt to compare 
Süleyman the man with Süleyman the sultan. “Süleyman gave the impression, or 
created the myth of, a perfect ruler,” says Đnalcık.16 Although introducing the main 
administrative elements and factions under Sultan Süleyman for most part, this article is 
worth mentioning.  
Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age is a study divided into two parts, one 
focusing on state policies and problems faced, and the second on ideal rulership and its 
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reflections. The second part seems to be a confirmation of the need to understand the 
appearance of the era and the dynamics of the process/es of idealization. The 
contributions of P.M. Holt, Colin Imber and Peter Burke provide models and critical 
approaches to the matter through examination of the Ayyubid and Mamluk models, the 
case of legitimation and ideals regarding the early Ottomans, and Renaissance 
perceptions of “golden age”. Through such a comparative approach the whole section 
aims to arrive at a more accurate approach to the image of Sultan Süleyman and his 
time. In the introduction to the second part, Christine Woodhead poses important 
questions as to when and how perceptions about the reign of Süleyman changed, why 
the age was perceived to be a “golden age” and the general discourse of the time.17 In 
her concluding article “Perspectives on Süleyman”, Woodhead examines both the 
process/es through which an image for the sultan was tailored and the resulting image. 
She also emphasizes Süleyman’s personal involvement and interest in his own image-
making process. Woodhead suggests a multi-media approach to the issue by juxtaposing 
visual and verbal sources. In the second part of the article, the author investigates the 
representation of the image in the seventeenth century as reflected by Ottoman writers 
critical of their own times. She also underlines the impact of these reflections in the 
formation of the concept of a “classical” system, as well as the “rise, decline, fall” 
paradigm dominating Ottoman historiography in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
In conclusion, Woodhead proposes a different perception of Sultan Süleyman as the 
first of those who lead the way to a new order of things rather than as one with whom a 
classical era came to an end.18 Through her statements Christine Woodhead opens the 
way for the search of a new paradigm regarding not only the way Süleyman’s reign is 
viewed but also the conventional periodization of Ottoman history following the reigns 
of individual sultans.  
These studies seem to have provided an impetus for several PhD dissertations in 
the last few years, focusing on the various aspects of Sultan Süleyman’s reign. In his 
dissertation The Sultan and the Sultanate: Envisioning Rulership in the Age of Suleyman 
the Lawgiver (1520-1566), Hüseyin Yılmaz analyzes the formation of Ottoman political 
theory of the period, and traces the shift of focus from the person of the ruler to the 
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governmental institutions and procedures. Yılmaz’s study covers a wide range of 
contemporary works, and elements of legitimation put forth in these works.19  Sjezana 
Buzov’s The Lawgiver and His Lawmakers: The Role of Legal Discourse in the Change 
of Ottoman Imperial Culture appears as one among a series of dissertations written at 
the University of Chicago. Through in-depth examination of specific legal documents, 
Buzov investigates the role of law, and its formation within the context of political 
discourse during the reign of Sultan Süleyman.20 Another contribution from the same 
institution, Ebru Turan’s The Sultan’s Favorite: Đbrahim Paşa and the Making of the 
Ottoman Universal Sovereignty explores perhaps the most influential figure of Sultan 
Süleyman’s reign.21 Yet another contribution from Chicago is Đbrahim Kaya Şahin’s In 
the Service of the Ottoman Empire: Celalzade Mustafa (ca. 1490-1567), Bureaucrat 
and Historian, which examines yet another influential figure in the making of Sultan 
Süleyman’s reign.22 As one of the major policy makers of Süleyman’s era, Celalzade 
Mustafa Çelebi is also analyzed in Mehmet Şakir Yılmaz’s ‘Koca Nişancı’ of Kanuni: 
Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Bureaucracy and ‘Kanun’ in the Reign of Süleyman the 
Magnificent (1520-1566). Yılmaz examines Ottoman bureaucracy during the reign of 
Sultan Süleyman through the life of Celalzade, in the context of the development of a 
new political discourse strongly emphasizing justice and law.23 It is not a coincidence 
that at least four out of these five recent studies share the twin concepts of law and 
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justice as a main point of focus. By contextualizing and tracing the transformation of 
these concepts, both in terms of discourse and bureaucracy, these studies help move 
beyond the monolith view of Sultan Süleyman’s reign as a static “golden age” 
empowered and identified with the almost extra-human “strong sultan.” 24 
Chapters on the reign of Sultan Süleyman in general histories tend to present the 
period as an apex. Stanford Shaw, for example, confirms the mystique of magnificence 
and lawfulness surrounding the time of Sultan Süleyman in his History of the Ottoman 
Empire and Modern Turkey. The chapter title is “The Apogee of Ottoman Power,” and 
the subtitle of the part talking about the reign of Süleyman is “The Peak of Grandeur: 
Süleyman I the Magnificent 1520-1566.” The titles also suggest a sense of stability and 
continuity disregarding change and transformation. Shaw tells, for example, how Sultan 
Süleyman compiled and organized laws which were to put an end to arbitrary behavior 
as had been observed with his father Selim I and Mehmet II; how he spent most of his 
time in campaigns in order to pursue his father’s efforts of establishing universal rule; 
how he proved his primacy in the Islamic world by defeating the Safavis in 1535 and 
how he re-established in some areas the “Sunni” institutions which the Safavis had 
destroyed. His account reads almost like a contemporary chronicle with the same 
discourse, and in conclusion he gets into the decline issue in a few words saying that 
although Sultan Süleyman’s reign was the peak of Ottoman institutions and cultural 
achievement; the devshirme grew in power as to leave the sultan out of state affairs; the 
harem got involved in politics; financial and social troubles pressed hard, and could not 
be dealt with.25 This book is apparently not intended for a scholarly audience, thus to 
expect a balanced account of Sultan Süleyman’s reign in thirty pages would probably 
not be fair to the author. This example is cited not out of disrespect to a very respectable 
historian, but only to point out the general attitude toward the reign of Sultan Süleyman 
until 1990’s. 
One of the problems observed with modern secondary literature on Sultan 
Süleyman is posed by the epithets “Kânûni” and “Magnificent”. A general search for 
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Sultan Süleyman in any well-known bookstore or library would result in approximately 
twenty to thirty books featuring an aspect or a full account of the reign of Süleyman the 
Magnificent or Süleyman the Lawgiver.26 Some titles even do not seem to need giving 
the Sultan’s name and leave it at “Lawgiver.”27 Although it is not the intention of this 
dissertation to suggest that Sultan Süleyman was neither magnificent in many aspects 
nor uninterested in law; it seems that these two epithets have been so much taken for 
granted that the complex dynamics which led to their formation are not given the 
attention they deserve, if we expect to have an accurate understanding of the reign of 
Sultan Süleyman. Another problem posed by the epithets is the inter-changeable use 
they seem to have acquired in our day. One gets the impression that, in some instances 
at least, the use of these epithets is designated by the country or language in which a 
study is published. Thus, Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age, published in English 
originally, appeared as Kanuni ve Çağı in Turkish translation, without a deliberate 
decision or approval by the editors. Therefore, this study proposes to set aside for a 
moment these two titles, which have not been used widely by the contemporaries, if 
used at all,28 and start anew by trying to make sense of the reign through the eyes of the 
contemporaries. In other words, this study proposes re-building the image-making 
program of Sultan Süleyman step by step as contemporaries did as circumstances 
required, and only then decide on which epithet to use, if any. 
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Sources 
Contemporary Ottoman chronicles form the backbone of this study. As this 
dissertation aims to understand the current dynamics, values, and opinions that shaped 
Sultan Süleyman’s image, sources have been deliberately limited to Süleyman’s exact 
contemporaries. In other words, it was imperative that the authors employed in this 
study lived in the same world; as to have similar life experiences, access to similar 
circles of knowledge, and a shared vocabulary, as well as the opportunity of first-hand 
evaluation of the events. Such a view of a presumably shared mentality does not mean 
that the authors employed in this study were uniform in their views, evaluations, and 
opportunities. They were individuals from different backgrounds; they had different 
personal experiences; they pursued different life paths. However, each personally 
experienced Sultan Süleyman’s reign along with Süleyman himself, as it happened.29 
While the authors employed in this study were insiders and often eyewitnesses, they 
were also semi-official voices with an agenda.30 Therefore, caution is imperative when 
interpreting what they say, if one is trying to reach the historical “truth.” However, for 
the purposes of this study, their somewhat restricted identities are for the better since 
they are more likely to present us the “image” of the Sultan. In other words, in their 
writings we shall be able to see what they wanted others/us to see, as well as the 
elements shaping the aspired ideal.31  
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Kemalpaşazade’s [d.1534] Tevârih-i Âl-i ‘Osmân, constituent of ten books, is one 
of the most frequently cited sources in this study. Born in 1468, Kemalpaşazade 
[Şemseddin Ahmed b. Süleyman] came from a family of military career. Although the 
author started his own career in the military, he changed paths and pursued a career in 
the learned establishment. Serving under Bayezid II, Selim I, and Süleyman, 
Kemalpaşazade was a first-hand witness to major events. Not only his own experience 
and observations at the Ottoman court, but his influence in the education – and works – 
of many other authors employed in this study make him an invaluable source on 
sixteenth-century Ottoman mentality. Furthermore, in his capacity as chief-judge 
[kadıasker] and mufti, and as a member of the closer circle of the sultans, he was one of 
the major figures shaping both the policy and the image of Sultan Süleyman. His history 
of the Ottoman House was initially commissioned by Bayezid II. Covering the period 
until 1508 [914], the initial commission includes seven books. The last three books were 
commissioned by Sultan Süleyman. While the seventh and eighth books relate the 
events starting from four years before Selim I’s accession and covers his reign, the tenth 
book is an account of Süleyman’s deeds starting from his accession. However, the tenth 
book is more like a compilation of individual campaign chronicles rather than a single 
history of the reign of Sultan Süleyman.32 
Another policy and image-maker whose work is intensively used this study is 
Celalzade Mustafa [d.1567]. Born around 1490, he was the son of a middle ranking 
judge. Starting his career as a protégée of Piri Mehmed Paşa, the author was appointed 
as court scribe [divân kâtibi] in 1516. He served as private secretary [tezkîreci] first to 
Piri Mehmed Paşa, then Đbrahim Paşa, as each became grand vizier. In his capacity as 
private secretary, he accompanied Đbrahim Paşa to Egypt in 1524, and was appointed 
chief scribe [re’isü’l-küttâb] on the return to Istanbul. In 1534, he was appointed to the 
post Nişancı, which he kept until his retirement in 1557.33 Celalzade Mustafa’s 
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Tabakâtü’l-Memâlik ve Derecâtü’l-Mesâlik covers the major events of Sultan 
Süleyman’s reign from his accession to 1557. Although the author seems to have 
composed the work after his retirement, his inclusion of certain documents, which were 
originally written by him, implies that the Tabakât was based on life-long experience. 
Furthermore, Sehi Beğ’s biographical dictionary mentions his composition of a “book 
relating the ghazas directed to the East and the West and to Hind and ‘Arab, as well as 
campaigns, in the beginning of the reign of His Majesty Sultan Süleyman Şah, in order 
to express his glory and power.”34  His career provided the author a high degree of 
proximity to the Sultan and the highest levels of imperial administration as a confidante. 
In this sense, he not only had the opportunity to witness and evaluate critical moments, 
but also to shape them. Yet a third feature of the author’s role in Süleyman’s story is his 
reflecting the Sultan in an idealized manner. Thus, Celalzade’s triple role as observer-
maker-reflector has made Tabakat an indispensible source for many generations of 
historians. 
Another chronicle on Süleyman’s reign used in this study was written by Bostan 
Mehmed Çelebi [d.1569], a member of the religious establishment. Born in 1498, 
Bostan first entered the service of Kemalpaşazade in 1519, and then transferred to that 
of the Sultan’s teacher Hoca Hayreddin. He served as instructor [müderris] in various 
institutions, and he eventually promoted to the post of chief judge of Rumelia in 1547.35 
The extant copies of Bostan’s work with different timeframes and completion dates 
                                                                                                                                         
Yılmaz, ‘Koca Nişancı’ of Kanuni: Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi. Celalzade has served a 
second tenure at the post of Nişancı during 1566-1567. 
34
 Edirneli Sehî, Tezkîre-i Sehî (Kitâbhâne-i Âmed, 1325), p.33: “Sultân Süleymân 
Şâh hazretlerinin taht-ı saltanata vâki‘ olan ibtidâ-yı cülûslarında Şark ü Garb ve Hind 
ü ‘Arab câniblerine itdikleri gazâları ve her diyâra itdikleri seferleri ve kendilerinin 
‘azametin ve kudretin beyân itmek içün bir kitâb te’lîf idüb ve yazub, târih tasnîf 
eyleyüb ‘Tabakâtü’l-memâlik ve derecâtü’l-mesâlik’ diyü tesmiye olınır.” Sehi Beğ 
composed his work in 1538 [945], and presented it to Sultan Süleyman. The author died 
in 1548 [955], before Celalzade even retired.  
35
 The manuscripts used in this study: Bostan Mehmed Çelebî, Târîh-i Sultân 
Süleyman Hân, Milli Kütüphane, Afyon Gedik Ahmet Paşa Đl Halk Kütüphanesi 
Collection, 03 Gedik 18350; Bostan-zâde Mustafâ Efendî Tirevî, Cülûs-nâme-i Sultân 
Süleymân, TSK, R.1283. For his life and various copies of his work, see, Hüseyin Gazi 
Yurdaydın, “Bostan’ın Süleymânnâmesi,” Belleten, vol.19, no.74 (April 1955), pp.137-
202. In this article, Yurdaydın clarifies the attribution of the various extant copies of 
Bostan’s histories of Sultan Süleyman, which were formerly attributed to authors as 
Ferdi and Şehzade Mustafa. 
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imply that the author composed the work as he lived through the events. Although he 
was not positioned in the intimate circle of the Sultan, his education with 
Kemalpaşazade and Hayreddin, as well as his being an almost exact contemporary of 
Süleyman, deems his account on the reign of Süleyman a useful source. One of the 
chronicles of Süleyman’s reign used in this study was written by a military man, 
Matrakçı Nasuh [d.1563]. Nasuh’s work, which was probably completed in 1538, 
covers the years 1520-1537. The author was educated in the Palace School [Enderûn], 
which he probably entered in the last years of Bayezid II. He started writing activities 
during Selim I’s reign with a treatise on mathematics. Nasuh was a man of many 
capabilities; he was a swordsman, a writer, a translator, and a painter.36 His wide-
ranging interests and his court attendance throughout the period makes him a suitable 
source for the purposes of this study, although in some parts of his account he draws 
much from Kemalpaşazade. Another source extensively used in this study is the 
dynastic history by Lütfi Paşa [d.1564], another man of military origin who climbed up 
to the grand vizierate. Probably born in late 1480s, Lütfi Paşa, like Nasuh, was educated 
in the Inner Palace during the later years of Bayezid II. He served Selim I under various 
palace offices such as head-taster, master of the banner and the like. His provincial 
appointments started with governorship of Kastamonu. His first-hand experience and 
observations at the Palace, at the provinces, and at the campaigns make his work 
indispensible for our research.37 Lastly, a quite detailed Selimname by an obscure author 
Sa‘di b. Abd el-Mute‘al has been used extensively in this study.38 The work which was 
completed in 1548 covers the period 1512-1524. Although the text starts with the 
accession of Selim I, it dwells on his succession struggle through flashback. This work 
provides detailed accounts regarding various ceremonial events, and is noteworthy 
                                               
36
 The manuscript used in this study: Matrakçı Nasûh Silâhî b. Karagöz Bosnavî, 
Dâstân-ı Sultân Süleymân, TSK, R.1286. For his life, see, Nasuhü's Silahi (Matrakçı), 
Beyan-ı menazil-i sefer-i ‘Irakeyn-i Sultan Süleyman Han, Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın (ed.) 
(Ankara: TTK, 1976), pp.1-30. 
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 Published edition used in this study: Lütfi Paşa, Tevârih-i Âl-i ‘Osman, Kayhan 
Atik (ed) (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2001). For his life, see, ibid. 
38
 The manuscript used in this study: Sa‘dî b. Abd el-Mute‘al, Selimnâme, TSK, 
R.1277, Muharrem b. Ramazan Hanefi Kadirî (copyist), 1055 [1645], Halep. Based on 
the father’s name, Franz Babinger suggests that the author was of non-Muslim origin, 
probably from Rumelia. Franz Babinger, Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri, Coşkun 
Üçok (trans.) (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1982), pp.67-8. 
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especially in providing some information on Süleyman’s princehood. The official 
history of Sultan Süleyman, namely the Süleymânnâme of Arifi [d.1561/2], the first 
official şehnâmeci of the Ottoman sultans, was not an appropriate source for this study, 
because it was composed at a much later point of Sultan Süleyman’s reign when his 
priorities seem to have changed. In this sense, it does not represent Süleyman’s image 
in-the-making during the 1520s. 
Due to their communicational nature official documents such as imperial edicts, 
law codes, proclamations, and diplomatic correspondence have proved useful in 
identifying the main elements making up the image of the Sultan. A huge corpus of 
documents pertaining to Sultan Süleyman’s reign is available in print. Archival research 
undertaken for this study, in the Topkapı Palace Archives and the Prime Ministry 
Ottoman Archives, has not produced additional documents which could have 
considerable contribution to the arguments presented in this dissertation.39 A major 
compilation of Ottoman diplomatic correspondence by Feridun Ahmed Beğ dates back 
to the time of Orhan Beğ. Although the authenticity of earlier documents cannot be 
taken for granted, the compilation known as Münşe‘at contains copies of many of the 
important documents pertaining to the reign of Sultan Süleyman. Among these are the 
proclamation of accession, official proclamations of victory, campaign diaries, and 
various decrees.40 Ottoman correspondence found in the Venetian archives has been 
published in Arabic alphabet by Tayyip Gökbilgin in two parts.41 Habsburg domestic 
and diplomatic correspondence relating to the Ottomans has been compiled by Antal 
Gevay [d.1845] in the nineteenth century. The compilation contains letters between 
Charles V and Ferdinand I, as well those with their sister and aunt, in addition to 
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 The inefficiency of archival research stemmed partly because a long list of 
documents which looked promising on the catalogue of the Topkapı Palace Archives 
was inaccessible, except for a few items. While the collection at the Prime Ministry 
Ottoman Archives have much to offer to a student of economic or institutional history, 
documents which might have contributed to this study, both in terms of type and date, 
have not yet been transferred from the Topkapı Palace. 
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 Feridun Ahmed Bey, Münşe‘atü's-selâtin (Đstanbul : Darüttıbaati’l-amire, 1858) 
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 Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyatında Kanuni 
Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri,” Belgeler, vol.1, nos.1-2 (1964); and “Venedik 
Devlet Arşivindeki Bazı Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle Đlgili Diğer 
Belgeler,” Belgeler, vols.5-8, no.9-12, (1968-1971).  
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correspondence with various officials as well as letters of instruction.42 A similar work 
in French is Charriere’s Négociations de la France dans le Levant, which also includes 
comments and evaluations by the author.43 Legal and administrative regulations, and 
law codes, have been published by Ahmet Akgündüz. These volumes contain 
simultaneously the transcriptions and facsimiles of a wide range of documents related to 
legal and administrative issues.44Among the literary sources poetry also offers insight to 
the ultimate reflection of the sultanic ideal and contemporary values.45  
Sultan Süleyman’s reign is also rich in accounts by ambassadors and travelers. 
Venetian correspondence provides valuable insight to the contemporary perceptions of 
Sultan Süleyman and his actions. Regular reports by the resident Venetian bailos in 
Istanbul, and of envoys to the Ottoman court offer very detailed accounts.46 Many of 
these accounts have fortunately been either summarized or recorded in full by a 
contemporary Venetian official Marino Sanuto [d.1536]. The author’s meticulous 
recording activity from 1496 to 1533, not only Ottoman affairs but everything going on 
in the world day by day, renders the fifty-eight volumes of I Diarii an indispensible 
source for any study on early sixteenth century. The information found in Sanuto’s 
entries range from diplomatic correspondence and treaties between states to current 
gossip and friendly conversations, from festivities to funerals. Sanuto’s sources of 
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 Antal Gevay, Urkunden und Actenstu cke zur Geschichte der Verha ltnisse 
zwischen Oesterreich, Ungern und der Pforte im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderte. Erster 
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[1838]-42). 
43
 Charriere, E.; Négociations de la France dans le Levant, (New York: Burt 
Franklin, 1965). 
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 Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri, vols.3-6 (Đstanbul: FEY Vakfı, 
1990). 
45
 For poetry as a tool in politics, see Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of 
Islam (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p.10: “In the days 
before the advent of media, the poet had an important role in the field of propaganda 
and of what we nowadays call public relations, and poetry could often be an important 
weapon of political warfare.” One major limitation on the use of poetry as primary 
source is the difficulty involved in dating, thus this kind of source has been used only in 
cases whereby the date of composition was predictable. 
46
 See Appendix 1, for the list of bailos and envoys in Istanbul within the 
timeframe of this study. 
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information were as wide ranging as his interests. Venetian resident ambassadors and 
envoys to major courts of Europe, officials and merchants abroad, friends and families 
of foreigners living in Venice, passers-by from all over were sources for Sanuto. While 
such a variety of sources no doubt increased his information flow, it also introduced 
ambiguity and inconsistency to his records, thereby reducing their credibility. As Sanuto 
himself occasionally complained about the inconsistency about the various accounts he 
laid eyes on,47 the reports in his entries may not reflect the whole truth. However, they 
do provide invaluable insight to contemporary opinions, attitudes and feelings.48 
Another important source, in this sense, is the compilation of English correspondence 
under the title Letter and Papers, covering the reigns of individual kings and queens of 
England. However, this is a compilation of copies or summaries of documents, thus 
does not have the personal tone of Sanuto’s diaries. Yet, the range of the documents in 
terms of subject-matter, authorship, and locality makes Letters and Papers 
indispensible.49  
A major compilation of Western narrative sources on the Ottomans written during 
the reign of Süleyman is Francesco Sansovino’s [d.1586] Dell’Historia Universale 
dell’Origine et Imperio de’ Turchi, published in 1560. Sansovino was an amazed 
observer of the Ottomans who found the need understand their expansion, as he 
explains in the beginning of his work.50 Works by contemporary European observers 
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 See, for example, an entry dated 8 November 1529, Sanuto, 52:201: “Letters 
come from many; I will have copies of some of them, because some write one thing and 
other another.” 
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 Marino Sanuto, I Diarii di Marino Sanudo (Bologna: Forni Editore, 1969).  For 
a discussion on Sanuto, see, Robert Finlay, “Politics and History in the Diary of Marino 
Sanuto,” Renaissance Quarterly, vol.33, no.4 (Winter, 1980), pp.585-598. 
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 J.S. Brewer (ed.), Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of 
Henry VIII, vols.3-4 (London: Longman, 1867-1875). 
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 Francesco Sansovino, Dell Historia Universale dell’Origine et Imperio de 
Turchi I (Venetia: 1560-1), n.p: “Tra i Principati del Mondo de quali noi habbiamo 
qualche notitia, ho sempre stimato degno di molta considerazione quello del Signor 
Turco, percioche la sua infinita grandezza, la somma obedienza del popolo, e la felice 
fortuna di tutta la nation Turchesca è cosa mirabile a dice in che maniera et come 
facilmente sia venuta crescendo in poco spatio tempo a tanta altezza di gloria e di 
nome. Et se cominciando noi dall’origine sua verremo di scorrendo con diligenza le 
cose loro fatte cosi in casa come fuori, diremo et forse con verità, che la disciplina 
della milittia et la obedienza et la fortuna de Romani dopo la rovina di quella 
Repubblica sia trapassata a questa generatione.” 
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referred to in this study are included in Sansovino’s compilation. Benedetto Ramberti’s 
[d.1546] Libri Tre delle Cose de Turchi is based on his observations during his journey 
to Istanbul in 1534, as he accompanied Venetian envoy Daniele Ludovici. The author 
describes Istanbul, Sultan Süleyman’s court, and his administration. The work was first 
published in Venice, and printed many times in Italian in 1540s, as well in German in 
1543.51 Theodore Spandounes [Thédoro Spandugino Cantacusino], who claimed blood 
ties with the famous Byzantine family of Cantacusini, came to Istanbul in 1499 in 
pursuit of his heritage, and stayed until 1509. His work is an attempt at explaining the 
origins and customs of the Turks. His treatise on the Turks was reproduced several times 
from 1519 onwards in various European languages. The author’s own last revision is 
dated 1530. Although he was not a first hand witness to Süleyman’s reign, he does 
provide interesting information. The treatise was also included in Sansovino’s 
compilation.52 Luigi Bassano was another traveler to Istanbul, his journey lasting from 
1537 to 1540. Bassano wrote his impressions in I Costumi et i Modi Particolari de la 
Vita de’ Turchi. The work was published in Rome in 1545. Sansovino included the 
work in his compilation. Bassano’s work was published several times in Venice during 
the second half of the sixteenth century.53  Giovanantonio Menavino’s I Cinque Libri 
della Legge, Religione, et vita de’ Turchi is another Italian work which was widely 
circulated in German and Latin as well as Italian, especially in the second half of the 
sixteenth century. This treatise, too, eventually found its way into Sansovino’s 
compilation.54 
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Paolo Giovio [d.1552] was a major figure who observed Ottomans from afar, yet 
with great concern. “Giovio was ahead of most Europeans in his knowledge of the 
Turks, gained from extensive reading and questioning of travelers and merchants,” says 
his modern biographer Price Zimmermann.55 While he tried to understand the strengths 
of the Ottomans, as well their weakness, as a detached historian, he nevertheless 
propagated unification between Christian rulers to oppose them.56 Giovio composed 
Commentario de le Cose de’ Turchi at a time when talks of a crusade gained impetus, 
and presented the work to Charles V on January 22, 1531. He aimed to keep his text as 
simple as possible to present Charles the reality as it appeared to him. The Ferrarese 
envoy is reported to have remarked, upon reading the treatise: “Your Excellency will 
learn in a short time what he would not perhaps learn even in a very long time without 
the book.”57 The work was printed and in circulation by August 1532, and being 
circulated. Commentario was printed several times during the course of the sixteenth 
century. Other than Italian editions, a Latin translation by Francesco Negri was printed 
in Wittemberg, Antwerp, and Paris in the second half of 1530s. It was also published in 
German in 1537.58 Eventually, Giovio’s Commentario, too, found its way into 
Sansovino’s compilation.  
Ceremonial and ritual events can also be regarded as a sort of primary source with 
a dual nature. While they are visual representations for contemporary audiences, they 
are also converted into verbal representation for they were recorded in histories and 
embassy reports thus being transmitted even to those who were not actually there to 
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p.125-6. 
55
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witness and perceive the image and the message/s for themselves. We can learn about 
ceremonial only through written accounts and relatively few miniatures depicting 
scenes from festivals. Such limited or even guided access has its disadvantages. At best, 
we find ourselves reading an eyewitness account, yet the eyewitness is also a “text-
maker.”59 Therefore, evaluating ceremonial instances to understand their contribution to 
the image of the Sultan requires a dual task of interpretation of ritual through 
interpretation of text. The various ceremonial occasions such as weddings, circumcision 
festivals, royal entries, campaign processions, religious holiday celebrations, Friday 
prayer processions, festivities upon victories appear as tools for legitimation, display of 
sultanic power and majesty, demonstration of the continuity of the dynasty and the 
established order, as well as the dynastic claim on authority. In a sense, the festivals and 
ceremonies can be considered as the visualization of “state” and “power” with its 
various components and aspects. The festivals also serve to confirm the silent contract 
between the sultan and his officials, as well as integrating them once again into the 
dynastic system. The repetition and recurrence observed in individual ceremonies and 
the festivals as a whole mark the values and messages transmitted through these events.  
The reader shall notice the limited use of visual sources such as illustrations in 
illuminated manuscripts, Western visual representations, and architectural 
demonstrations of the Sultan’s image. This limitation is posed by the scope of this study 
in terms of time. Major projects involving visual demonstrations of power such as the 
building of the Süleymaniye Mosque [1550-1558] and the commissioning of illustrated 
Süleymânnâme [1555] of Arifi remain beyond the timeframe of this study. These 
projects reflect a different phase of the image making process, therefore not evaluated in 
this study. However, the absence of large scale architectural and artistic activity during 
the first ten years of Sultan Süleyman’s reign should be regarded as a contemporary 
statement on its own. During the timeframe examined in this study, Sultan Süleyman 
and his image-makers seem to have been more concerned about military success and 
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administration of justice as main elements of reputation. Various scholars have pointed 
out a breaking point after 1540s through which Sultan Süleyman’s imperial display 
found a new expression which was marked by visual elements.60 The reasons 
underlying the absence of large scale artistic activity to support the Sultan’s image in 
the 1520s still remains to be uncovered. Various trophies of war and ceremonial 
artifacts, on the other hand, have been evaluated through the course of this study. 
Approach 
The task attempted in this dissertation requires a chronological journey through 
contemporary texts and visual sources we have access to. In this respect, a combination 
of perspectives applied by scholars such as Peter Burke, Quentin Skinner, Roger 
Chartier, Robert Darnton, Natalie Zemon Davis, Stephen Greenblatt in their various 
works provided the theoretical framework to formulate some of the main questions of 
this study – some aspects of the theories of Clifford Geertz and Norbert Elias have also 
been inspiring. My approach has been largely inspired by Peter Burke’s total history 
approach. In his Fabrication of Louis XIV Burke argues for the necessity of bringing 
visual and textual representations in order to “see the royal picture as a whole” and to 
render change more visible. Burke regards his work as a contribution to the “history of 
communication, production, circulation and reception of symbolic forms” and as a case-
study of the relations between art and power, and more specifically of the “making of 
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great men.” The chronological approach, he argues, gives the opportunity to see 
whether change takes place at the same time in different media. If we put it in another 
way, any simultaneous change would imply a deliberate change in the image as a 
whole. 61 Burke’s insistence on the concept of “representation” also provides different 
angles of inquiry and interpretation.62 Burke admits drawing on Erving Goffman,63 and 
one can get the sense of the Geertzian perspective in Burke’s application of the 
dramaturgical perspective. I would not go so far as to apply the Geertzian “theatre-
state” model to Süleyman’s state, but I still believe that although the “power” of a 
“king” may be taken for granted by modern observers, we need to keep in mind that 
power consists and consisted of various components, and it was necessary to 
demonstrate this compilation from time to time. As Geertz puts it, “At the political 
center of any complexly organized society, there is both a governing elite and a set of 
symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth governing.” Symbolic expressions 
were one of the means of “marking the center as the center” and a means for the center 
to justify its claims and existence.64   
There are two levels of inquiry and interpretation involved in this journey. The 
first has to do with understanding what various concepts meant for the contemporaries.  
The second level of interpretation involves due care to the motives and intentions of the 
contemporary authors, as well as the overall “performance” of their messages. In this 
level of inquiry, applying some of the principles of Quentin Skinner’s contextualization 
theory would be very helpful. Skinner’s method can be briefly defined as 
contextualizing conceptions: “… what a writer may have been doing in using some 
particular concept or argument, we need first to grasp the nature and range of things that 
could recognizably have been done by using that particular concept, in the treatment of 
                                               
61
 Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1992), pp.2-3. 
62
 Ibid, pp.8-9. 
63
 Ibid, pp.7-8. 
64
 Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics 
of Power,” in Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics Since the Middle Ages, 
Sean Wilentz (ed) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania University Press, 1985), 
pp.13-38. 
24 
 
that particular theme, at that particular time.”65 Skinner mainly argues that texts are not 
written in a vacuum and without purpose, so the historian – if s/he wishes to arrive at a 
relatively sound interpretation – should be able to see the contexts they were written in 
and the uses they were put into.66 Skinner’s main idea lies in his belief that “all serious 
utterances are characteristically intended as acts of communication.” In this respect, it 
becomes important why something is said if we want to understand what it means. This 
also requires us to presume an existing or ongoing argument in the context of which a 
particular remark has been made. Thus intentions become an inevitable issue to trace 
when trying to make sense of contemporary accounts.67 In this sense, this dissertation 
argues that statements about Sultan Süleyman did not merely reflect his authority, but 
helped construct and maintain it. 
At this point, we probably should make it clear that we are faced with a dual 
process of image-making. There is the Ottoman side trying project a viable omnipotent 
image for the Sultan. There is the “others” like ambassadors, rival rulers, accidental 
passers by trying to transmit how they perceive what is presented to them and thus 
getting engaged in another process of image-making. In this respect, Roger Chartier’s 
appropriation theory provides a suitable model for investigation. Although he means his 
method for reading practices in general, overall principle of reception is aspiring 
regarding other sorts of sources as well. Chartier’s theory re-orients meaning production 
from a passive process to an active one which requires the participation of various 
parties, or factors, involved in meaning production. Following his lead, this study takes 
into consideration the audience toward which the image is intended with their diverse 
characters and dispositions, their multiple abilities and expectations and thus tries to 
approach the issue from the point of view of meaning production, too.68  
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A wide range of approaches from various disciplines have been consulted 
throughout this study. Theoretical frameworks from political science, international 
relations, conflict resolution, and psychology provided useful conceptual tools in 
discussing individual issues related especially to war-making and rebellion. Classical 
theories of war, as delineated in the works of Machiavelli [d.1527]69 and in the writings 
of nineteenth-century strategists such as Clausewitz [d.1831] and Jomini [d.1869],70 
provided a general understanding of the strategies involved in various phases of war 
making from the decision to wage war to termination. Rationalist – or Neorealist – 
explanations of war added to my understanding of possible origins of war. Such 
explanations attribute conflict to a lack of an overarching hegemonic power to arbitrate 
between states, which gives rise to competition and conflict between individual political 
identities. In such an environment, each actor must provide for its own security and 
interest. An actor amassing instruments of war to defend its territory and/or power soon 
becomes a perceived threat itself to the security of another.71 The role of the perception 
of threat, even when there was none, has been one of the questions underlying my 
examination of wars throughout this study. Approaches combining anthropological and 
psychological perspectives on war have provided conceptual tools to understand the 
symbolic significance of certain types of behavior and discourse related to the different 
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phases of the campaigns investigated in this study.72 Conflict theories, on the other 
hand, was consulted to conceptualize the rebellions and their representations.73 
While following a chronological event-based approach for uncovering the 
dynamics of the image-making and reputation management process/es, a few sets of 
questions were applied to the material/event under examination at each step of the way 
in order to contextualize the issue as well as to offer different view points. By bringing 
out the details which might not seem particularly significant on their own, and fitting 
them in the bigger picture, recognizable patterns can be observed. In this sense, the first 
set of questions involves the issue in question: What is the issue at its face value? What 
was at stake? How did the contemporaries regard the issue? If a problem, how did they 
plan to solve it? This will give us a picture of what the contemporaries thought to face. 
Then we can try our hand at interpretation at various levels through other questions and 
try to figure out any ideological and/or symbolic meaning possibly attached to the 
matter.  
A second set of questions investigates the relevance of timing: When is a certain 
event happening? Does it have former history? If so, do contemporary sources dwell on 
that former history and how? What is happening elsewhere? What kind of a context 
does this provide? Such an investigation illuminates the context, possible motives, and 
possible advantages.  
A third set of questions involve the people around the Sultan: Who are the main 
actors appearing at a specific time/event/period of the Sultan’s life? What are their 
functions? Do their functions change over time, if so how and why? How are they 
related to the Sultan? Do their relations change, if so how and why? How are they 
represented? Do their representations change over time, if so how and why? These 
questions help gain an insight about issues related to how networks function, about 
general appointment and dismissal policies as well as an overview about the people 
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around the Sultan, and their capability to influence him. Furthermore, the 
representations of major figures contribute to the general image of the Sultan.  
The fourth set of questions dwells on “precedence”: Are there repetitions in the 
handling of similar situations? Are these repetitions a matter of legitimation through 
referral to ancient custom, or are they practical solutions to deal with a given task or 
situation? If there are repeated patterns, are there deviations at specific instances? Are 
these deviations specific to the situation, or do they imply any signs of deliberate 
change of strategy? Does what appears to be a deviation at a specific instance repeat 
itself in later episodes? These questions help identify recognizable patterns of behavior, 
as well as established elements of legitimation. The fifth set of questions investigates 
the significance attributed to analogies and honorifics: Which analogies and honorifics 
are used at different times? Do they follow a pattern, or are they randomly chosen from 
an already available repertoire? Are new elements added to the repertoire? If so, when? 
What do they imply? What kind of judgment values are attached to them? Such 
questions shed light on the aims and claims as well as value judgments; not only about 
the Sultan but also about value judgments directed at his opponents, as often times 
Süleyman’s image and reputation is reflected in opposition to his adversaries.  
The last set of questions, but not the least, aims at a comparative perspective: How 
did previous rulers or other contemporary monarchs react in similar circumstances? 
How were they represented in similar events? Does the image/s of Sultan Süleyman, at 
a certain phase, possess stability regardless of the identity of the audience in terms of 
reflection and perception? Or is it possible to trace different representations directed to 
or produced by different parties? The quest for the formation and reception of meaning 
requires an understanding of the contemporary significance of the concepts employed in 
the image of Sultan Süleyman. For a concept to function in the image, it had to be 
legible to all parties involved. Thus, a major component in the making of an image is 
communication. Even a basic text book definition of “communication” would clarify 
the point: “Communication is the act of transmitting information, ideas, and attitudes 
from one person to another. Communication can take place, however, only if the 
speaker and the listener (called the sender and the receiver) have a common 
understanding of the symbols being used.”74 In order to understand the process, I had to 
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understand, to some degree at least, what various concepts meant to the contemporaries 
and what concepts were available to them.75 Ottoman political culture drew from 
various sources. It was a Persian-Islamic synthesis, on one hand. On the other hand, it 
claimed to inherit the Roman Empire. These in return often appeared in the texts as 
references to a legendary world of Hellenic and Sassanid origin, idealizing its subjects 
as heroes from the Shahnama. Sultan Süleyman acquired his power from God, and 
achieved his deeds through God’s favor. But so did Charles V, for instance. In this 
respect, this study traces certain practices, concepts, and symbols through various 
cultures and periods. The aim is not to make comparisons to see who was influenced by 
whom, but to see under what context similar concepts have been employed. Similarities 
shed light on the functions of particular elements making up the image, while 
differences or absences led to the question whether such a function was not necessary or 
was fulfilled through other means. Furthermore, lately, more and more scholars have 
voiced the need for proper knowledge of the Ottoman-Habsburg-Valois confrontation to 
understand sixteenth-century European history.76 Likewise, I believe that it is necessary 
to view the reign of Sultan Süleyman in the context of this confrontation as well as in 
comparison to other contemporary court cultures. 
 
This study examines the making of Sultan Süleyman and his contemporary image 
chronologically in six parts. Chapter 1 dwells on the period up to Süleyman’s accession. 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the various aspects of his princehood in relation to his 
membership of the Ottoman dynasty. Süleyman started his dynastic careers as one of 
the many potential claimants to the throne, and eventually found the way to the throne 
through a shared struggle alongside his father Selim I. As his father ascended the 
Ottoman throne, his dynastic role and his image related to this role changed, too. As 
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such, this chapter argues that the process of the “making” of the Sultan was one which 
started long before his accession.  
Chapter 2 examines the process of transformation of Süleyman from a prince to a 
Sultan. This transformation consists of two consecutive processes. Firstly, he inherits 
sovereign authority, as wells as the royal prerogatives and titles, from his father. This is 
marked by the accession, which is evaluated as a process in itself. While accession 
ritually marks the transference of sovereign power, the issues investigated in the second 
part of this chapter, consolidates the authority vested in the title of sultan in the person 
of Süleyman. If accession marks the short-term transference of power, the following 
acts related to the twin concepts of ‘adâlet and siyâset, which are considered to be the 
main building blocks of sovereign authority, establish Sultan Süleyman’s authority on 
his own right.  
Chapter 3 discusses the first two large scale projects of Sultan Süleyman after his 
accession, namely the campaigns of 1521 and 1522. With their aggressive and 
ambitious nature, these two campaigns are investigated as strong statements made in the 
beginning of the process of the “making” of Sultan Süleyman. This investigation 
involves an understanding of the significance of military skills, as part of contemporary 
political culture. These campaigns are also investigated in relation to Süleyman’s self-
positioning within the dynastic tradition. In this respect, the specific targets chose for 
initial action demonstrate the dual nature of Süleyman’s relationship with the dynasty. 
On one hand, these targets imply an attempt to complete the unfinished business of his 
forefathers to glorify the dynasty. On the other hand, they imply the ambition to surpass 
his predecessors. This chapter also takes the opportunity to explore current conceptions 
of warfare, and how Sultan Süleyman’s actions corresponded to them. At the end of the 
two years investigated in this chapter, the image of the almighty Sultan Süleyman 
emerges. 
Chapter 4 investigates the power relations at the highest levels of Ottoman 
imperial administration, and traces the significance of Đbrahim Paşa in the process. The 
appointment of Đbrahim Paşa as grand vizier is evaluated within the context of 
Süleyman’s building himself a household with his own ranks. This chapter also explores 
the rise of Đbrahim Paşa in relation to its contribution to the overall image of Sultan 
Süleyman. 
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are related to the maintenance and enhancing of the 
image Sultan Süleyman. Chapter 5 is an examination of the 1526 campaign, through 
which the dynamics and rules of war-making are analyzed. Through this analysis, 
Süleyman emerges not only as a proud victor, but as a “law-abiding” commander. 
Chapter 6 investigates the campaign of 1529 as an enterprise aimed at “restoring 
Hungary to her legitimate King.” This investigation involves the contemporary care 
devoted to the legitimation of Janos Szapolyai through the process. As such, Süleyman 
emerges as the “refuge of the world”.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE FELICITOUS PRINCE: ŞEHZÂDE-Đ CĐVÂNBAHT 
1.1. Defining the Problem: The Role and Functions of the Princely Courts at 
Caffa and Manisa on the Way to Become a Sultan 
This chapter aims to trace the career of prince Süleyman as a potential candidate 
to the Ottoman throne. The period under examination covers the years between his birth 
in 1494 [900] and the death of his father in 1520 [926]. Throughout this period 
Süleyman served as district governor in two different posts and assisted his father’s 
campaigns by guarding Rumelia while stationed in Edirne. These tasks were standard 
procedure applied to all Ottoman princes up to the late sixteenth century. In this sense, 
this chapter focuses to some extent on the institutional character of princehood within 
the concept of dynastic monarchy. On the other hand, since Süleyman was a member of 
the third generation of the dynasty at the time, his princely career was inevitably linked 
to that of his father. In this respect, this chapter focuses on those elements, concepts and 
events which paved the way to the making of Sultan Süleyman through the agency of 
his father Selim. Such an approach is also provoked by the way contemporary sources 
reflect Süleyman as a prince. While the Selimname literature pays considerable attention 
to the deeds Selim I accomplished as a prince, the Süleymanname literature starts with 
the accession of Süleyman. More general chronicles on the history of the House of 
Osman mention certain points of Süleyman’s princehood but only in relation or tied to 
Selim’s story. The fact that the main body of Selimname literature dates back to the 
reign of Sultan Süleyman himself77 suggests that this mode of projection and perception 
was deliberate on the part of Süleyman and his contemporaries.   
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It is a universally acknowledged fact that Ottoman succession was based on the 
dynastic principle. As far as Ottoman tradition goes, sovereignty was heralded not only 
to Osman but to his whole house through a dream.78 Following a practice that can be 
traced back to many Turco-Mongolian states, the worthiest son of a deceased ruler 
would be recognized as his legitimate successor. This would usually entail a fierce fight 
between the candidates but whoever gained supremacy would be considered to have 
God’s blessings and be regarded as legitimate sovereign.79 Despite the seemingly 
smooth succession of Sultan Süleyman to the throne,80 he was the key figure in his 
father’s succession struggle which can be regarded as his own way to the throne. The 
first two sections of this chapter examine the first two phases of Süleyman’s 
princehood, namely his childhood in Trabzon and his first post in Caffa [Feodosiya, 
Kefe] as a third generation Ottoman prince among many. Whether in Trabzon or Caffa, 
Süleyman’s story in these years of his life is inseparable from his father’s.  
The third section dwells on an intermediary phase when Süleyman transforms into 
the sole heir of the Ottoman throne. This transformation is reflected in his reception in 
Istanbul following his father’s enthronement in 1512 and his departure for a new post 
after his father eliminated the remaining claimants. The fourth section examines the 
Manisa post in more institutional terms. As such it demonstrates not only the 
subordinate but also the complementary status of the princely court as far as the duties 
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and actions of Süleyman as the sole heir until his father’s demise are concerned. This 
last section also points at the function of the princely post as as a base where the prince 
started forming a household for his possible future career,81 altough the Ottoman 
princely court was not allowed to be a “government-in-waiting.”82  
1.2. Trabzon: A Prince is Born  
Süleyman was born in Trabzon, where his father was governor, in 1494 [AH 900]. 
His birth does not seem to have caused any extraordinary occasion. Contemporary 
narrative sources do not mention his day of birth. Neither do they attribute any 
“auspicious omens” related to his birth,83  unlike the attribution of a legendary prophecy 
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surrounding the birth of his father Selim.84 On the other hand, the “auspicious” element 
of Süleyman’s birth was in his name, which was one of the “given” aspects of his 
existence. The second “given” in this sense was his mother. It is probably a posthumous 
legend-making process that caused Princess Hafsa to be regarded often as “the last 
noble bride to the Ottoman court, daughter of the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray.”85 
However, just like the contemporary disinterest in the year of birth, the identity of 
Süleyman’s mother seems not to have occasioned any excitement for his 
contemporaries. The third “given” is the city of Trabzon where Süleyman spent his 
childhood in his father’s court. Contemporary chroniclers seem to have been interested 
in Trabzon, though not for the sake of Süleyman’s childhood. The city was relevant to 
the advancement of Selim and his branch of the dynasty due to its frontier nature. This 
brief introduction to Süleyman’s childhood demonstrates that he mattered only in two 
instances: first when he was named by his father and second when his father requested a 
sancak appointment for him. In other words, until that point, his dynastic identity was 
one with his father’s. 
1.2.1. The Name 
 The name chosen by Sultan Selim for his son seems to have provided the main 
building block of the image of Sultan Süleyman. As Süleyman ascended to the throne, 
his name gave occasion to numerous associations. According to tradition, as Süleyman 
[	
] also reads Selîmân, Selim meant “the little Selim”. In other words, Selim named 
the newborn Selîmân, as a diminutive of his own name. According to Sa‘di, this 
decision of the Sultan reflected tenderness, while also implying a pun.86 According to 
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the seventeenth-century writer Taşköprizade Kemal, when asked how he would name 
his son, Selim said “Selîmân from Selim.” Upon this, the humorous Murad Paşa 
explained the name as being a diminutive [tasgîr] version of the Sultan’s name; 
signifying the prince, it meant: “He is my miniature [küçüğüm].”87 Such an account 
supports Süleyman’s admirable qualities by making him a replica of his much-adored 
father. It also reflects an expectation that the son would inherit the glory of the father, 
rule the realm as well, and conquer as many lands. Relating the accession of Süleyman, 
Kemalpaşazade employs the pun to imply both Selim and Solomon as models for the 
new Sultan.88 A later historian Hasan Beyzade has employed the pun as to include 
Sultan Süleyman’s son Selim as well, using the dual significance of the word Selîmân: 
“Both the father is Selim and the son is Selim, between the two Selims is Süleyman.”89 
Another tradition refers to the legendary king Solomon. The association of the 
prince with the most ideal king of all times implies yet another expectation, if not 
glorification. One of the foreigners dwelling on this analogy is Giovio, the Italian 
observer. According to him, all “sophisticated Turks” attributed the name of the Sultan 
to the prediction of the felicity he would bring. Giovio goes on to make a comparison of 
the names of father and son. He finds it ironic that while his name meant docile, 
peaceful and a maker of peace; Selim himself was a terrible man who was inclined to 
cruelty and who turned out to be the most warlike of all Ottoman rulers. To prove his 
point, the author emphasizes that more blood was shed in the eight years of Selim’s 
reign than that of the thirty years of Süleyman up to the time of writing. He points out 
that the name Süleyman [Solimano] signifies “King Solomon of the history of Moses 
who was known for his wisdom.” However, assessing by the number and importance of 
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Süleyman’s victories, Giovio comes to the conclusion that Süleyman’s deeds would be 
more compatible with the “fame of his father” than those of the sage king. 90 
1.2.2. The Mother 
The identity or the ethnic and religious affiliation of Süleyman’s mother Hafsa 
Sultan has always been controversial.91 One tradition claims that she was the daughter 
of the Crimean Khan.92 Challenging conventional views, based mainly on Hammer’s 
belief that Hafsa Hatun or another one of Selim I’s women was the daughter of the 
Crimean Khan, Çağatay Uluçay refutes the royal origin of Süleyman’s mother. Based 
on the absence of relevant documentation, Uluçay finds it unlikely that Süleyman’s 
mother was a Crimean princess. Uzunçarşılı’s findings of a record naming her “Hafsa 
bintü Abdülmûin” strengthen Uluçay’s argument, for the paternal name indicates slave 
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pareggiato il nome della fama del padre, quando giustamente vogliamo misurare i 
numeri e l’importanza delle vittorie.” 
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origin.93 In a later work, Uluçay establishes her slave origin based on a document 
recording her name as “Hâtûn binti ‘Abdü’l-hay”.94  
Contemporary accounts do not provide grounds for assuming royal Crieman 
origin, nor has a document supporting this assertion been uncovered yet. Apparently, 
the origin of Süleyman’s mother did not have much relevance in the eyes of the 
contemporaries. Although Süleyman is not referred to as being related to the Crimean 
Khan in any way, there a few implications which point vaguely at a marriage of an 
Ottoman prince to a daughter of the Crimean Khan, in other words an ally and tributary 
of the Ottoman Sultan. When Selim is taken to be the prince in question, the issue 
becomes relevant in terms of a kinship power group within the ensuing succession 
struggle.  
Accounts suggest that inter-dynastic marriages were already regarded as highly 
unfavorable by the sixteenth century. Leslie Peirce argues that as the Ottoman claims to 
being a world empire became stronger, they did not see other powers worthy of a bond 
as intimate as marriage. Peirce associates this stance with the “consolidation of empire” 
and with it to the claim of “a preeminence that dictated a disdain for alliances with 
lesser powers.”95 Peirce traces the same trend in both male and female marriages; in 
other words, Ottoman princesses were neither taken nor given in marriage.96 Seen in 
this perspective, a marital arrangement involving a daughter of the Crimean Khan and 
the reproduction of an offspring seems unlikely. 
Uluçay argues that another son of Bayezid II, namely Mehmed who was governor 
in Caffa, was married to a daughter of the Khan.97 A contemporary Venetian observer 
Jacopo Contarini mentions that Bayezid’s son in Caffa was related to the Crimean Khan 
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through marriage.98 Kemalpaşazade reports that a marriage between Bayezid’s son 
Mehmed and a daughter of Mengli Giray Khan was indeed planned to cement the 
“affectionate association” between the prince and the Khan. However, the plan never 
materialized because the pair was “incompatible” and the marriage “inappropriate”.99 It 
is possible to trace the reasons of the “inappropriateness” of such unions in 
contemporary sources. According to a Venetian account, while in Trabzon, Selim 
wished to arrange a marriage between one of his sisters and Shah Ismail [Ardevelli] so 
that he could make use of the latter’s forces for his own purposes. Thus, Selim 
convinced Ismail to send a messenger to his father to ask for the hand of the princess. 
However, Sultan Bayezid was far from pleased and declined the proposal, saying that it 
was against their custom to give their daughters to foreigners, that the daughters could 
only be wed to his own subjects and slaves. According to this report, Bayezid’s refusal 
gave rise to a political crisis, although the marriage was initially intended for political 
alliance. Probably to prevent a crisis, a suitable bride from among the daughters of those 
nobles loyal to Bayezid was found for Ismail. As far as we can understand from various 
Italian accounts, the chosen bride was the daughter of Alaüddevle.100  
An inter-dynastic marriage is still implied in some sources. Andrea Foscolo, the 
Venetian bailo in Istanbul, wrote in a letter dated 18 June 1511 that Selim had sons and 
that one of these sons was a valiant man. Moreover, he said that the imperador di tartari 
has given him one of his daughters as wife and that this was a great favor.101 In late 
August 1511, Foscolo’s letters mention Selim being with “his brother-in-law, the son of 
the Crimean Khan.”102 An anonymous chronicle reports that Selim’s intention was to 
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engage Süleyman and a daughter of the Khan at Caffa.103 According to an anonymous 
Greek chronicle, written in late sixteenth century, Selim took the Khan’s daughter as 
wife when he was in Caffa.104  
These references demonstrate the rumors circulating at a time when Sultan 
Bayezid’s sons were already competing for the throne, and probably reflect the 
impression of the contemporaries regarding the nature of the relationship between the 
Khan and Selim. The only remote documentary clues that can be put forth as to a “wife” 
of Selim of Crimean origin are a few letters from Selim I to the Khan where the former 
addresses the latter as “my father [babam].” One such letter is the one Selim sent the 
Khan upon his enthronement, whereby he informed Mengli Giray of his accession and 
requested that Süleyman be sent to Istanbul.105 Another example is the proclamation of 
victory sent after Çaldıran, Selim’s first major victory against another ruler. In this 
letter, too, Selim addresses the Khan as “my father [babam] Mengli Giray Han.”106 
Since none of the later letters to the Khan refer to him as such,107 it is more likely that 
Selim meant the address more as a show of respect than a familial title. Considering the 
Khan’s support of Selim’s acquisition of the Ottoman throne, Selim’s tone of address 
seems to stem from a sense of sincere gratitude rather than kinship. 
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1.2.3. The Town 
Selim was appointed to Trabzon in 1481 [886]. He was the second prince to be 
appointed to the recently acquired district following his older brother Abdullah.108 
Although Selim’s appointment to Trabzon can be regarded as a sign of unpopularity at 
court because it was very distant to the throne,109 it was not contradictory with the early 
Ottoman practice of stationing princes in newly conquered or troubled regions.110 
Selim’s princely sancak was on the Georgian border. Trabzon was also the border first 
to Akkoyunlu, then to Safavi territory. The frontier nature of the district of Trabzon is 
worth dwelling upon for it made it possible for Selim to gather enough funds, men and 
prestige to pursue the long road to the throne. Such a critical location presented Selim 
with both an advantage and a disadvantage. While the prospect of raid and booty 
offered an opportunity to establish a firm powerbase, the location of Trabzon signified 
constant threat from the newly prospering Ismail the Safavi. With the rise of Shah 
Ismail and the fall of the Akkoyunlu, the triple border around Trabzon was in a chaotic 
state. In 1501, Selim offered refuge to Akkoyunlu commanders who survived Safavi 
attacks. At around this time, Selim directed raids into Georgia, moving as far as Kutaisi 
[Kütayis], conquered Rize in 1509 and moved on to Batum. He also moved against 
Ismail to Bayburd and Erzincan.111 
Selim’s location at a critical frontier at a critical time gave him the opportunity to 
carry on raids and earn prestige as well as material gains. Along with these gains came 
local alliances which strengthened his powerbase. The opportunity of ghaza, offered by 
the local frontier circumstances, provided Selim with the warrior-hero image 
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encountered in various accounts. Ottoman sources often praise his raids against the 
Georgians and the prosperity such activity brought to the region. When talking about 
Selim’s deeds at Trabzon, Kemalpaşazade notes that Trabzon was a stronghold of Islam 
on the border of Georgia. The author further emphasizes that when the “prince of good 
fortune” entered the land of the Georgians, “a sea-full of booty poured” to Trabzon.112 
Kemalpaşazade emphasizes not only Selim’s raids into Georgia but also his seizure of 
former Akkoyunlu castles – some peacefully and some by force – to add to his land 
[mülk]. The author mentions the local commanders of these regions joined Selim as he 
captured Bayburd and Kemah.113  
At this point, Selim’s conflict with Shah Ismail seems to have been a competition 
for the former Akkoyunlu castles. Selim saw the growing power of Ismail as a threat, 
especially with the association of unrest in Anatolia with the followers of Ismail. 
According the Venetian bailo Contarini, Ismail started his recurrent excursions into 
Ottoman lands with the excuse of chasing the man who wronged him, namely 
Alaüddevle. According to what Contarini heard from one of Selim’s men, Ismail got as 
close to Trabzon as 1.5 days distance. Suspecting Ismail would attack him, Selim 
arranged a raid to Ismail’s camp, causing him to retreat. Upon this, Bayezid II sent a 
messenger to Selim to say that he could leave Trabzon and go wherever he chose. Selim 
declined the proposal on the grounds that he wished to live and die there. According to 
Contarini, at one point, Alaüddevle even sought refuge in Trabzon with Selim.114 On the 
other hand, while mentioning the excursions of Ismail chasing Alaüddevle, Ottoman 
sources emphasize that he did not violate Ottoman soil. While Kemalpaşazade reports 
that Alaüddevle insulted Ismail’s messenger, Lütfi Paşa does not provide a specific 
reason for the animosity.115 
Selim’s actions against Georgian and Safavi territories also seem to have 
displeased Bayezid II. Following the Georgian raids of 1508, Shah Ismail sent an envoy 
to Bayezid II to complain about the destruction caused by Selim around Erzincan and 
Bayburd. Upon this complaint, Bayezid II forbade further raids. Furthermore, he warned 
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against taking in former Akkoyunlu commanders because their integration caused 
scarcity of fiefs. Another reason put forth by the Sultan was the provocation of envy on 
the part of other princes.116 While the accounts of Kemalpaşazade and Celâlzâde  praise 
the deeds of Selim and reflect the raids as a device to increase prospering, contemporary 
correspondence shows otherwise. In an undated letter of complaint to his father, Selim 
expressed his wish to conquer and destroy “the enemy”, as well as complaining of the 
constant enemy attacks which hindered agricultural growth. He wrote that even basic 
subsistence items such as barley were scarce. He compared his precarious condition and 
his ghaza efforts with the peace and prosperity his brothers enjoyed in inner parts of the 
realm.117   
It was within this frontier environment that Süleyman grew up and spent his 
childhood, while his father pursued activities which served to build a powerbase. While 
Süleyman was too young to join his father’s military enterprise or administrative 
function, with its recently acquired status, the city of Trabzon probably offered the 
young prince a natural understanding of the composite nature of the Ottoman realm, as 
discussed by Heath Lowry. Lowry points to the frontier nature of the city and its 
influence on Süleyman, and argues that the multi-cultural characteristic of the city 
endowed the young prince with an “awareness of the multi-national, polyglot nature of 
the state which one day he would rule.”118 In 1509, as his father decided that Süleyman 
should step into the imperial administrative system through a post of his own, 
Süleyman’s succession struggle began.   
1.3. Caffa: The Long Road to the Throne  
Süleyman’s appointment to Caffa signifies his political coming of age and can be 
regarded as the first instance of Süleyman being officially incorporated to the imperial 
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administration. It also signifies his active involvement in the succession struggles. 
Ottoman princes were appointed to districts when they reached the appropriate age. The 
average age of sancak appointment for an Ottoman prince ranged between 12 and 15.119 
This practice had various purposes. First of all, sancak posting was part of the training 
of a prince through which he acquired administrative experience. Secondly, the 
administration of a district, especially in newly acquired or troublesome regions, by a 
member of the Ottoman house was regarded to enhance the security of the realm. 
Thirdly, the presence of a prince in a provincial post strengthened the dynastic presence 
in the region in question.120  
It is generally assumed that Süleyman came to the throne without a succession 
struggle and fratricide because he was an only son. However, his appointment to Caffa 
and the years he spent there prove otherwise. Süleyman’s struggle for the throne was 
fought long before his succession. The period between 1509 and 1512 is actually the 
time when he fought his succession struggle, as part of that of his father’s. Selim’s 
competition for the throne and following elimination of the rival claimants signified a 
familial struggle rather than a personal one. It is this process that shall be covered under 
this section. In 1509, Süleyman had several uncles and numerous cousins with 
theoretically similar chances to acquire the throne after the death of Sultan Bayezid. In 
this sense, his father’s struggle was actually Süleyman’s own road to the throne.121 
Throughout the succession struggle of Selim,122 Süleyman appears to have been a 
valuable asset to his father. Firstly, his sancak appointment gave Selim the opportunity 
to step into succession struggle. Secondly, his son’s presence at Caffa gave Selim the 
opportunity to acquire the support of the Crimean Khan to strengthen his powerbase. 
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The distant location of Caffa signified a safe refuge both for himself and for his son 
during the process. We shall now consider the main issues involved in this process. 
1.3.1. First Appointment 
The issue of Süleyman’s appointment figures as a pretext for the surfacing of the 
conflict between Bayezid II’s sons Ahmed and Selim. Contemporary sources reflect a 
premeditated plan on the part of Selim as he requested a sancak for his son who was old 
enough for appointment. According to Şükri, Selim presented the sancak request 
without anyone being aware of his intentions. Selim’s request, as Şükri has it, was based 
on the argument that his son Süleyman was a servant [bende] of the Sultan. Since he 
grew to be not only a young man [civân] but also a strong one [pehlivân], the Sultan 
was expected to grant him a sancak.123 Sa‘di says that “with the help of God” the viziers 
could not realize Selim’s intentions and Süleyman was granted Caffa. Moreover, they 
were convinced that since Selim got his son land on the Russian border [Urûs], though 
he might have plans to make himself a state to rule, he did not have his eye on the 
throne.124 Later correspondence demonstrates that this was actually among the rumors at 
the time. When Mevlana Nureddin [d.1522] was sent to negotiate with Selim at Caffa, 
he reported back to the Sultan that as far as he could understand, Selim’s intention was 
to acquire the castles between the land of the Crimeans and the Russians with the help 
of the Khan. He would then gather more men from the vicinity and reside there.125  
In his Selimnâme, Celâlzâde summarizes the episode, taking the opportunity to 
praise Süleyman as a young man and to emphasize how lucky Selim was to have been 
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granted by God a son like him.126 He starts his account by telling that the greatest gift 
God could bestow on a man was a son. And He definitely had given Selim a superior 
one. Finally, he grew up and it was time for him to get a sancak of his own. Selim sent a 
request to Bayezid. The first two requests were rejected because of proximity to Ahmed. 
As Celâlzâde has it, Caffa came to be the ultimate solution. Meanwhile, the “cruel” 
viziers had their minds set on making Ahmed sultan. When their intentions came to 
surface, Selim left Trabzon and set sail to Caffa.127 Although Celâlzâde does not go into 
as much detail as Sa‘di and Şükri do, he gives us enough clues to assume that the 
appointment of Süleyman was the first major incident to trigger an open succession 
struggle between Selim and Ahmed. 
Süleyman was appointed to Caffa on 6 August 1509 [18 Rabi II 915]. According a 
document written after his accession, Süleyman was given flag staff and some 
textiles.128 The list of the items given to Süleyman’s cousin Osman b. Alemşah upon his 
sancak appointment in 1507 [912], on the other hand, included more items. Likewise, 
an undated and unidentified list of items given to princes on their first appointment 
consisted of not only more items but specifically of various horse gear.129  
An account book partly published in transcription by Uluçay gives the names and 
numbers of the people making up Süleyman’s retinue at Caffa in September 1511 
[Rajab 917]. The list demonstrates a full household with the presence of key officials 
organized in regiments. Among these were four eunuchs [tavaşiyân] and 24 pages of the 
inner palace [gulâm-ı enderûn] of Albanian, Circassian, Georgian and Russian origin. 
There were also those whose salaries were paid monthly [müşâherehorân] among 
whom were Süleyman’s teacher Mevlâna Hayreddin, head gate-keeper [ser-bevvabîn], 
head-taster [ser-zevvâkîn], master of the horse [mirahur], head falconer [ser-şâhinciyân] 
and others. The prince had a group of men of “distinguished” status [müteferrika] 
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including an imam, a muezzin and scribes. The prince also had a regiment of artisans, 
tent-tenders, guards and the like among his household.130  
Sa‘di’s account regarding the reception of Süleyman in Caffa gives a sense of the 
dynastic claim. Although the author does not mention anything about the dynasty, 
Süleyman’s arrival in Caffa “with the help of God,” his being likened to “Simurg of the 
Mount Qaf,” the beautiful textiles spread on his way reflect previous accounts on royal 
entries in various cities on various occasions. According to Sa‘di, the people of Caffa 
were joyful because “that eminent favored bird of heaven” was to provide his shadow 
over them. So he was expected to protect the city and guard the realm; he not only met 
the expectations but also spread justice.131  
Selim’s choice of camping in the country rather than entering the town as he came 
back to Caffa after being chased from Edirne by the imperial army might suggest the 
exclusive nature of sancak administration. According to Sa‘di, Selim met his son at 
Caffa but did not enter the town. He felt relieved to see his son in good health and 
thanked God. Meanwhile, his surviving followers who were scattered around started to 
gather around him once more. 132 Whether Selim camped outside the town for practical 
reasons, such as keeping the soldiers out of the town, or because he respected his son’s 
authority is hard to say. Contemporary sources are silent on the reasons Selim might 
have had.  
Selim’s keeping his distance may be taken as a superficial demonstration of the 
institutional and administrative nature of Süleyman’s first post as a prince. The registry 
of the retinue provides documental evidence in this respect. Sa‘di’s comments on the 
“shadow” and good administration of the prince, on the other hand, imply the 
contemporary perception of the princely sancak as an individual administrative unit for 
which the prince was personally responsible. At a deeper level, this seemingly regular 
administrative and educational post appears as a base for factional power-building with 
Süleyman’s presence as the keystone.  
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1.3.2. Factions at Work 
A court is not a single identity. It functions with the involvement of other 
households.133 This definition of the court can be regarded as the main dynamic which 
gave direction to the struggle between Ahmed and Selim. The enmity between the two 
princes from 1509 to 1512 was not only rivalry acted out by two princely households in 
the narrower sense of the term. Each of these princely courts had their “subsidiary 
courts” primarily in their son’s courts. As such, it would be possible to talk about not 
only princes but familial factions competing for the throne. Each of these kinship 
factions was supported by various other households and/or groups of influence. 
Süleyman appears as an accessory to Selim’s motives throughout the 1509-1512 
period. His participation in the episode, as related by contemporary chroniclers, remains 
largely passive. Actually, he seems like an asset on Selim’s side to support him in his 
struggle. Contemporary accounts emphasize the significance of having a son. In other 
words, having an heir to take over the throne when the time comes seems to have been a 
serious advantage in the claims of succession. Kemalpaşazade, for example, not only 
praises Bayezid II for the abundance of his sons upon his accession but also tries to 
demonstrate that each of them was perfectly fit to rule.134 Sa‘di underlines the fact that 
Ahmed had many offspring, all of whom ruled their own districts.135 In contrast, Sa‘di 
explains, prince Korkud – though perfectly fit to rule – was sterile and did not have a 
son to succeed him. Therefore, since succession to the throne was by heredity, Korkud 
did not think the army would prefer him. So he tended towards peaceful seclusion.136 
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While praising Korkud for his high moral and intellectual qualities, Kemalpaşazade too 
dwells on his lack of an heir and the disadvantages of not having a son.137 The echoes of 
concern about the availability of a son to succeed the father can be found, for example, 
in the stories of Book of Dede Korkud. In the first story of the book, we witness a 
banquet given by Bayındır Khan whereby he ordered three different tents to be set: the 
white one for those who had sons, the red one for those who had daughters and a black 
one for those who did not have any children. Dirse Khan, a notable who had neither son 
nor daughter, was placed in the black tent and was very much offended by this.138 This 
episode clearly suggests that offspring, and preferably male offspring, may be regarded 
as an asset for the ruler or any man of importance.  
As the only son of the youngest of Bayezid’s sons, Süleyman was in a delicate 
position before his father succeeded to the throne. The appointment to Caffa marked the 
beginning of his involvement in his father’s succession struggle which actually turned 
out to be his own. Theoretically, he had an equal claim and opportunity to the throne 
with all other contestants of his generation. While Selim struggled to eliminate his rivals 
and clear the path to the throne, his son’s future was inevitably linked to his own. In this 
respect, we can view the princely household as a faction with a political claim. From 
1509 on, two generations were involved in the succession struggle. The first generation, 
in other words the immediate stakeholders, consisted of Bayezid’s sons Ahmed 
[Amasya], Korkud [Manisa], Şehinşah [Konya], and Selim [Trabzon]. The second 
generation consisted of Ahmed’s three sons, namely Murad [Bolu], Alaeddin and 
Süleyman; Şehinşah’s [d.1511] sons Mahmud [d.1510] and Mehmedşah, Alemşah’s 
[d.1502] son Osmanşah [Çankırı]; Mahmud’s [d.1507] sons Orhan [Sinop] and Musa 
[Kastamonu].139 After Süleyman’s appointment to Caffa, Ahmed’s sons were re-
positioned with Alaeddin in Bolu, Süleyman in Çorum and Osman in Osmancık.140 We 
can even talk about a fourth generation involved in the conflict; Murad’s sons, in other 
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words Ahmed’s grandsons Mehmed and Mustafa were in Amasya on behalf of their 
grandfather in 1512-13.141 Although Korkud did not have sons, he did have sons-in-law 
who could have assisted him. Two of his daughters were married in 1506 [912]. One of 
the sons-in-law was Malkoçoğlı Ali Bey, a member of an influential family. The other 
was Mustanseroğlı Ali Bey who was the governor of Karesi, which was on the way to 
Istanbul if Korkud decided to pass through Gallipoli [Gelibolu].142 
During the later years of his reign, Bayezid’s deteriorating health seems to have 
become a serious issue. According to Kemalpaşazade, Bayezid’s declining health meant 
the end of his conquering days. The author asserts that the sedition in Anatolia was 
because of the decline of the personal military prowess of the Sultan.143 As early as 
1507, rumors circulated on how the viziers sent for his oldest son Ahmed in Amasya 
because of the death of Bayezid II. In his entry dated 14 August 1507, Sanuto 
emphasized the expectation of such an event although nobody knew for certain what 
happened.144 In 1508, there was already speculation on who the new sultan would be. 
An Italian report brought forth “the second son” as the favorite candidate and claimed 
that he would be the next sultan.145 Venetian ambassador Jacopo Contarini, who left 
Istanbul in August 1506, reported that the two sons of Bayezid were at war with each 
other. He mentioned that one of them was “the one at Caffa”.146 Although he does not 
provide a name, he must be talking about Mehmed. However, Mehmed was already 
dead in 1506. Since no princely governor was assigned to Caffa between Mehmed and 
Süleyman, Contarini probably referred to a situation pertaining to earlier than 1504 
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when Mehmed died. The next son Contarini mentioned is the one in Trabzon; the 
ambassador, however, does not refer to the mortal war between the princes again.147  
According to Sa‘di, in 1509 [917] Sultan Bayezid had already made up his mind 
to abdicate in favor of one of his sons. When the clients of the princes present with the 
Sultan in Edirne learned of his plans, each warned his patron. This was how the 
competition for the throne began, according to the author, as each prince started to 
prepare for military action wondering whom “fortune would favor.”148 Sa‘di’s account 
continues with Selim’s plans and the involvement of Süleyman as part of them. As 
such, when Selim realized that the highest officials favored his brother Ahmed, he 
determined that their intentions could not be changed except by the sword. He knew that 
he had to get access to Rumelia in order to pursue his struggle. Conveniently, his son 
Süleyman was not yet assigned a sancak; Selim made a plan to request Caffa for his son 
so that he himself could pass on to Rumelia by using this post as cover. According to 
Sa‘di, his aim was to reach his father’s palace in Edirne so that he could inform his 
father of the intentions of his “enemies”. He also planned to tell his father that the land 
was being destroyed and something had to be done to stop it. However, before asking 
for Caffa, he asked for Sivrihisar [sic]149 or Bolu, both of which were between Amasya 
and Istanbul. In other words, they were both on Ahmed’s way to the throne, and Selim 
knew his brother would oppose this proposal. When the request was communicated to 
Bayezid, officials supporting Ahmed told the Sultan of the necessity to inform Ahmed 
before making the appointment. They thought that doing otherwise would cause conflict 
since both districts were located on areas of importance to Ahmed. When Ahmed was 
informed of the situation, he got very angry. He thought Selim’s purpose was to hold 
the road to the throne and keep imperial correspondence from him.150 When Selim’s 
initial request was denied as planned, he sent another request without delay, this time 
asking for Caffa.151  
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The process involving the designation of Süleyman’s post clarifies the role and 
function of princely households as competing factions. Süleyman’s appointment to 
Caffa triggered the surfacing of the succession conflict between Selim and Ahmed. 
According to Şükri-i Bidlisî, when Ahmed heard that Süleyman was given a sancak 
close to his own, he objected strongly, wondering whether Sultan Bayezid was not 
aware of the mutual dislike between them. Since being neighbors required friendship 
and affection, having an enemy as neighbor would not bring any good.152 His vizier 
Yular Kasdı Sinan Paşa [d.1514], on the other hand, tried to warn Ahmed about the 
danger of rejecting this appointment. He told that having the enemy close by would be 
much better for observing his motives and actions, thus allowing him to take 
precaution.153 Although Şükri wrote his Selim-nâme when Süleyman was already on the 
throne, the enmity is strongly felt and articulated. Regardless of whether Ahmed 
expressed such feelings or not, such enmity seems to justify the path taken by Selim. 
Other than Ahmed’s expression of the “mutual dislike”, Şükri’s Sinan Paşa repeatedly 
refers to the “enemy” [‘adû, düşmen]. Moreover, he clearly identifies the sides: “Two 
rams are two enemies / One is you, one is Süleyman son of Selim”.154 In Şükri’s 
account, Ahmed appears quite confident in terms of the possession of the throne: “I am 
shah after the Shah; I merit the crown and the throne.”155 Kemalpaşazade attributes 
Ahmed’s conception to his “devilish and ill-intentioned” advisors. According to the 
author, Ahmed aspired for the sultanate believing that the “state/fortune” [devlet] was 
his and his sons.156   
Şükri relates that Ahmed welcomed the Caffa appointment with confidence. His 
vizier Sinan Paşa, on the other hand, was wise enough to see the consequences. He told 
Ahmed that he now destroyed his own house by giving “them” access to Rûm. Now that 
Süleyman was to have Caffa, Selim would be able to gather armies, cross the sea, 
conquer the world and take the throne of Rûm. And then Ahmed would have no choice 
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but to obey.157 Şükri employs a similar rhetoric as he tells about Süleyman’s journey to 
Caffa, this time from Selim’s point of view. Those to whom Ahmed referred to as 
“them” now become “us” as he puts the lines in Selim’s mouth. It is now “us” who 
would bring order to the world and challenge the enemies of the religion as the “pride of 
the House of Osman.”158 These verses emphasizing “us” versus “them” reinforce the 
idea of a faction formed by the “House of Ahmed” in opposition to Selim and 
Süleyman.  
Kemalpaşazade, on the other hand, does not comment on the triggering effects of 
the appointment. Kemalpaşazade probably regarded the appointment as a regular one 
since he goes on telling that the sons of the other princes were given posts in various 
parts of the realm and lists where each young man ruled.159 He reflects the Caffa 
appointment merely as a consequence of Selim’s success against the Georgians. 
According to the author, Selim was so successful in his raids to the bordering Georgians 
that, as a token of his appreciation, Bayezid granted Selim’s son [ferzend-i 
ercümendine] Caffa as was his wish.160 In this respect, the father is rewarded through 
the son, thus suggesting once again a sort of unity formed by the father and son. Again, 
we can clearly see that father and son are viewed together, almost as a single will and 
entity. In many Venetian accounts, Selim is referred to as the governor of Caffa and 
Süleyman only as his son.161  
Sa‘di provides a detailed account of the events that followed Süleyman’s 
appointment. According to the author, as Selim started to become more active, Ahmed 
realized that he had not foreseen the consequences of his approval of Süleyman’s 
appointment to Caffa. He was furious when he heard of Selim’s movement. Relying on 
the support of the viziers, he gathered troops and planned to go to his father. Observing 
all of these developments, the other brother Korkud assembled his troops and waited to 
see how events would fold out, only to get on the move if opportunity arose. All men of 
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some influence and power had sided with one of the princes. The Rumelian 
commanders, their sons, their town commanders and cavalry sided with Selim.162 At 
this point, Sa‘di tells that both Selim and Ahmed headed for Sultan Bayezid. Grandees 
accused Selim of rebelling against his father. Arguments followed about whether to 
have Bayezid abdicate or not and, if so, who to have on the throne got more ardent. 
Selim won over the Rumelian commanders while Ahmed started losing followers. 
According Sa‘di, ultimately Selim came face to face with the imperial army and was 
forced to flee, whereas Ahmed was told to go back to his district.163 According to 
Celâlzâde’s version of the story, Ahmed came to the capital to meet with his father. The 
intention of the viziers was to have him kiss his father’s hand, to proclaim him ser‘asker 
[general commander of the army] and send him after Selim. 164 
The course of events brought forth heated discussions about the abilities of each 
prince as to which one was more capable of taking over the throne. Ahmed’s failure to 
cope with the rebellion in Anatolia, known as the Şahkulu rebellion, became an 
important argument. His inability to get rid of “a handful of Turks” who threatened his 
land caused the Janissaries to redirect their loyalties towards Selim.165 According to 
Celâlzâde, since janissaries were influential in matters pertaining to the state, it was 
only natural for them to express their standpoint. They supported Selim because when 
he was in Trabzon, “his good fortune and sense of justice had become clear to all”. On 
the other hand, Ahmed “indulged in eating and drinking day and night” and was 
notorious for his injustice. Their displeasure rose to the degree of a revolt whereby they 
attacked and pillaged the houses of Ahmed’s supporters.166 Celâlzâde uses this 
argument various times in his Selimname. He reproaches Ahmed for having talked over 
ambitiously for the sake of winning the throne, being obsessed with the love of 
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sultanate, gathering around him a “sky-full” of soldiers but yet not being able to 
extinguish “the fire kindled by a few feeble-minded Turks.” For Celâlzâde, this was 
enough for the Muslim folk to realize that Ahmed was not fit to rule.167  
Interestingly, documentary evidence shows that Ahmed actually tried his hand at 
suppressing the rebellion. He was stopped by Vizier Ali Paşa, who told him not to 
pursue the rebels any farther for he himself would go after them. It seems that though 
Ali Paşa stopped Ahmed, he took along his son Alaeddin. An undated letter reports that 
Alaeddin tried his hand at battle but his banner fell and he had to flee.168 On the other 
hand, no attempt to ease the unrest on this occasion can be observed on the part of 
Selim, who was famous for chasing kızılbaş during his governorship in Trabzon. While 
the Şahkulı rebellion shattered Anatolia in 1511, Selim seems to have been busy 
pursuing his own future. Curiously, sources seem to ignore the absence of Selim in 
Anatolia during the rebellions. In the first instance, such almost self-centered inactivity 
on Selim’s part makes one wonder why his reputation did not suffer from his non-
action. However, when we think about the sancak system, Selim had already dealt with 
similar problems around Trabzon. The immediate problem posed by the Şahkulı 
rebellion stretched from Teke to Sivas through Kütahya and Ankara.169 In other words, 
the rebellion started around Korkud’s district, i.e. Antalya and affected the areas closer 
to the districts of Ahmed and his sons. Furthermore, the task of suppressing the 
rebellion was given to Ahmed as governor of Amasya and Mehmed as governor of 
Niğde, along with the governor-general of Anatolia Karagöz Ahmed Paşa.170 Ahmed 
already had trouble accepting Selim’s son in his vicinity; having Selim himself suppress 
a major revolt right in the middle of his jurisdiction would probably be out of the 
question. Though this is only speculation, if remotely true, it provides an example for 
how the princely household and sancak networks functioned. 
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The persistence of princely factions is observed after the accession of Selim. 
While Selim stationed his son in Istanbul in his absence,171 Ahmed employed his sons 
as well. According to Kemalpaşazade, he first sent his son Alaeddin to Bursa with 
troops. Invading Bursa, Alaeddin had the hutbe called in the name of his father, issued 
coins, and “administered law as the custom of sultanate required.”172 
1.3.3. Location 
Caffa provided Selim a convenient departure point and a promising base for 
putting together a considerable military force before he set on the road to challenge the 
status quo. It also provided a safe refuge when things did not turn out exactly in his 
favor.173 It seems that Selim found an asylum to heal his wounds and regain his strength 
in Caffa. Although sources are silent about the matter, we can probably assume that 
Süleyman had a role in keeping that asylum/base safe and available during his father’s 
absence. We could also say that Caffa provided a safe shelter to leave an inexperienced 
heir in his absence. 
Caffa was conquered in 1475. The Ottoman-Crimean alliance dated back to 1454 
when the Crimean Khans became tributaries of the Ottoman Sultan. Mengli Giray Han, 
who was Khan at the time of Süleyman’s appointment to Caffa, was put on the throne 
with the support of Mehmed II.174 Süleyman was the second Ottoman prince to be 
appointed to Caffa, following his uncle Mehmed [d.1504]. Although princes were not 
appointed to districts out of Anatolia, Caffa was probably a special case. Öztürk argues 
that the main function of the district was to monitor the Crimean Khanate. Secondly, it 
was a regulating post to pursue diplomatic relations between the Ottoman court and 
Russia, which began during the princehood of Mehmed at Caffa.175  
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In addition, Süleyman was an asset to his father who had the claim to the throne. 
It seems like he served as instrument in acquiring Selim a stepping stone to Rumelia. If 
the location of Süleyman’s first provincial post triggered the open struggle between 
Selim and Ahmed for succession, his appointment to Caffa provided Selim the 
opportunity to build a power base to pursue his own interest. Caffa was remote enough 
from the core lands of the imperial administration and far enough from Ahmed’s 
control. It provided access to Rumelian provinces without having to cross either 
Ahmed’s or his sons’ districts; therefore, Selim could go to Istanbul and avoid possible 
intervention.176 In Caffa, Selim would also be able to find allies for his cause as his 
association with the Crimean Khan following his arrival demonstrates. As we can see 
from Sa‘di’s account, he finds a legitimate excuse through Süleyman to go to Caffa on 
his own and probe for himself the opportunities which Caffa and the Khan could offer.  
We shall again follow Sa‘di’s account as he offers a detailed story which allows 
an understanding of the significance of Caffa in Selim’s struggle. Sa‘di’s account is also 
noteworthy because it offers slightly more clues to Süleyman’s presence at Caffa. 
Although this is not to say that all that he mentions is absolutely true, it is an indicator 
of contemporary perception. According to the author, Selim was very happy when he 
received the approval of Caffa for his son. He immediately sent some of his men to 
Caffa for an initial inspection. He stayed in Trabzon until a thorough inspection was 
completed. Then he sent a request to the capital to go to Caffa and see things personally 
before he sent his son there. He said that he wanted to make sure that it was a suitable 
place for his son. Sa‘di emphasizes Selim’s insistence that “it was not fit to let his future 
on the sea only to be drawn into trouble.” Leaving Süleyman in Trabzon, he left for 
Caffa without waiting for the approval.177 According to the author, Selim found Caffa to 
be a beautiful place and he was greeted enthusiastically by the people of Caffa on his 
arrival. Many people gathered on shore to meet him and they were happy to have him 
there. He was well aware that if he intended to pass to Rumelia, he would need the 
support of the Khan. Therefore, he sent gifts to Mengli Giray Khan to which the Khan 
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reciprocated.178 However, neither seems to have dared to arrange an open meeting. The 
Khan made the first move by “incidentally” chancing upon Selim on the hunt. Forming 
“immediate mutual friendship”, Selim opened up to the Khan to reveal his intentions. 
The Khan promised to do his best to help him.179 Selim stayed in Caffa for a while to 
make preparations for the journey. When he was ready to leave, he sent for his son to 
come and take over the district as soon as possible, informing him of his departure for 
Edirne.180 According to Sa‘di, Süleyman he left for Caffa as soon as he received the 
news. On his arrival, he was greeted by the people of Caffa waiting on the shore. They 
spread beautiful textiles under the feet of his horse as he went directly to the palace. 
Busying himself with “the protection of the city and the realm”, he made everyone talk 
about his justice. Meanwhile, he was waiting for his father, wondering what the events 
would bring.181  
Selim, at some point, was worried that the Khan might have changed his mind 
about helping him. Upon receiving the Khan’s letter which stated that he would help 
Selim in any way he could, Selim left Caffa for Istanbul. The son of the Crimean Khan 
Saadet Giray accompanied him.182 According to Celâlzâde’s version of the story, the 
second departure of Selim was a response to Bayezid’s order for him to come and take 
over. In this version, the opinions and actions of the janissaries force Bayezid to take 
such action.183 However, we should keep in mind that Celâlzâde’s Selimnâme has an 
apologetic tone in general. His task, as he states in the beginning of his work, was to 
write about the truths about the accession and reign of Selim I. His aim was to challenge 
the accounts on how Selim rebelled against his father and how he was defeated by his 
father’s army.184 On the contrary, he sets out to prove that Selim did not have the 
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slightest intention to revolt against his father, and that if he did, he could easily have 
overcome his father with so many able followers under his command.185 Thus, 
Celâlzâde’s account on how Bayezid sent messengers to call Selim to Istanbul could be 
regarded as an attempt to legitimize Selim’s second journey from Caffa. Nonetheless, 
what matters for our purposes is Selim’s employment of his son’s sancak as a quasi-
permanent power base.  
Documents show that the Khan did support Selim. According to reports sent to 
Bayezid II, the youngest son of the Khan accompanied Selim in his move to Rumelia in 
May-June 1511 [Rabi I 917]. The number of troops provided by the Khan ranges 
between 300 and 1,000 in the reports.186 The Khan seems to have supported Selim not 
only with troops but also with his influence in Bayezid II’s court. In an undated letter to 
Sultan Bayezid, he seems to have intervened on behalf of Selim whom he referred to as 
his son [oğlum Sultân Selîm Şâh]. In this letter, The Khan informed the Sultan that 
Selim left Caffa for Rumelia upon hearing that “Sultan Ahmed had Anatolia under his 
command.” He requested that Selim be given the Rumelian districts previously offered 
as to prevent sedition in the realm.187  
1.3.4. Legitimizing the Line 
As Selim’s struggle for the throne was Süleyman’s own succession struggle, the 
body of histories of Selim written during the reign of Süleyman to legitimize Selim’s 
way of acquiring the throne can also be considered as a device to legitimizing 
Süleyman’s succession. Erdem Çıpa asserts that “the corpus of Selîmnâme literature can 
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be considered a conscientious project of early-modern Ottoman revisionist 
historiography initiated and supported by Süleyman I in order to clear his father’s name 
and, by extension to further emphasize his own legitimacy.”188 A brief look at Selim’s 
entry to Istanbul to be enthroned demonstrates the pain taken to reflect Selim’s 
accession as legitimate and just.  
According to Sa‘di, when Ahmed heard of Selim’s departure, leaving his oldest 
son Murad in Amasya and sending his other son Alaeddin to Bursa with some of his 
men, he left for Istanbul and stopped in Ankara. On the other hand, worried about what 
was going on, Korkud left his Manisa seat and went to Istanbul. Keeping silent up to 
this point, Korkud decided to try his hand at the race and claimed that it was he who 
gave the throne to his father; therefore, he would not let any other have it if his father 
decided to abdicate. His claim was based on the fact that he guarded the throne until his 
father came to assume it on the death of Mehmed II.189 Meanwhile, janissaries were on 
the road and expecting the arrival of Selim. It was clear now that Selim was to acquire 
the throne. Although Selim himself did not care for worldly dominion, he had to accept 
the throne to preserve the order of the realm.190 Selim’s entry into the capital reads like 
a royal entry. From the textiles spread on the roads and the canopies prepared, we can 
sense that this was a pre-planned welcoming. Even Korkud was there to greet his 
brother on horseback. Sa‘di emphasizes that they greeted each other and showed their 
mutual affection on horseback, whereby they resembled “two dragons mounted on 
lions, and like the Twins they went towards the city side by side.”191 Sa‘di probably 
refers here to the famous astrological twins Castor and Pollux, or the Gemini, who were 
known as tamers of horses.192 With this analogy Sa‘di emphasizes the brotherly 
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affection between Selim and Korkud, which is somewhat ironic since he and his readers 
already knew what happened later on. His aim was probably to imply that there was no 
enmity between the two brothers until Korkud misbehaved. This analogy also serves the 
purpose of exaltation, for what Sa‘di makes is a very relevant celestial reference.193 
Sa‘di’s account continues with Selim’s entery in the city from Topkapı and a 
ceremony held at Yeni[kapu]bağçe. The janissaries encircled Selim’s tent “as the 
custom of Ottoman sultans required.” Then came the hand kissing ceremony, followed 
by Selim distributing rewards.194 All this, according to Sa‘di, was done before Selim 
went to the Palace and paid his respects to his father. After Selim’s visit, Korkud visited 
his father and kissed his hand. At this point, Sa‘di likens Bayezid to Jacob and Korkud 
to Joseph.195  Then followed a conflict between Selim and those who still secretly 
supported Ahmed. They suggested that Selim be proclaimed ser‘asker. However, Selim 
protested and asserted that the realm needed a pâdişâh. He also told them to bring in 
Ahmed and make him pâdişâh if they so wished, and that he would strive to help under 
his command, too, because the realm suffered because of their struggle. He reproached 
them for ignoring the inactivity of Ahmed when he sat idle in Anatolia and now they 
were asking him to go and clean up his mess.196 Celâlzâde, on the other hand, turns the 
story round. According to his version, Selim accepted to be ser‘asker since his father 
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commanded so. However, the janissaries did not consent to this, insisting that they 
would offer their services only if Selim ascended the throne.197 This climatic moment 
culminates on the agreement between all on the need of a new sultan; the only one fit 
for the job would be Selim. Sa‘di tells us that although Sultan Bayezid felt the same 
way from the beginning, he had to postpone his plans to ease the unrest of the other 
princes. Thus, Bayezid immediately proclaimed Selim pâdişâh to the land of Rûm in his 
stead on 7 Safar 918 [24 April 1512] which happened to be an “auspicious Friday.”198 
Celâlzâde’s Bayezid is not so light of heart, though. First he rejects the idea on the 
grounds that he himself was still healthy enough to hold the throne. He only gives in 
when the viziers express their concern about the possible consequences of rejecting the 
janissaries.199  
1.4. Istanbul: Waiting to be the Only Heir 
Selim’s accession marks the end of Süleyman’s days in Caffa. Having secured the 
seat of the throne along with its main influence group, Selim probably did not need such 
a strong hold on Caffa any more. The Khan’s friendship would suffice from then on. 
Caffa seems to have served its purpose for the time being, so has Süleyman’s presence 
there. Now his father needed him elsewhere. So he was called to Istanbul where he was 
welcomed festively.  
The ceremonial reception of Süleyman in the capital seems to be his first imperial 
public appearance. Although a solemn reception was held on the young prince’s arrival 
in Caffa three years earlier, the imperial quality of the reception is highly questionable 
since it was a local greeting and his father was only one of the candidates to the throne. 
Before elaborating on the significance of this initial reception for the various parties 
concerned, it would be useful to have a brief look at the background against which it 
took place. After a long struggle Süleyman’s father Selim finally acquired the Ottoman 
throne with the abdication of his father Sultan Bayezid. He was officially, or rather 
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semi-officially, enthroned in Istanbul on 24 April 1512 [7 Safar 918]. With his father 
out of the way, Selim was ready to confront his brothers who also aspired for the throne. 
The most serious threat to Selim’s claims was posed by his brother Ahmed and his sons 
who held a power base in Anatolia. Selim’s throne was not safe until his rivals were 
eliminated; his claims were not fully legitimate either. Set on securing his claims on 
ultimate power, Selim called for his son Süleyman from Caffa. In the letter Selim sent 
to the Crimean Khan, he informed the Khan that he was enthroned with the blessings of 
his father and requested his son Süleyman be sent to Istanbul to guard the city if the 
need to go on campaign arose.200 It is upon this order that Süleyman rushed to Istanbul 
as an heir to the throne. 
1.4.1. Arrival 
Upon the arrival of a messenger, Sultan Selim ordered urgent preparations to be 
made for a grand welcome for his son. All dignitaries were to be present as the prince 
was greeted on the shores of Üsküdar. Ships, boats and galleys, big and small filled the 
sea. Following the order of the Sultan, all were there to welcome the prince as he 
reached the shore. They greeted him with thunderous cannon fires, making it known to 
all that the felicitous prince arrived. As the prince came out of the ship and let his face 
be seen by all those gathered, they were impressed by the handsome countenance and 
the comely stature of the young man. Dignitaries saluted the prince as ancient custom 
required, kissing his hand before he was taken aboard another galley which would take 
him to the abode of his father. On the other side of the sea, yet other servants of the 
Sultan, the cavalry and the infantry, were ready to welcome the prince on shore. They 
greeted him on his debarkation and had him mount an elegant horse bedecked with a 
silver saddle. As he marched to his place of accommodation, people of the capital filled 
the roads spreading beautiful textiles under the feet of his horse. The whole city was in a 
festive mood. Thus, the eighteen year old prince, Süleyman, was welcomed at the 
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capital in the summer of 1512 as the only son of the newly enthroned Sultan of the 
Ottoman realm.201 
This reception can be approached in various ways. This is the first glimpse 
imperial dignitaries have of the young prince; it is also the first glimpse Süleyman 
himself has of the imperial world. Therefore, the significance of this event must have 
been great for Süleyman and for his later career. Although he already held a sancak 
[district] of his own for three years, it is hard to assume that he was really an important 
part of imperial administration or imperial protocol. Furthermore, during his Caffa 
years, his father was not the only heir to the throne. With as many uncles and male 
cousins as Süleyman had, the road to the throne probably seemed quite long in 1509.202  
On his arrival in the capital in the summer of 1512, things were different. His 
father had started to clear the way and his prospects were now definitely brighter. He 
was in this struggle with his father and now he was called to assist him further. If his 
father managed to succeed, Süleyman would remain the sole heir to the throne of the 
House of Osman. If his father failed, he too would be destroyed. The appearance on the 
shores of Üsküdar reflected this mutual destiny in a way. More solidly, it reflected a 
strong faction with a strong claim. Taking hold of Istanbul, “the abode of the throne” 
[tahtgâh], was a vital phase in acquiring the throne.203 In this sense, leaving the city 
under his son’s protection was both a practical and symbolic act on the part of Sultan 
Selim. Even if Selim’s reason to bring his son to Istanbul seems to be more practical 
than symbolical, this show-off displayed Selim’s dynastic potential and capability. 
There was the ruler adored by the janissaries because of his courage to fight the 
“heretics” and “trouble makers” and here was his “auspicious son” who would ensure 
the continuity of the dynasty and the order of the world associated with it. The reception 
also seems to signify the acceptance and confirmation of Selim I’s claims by the 
imperial establishment.   
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In Sa‘di’s account, the main focus is on the meriting physical appearance of the 
prince, along with his resemblance to his father. Such a description is employed to 
prove that the prince merited the throne as did his father.204 In Ishak’s account, a more 
celestial aura surrounds the arrival of the prince which has more to do with a sort of 
divine favor upon the prince. Ishak likens the arrival of the prince to a herald from the 
“invisible world” [gâ’ib]. Furthermore, the author likens the ship bringing Süleyman to 
the throne of Solomon with “winged feet” which brought about miracles.205 
On the other hand, the reception of Süleyman in Istanbul is also a public 
demonstration of the re-confirmation of loyalty to Sultan Selim, just like any other 
figure in the Ottoman military/administrative system. Ishak, for example, mentions the 
invitation sent to Süleyman ordering him to come from Caffa while relating the decrees 
sent to Rumelian commanders to come to pay their respects.206 
1.4.2. Departure 
In mid-April 1513, Selim was on the verge of eliminating all his rivals and 
securing the throne once and for all. In late March 1513 [Muharram 919], he wrote a 
letter to Süleyman who was guarding Istanbul. He asked his son to go to the location he 
designated on the outskirts of Istanbul without delay. Süleyman was required to inform 
his father of his arrival at the designated location and wait for his instructions. 
Meanwhile, Selim left Bursa in chase of his brother Ahmed for a final settling of 
accounts.207 Eleven days later, Selim and Ahmed came up against each other in 
Yenişehir. Ahmed was trapped and caught on flight to Izmit. Although he asked to be 
allowed to see his brother, he was executed without being given the opportunity. His 
body was brought to Bursa to be buried. Meanwhile, his son Osman who was in 
Amasya was captured by Selim’s forces. Both Osman and Murad’s son Mustafa were 
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strangled on 14 May 1513 [8 Rabi I 919]. Their possessions were confiscated along 
with those of Ahmed.208  
All his rivals finally eliminated, Selim was now the sole possessor of the throne 
and his son the only rightful heir. A report from Nicolo Giustiniani, the Venetian bailo 
in Istanbul, dated 15 May, informs that Selim arrived in Gallipoli and feasted with 
Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa. Giustiniani reported that some of the troops were sent towards 
Edirne with the purpose of preparing an attack on Hungary. It was expected that the 
Sultan would move on to Edirne after meeting his eighteen year-old son who was in 
Istanbul and he would grant his son a sancak.209 Ottoman sources tell a similar story 
about Selim’s return from Bursa through Gallipoli [Gelibolı]. There, he was greeted by 
the grand vizier Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa who possessed a farm in a nearby village and 
enjoyed a feast given in his honor by the grand vizier on his property. After sending 
some of the troops to Edirne and staying for a few days himself, he moved on to 
Istanbul, hunting on the way. These accounts note that meanwhile his son Süleyman 
was stationed in Istanbul to guard the Rumelian provinces in the absence of his father. 
Thus, he set off from Vize, where he had spent the winter, to meet his father on the way 
and paid his respects.210  
Süleyman was ready to leave for his new post after another hand-kissing 
ceremony where his father gave him precious advice. Then the son left for Manisa 
through Gallipoli and the father for Istanbul in the opposite direction.211 However, 
Kemalpaşazade contradicts Sa‘di’s story and says that the prince set off from Istanbul 
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and that Selim went to Edirne, his favorite location because of hunting opportunities.212 
Celâlzâde  does not give details on where the meeting took place or from where 
Süleyman set off for his new post; however, he says that Selim came to “dârü’s-
saltanatü’l-‘aliyye” after he eliminated his brothers and nephews.213 From this 
statement, we can assume that Selim did come to Istanbul before sending his son to his 
provincial post. The above-mentioned letter ordering Süleyman to go to the appointed 
place and wait for Selim shows that Süleyman was not actually in Istanbul at the time, 
nor did his father order him to go in the city: “When my royal decree reaches,” wrote 
Selim, “go to a healthy place  near Istanbul and get close to Istanbul without delaying an 
hour, important things have happened and write to me when you arrive in the appointed 
place and do whatever I order you thereafter.”214 The reference to Vize, as mentioned 
above, also suggests that Süleyman did not remain in Istanbul proper. 
 “A prince’s departure for his provincial capital was the occasion of a ceremonial 
marking his political coming of age,” says Leslie Peirce.215 In the case of Süleyman’s 
departure for Manisa, sources do not provide elaborate accounts of the ceremonial. This 
lack of detail may result from a number of reasons. The number of the audience could 
have been very limited to allow eye witness accounts or even hearsay. However, the 
sources I have consulted have been written during Süleyman’s reign and at least two of 
the authors knew Süleyman closely and had the opportunity to hear about the occasion 
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from him personally.216 We know that the prince kissed his father’s hand, an act of filial 
reverence for one’s father as well as of confirmation of submission at the political level. 
When it comes to other ceremonial elements such as the identity of participants in the 
procession, if there was one at all, behavior of participating individuals or groups, the 
location and hierarchical relationships of these elements are absent in these accounts. 
Comparing the accounts of this departure with those on his initial arrival in Istanbul – 
and to the departures of those after him – the ceremonial aspect appears to be rather 
faint. We hear of no viziers, no servants of the sultan, no beautiful textiles spread on the 
roads. Speculatively, if Süleyman’s departure for Manisa was not celebrated with as big 
a ceremony as his arrival in Istanbul or even if a possibly larger event was slighted in 
the accounts, perhaps the contemporaries attributed less significance to this particular 
departure. Süleyman’s Manisa appointment and his departure were somewhat different 
from previous and future cases. He belonged to the third generation when he had his 
first provincial posting. In other words, he had already “come of age” politically. His 
departure to Caffa, his first sancak, was from Trabzon, thus not a ceremonial event in 
the imperial scale, but one at the provincial level if at all. Since his father – yet a prince 
himself – had already left Trabzon, it would have been impossible for Süleyman’s first 
departure to follow the appropriate course of ceremonial. However, his ceremonial 
arrival in Istanbul in 1512 seems to have covered the void and probably signifies his 
“political coming of age” at the political and imperial level. In this respect, the 1513 
departure might not have posed a more elaborate ceremonial occasion since it might 
have been regarded as a change of post rather than a political change of status. 
1.5. Manisa: Heir to the Ottoman Throne 
Manisa was Süleyman’s first post in terms of imperial significance and in terms of 
his being on his own to the extent that a member of the second generation would be 
allowed. More significantly, this was his first post as the only heir to the throne, which 
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seems to be reflected in the items given to him on his departure. The list contains one 
million aspers in cash, various robes, garments and textiles, a ceremonial sword and 
dagger, a gold-plated knife. The list also contains ten servants [gılmân], five of them 
with üsküflü keçe. The Prince was also given fifteen horses and two seals.217 
Manisa functioned as a princely sancak from the beginning of its Ottoman past 
after the conquest around 1390. The first prince to be appointed to the city was the son 
of Bayezid I, Ertuğrul. After the governorship of Mehmed II, the district hosted princes 
without interruption. Feridun Emecen argues that in the earlier periods, princes were 
stationed in Manisa according to ancient Turkic custom which involved increased 
security and easier adaptation by the local population. This theory is also supported by 
the earlier frontier natures of cities such as Amasya, Sivas, Konya, Kastamonu and 
Trabzon. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the importance of Manisa 
increased because of its proximity to Istanbul.218  Whatever Selim’s thoughts were when 
he sent the afore-mentioned letter to his son, he was by then ready to send Süleyman to 
a sancak of his own. The Sultan’s choice rested on Manisa [Saruhan]. Kemalpaşazade, 
who mentions that the province had always hosted great rulers, emphasizes the princely 
status of Manisa.219 
The news of Süleyman’s new appointment was soon heard. Francesco Arimondo, 
the commander of Napoli di Romania, wrote on 24 July that “the son of the Signor has 
gone to Magnesia, where his father gave him the governorship”.220 Letters from Chios 
[Syo], dated 2 and 3 July, stated that the son of the Signor went to reside in 
Mengrisia.221 Süleyman had officially become a subject of international reporting by 
now. 
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1.5.1. Household 
A separate household was prepared by the Sultan to accompany Süleyman in 
Manisa. This attests to the dependent status of the princely court in relation to the 
imperial court. The main officials such as the lala who acted both as a political advisor 
and tutor to the prince, the defterdar [treasurer] and the nişancı [head of chancery] were 
supposed to be trusted men of the sultan. Their duty was two-fold: while they served as 
officials of the newly-formed princely household, they would also keep an eye on the 
prince in the interest of the sultan. Such a practice signified a control mechanism 
implying dependence and connection.222 Ottoman princely sancak appointments were 
modeled on the practices of earlier Persio-Islamic/Turco-Islamic states. The lala, in this 
respect, mirrors the Saljuqid practice of “atabegate”. The attachment of an atabeg to a 
prince on his provincial appointment served both a social and a political function. The 
atabeg would be responsible for the education of the prince and prevent his potential 
rebellion.223 The same functions seem to have continued in the lala. The lala designated 
by Sultan Selim for Süleyman, Kasım Paşa, was an experienced member of Ottoman 
bureaucracy. He descended from an established family of bureaucrats of Arab origin. 
He served as nişancı and vizier under Bayezid. For a while he was governor of Caffa.224 
According to Celâlzâde, when it came to appointing a lala to send along with his son, 
there were two prospects for the job: Piri Paşa and Kasım Paşa, who were both “most 
superior and wise.” Finally, Kasım Paşa was appointed along with a defterdar. A 
household consisting of ağas, çavuş and guards was brought together for the prince. All 
necessary equipment was prepared according to “Ottoman custom”. A treasury and 
munitions were added.225  
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The pay registers pertaining to Süleyman’s governorship in Manisa demonstrate 
that his court as a prince was a miniature version of the imperial court and household.226 
While Süleyman’s household consisted of 458 persons in Caffa, the number rose to 746 
in Manisa.227 A comparison of the pay registers pertaining to Caffa dated 
September/October 1511 [Rajab 917]228 and pertaining to Manisa dated March-April-
May 1513 [Muharram-Safar-Rabi I 919]229 demonstrates that the princely court was 
transferred to Manisa with additional staff. A comparison of the registers also 
demonstrates a raise in the allowance of the prince. While he was allocated 600 aspers 
per diem in Caffa, in Manisa this amount rose to 1,000 aspers. The same holds true for 
the various members of his court. His teacher Mevlana Hayreddin’s salary, for instance 
rose from 20 aspers to 60 aspers. Similarly, the salary of the master of the horse rose 
from 10 to 35 aspers. 
In Manisa, Süleyman probably had the opportunity to start building a courtly 
circle of his own, including various sorts of people who would accompany him in 
Istanbul after he ascended the throne.230 One such person was the Halveti sheikh Musa 
Muslihiddin, known as Merkez Efendi [d.1552]. Süleyman is said to have frequented 
his convent during the years he spent at Manisa. After his accession, Süleyman 
appointed him preacher to Hagia Sophia.231 An analysis of the registers of court artisans 
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dated 1526 [932] demonstrates that at least thirty one members of this group came to 
Istanbul from Manisa with Süleyman.232 A cross-examination of Palace registers dating 
to late 1530s or early 1540s published by Barkan suggests the possibility of tracing 
some men who came from Manisa with Süleyman and continued to serve him in 
Istanbul in late 1530s.233  Despite the absence of family names or other such indicators, 
one could suggest the continuing service of for example an Iskender. In the Caffa 
register, there is an Iskender who is the chief of a regiment [ser-silâhdâr] with a salary 
of 9 aspers. In the first Manisa register, there is an Iskender who is the “commander” of 
the sons of the cavalry [ağa-yı ebnâ-yı sipâhiyân] with a wage of 33 aspers; in the 
imperial register, there is an Iskender with a wage of 68 aspers who is defined as ser-
silâhdarân-ı köhne. This Đskender is also recorded to have come from Trabzon with the 
Sultan.234 One obvious example would be the physician Mevlana Ramazan who appears 
with a daily wage of 40 aspers in the undated register pertaining to Manisa.235 In the 
later imperial register, published by Barkan, the wage of Mevlana Ramazan the 
physician is 120 aspers. The entry includes the explanation of “he came together with 
his Majesty” [Hünkâr hazretleriyle bile gelmişdir]. This explanation is provided for four 
more medical personnel.236 Barkan’s list also includes musicians, scribes and a 
messenger. 
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1.5.2. Administrative Duties 
Exactly what Süleyman did during his residence in Manisa is hard to say; 
however, he seems to have been involved in administrative routine. Tayyip Gökbilgin 
mentions that Süleyman gave Kapu Ağası Ali Ağa a farm as property and issued a 
charter [berât] exempting the sheikh of the convent of Bozköy from charge 
payments.237 However, as Emecen demonstrates based on documentary evidence, 
Süleyman had to inform the imperial court of such distributive actions and get 
approval.238   
An administrative regulation was sent to Süleyman in Manisa upon his request. 
The document opens with a titular address where Selim confirms that he has granted the 
sancak of Saruhan to his son Süleyman Şah. The text indicates that Süleyman requested 
recommendations regarding the discipline and punishment of the criminals in the 
district. Among the crimes and punishments were abduction and forceful marriage, 
unlawful affairs with women, murder punishable with death, numerous thefts 
punishable by execution, selling women punishable by scorching the forehead, 
maintaining stolen property, pick-pocketing and wounding with a knife punishable by 
amputation of the hand, murdering of parents, arson punishable by execution by 
hanging if intentional. The text also includes a clause on the inn-keeper. He should be 
someone trustworthy. The gates of the inn should only be opened after he makes sure 
that everyone’s belongings are safe and secure. If anyone was released before this was 
done, the inn-keeper would be responsible for the compensation of any losses. There is 
also a separate clause regarding theft committed by a cavalry man, in which case the 
thief should be imprisoned and the Sultan informed. If someone was murdered in public 
and the murderer not found, the crowd would be imprisoned and Sultan informed. 
Another clause on theft requires the judge to handover the thief to military authorities 
for execution either by hanging or by amputation of hand at the crime scene.239  
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Though this text reads like an ordinary law code, the initial request of such a 
document seems interesting. By the time Süleyman established his administrative unit 
in Manisa, he had already served for three years in Caffa in a similar administrative 
position. He had even stayed for almost a year in Istanbul where he presumably had 
access to all necessary information on sancak management. Moreover, Manisa was a 
princely sancak before his arrival, thus a system must have existed already. With his 
experience and the district’s past, it is hard to say why he needed instructions from the 
center. This was probably some kind of a renewal process occasioned by the 
appointment of a new prince to the district. Considering that the previous princely 
governor of the district Korkud was also involved in the succession struggles, it might 
be speculated that the district had been neglected. According Kemalpaşazade, the area 
was troubled ever since Korkud’s demise. With the arrival of the prince, the province 
would be safe and prosperous again.240 Kemalpaşazade’s rather cliché praise stating that 
the roads were free of criminals after the arrival of the prince may not be an ordinary 
cliché considering the regulations cited above.241 
The image of the just ruler which was constantly projected after Süleyman 
ascended the throne appears in the descriptions of his princely administration at Manisa 
as well. Sa‘di says that when Süleyman arrived in Manisa, the people of the district 
gathered to welcome him in joy. As he set foot before them, they all bent down to put 
their faces on the ground his horse stepped on. They had seen the “glowing star of 
fortune” in him and offered him their full obedience.242 Accounts emphasize that the 
district flourished in safety and security under Süleyman’s just administration.243  
During his princehood in Manisa, Süleyman fathered three sons between 1515 and 
1520. Now another function was added to his dynastic duties: procuring the future of 
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the dynasty. Leslie Peirce argues that once a prince got reproductively active, the duty 
of dynastic reproduction became his duty: 
The prince’s political/reproductive maturation initiated a change not only in 
his mother’s role – to the onset of her public political career – but in one of his 
father’s as well. From the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror on, and perhaps 
earlier, the sultan’s reproductive function ceased when that of the sons began. 
Whereas earlier sultans tended to continue producing offspring even after their 
first sons were well grown, Mehmed and his descendants ceased fathering 
children after a healthy number of sons had survived childhood and could 
themselves assume the function of reproducing the dynasty.244 
Süleyman’s first son was born in 1515. The news of the royal birth reached 
Istanbul on 19 October [11 Ramadan], that is shortly after Süleyman’s departure from 
Istanbul. The baby was named Murad according to the wish of Sultan Selim. Two days 
later a congratulations letter was sent to Süleyman.245 However, either this first boy did 
not live long or the author is confusing the baby with Mustafa who was also born in 
1515 [921].246 On the other hand, Süleyman did have a son named Murad who died in 
1521 when he was only two years old. Another son, Mahmud, also died in 1521 when 
he was nine.247  
On 7 February 1514, Antonio Giustiniani, who was in Istanbul on an 
ambassadorial mission, reported that Sultan Selim had a seventeen year-old son named 
Selim [sic]. He also mentioned that the Sultan did not wish to have any more children so 
he did not engage with women.248 Alvise Mocenigo in his audience in Venice on 4 June 
1518 said that Selim had only one son who was 20 years old and was residing in Edirne 
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at the time. Mocenigo, too, emphasized that Selim did not want any more children.249 
Although the references are rather brief, it is apparent that there was an impression that 
Selim did not care about reproducing the dynasty anymore. Considering that Süleyman 
had fathered at least two sons by this time, the duty of reproducing the dynasty was 
probably his job now. 
1.5.3. Guardianship 
It was customary for the princes to assume the role of Rumili Muhafızı [Guard of 
Rumelia] when the sultan was away on war. The prince would assume administrative 
and diplomatic charges such as correspondence with foreign authorities and the sultan 
himself.250 Other than administrative duties, this procedure was intended to prevent 
enemy attacks during the absence of the sultan and the imperial army. It was Murad I 
who first employed the method, when he left his son Bayezid in his tent to protect 
Anatolia when he went on to Gallipoli in 1375. In 1385, as Murad I led a Rumelian 
campaign, Bayezid was stationed in Kütahya, Yakub in Karesi, and Savcı in Bursa for 
protection. When Mehmed II went against the Akkoyunlu in 1473, he left his son Cem 
in Edirne for the task.251 As we shall see, the prince’s main function at this post appears 
to be being the eyes and ears of the sultan in the Western part of the realm. The duty of 
guardianship also provided the prince with an understanding of the situation at the 
borders and the relations with other rulers. The prince’s sojourn in Edirne must have 
provided an opportunity to get a thorough understanding of the imperial administrative 
mechanisms, as well as a familiarity with various administrative figures. 
In such circumstances, princes were not stationed in Istanbul for fear of a 
possible scheme to depose the father in favor of the son.252 This view has been 
challenged recently by Haldun Eroğlu who suggests that princes would be stationed in 
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Edirne to guard Rumelia if the Sultan marched east, and in Istanbul if the Sultan 
marched West to protect Anatolia. According to Eroğlu, “the ruler would not leave a 
prince either in Edirne in Rumelia or in Istanbul in Anatolia if he suspected any act 
against himself.”253 This proposition can easily be invalidated, for sixteenth century 
Istanbul can not be regarded as Anatolia. More importantly, the one example of a prince 
stationed in Istanbul for guardianship, on which Eroğlu builds his theory, is 
anachronistically Mehmed II. Misreading the relevant source, Eroğlu asserts that Murad 
II “advised his son to stay in Istanbul and protect the throne.”254 The relevant part of the 
source, however, has Murad II tell his son Mehmed to stay at Edirne to “protect this 
throne from the infidels of Istanbul.”255 Süleyman’s placement in Istanbul when Selim I 
marched into Anatolia in 1512 also contradicts Eroğlu’s theory. If the prince was 
supposed to guard Rumelia, he should have been stationed in Edirne according to this 
theory. Furthermore, Süleyman’s guardianship in Istanbul was a unique case, required 
by circumstance and not by choice as discussed above. 
Süleyman’s princehood lacked one duty that his prdecessors had. Ottoman princes 
often joined imperial campaigns and engaged in military activities. In the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389, the sons of Murad I, namely Bayezid and Yakub, commanded the right 
and the left wings of the army, respectively. In 1473, when Mehmed II fought against 
Uzun Hasan, prince Bayezid commanded the right wing and prince Mustafa the left 
wing. The practice of such command was abandoned during the reign of Bayezid II, 
initially due to the young age of his sons. When his sons were old enough, Bayezid had 
already stopped leading campaigns personally. Being an only son, Süleyman did not 
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attend any campaigns with this father. However, he took his sons along various times, 
though they were not given large scale military command.256  
Unlike his predecessors, Süleyman never engaged in military action before he 
came to the throne. Throughout the sources used in this study, only one reference of 
Süleyman actually fighting on the border was found. In the letters he wrote in May 
1515, Nicolo Giustiniani reported that Süleyman was in Edirne with his court and was 
expected to go on campaign against Hungary. Then Giustiniani reported that Süleyman 
defeated Hungarians around Smederevo [Semendire]. Four captured Hungarian captains 
were being transported to Constantinopoli to be presented to the Sultan.257 However, 
this is probably not Süleyman himself fighting but the Rumelian frontier commanders. 
Süleyman was probably involved in coordinating the frontier activity and keeping an 
eye on developments as he did in 1517.  
In 1514, Süleyman was ordered to go to Edirne as his father decided to lead a 
campaign to fight the Safavis. According to Celâlzâde, heeding the vital importance of 
guarding Rumelia which was adjacent to the “lands of the infidel,” Selim ordered his 
son to go to Edirne to protect Rumelia.258 When Sultan Selim decided to pursue another 
eastern campaign in 1516, Süleyman was called to guard Edirne once again. According 
to the campaign diary, in the council meeting summoned in Edirne on 3 April 1516 [29 
Safar 922], it was decided that the household as well as Ahmed Paşa, Rumelian chief 
judge and Anatolian defterdar and nişancı should stay in Edirne with the prince. Selim 
and his dignitaries probably wanted to make sure that the borders would be safe while 
they were away so establishing peace with Hungary was already decided in this 
meeting. A few days later, news of the death of the Hungarian king arrived.259 On 20 
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April [7 Rabi II], Selim left Edirne for Istanbul. One week later, a new command was 
issued: the prince was to move towards Edirne together with his defterdar and Mustafa 
Paşa, the district governor of Bosnia, was to accompany him. The judge and treasurer of 
Rumelia were also to stay with the prince. These commands seem to have been revoked 
at a council meeting ten days later with the decision that the prince should stay put in 
his sancak Saruhan.260 However, later correspondence shows that the initial decision 
was implemented and Süleyman actually stayed in Edirne during Selim’s absence. In 
order to understand the purpose of such a temporary re-positioning, we should take a 
brief look at what kind of activity Süleyman undertook during his stay in Rumelia. 
There are no sources directly giving an account of the days he spent there. However, it 
is possible to acquire a few clues from accounts talking about the deeds of Selim and 
the campaign in general. We shall now try to isolate these few instances before going on 
to analyze the role of the prince as the guard of Edirne. 
On 25 July 1517 [6 Rajab 923], messengers from Süleyman informed the council 
that the voivode of Moldavia was dead. The messengers also conveyed the news that 
Süleyman had detained the Hungarian ambassador who had come to Edirne.261 
According to a letter dated 18 June 1517 by Leonardo Bembo, the Venetian bailo in 
Istanbul, the Hungarian ambassador was placed in a caravaserà and closely watched by 
guards. He was not allowed to speak with another Hungarian ambassador who had been 
in detention for four years.262 
On 9 August 1517 [21 Rajab 923], Mesih Beğ received a command from 
Süleyman which ordered him to stay put in his post at Vidin. Four days later, 
Süleyman’s chief of guards [solakbaşı] set off by sea to convey a message to the Sultan. 
On 7 September [10 Shaban], the messenger was given a reply, ordering Mihaloğlı 
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Mehmed Beğ and governor of Inebahtı Hüseyin Beğ to remain in their districts. The 
reason was to have them lead the akıncı in case of an attack by the “infidel.”263 
On 6 December 1517 [22 Dhu’l-Qada 923], we encounter yet another messenger 
from Süleyman in the camp of Selim. This time, he conveyed the news of the death of 
the governor of Zvornik [Izvornik] in a battle with the “infidel.” Upon this news, it was 
decided that the governor of Çirmen Mahmud Beğ of the Mihaloğlı family should 
replace the deceased. Süleyman’s lala Sinan Beğ was ordered to go Istanbul and stay 
there.264 On 12 February 1518 [1 Safar 924], a messenger of Süleyman brought news of 
the death of the above-mentioned Mesih Beğ and the discord among the infidel. Upon 
this news, replacements were made and the district of the deceased Mesih Beğ was 
given to Mustafa Beğ, son of Davud Paşa.265 On 25 March 1518 [13 Rabi I 924], a new 
defterdar was appointed to Süleyman, he was also ordered to examine the situation at 
the borders and let the Sultan know.266 According to Spandounes, while Selim was in 
Cairo, he got news from his son that Pope Leo X had preached a crusade in Rome 
“inciting all Christian princes. Upon hearing this Selim appointed a viceroy in Egypt 
and left for Constantinople”.267 
We also find references about the armada and the involvement of Süleyman with 
its transfer. According to Şükri, Selim sent a messenger to Süleyman telling him to 
prepare the ships and send them to Egypt fully equipped together with district governors 
and the captain [kapudan]. Receiving the order, Süleyman commanded the designated 
governors to leave their districts, meet with the kapudan, prepare munitions for their 
ships and set off.268 According to a letter from Corfu dated 5 May, Süleyman, who was 
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in Edirne, had received news from his father in Cairo which informed on the large 
number of casualties on each side. The letter also mentions that the armada had just left 
Constantinople.269 
Selim sent at least two proclamations of victory to Süleyman during the first 
Eastern campaign; one following the battle of Çaldıran and the other one following 
Kemah.270 They were both detailed accounts of the battles. They both ordered the prince 
to make celebrations for the victory. The second one also informed Süleyman that Selim 
was on his way back to Istanbul. In reply to the first letter, Süleyman summarized the 
content of his father’s letter and informed him that the victory was celebrated for a 
week. In reply to the second letter, he did not repeat the content of the received 
proclamation to the extent he did before. He informed his father that alms were 
distributed as ordered. This letter also indicates that the master of the horse was sent to 
present his gifts along with a detailed letter.  
Selim sent his son a proclamation of his victory from Cairo in February 1517 
[Muharram 923]. The letter is a lengthy account of the second phase of the campaign 
starting with the death of Qansuh al-Ghuri. Selim informed his son of the victory 
achieved by “the soldiers of Islam” and the defeat suffered by “the Circassian gang.”271 
The wording suggests a legitimization process at work: the victory was granted by God 
[bi-‘inâyetullah-ı te‘âla] to the soldiers of Islam [leşker-i Islâm], whereas the defeated 
party was referred to as the Circassian gang [gürûh-ı Çerâkese]. As a cliché, such a 
phrase legitimated both the initial attempt to go against a Muslim ruler – who is not an 
outright “heretic” as the Safavi Ismail, and who held the honorable service of Mecca 
and Medina – and the victory itself. Thus, it is not surprising to read on to find that al-
Ghuri’s head was brought to Selim and hung upside down before him. This is followed 
by the episode regarding the successor of al-Ghuri, namely Tumanbay. We also learn 
how this new so-called Sultan “gave” Damascus to Gazali, how Sinan Paşa was sent to 
fight Gazali and how he managed to escape to Egypt in order to unite with Tumanbay. 
Meanwhile, Selim himself came close to Cairo. The letter provides details about the 
order of the battle fought on 23 January 1517 [29 Dhu’l-Hijja 922]. Among the 
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commanders were Hayrbay and Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beğ of Dulkadır. The letter continues 
with the ending of the battle to the advantage of the Ottomans and the flight of the 
enemy. On 9 February [7 Muharram], Tumanbay returned at night and entered Cairo in 
secret. The letter also gives details about the nocturnal street fighting between Ottomans 
and Circassians. When Tumanbay attempted to escape, Rumelian governor-general 
Mustafa Paşa, the newly crossed-over Gazali and Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beğ were sent after 
him. Tomanbay was finally captured and brought to Selim in bonds. Although he was 
offered the chance to repent, he insisted on his old ways and was executed. Thus, 
according to the letter, in longitude Egypt, Aleppo, Damascus, Cairo, Upper Egypt, 
Abyssinia, Yemen till Morocco and in latitude the Hejaz, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem 
entered the domain of the Ottomans. We also learn that the son of the şerif of Mecca 
was on the way to pay his respects, while Arabian sheikhs already came to present 
themselves to affirm their loyalty. They were granted robes and gifts. Saying that he 
was sending this “fortunate proclamation of victory” with his taster [çaşnigîr], Selim 
ordered his son to spread this “good news” all around as well as to make joy and 
festivity. They were instructed to fire guns and cannons from the castles, decorate the 
streets and have the people pray for Selim in celebration of this event. Süleyman was 
also expected to inform Selim about the situation in Rumelia and to expect his arrival.272  
In all three reply letters, Süleyman’s choice of words shows submissiveness and 
loyalty to a sovereign. In the first letter, he refers to himself as bende-i kemter [feeble 
servant], in the second as bende-i bî-irtiyâb [indubitably (your) servant] and in the third 
as bende-i bî-iştibâh [doubtlessly (your) servant].273 While announcing and glorifying 
the victory of the Sultan, these proclamations could have served as teaching devices as 
well – intentionally or not. For a prince who has not been on the battle field himself, 
these detailed accounts probably had instructive value.   
Another purpose of sending the proclamation to the prince is apparently to have 
him officially spread the news. A letter from Ragusa to Venice, dated 28 September 
1516, gave information about the arrival of a messenger from Signor Sultan Suliman, 
son of Signor turcho. The messenger brought letters which had his seal on them. These 
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letters conveyed news about his father’s victory against Signor Soldan on 27 August on 
the outskirts of Aleppo. Festivities were to be organized as the letters ordered. The 
writer noted that festivities were already under way all the way to Albania.274 According 
to Sanuto’s entry, the letter from Ragusa reached Venice on 24 October. The contents 
were the talk of the day on 25 October, with Sultan Selim being a second Alexandro 
Magno as the conqueror of Syria. The Venetian government immediately started to plan 
a diplomatic mission.275  
When he received the victory proclamation regarding Egypt in 1517, Süleyman 
again sent letters all around spreading the word, just like his father told him to. Sanuto 
has reproduced the copy of the letter sent by Süleyman to Chios:  
To the lords [signori] of Chios! I have received a commandment from the 
Gran Signor in Cairo, the commandment is as follows: With the grace and 
favor of God I have acquired sovereignty of Arabia; then in Aleppo, I have 
engaged in a great battle with the moors, and I have won, and I have beheaded 
their sultan, named Tomon bei, and we have fought with him five or six times, 
and then we have fought with the mamluchs for three days and three nights, 
and their sultan Tomonbei fled to Sayto. And then I announced around Cairo 
that “should anyone know where this sultan, or the mamluchs indeed, escaped 
and did not bring them to me, I would burn down their houses, their sons and 
their farms”. The sultan was not found, and 2,040 mamluchs were brought in 
with their hands tied; these did not know where the sultan or others were; I 
beheaded all 2,040 of them. Then I sent the governor of Aleppo, Canberdi 
Gazali who was always with me; those I have sent to Upper Egypt have taken 
the sultan with some his close men. I beheaded some of the men; I had the 
sultan tortured so that he revealed the location of his treasury and he did. Then 
I had him paraded around Cairo, then I had him hung from his neck on a gate 
in Cairo. Then, all the land, all the Arabs, 12-13 thousand men, came and 
offered fidelity. I have restored all places acquired, presented them with robes, 
since we have in our power Aden and all provinces of Mecca and Bagilari and 
the provinces acquired in Calcutta. I have sent word to all the lords about these 
things so that they are informed, and also to my son, who will send 
messengers to all lands of the Ottomans [Otomangli] and the Europeans 
[Franchi] to inform them. And for this reason, I Sultan Soliman write this and 
send my man Mehmed, so that you who are our friends, will make joy and 
festivity, and send back my man soon and pay him respect.276  
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Looking at these activities, we could cite Süleyman’s guardianship tasks in three 
categories as monitoring, informing, and coordinating, whereby he not only supported 
his father’s enterprise but had the opportunity to acquaint himself with issues and 
people at the imperial level. 
1.5.4. Meetings with the Father 
Rumelian guardianships seem to have provided Süleyman with an opportunity to 
meet his father and his household, including the highest ranking officers. These 
meetings also seem to have served to enhance the image of dynastic coherence since 
Süleyman’s ceremonial behavior re-confirmed his loyalty to his father.   
Süleyman came to Istanbul and spent time with his father following Selim I’s 
return from the campaign in 1515. According to the diary recorded by Haydar Çelebi 
and reproduced by Feridun Ahmed Beğ,277 Süleyman arrived in Istanbul on 26 July 
1515 [14 Jumada II 921]. He was greeted by the viziers, chief judges, treasurers, other 
troop commanders, council members, household troops and janissaries. He was taken to 
the residence of Iskender Paşa who left the premises so that the prince could stay 
there.278 While everyone was busy welcoming the prince, Sultan Selim had gone to 
Eyüb with his standard-bearer and master of the horse, taking only a few people along. 
As Süleyman passed through the Silivri Gate, one of his flagstaffs hit the gate and 
broke. A temporary solution was found, they tied the broken pieces back together with 
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whatever rope they could find on the spot.279 How this was perceived we do not know 
but the author does not imply any bad omen. Three days later, there was a council 
gathering. Süleyman came over to present his gifts and kiss the Sultan’s hand. His gifts 
consisted of various textiles, silver cups and nine horses. On the next day, his lala 
Kasım Çelebi, his treasurer Sinan Beg and his teacher Hayreddin attended the council to 
kiss the Sultan’s hand. They were followed by others who came to pay their respects to 
the Sultan such as the envoy of the Crimean Khan and Ramazanoğlı Mahmûd Beğ. The 
rest of the day was reserved for the Sultan’s hunting. Similar ceremonies were held on 
the following days with various people attending. On 19 August [9 Rajab], Süleyman 
once again visited the council to ask for permission to leave.280 Three days later, 
Süleyman was ordered to stay for a few more days in the council meeting. His lala and 
treasurer were summoned to the council and were asked to present the account books. 
On 26 August [16 Rajab], Süleyman’s lala and treasurer attended the council meeting 
and read the account books to the Sultan.281 Following the council meeting and lunch, 
on 4 September [25 Rajab], Süleyman was escorted to the boat to cross to Üsküdar, 
through the Hippodrome [At Meydanı], accompanied by the viziers and troop 
commanders.282   
Apparently, Süleyman stayed in Istanbul for more than a month in 1515 while his 
father was also in the city. Süleyman’s presence in the city reflects the dual character of 
his relation with his father, the Sultan. He was greeted with due pomp on his arrival as a 
prince and potential heir to the throne. Special accommodation arrangements were made 
for the prince at the premises of a vizier.283 The fact that the palace reserved for the 
prince was the palace of not only a vizier but a royal groom suggests that a residence 
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that was already dynastic property was allocated to the accommodation of the prince. In 
other words, Süleyman’s household was regarded to be different than that of his 
father’s, yet inseparable from the dynastic sphere. Contemporary sources do not 
mention whether Süleyman spent any casual time with his father but he surely 
performed his role in the ceremonial occasions. If his first role was that of the son of the 
Sultan, an equally important role was the loyal servant of the Sultan.284 Like a good 
subject of the Sultan, we see him kissing hands. Once again we are face to face with 
what might be regarded as a public display of submission. If Selim, or anyone else for 
that matter, had suspicions regarding Süleyman’s intentions, these acts of loyalty 
probably also served to appease such concerns.  
When Sultan Selim was on the way back from the Egyptian campaign, he sent for 
his son who was on guard in Edirne. They met near Kırklareli [Kırk Kilisa]. Süleyman 
presented gifts to his father, kissed his hand, and paid his respects. As Lütfi Paşa has it, 
the Sultan observed and appreciated the countenance of his son.285 Considering that they 
have not seen each other for a couple of years, Selim probably saw that his son had 
grown into a fine man during these years. According to Lütfi Paşa, Selim was 
convinced immediately that his son was fit not only to rule but also to become a world 
ruler [sâhib-kırân].286 According to the campaign chronicle, the meeting of father and 
son resembled the “meeting of the sun and the moon” [cem‘ el-şems ve’l-kamer].287 
After this meeting on 23 August 1518 [6 Shaban 924], Süleyman was sent back to his 
district with gifts and a promotion of 500,000 aspers to his annual income.288  
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However, being away from Istanbul and acting out the part of the “loyal 
servant” does not seem to have spared Süleyman of suspicion at all times. Having a 
father figure as powerful as Selim must have had some influence on the young prince. 
An anecdote provided by Giovio suggests that there were times when Selim was jealous 
of even his own son due to the throne. Once he was offended by his son’s bitter words 
and attempted to kill the young prince by a poisonous gown. However, the mother 
shrewdly saved the life of the prince by offering the gown to a servant.289 Although 
Giovio provides this anecdote as proof of the degree of cruelty Selim was capable of - a 
cruelty that reaches the point of not even sparing his own kin – it may be seen as a 
reflection of the fierce image Selim I had in the perception of Western audiences. 
Giovio talks about the poisoned gown and the danger Süleyman went through in the 
Commentario de le Cose de Turchi as well. According to Giovio, Selim was actually 
afraid that his son would do to him what he did to his father.290 The Venetian bailo in 
Istanbul, Nicolo Giustiniani referred to the poisoned gown in his letters dated 5 and 10 
April 1515. In his account, it is not the mother but Süleyman himself who suspects the 
trick and has one of his men wear it.291 A letter dated 7 September 1515 by Alvise 
d’Armer, bailo in Corphu, confirms that Selim’s suspicions – regardless of whether he 
actually had them or not – were in public circulation at that time. Selim was suspicious 
because he suspected that Süleyman could scheme against him together with the 
janissaries.292  
Another anecdote recorded by Sanuto sheds light on what might have angered 
Selim so much. According to a letter from Cyprus dated 25 April 1515, Selim asked his 
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son for help against the Sophi. However, Süleyman did not consent to this and sent a 
reply to his father saying:  
You have ruined our realm, you have perished the warriors we had, and you 
have lost them in defeat; there is neither a fortress nor a castle left that you 
have not destroyed; and now all this harm you have done does not suffice and 
you ask for the people who are protecting our borders, do you wish to lose all 
of our realm? 293 
According to this report, when Selim heard this reply, he supposedly said to his 
lords: “How true are my son’s words!”294 It is quite unlikely that Süleyman refused his 
father his own soldiers; however, Süleyman emerges as a sensible young man in this 
anecdote. He serves as a counter-balancing figure as opposed to his fierce father who is 
a man of his own mind. Both anecdotes are stories based on hearsay. Although it does 
not mean that Selim thought of killing his son, it does demonstrate the ambiguous 
contemporary perception regarding the relationship between the royal father and son. 
With such public concerns in circulation, the public demonstration of coherence 
between Sultan Selim and his only son Süleyman through the meetings appear to be 
vital devices for the dynastic image. 
1.5.5. End of Princehood 
Süleyman’s princehood in Manisa came to an end with his father’s death in 1520. 
Accounts on his reception of the news of the death of Sultan Selim dwell on three main 
issues: the vacancy of the throne, chaotic grief versus sensible order, and haste in 
relation to responsibility.  
The news of his father’s death reached Süleyman as he was hunting. According to 
Nasuh, he was contemplating at a mürgzâr [shooting ground].295 The letter sent by the 
viziers to Süleyman consists of three parts. Firstly, the death of Sultan Selim was 
announced. Secondly, Süleyman was informed that it was now his turn to succeed his 
father. Thirdly, he was informed on what he should do next. Each of these parts can be 
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regarded as individual messages. According to Sa‘di’s account, the letter informed 
Süleyman of the death of the Sultan, expressing that the throne was left vacant. With 
this piece of information comes the announcement of Süleyman’s succession as the 
“hope of the world”. Thirdly, he is told to ride to Istanbul for enthronement in haste and 
discretion, as to prevent mischief until then.296 According to Adâ’i, the letter addressed 
Süleyman as the “possessor of the crown and the throne” and informed him that the 
throne was left to him, coins struck in his name, the “drum of state” [devlet] sounded for 
him. He was told to keep the secret. And he was asked to “renew” the world with the 
“fortune” of his foot. He should ride immediately because the throne was “vacant.” He 
was warned that if he delayed on the chaotic road, the head of the realm would 
“disintegrate.”297  
Chronicles describe the extreme shock and pain Süleyman experienced as he 
heard his father’s death. According to Nasuh, he tore his clothes and beat himself. The 
two main emotions leading these acts are defined as “shock” [hayret] and “yearning” 
[hasret].298 The author expresses that the witnesses could not help but fall apart before 
such an “exemplary situation” [hâlet-i ‘ibret-vâr]. Nasuh describes the violent crying 
and self-beating of the witnesses as well.299 According to Adâ’î, Süleyman was so sad 
about his father’s death that he shed “tears of blood”.300 According to Sa‘di, upon 
hearing the news, Süleyman let out a painful cry, which was beyond his control [bî-
ihtiyârî]. Sa‘di makes use of figures of speech rather than actual violent behavior when 
he says that Süleyman “bit the cheek of separation [firkat yanağın] with the teeth of 
yearning [dendân-ı hasret].”301  
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Such over-emotional description of the reaction of both Süleyman and the 
witnesses to the moment of awareness of Selim’s death suggests deliberate exaggeration 
of emotions on the part of the writers. The chaotic scene reflecting an exaggerated 
expression of grief immediately turns into a scene of resignation to the will of God 
which leads to Süleyman’s full control over his emotions, and consequently over the 
situation. According the Nasuh, once he digested the news, Süleyman acted according 
to God’s command of “forbearance” [sabır], and rode in haste to Istanbul.302  
The sudden change of mood observed in the chronicles also implies a sense of a 
transformative process in the persona of Süleyman. This implication is first provided by 
the information that the news caught Süleyman while he was out in the country side 
either hunting or contemplating, in other words under relaxed and carefree 
circumstances. Passages describing violent grief are followed by expressions of the 
responsibility that fell on his shoulders with the death of his father. Nasuh, for example, 
expresses the transformative process quite clearly by saying that “he bid farewell to 
merriment and comfort, broke of his relation to tranquility and repose.”303 
Uninterrupted continuity of dynastic rule is another issue stressed in the accounts 
at this point. Nasuh explains Süleyman’s haste to get to Istanbul with the purpose of the 
continuity of the sultanate.304 Sa‘di employs the Solomon analogy to the haste and 
swiftness of Süleyman’s journey: “He is the Solomon of the day, it is the storming horse 
that carried his golden throne.”305 Although Sa‘di describes the haste once Süleyman 
decided to go to Istanbul, he also reports a reluctance on the part of the prince to make 
this decision. As the author has it, Süleyman had to be convinced by his advisors to go 
Istanbul to take over the throne. Sa‘di attributes this reluctance to Süleyman’s lack of 
greed regarding worldly power, especially after contemplating on the lesson of the death 
of his father.306 Süleyman’s hesitation to ride to Istanbul upon receiving the news also 
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found echoes in Western works. Andrea Cambini, for example, notes that when 
Süleyman was informed of his father’s death and of his being the ruler, he had a hard 
time believing it. He would not move until he was assured by Piri Paşa.307 The sort of 
reluctance exemplified in Cambini’s account is different than that implied by Sa‘di. 
While Sadi meant to appraise Süleyman for the virtue of not being greedy, the 
reluctance mentioned by Cambini is a rather practical matter related to unauthorized 
entry in Istanbul by a prince. In this sense, Süleyman probably wished to make sure that 
this news was not some kind of a scheme to eliminate him through having him perform 
an inappropriate action. The impression of reluctance in either case carries on the 
impression of the “obedient son” who would turn out to be a Sultan acting by the book, 
in other words a “law-abiding” monarch.308 
1.6. Conclusion 
The experience of Süleyman as a prince appears to be quite different from that of 
his father’s. Selim’s princehood was spent at the borders [uc], providing him the 
opportunity to build a name for himself as a warrior. Süleyman, on the other hand, was 
on more neutral ground. When in Caffa, he was monitored by his father and the 
Crimeans. The situation was too complicated to pursue his own glory. His second post 
in Manisa was in the core perimeter of the realm, not at all a suitable region for 
individual ghaza activity. Moreover, Süleyman spent most of his Manisa princehood in 
Edirne, “guarding” Rumelia. Though he served in coordinating some border activity, he 
was in no situation to actively pursue any attacks. His being an only heir to the Ottoman 
throne was probably one of the reasons of avoiding battle fields. While lack of military 
experience might have been a drawback, the administrative and diplomatic experience 
acquired during his princehood seems to have made up for his military inexperience. 
On a physical level, Süleyman did not need to fight fiercely for his princely 
future. His father, on the other hand, had to fight his way for survival. For this end, he 
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employed his son’s career to push his way out, extend his possible living space and 
build a powerbase. As a kinship faction competing for the throne, while Selim pursued 
actively the succession struggle, Süleyman supported his father through the way and 
from behind the scenes. After Sultan Selim’s accession, Süleyman continued to support 
his father’s endeavors by serving as guardian of Rumelia.  
When compared with his father Selim I, who appears very dynamic and active, 
Süleyman emerges as a more passive young man in terms of physical action. This 
impression also holds true when the two men are compared as sons of a ruler; Selim 
creates the impression of a well-intentioned son with a rebellious spirit while Süleyman 
is the always obedient son. Whereas Selim seems to be in almost constant rage and 
excitement, Süleyman seems more sensible and down to earth. In a way, one sees the 
warrior in the father and the administrator in the son.  
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CHAPTER 2 
“THE BLESSED SOVEREIGN”: HÜDÂVENDĐGÂR-I KÂM-KÂR 
A man becomes a king because he comes to be treated as a king.309 
2.1. Defining the Problem: Transference and Establishment of Sovereign 
Authority 
This chapter examines the transference of sovereign authority from the deceased 
ruler to his successor and the consolidation of sovereignty in the person of the new 
ruler. In other words, this chapter tries to define when and how Süleyman the young 
prince became Sultan Süleyman. Contemporary evidence shows that it is impossible to 
define a single moment or a single ceremony which inaugurates the reign of Sultan 
Süleyman. Unlike his European counterparts, Sultan Süleyman did not ascend the 
throne with a coronation rite; he was not vested with a sacred and/or dynastic object by 
a single religious and/or temporal authority. Yet his accession to sovereignty was 
unchallenged and legitimized through a number of symbolic and ritual elements. This 
chapter is an attempt to uncover the dynamics underlying this process of legitimate 
succession of power whereby the new ruler personifies the state through various “state 
ceremonials.”310 
                                               
309
 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), p.25. 
310
 For “state ceremonials” personifying the Crown/State, see Ralph Giesey, 
“Inaugural Aspects of French Royal Ceremonials,” in Coronations: Medieval and Early 
Modern Monarchic Ritual, J.M. Bak (ed.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), p.36. 
93 
 
An examination of any legitimized transfer of sovereignty involves three main 
questions: Who, when and how.311 Based on the principle of dynastic continuity, the 
absence other candidates to the throne after Selim I’s death leads one to assume that 
Süleyman – as the only living male member of the dynasty – automatically became 
sultan the moment his father died. However, the events following Selim’s death show 
otherwise. Contemporary accounts show that Süleyman first had to come to Istanbul to 
take over the throne. The discretion on the part of the viziers regarding the death of 
Sultan Selim and their efforts to keep things in their normal course until Süleyman’s 
arrival in Istanbul suggest that sovereign authority still rested with Sultan Selim, at least 
in appearance. Neither was coming to Istanbul sufficient, the deceased ruler’s funeral 
rites had to be completed before Süleyman could perform the basic acts of sovereignty 
such as receiving the obedience of the household and other subjects, having the Friday 
prayer [hutbe] called in his name, issuing coins [sikke], distributing promotions, 
renewing offices and pacts. These acts of sovereignty themselves also appear to be 
constituent parts of the accession process.  
Accession marks the transference of sovereign authority, but the process as 
narrated by contemporary sources seems to be a generic process more or less applicable 
to any Ottoman ruler. Contemporary mentality required a monarch to rule and watch 
over the people. According to the political wisdom of the time, society would fall into 
chaos in the lack of a ruler. Thus, kingship was a divinely sanctioned status to ensure 
the persistence of “world order” [nizâm-ı ‘âlem]. The absolute necessity of the monarch 
was a well established belief for centuries, with arguments supported by verses in the 
Quran and by examples from histories of various states.312 Thus, in the course of his 
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accession, Süleyman seems to have fulfilled a generic role: a legitimate monarch from 
the house of Osman. Although chronicles provide us with ample praise on the person of 
the new sultan, what we actually see is the power of a sultan from the house of Osman. 
As such, he also ensured the continuity of the dynastic chain by becoming the next 
link.313 In this sense, one of the most important aspects of Süleyman’s accession would 
be the emphasis made on the continuity of the dynasty as well as its reconfirmation and 
glorification. Promoting the sense of dynastic continuity on one hand, the accession 
process simultaneously reflects the beginning of a new era. While Selim’s death is 
conveyed as an end, Süleyman’s accession is hailed as a new beginning. This effect is 
heightened by binary oppositions looming large in Ottoman accounts. The use of 
contrasting concepts such as setting sun/rising moon, night/day, grief/joy helps create 
the atmosphere of an era ending and a new one beginning. However, this opposition 
does not appear as an absolute break with the previous reign – or reigns for that matter. 
The initial sense of an abrupt end and beginning gradually turns into a renewal 
throughout the process of transference of power. The dynastic concept, along with the 
concept of ancient custom, is perhaps the most important element in this transformation. 
These two closely related concepts appear to be the most important factors in what 
Ernst H. Kantorowicz calls “the perpetuity of the head of the realm.” I would not take it 
as far as the concept of a “king that never dies” as seen especially in the case of French 
kings, but I tend to find Kantorowicz’s assertion of the interplay between three factors 
applicable to the case at hand: namely dynastic continuity, corporate character of the 
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Crown, and immortality of the Royal Dignity as factors in the formation of the concept 
of perpetuity.314  
Considering accession as a process of transference of sovereign authority to the 
legitimate successor, the enthronement of Süleyman marks the first phase of this 
transfer in the short term. This phase delineated the main elements of Ottoman 
“normative legitimacy” as inherited from his predecessor. The second phase was to 
consolidate the inherited legitimation and the image of the Sultan in the person of 
Sultan Süleyman through his own actions. This phase involves the actualization of 
legitimacy and image in the medium term.315 Two issues can be underlined which 
helped mark Süleyman’s – not a sultan’s but his – sovereign power or image of power 
following his accession. The first issue is his acts related to the administration of justice 
right after his accession. Justice being the foremost quality expected of a ruler, 
contemporary accounts give an almost identical list of the first deeds of Sultan 
Süleyman: sending those back home whom his father had brought in Istanbul after the 
conquest of Egypt, lifting the ban on Persian trade, inspection and execution of Captain 
Cafer Beğ due to complaints of oppression.316 These “acts of justice” also suggest a 
reversal of some of Selim’s policies. If true, we can consider these acts as an attempt to 
mark a distinction with the previous reign. The second issue is the revolt of Canberdi 
Gâzâli, which I argue turned out to be an opportunity to confirm authority and ability 
rather than a threat to authority. Thus, we shall have examined the first four months of 
Süleyman’s rule which I believe transformed the prince into sultan in his own right. The 
last part of this chapter will provide an overview of the first impressions Süleyman left 
both domestically and externally. 
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2.2. Transference of Sovereign Authority: Accession 
The accession marks the transference of sovereign authority in the short term as a 
generic process. The ceremonial accession of Süleyman lasted two days, starting with 
his arrival in Istanbul and ending with the divan presumably held next day after his 
father’s funeral. The ceremonial observed signified not only the taking over of the 
ruling authority, but also the symbolic meanings and the titles attached to that authority. 
As can be argued for any other ceremonial transference of power, Süleyman’s accession 
should be considered a rite of passage whereby through a series of rituals he is 
“conveyed from one social status to another.” This process transforms both the 
perception the society has of the individual and also the individual’s self perception.317  
The following events shall be examined in this respect to understand how 
sovereign power attached to Selim was transferred to Süleyman. Such an exercise 
displays the means and elements involved in what is customarily called “accession” 
[cülûs], as well as providing a clear view of the transformation of the “feliticious 
prince” into the “blessed sovereign.” Although one assumes that the principle of 
hereditary succession by default makes the heir the new ruler – especially when there 
are no legitimate competitors – the actual accession itself was not a momentary 
happening. Based on the action flow provided by contemporary accounts, we can 
categorize three phases toward the full transfer of authority in the short term. The first 
phase would be the new ruler’s entry in Istanbul whereby as heir to the throne he claims 
the sovereign authority. The second phase would be the funeral of the deceased Sultan 
Selim whereby the previous authority leaves the scene. The third phase would be the 
actual hold on sovereignty through holding court and accepting obedience. Agreeing 
with Kertzer on the use of ritual in constituting power rather than just reflecting what 
already exists,318 we shall now take a closer look at these three phases and try to see 
how the process as a whole endows the heir with actual ruling power and authority.  
                                               
317
 For the transformative function of rites of passages see, Robbie E. Davis-
Floyd, “Ritual in the Hospital: Giving Birth the American Way,” in Grimes (ed), p.148. 
318
 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, p.25. 
97 
 
2.2.1 The Entry 
If stripped off its symbolic and ideological content, a typical factual contemporary 
account of Süleyman’s entry in Istanbul would read as follows: Süleyman arrived at 
Üsküdar on 30 September 1520 [17 Shawwal 926]. Boarding the galley prepared for 
him, he came ashore near the Palace around noon. He was greeted by the janissaries and 
other servitors along with the religious groups and inhabitants of Istanbul. This was the 
first instance that the death of Sultan Selim was made public. Surrounded by the 
janissaries Süleyman was taken to the Palace. The procession passed through the 
spectators who came to see him. He entered the Palace.319 
Looking at this flow, we can focus on three subsequent stages which can be 
considered as constituting the first ceremonial phase of accession: revelation of the 
death of the ruler, acceptance of the dynastic successor, appropriation of the abode of 
power. These stages can be identified with the arrival of the prince, the procession and 
the entry into the palace. This initial phase of the accession is characterized by 
movement from one place to another. If we are to take this phase as part of a rite of 
passage, we can see that Süleyman comes out of the separation phase as he arrives by 
boat and disembarks, goes through a transformation phase with the procession and 
finally enters the Palace where he assumes power.320  
In contemporary mentality, the death of a sultan seems to be revealed to the public 
not verbally, but visually through the arrival of the successor. Kemalpaşazade’s account 
of Süleyman’s entry in Istanbul confirms the idea. Kemalpaşazade says that the 
household troops in Istanbul became aware of the death of Sultan Selim only when 
Süleyman reached the shore. It was only then that it became apparent that the life of the 
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deceased ruler had come to an end and that “the new holder of the crown [tâc-dâr-ı 
cedîd] became his successor at the throne of hilâfet.”321 Sa‘di reports that nobody knew 
about the situation when Süleyman appeared at Uskudar.322 Contarini, the Venetian 
bailo in Istanbul, immediately after learning about the death of Sultan Selim wrote his 
first impression of the arrival as such: 
This morning [September 30] at one o’clock his son arrived with three 
vessels from Anatolia. He disembarked near the Palace and accompanied by 
the aga of the janissaries entered the Palace. There he heard the cries of the 
women and the populace because they had been informed of the death of his 
father signor Selim Sach. These people were worried about the possibility of 
being looted, but by the grace of God nothing happened for the good 
government of the viziers and the above-mentioned commander of the 
janissaries.323 
Earlier chronicles also confirm that the death of the sultan was revealed with the 
arrival of the successor in the seat of government. For example, Neşri says that Mehmed 
I’s death was kept secret for forty days. When Murad II came to Bursa and sat on the 
throne, Mehmed I’s death became obvious instantly.324 When Murad II died, his death 
was concealed for sixteen days and people became aware only when Mehmed II came 
to Edirne.325 
Although the death of Sultan Selim was kept secret until the arrival of Süleyman, 
accounts imply that some kind of preparation was made in Istanbul for the latter’s 
arrival. Sa‘di reports instant preparations by the commander of the janissaries on his 
own initiative. According to the author, nobody was aware of the death of the Sultan 
until Süleyman’s ship appeared on the shores of Üsküdar.  As the people tried to make 
sense of the arrival of the ship, the commander of the janissaries, who was cautious, 
understood that it was the Prince arriving. Thus, he prepared the janissaries along with 
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‘ulemâ and sâdât for the greeting.326 According to Celâlzâde, orders were sent to the 
Palace to clean up and prepare it for the arrival of the Sultan.327 Since no name was 
mentioned, those who were to proceed with the preparations probably thought it was 
meant for Sultan Selim. Selaniki provides insight on how the preparation mechanism 
worked in the case of Selim II’s entry in Istanbul upon Sultan Süleyman’s death. 
According to his account, a letter was sent to the Chief Gardner [Bostancıbaşı] ordering 
cleaning and preparations at the Imperial Palace. The letter commanded that the Palace 
should be handed over to its owner in good shape when he arrived [… hidmetinde kusûr 
itmeyüb sâhibi geldükde teslim eyleyesiz]. The letter also ordered to make sure that 
everything was in order at the other side [Üsküdar] because the Sultan wished to cross 
to his gardens when he came back. It was upon these preparations that Selim II arrived, 
and crossed to the Imperial Palace by boat. Although cannons were fired, and heralds 
announced that it was “the era of Sultan Selim” [Devr-i Sultân Selim Hândır], Selim 
had a difficult time entering the Palace because the guards were still not aware of the 
death of Sultan Süleyman.328 In this respect, the alertness of the janissary commander in 
Sa‘di’s account seems to have had vital contribution to the smoothness and ceremonial 
nature of Süleyman’s entry in Istanbul. 
Accounts on Süleyman’s arrival convey a simultaneous feeling of grief and joy. 
Upon seeing the prince approaching the city, the on-lookers must have realized that 
something was wrong because princes did not enter Istanbul on their own under normal 
circumstances; this would be either outright rebellion or else it signified the death of the 
reigning sultan. So their grief must have been for the deceased sultan and the 
expectation of chaos related to the death of the ruler; on the other hand, their joy was 
over the new sultan and the expectation of order related to accession. Sa‘di mentions 
that people felt  pain upon seeing Süleyman and they were lost in thought imagining 
what this arrival entailed. Talking about the reaction of the janissaries in Istanbul upon 
hearing the news, the author tells that they were so shocked that “they could not 
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differentiate between night and day.” They started wailing since they felt the grief of a 
“dark night” [şeb-i deycûr] and the joy of a “holiday” [rûz-ı ‘iyd] at the same time. Yet 
they knew that this “heavy grief” [gâm-ı düşvâr] had no remedy other than this 
“digestive bottle” [câm-ı hoşgüvâr].329 Kemalpaşazade describes the complex and 
conflicting feelings of the people as such: 
The gloom of sorrow and the misery of misfortune rushed in, from the other 
side came the splendor of a wedding. Now their eyes were filled with tears like 
the tip of the decanter and now their faces glowed [with happiness] like the 
surface of a goblet. At this instance was seen a depression which was to 
combine with joy, an anguish which was to excite cheer.330 
While Ottoman writers poetize the situation and accord a more enduring sense of 
felicity following an event “as misfortunate as the death of the sultan”, the Venetian 
bailo has a more practical view of the situation. Contarini tells that the women and the 
people [femene e populi] started crying when the death of Sultan Selim was revealed. 
These lamenters, according to the bailo, were worried that they would be sacked.331 
It is tempting to view this course of events as a typical royal entry. It fits the two 
phases of rendering homage described by Lawrence M. Bryant regarding French royal 
entries. In the first phase the king would be static and the people mobile, while in the 
second phase the king would be mobile and the people static.332 The coming to power of  
a Mamluk Sultan, too, involved a state procession During this procession he rode 
through Cairo to the Citadel. He was accompanied by the commanders and preceded by 
the insignia.333 The greeting on shore renders Süleyman static while the janissaries and 
other servitors of the household pay their condolences and respect [takdîm-i merâsim-i 
ta‘zîm ü iclâl].334 Sa‘di’s account confirms an initial obedience ritual at this point. 
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According to the author, those who were worthy of kissing hands came up to Süleyman 
and kissed hands while he replied appropriately.335 Likewise, Contarini reports that the 
“janissaries and his slaves” were there to meet Süleyman, and that they promised him 
their services and obedience.336 This may be taken to signify the initial public 
acceptance of the ruler, as does the procession to the Palace with the accompaniment of 
the household troops.337 The procession, on the other hand, renders Süleyman mobile. 
The procession can be considered both as the appropriation of the city (the seat of 
government in this case) by the new ruler and as the acceptance of the subjects of this 
appropriation.338  
At least two elements are missing define Süleyman’s arrival in Istanbul as a 
typical royal entry, though. The first element is the regalia. Some of the signifiers of 
sovereignty observed in Western courts were not applicable to the Ottoman court. The 
most obvious examples to these are the crown and scepter.339  The second absent 
element is a full household. At this point, we should keep in mind that Süleyman came 
to Istanbul in a hurry and discreetly. He came with as few servitors as possible to ensure 
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a fast and safe journey, leaving his household back in Manisa. As for the existing 
imperial household, many of them were still outside the city in camp. They were still 
unaware of the situation. Thus, they were not yet considered his household. We are 
informed by contemporary accounts that Süleyman sent for his family, which still 
resided in Manisa, after his accession was complete in ceremonial terms. According to 
Bostan, Süleyman’s family arrived in Istanbul through Gallipoli in mid-November 1520 
[beginning of Dhu’l-Hijja 926] and they were greeted ceremonially.340 
Süleyman’s arrival at the Palace is generally identified with ascending the throne. 
Kemalpaşazade ends the day saying “he ascended the sky-like throne, enlightened the 
East and the West like world-illuminating sun.”341 Sa‘di ends the day in a similar 
manner by saying he entered the Palace and “on the 17 Shawwal, which was Saturday, 
he went on the throne of state and thanks be to God became blessed sovereign.”342 
Nasuh talks about a gathering at the Palace on the day of arrival consisting of high 
officials, household troops and other men of valor in ceremonial order to present their 
dependability and loyalty.343 
Ottoman accounts on Süleyman’s first day in Istanbul make use of analogies to 
define him and what is going on. These analogies serve not only to glorify the new 
Sultan, but also to shape the public’s perception. Associating him with already familiar 
and well known figures or phenomenon, people are provided with a ready-made image. 
In this respect, associating a new ruler with an already familiar one and the 
transformation with an already familiar natural phenomenon eases the transformation 
and acceptance process. During the process the unknown is replaced with the known. In 
this sense, the analogies constitute a tool of political communication as well as 
reflecting a set of expectations.  
An inevitable analogy reflecting the transfer of sovereignty from Sultan Selim to 
Sultan Süleyman is the one referring to the biblical kings David and Solomon. In the 
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Perso-Islamic heroic tradition, King David often figures as the archetype of the royal 
adventurer and the initial owner of the coat of mail of the Prophet.  His son Solomon, on 
the other hand, represents ultimate valor and splendor as the chief of monarchs 
presiding over prophets, kings and warriors.344 Being the father and son endowed with 
kingship by God, this couple would be a perfect way to associate dynastic succession 
and legitimate sovereignty in the case of Selim and Süleyman. Bostan, for example, 
refers to a Quranic reference as he relates the succession. The quote reads: “And 
Solomon was David's heir.”345 This reference not only creates a parallel between 
Süleyman and the exemplary king/prophet Solomon but also a parallel between Selim I 
and David, thus mirroring the current situation to a legendary succession which is 
assumed to have been conferred by God. Although Süleyman had the advantage of the 
name, the David-Solomon reference seems to be part of the common vocabulary of the 
sixteenth century political scene. During the progress of Prince Philip of Spain in 1548-
1549 in the Low Countries, among the classical and biblical references employed we 
see Solomon crowned King of Israel at the behest of his father David.346 Again an 
appropriate and convenient analogy taking into consideration the aims of Charles V in 
having his son proceed around the realm. 
The most favorite analogy employed by contemporary writers seems to be the 
“sun” analogy. The analogy of the “world-illuminating sun” can be viewed in two 
perspectives; first, in terms of a cosmological view of worldly order and secondly, in 
terms of “divine light” conferring divine kingship. Anthropologically speaking, royal 
rituals in many cultures involve association of society, royalty and astronomy. Such an 
association of cosmic and political order helps render royal authority “as a thing beyond 
challenge,” making it “an aspect of a whole which is beyond the mere creation of 
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man.”347 Influential writers like al-Ghazali and Nizam al-Mulk considered that the ruler 
was bestowed with kingship and the divine light by God.348 In the mystic sphere, too, 
the imagery of light was formulated in terms of illumination. Suhrawardi’s philosophy 
had already well-systematized the concept of divine glory and divine light in the twelfth 
century.349 Thus, the analogy was already there for the Ottomans of the sixteenth 
century to employ. The same concept would also be observed elsewhere in the sixteenth 
century: “The shamsa [image of the sun]… is a divine light, which God directly 
transfers to kings, without the assistance of men; and kings are fond of external 
splendor, because they consider it an image of the Divine glory” Abu'l-Fazl would write 
in A‘in-i Akbari.350 An interesting reference to the sun is found in the first book 
Kemalpaşazade as he relates an episode from the first days of the Ottoman dynasty. 
According to the episode, when Osman Beğ conquered Karacahisar he was told that the 
permission of the Saljuq sultan was necessary to say the first Friday prayer [hutbe] in 
his name. Osman Beğ defied the sultan and appropriated the right of hutbe for himself, 
basing his argument on superiority of descent. In this instance we see Osman Beğ 
arguing that his origin is the “sun” while that of the sultan is the “moon”, thus making 
his claim superior.351 
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When describing the arrival of Süleyman and the procession to the Palace, 
Celâlzâde stresses the analogy by employing both the sun and the moon to refer to the 
Sultan. The author refers to Süleyman as “the sun illuminating the world” [âfitâb-ı 
cihân-tâb]352 and the greeters as “the gracious servants of the threshold which is 
magnificent like the skies.” These greeters, then, encircle “the moon” like a halo.353 
Kemalpaşazade describes the moment of enthronement in a similar manner: “He 
ascended the sky-like throne and illuminated the East and the West like the world-
illuminating sun.” While the new ruler was the ascending sun for Kemalpaşazade, the 
coffin of the deceased sultan was associated with the “decline of the sun of sovereignty” 
[magrib-i afitâb-ı saltanat].354 Kemalpaşazade also presented a panegyric on the 
occasion of the accession which revolved around the theme of the sun.355  Likewise, 
Sa‘di describes the first appearance of Süleyman on the shore of Uskudar as “the sun 
coming out of a curtain of clouds.” He likens the prince to the rays of the sun which 
“leave the candle light dim in broad day light.” He also says that while preparing the 
janissary troops for the royal greeting the commander of the janissaries informed the 
men about the “setting of the father and the rising of the new moon.” Upon hearing the 
news the janissaries were so shocked that “they could not differentiate between night 
and day.”356  
Sadi’s choice of words is interesting as he describes Süleyman’s arrival. The 
author tells that a boat was prepared and sent to serve the “prince who is the refuge of 
the world” [şehzâde-i ‘âlem-penâh]. As the town people and others [şehürlü ve sâ’ir 
tavâif-i enâm] saw the boat approaching, they realized that aboard was a “sa’âdetlü 
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pâdişâh.”357 Whether Sadi used the two titles deliberately is questionable, but it sure 
adds to the sense of a transformation taking place. Süleyman gradually turns from 
prince to sovereign ruler as he approaches closer to the seat of government. In 
Selimname Celâlzâde employs similar wording. According to the author, the news of 
Sultan Selim’s death was written to the “hazret-i şehzâde-i ‘âlem-penâh.” Similarly the 
news of Süleyman’s approaching Istanbul was brought to the camp by a messenger of 
“şehzâde-i civân-baht.” On the other hand, on the day Süleyman arrived in Istanbul it 
was no more a prince but the “pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh” who ascended the throne.358 
2.2.2 The Announcement at the Camp: Shift in Authority 
In an imperial monarchy heavily based on the military establishment, transference 
of authority without the integration of any part of the imperial army could never be 
complete. Some of the household troops were not present in Istanbul when Süleyman 
made his entry and appropriated the city. As such, they were not aware of the situation; 
and neither were they Süleyman’s men yet. Therefore, the announcement at the camp 
figures as an important part of the accession process of Sultan Süleyman. Although 
current mentality and circumstances probably did not allow for an alternative, the 
announcement leads to the transformation of the “servants” of Sultan Selim into those 
of Sultan Süleyman. In order to trace the logic beneath this transformation, we shall try 
to analyze the rather detailed account of Sa‘di.359 
The mood of end versus beginning is conveyed in Sa‘di’s account of the reception 
of the news in the military camp where Sultan Selim passed away. According to this 
account, as Süleyman arrived in Istanbul to ascend the throne, a decree was sent to the 
camp to have the deceased Sultan’s body along with the equipment and treasury brought 
to the city. The camp dwellers were not yet aware of either the death of Selim or the 
accession of Süleyman. The soldiers were assembled around the imperial tent and the 
news was announced first to the troop of imperial guards [solaklar]. The announcement 
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can be read in three parts, like the announcement to Süleyman discussed in Chapter 1. 
While the first part of the announcement focuses on death and thus an end, the second 
part heralds a new beginning. The third part of the announcement introduces what is to 
be done by the soldiers in the face of this transition:  
Comrades, let it be known to you that the Pâdişâh, the refuge of the world, 
passed away a while ago leaving us orphans; from this temporal seat he is 
gone to that place of prosperity; his conquering soul departed gone on the 
campaign of the hereafter to reign over the army of souls. Currently, the 
felicitous prince [şehzâde-i civân-baht] has reached Istanbul and has become 
blesses sovereign [pâdişâh-ı kâm-rân] in his stead. It is required that his 
servants [kulları] report to his stately abode [âsitâne-i devlet-penâh] and fulfill 
the service of congratulation of his long-to-be reign, hence the need to go.360  
The first part of the announcement, which announces the death of the ruler, 
emphasizes three messages. Firstly, the deceased has passed from the temporal world to 
a better place, which neutralizes the death of the ruler as a matter of course. It also 
seems to be a reminder of the destiny all mortals are to witness someday. It reflects a 
contrast between the mortal world and the eternal one, yet with an association between 
death and resurrection. In this sense, the divine nature of death gets on the scene. 
Regardless of the “stage of religious evolution”, death signifies the passage to another 
realm of being. This realm is often associated with the heavenly, usually a place where 
the “glorious fore-fathers” of the deceased have already gone. Death in this sense is to 
be followed by “resurrection into a superior life.”361 Being the warrior sultan he was, in 
the author’s words Selim has not just passed away, but he has gone on a campaign 
involving the welfare of the hereafter. Thus, the warrior image of the deceased sultan is 
once more reminded. Thirdly, it conveys a sense of a familiar realm in which the Sultan 
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has gone. It offers the audience an opportunity to cope with the loss by presenting a 
“world analogous to ours… and of a society organized in the same way as it is here. 
Thus everyone re-enters again the categories of that he had on earth.”362 
The loss reflected in the first part is compensated for in the second part of the 
announcement. The fact that the ruler’s death has left the army orphan reminds the role 
of the ruler as the father of his people. Actually, we can argue that this is the most 
immediate message for the intended audience since it directly involves their relation to 
the situation and vice versa. If we interpret this state of orphanage as remaining without 
a head of family or in a more general sense without a leading figure of authority, the 
next sentence informs that this authority has already been appropriately replaced 
suggesting that there is no reason to worry. This part of the announcement, as conveyed 
by Sa‘di, is also noteworthy since it expresses Süleyman’s transition from a prince 
[şehzâde] to a sovereign ruler [pâdişâh] on his own. Sa‘di’s account makes it clear that 
Süleyman became sultan in his father’s stead after he came to Istanbul. The specific 
mention of the name of the city strongly suggests that he was not considered as having 
taken over at the moment his father died, or even when he got the news at Manisa; but 
that he was required to present himself in Istanbul.363 According to Celâlzâde ’s 
narrative in Selimname, when Piri Paşa called the troop of imperial guards [solaklar] 
and announced the death of Sultan Selim, he made it clear that “Pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh 
hazretleri has fortunately ascended the throne in Istanbul.”364 Lütfi Paşa tells that 
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Süleyman came to Islambol from Manisa and ascended his father’s throne.365 Such an 
expression again suggests that taking hold of Istanbul was a pre-requisite of 
accession.366 
The third part of the announcement deals with what is to be done. They should go 
to congratulate as regular course of action. With this message comes the transformation. 
The mood of ending versus beginning is further observed in Sa‘di’s account of the 
soldiers’ reaction to the announcement, as well as the transformation process. The first 
reaction we see in this account is a collective lamentation demonstrated by the throwing 
of headgear on the ground and crying out loud. After crying a while “their burning 
[ateş-sûz] bosoms found some tranquility with the downpour of tears [bâran-ı eşk]” and 
only then they realized that there was no use in crying because what happened was 
“destiny.” They also realized that the same destiny provided them with a fortunate 
pâdişâh in place of the one they lost. Sa‘di emphasizes that although Selim’s death was 
a disaster, the soldiers would survive through “this dark night” with “the rising of the 
sun.” With this realization also came the realization of the requirement to go to the new 
ruler to pay respects and present obedience.367 The contrasting concepts of fire/water 
and dark night/rising sun imply recovering from a troublesome situation. In addition to 
the sense of acceptance of destiny, there is the sense of hope of a new and bright 
beginning. And this beginning is implied to be occasioned through the agency of the 
new ruler. Once the new ruler comes to be seen as part of the destiny which brought 
along the death of Sultan Selim, in other words the destiny which brought an end, 
Süleyman seems to have become the Sultan in the eyes of the soldiers. Through this 
acceptance, the soldiers have been transformed from being the “servants of Sultan 
Selim” to being “servants of Sultan Süleyman.” 
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This tranformation is not only a symbolic element underlying the process of 
accession, but is integral to the process of succession. In most of the accounts, the 
possibility of an insurrection of the soldiers upon being left without an acknowledged 
head figures as a serious concern. Cemal Kafadar explains this as janissaries 
considering the “original contract of allegiance” invalid, since all contracts are to be 
renewed with each ruler. Thus they find it a right “to go wild” in the lapse between the 
death of a ruler and the accession of a new one.368 This concern leads those in charge to 
conceal the death of the sultan until they are assured that the new figure of authority has 
taken matters in hand.369 For example, Kemalpaşazade asserts that since the death of the 
sultan was not known among the enemies no mischief occurred.370 Celâlzâde’s version 
of the events as narrated in his Selimnâme starts even earlier, that is to say before the 
death of Selim. Celâlzâde expresses the concern through Selim’s last words. When 
Selim got ill on the way to Edirne, measures were immediately taken to prevent any 
mischief. “Because,” explains Celâlzâde , “from time immemorial in the realm of Rûm 
there has been the disapproved tendency during a change of reign [tebdîl-i saltanat], in 
the time of the absence of the shadow of God, to plunder the properties and possessions 
of Jews and Christians that were detested by the people.”371  
The significance of this concern is apparent in foreign sources as well. A letter 
dated October 11 from Ragusa to Venice informs that the death of Selim has been kept 
secret by the viziers in order to prevent trouble.372 Cardinal Compeggio, writing to 
Wolsey in November about the death of Selim and accession of Süleyman, tells that 
janissaries plundered all Jews, Christians and others living at Constantinople.373 This 
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piece of information seems to be the projection of the above mentioned expectation 
rather than what actually happened. 
Concern about strife upon the death of a ruler is a general phenomenon not unique 
to the Ottomans.374 In England, for example, the matter extended into the seventeenth 
century. The concern over plunder and violence led to arguments about whether the 
king was actually a king before coronation. If not, then any act of violence against him 
would not be treason and thus not be charged. The contrary view was that coronation 
was only a “royal ornament and outward solemnization of the descent.” Sovereignty 
being transferred momentarily through descent would solve the problem of possible 
strife in the absence of a ruler.375 Already back in the thirteenth century there had been 
attempts at the principle of “full government begins with the day of a ruler’s accession” 
with monarchs like Philip III and Edward I.376 These concerns emphasized not only 
internal strife, but also foreign aggression. After the death of the Holy Roman Emperor 
Maximilian I, Henry VIII raised the issue in connection to the urgency of electing a new 
emperor: “The Holy Roman Empire, in consequence of the death of Maximilian, having 
been deprived of its governor, unless the Electors supply the vacancy, the peace of 
Christendom may possibly be endangered, especially as the sole object of the Turk is to 
enlarge his dominions, now dearly doubled by the acquisition of those of the Sultan.”377 
Regardless of period or geography, there are many examples of disorder following 
a royal death. In his The King's Body Sergio Bertelli describes the disorder experienced 
in Cairo following Qayıtbay’s death in 1496 whereby the streets were blocked, bazaars 
were locked down, and people robbed and devastated the town. Bertelli’s assertion  
regarding the urban violence during the election period following the death of a Pope is 
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similar: “No chronicle of a conclave fails to call this [the interregnum between death 
and burial] a period of turbulence and riot, which made Rome a no man’s land where 
criminals roamed at will at the expense of the peaceful inhabitants.”378 An early 
eighteenth century traveler to Guinea tells that “as soon as the death of the king 
becomes public knowledge, everyone hastens to rob his neighbor without there being 
any means of punishment, as if with the death of the king justice also died.” But the 
violence came to an end as soon as the successor was proclaimed.379 Even more tragic 
was the situation at the death of William the Conqueror in 1087. It has been recorded 
that attendants of lower ranks looted his belongings and took all they could such as 
weapons, linen and furnishings. As the twelfth century chronicler Ordericus Vitalis 
reports:  “So when the just ruler fell, lawlessness broke loose, and first showed itself in 
the plunder of him who had been the avenger of plunder.”380 As the urban disorder 
associated with the death of a ruler was not unique to the Ottomans, neither was 
violence being directed particularly to the Jews. On the coronation of Richard I in 1189 
Londoners committed atrocities against the Jews for two days. In 1590, when Pope 
Sixtus V died, the synagogue and property of Jews were sacked in Bologna.381  
Concern about possible strife at the death of a sultan looms large in earlier 
Ottoman chronicles as well. According to the late fifteenth century chronicler Neşri, 
Mehmed I called his viziers when he fell ill. He told them not to announce his death 
before his son Murad arrived. He was worried that the realm would be harmed 
otherwise. Upon his death, viziers faked a campaign in order to keep the troops 
occupied. They also held regular council meetings and continued to issue promotions. 
Soon some of the aghas grew suspicious and wanted to see the sultan. Although the 
viziers managed to distract them for a while, they were worried that if the death of the 
sultan was heard the “household troops would loot the city, rebels would rise.”382 A 
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closer example in time was the disorder that broke out following the death of Mehmed 
II in 1481. Although officials had done their best to keep Sultan Mehmed’s death a 
secret, news spread anyway. The janissaries began to get uneasy and urged to see their 
ruler. When no leave was given, they broke the gate and entered the Palace. Upon 
seeing the corpse of the Sultan, they killed the grand vizier Karamani Mehmed Paşa. 
Putting his head on a lance they paraded on the streets of the city. This was followed by 
a collective uprising of mobs attacking the houses and shops of especially the Jews and 
Christians. Venetian and Florentine warehouses were sacked. The violence could only 
be stopped when the commander of the janissaries promised them that once on the 
throne Bayezid would double their wages. With this proclamation they started shouting 
“Long live Bayezid!” Although the proclamation was made and violence appeased, 
officials still put Bayezid’s son Korkud on the throne as regent until his father 
arrived.383 Kemalpaşazade, in his earlier work on Bayezid II’s reign, mentions that the 
violence following Mehmed II’s death was dated [886/1481] with the verse “Janissaries 
severe the head” [yeniçeri başın keser]. The author attributes the chaos in this occasion 
to the incapability of the grand vizier Karamani Mehmed Paşa. Yet, in this account, it is 
another vizier, Ishak Paşa, who tranquillized the mood through “proper” measures.384  
The violence is clearly linked with the janissaries as Kemalpaşazade’s above-
mentioned account of the succession of Bayezid II demonstrates, hence the urgent need 
to re-integrate them into the system. Kemalpaşazade’s holding the grand vizier 
accountable for such chaos also indicates the established role of the viziers in the 
transformation phase, hence the praises for Piri Mehmed Paşa following Selim I’s 
death. Such collective memories must have made an impression in the minds of the 
contemporaries. As such, it is not surprising that the people expected trouble. On the 
other hand, they also expected the ending of this temporary disorder with the arrival of 
the new ruler. Celâlzâde’s emphasis that the Sultan ascended the throne and people 
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were protected from mischief appears to be a conventional phrase.385 However, the fact 
that such trouble did not occur was to be one of the first building blocks of Sultan 
Süleyman’s image as demonstrated by the impressions of his accession which shall be 
discussed at the end of this chapter.  
2.2.3 The Funeral 
The funeral of Sultan Selim, as part of Süleyman’s accession, consists of four 
subsequent stages: receiving of the corpse, the funeral prayer, the burial, the return to 
the Palace. All of these stages are linked to each other through public processions which 
bring together various sectors of Ottoman society and imperial administration. All are 
marked with a sense of grief and mourning which disappears right after the funeral 
services are completed. The change of mood makes itself manifest with the accounts of 
piety and largesse of Süleyman after the burial. Metaphorical or actual change of attire 
and ending of uncontrolled forms of mourning behavior also figure as elements which 
emphasize the transformation. A funeral, after all, is a principal “rite of passage” in the 
sense that it a crucial event for the transformation of the perception society had of the 
deceased. Through the ceremonial, Selim was transformed into an ancestor from being 
the ruler and Süleyman into his legitimate successor.386 As a “transition rite”, the 
funeral is also a way to incorporate the deceased into the world of the dead, whereas the 
mourning involved is a transitional period for those left behind.387 
In order to understand this process of transformation both for the deceased and for 
those left behind, we need to emphasize that the funeral is a kind of public spectacle. 
Accounts relating the various stages of the funeral resemble royal entries or other ritual 
processions where visibility and participation are important elements. A typical account 
of Selim I’s funeral would start with Süleyman going out from the Palace, ride through 
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the city and go out of Edirnekapı to receive the corpse of his father. There the corpse is 
taken out of the cart and placed in a coffin. The procession enters the city back through 
Edirnekapı marching to the Mosque of Mehmed II where the funeral services are 
performed. Once the prayers are said, the procession heads to the place of burial which 
has been designated beforehand. There burial services are completed and more prayers 
are said. Süleyman orders a mausoleum and a mosque complex to be built around the 
grave. Food and alms are distributed to the poor and the needy. Once the burial service 
is over, the new Sultan rides back to the Palace.388 Throughout the event authors 
emphasize the great amount of crying and lamenting by the participants. 
An anthropological/sociological approach which interprets the ceremonial aspect 
of death as “a collective representation of death” might provide a useful perspective to 
view the funeral. Robert Hertz argues that actions related to death can not be interpreted 
if death is seen only as a physical event. He also states that the death of an individual 
who is “attributed great dignity and importance” affects the collective conscience of a 
society. The death of a person who is regarded as the embodiment of a society suggests 
in the collective mind of that society its own death/demise. The society, then, tries to 
cope with the loss and the possibility of its own demise. Since society aspires to be 
immortal, it envisions its embodiments to be so too. When a figure thus loaded dies, the 
society needs a certain period of time to get over the shock, to adjust and to regain 
balance.389  
One of the important elements of funerals is participation as in other ceremonial 
public events. Participation in a funeral is “one of the rights the deceased has over other 
Muslims”, as well as an opportunity for the participant to merit a reward for his own 
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afterlife.390 Participation also has to do with the way the deceased is remembered by the 
community. Various traditions of the Prophet demonstrate the connection between the 
public’s view of the deceased and his salvation. In other words, “if four people testify to 
the goodness of a Muslim, Allah has him enter Paradise.” Thus, funerals become 
markers of both public reverence and of divine approbation.391 The divine approbation 
and public duty aspects of the funeral is apparent in declarations sent to provincial 
officials and other Muslim rulers. Hayrbay, the governor of Egypt, for example, was 
commanded to assemble as many people as possible from each sector of the society and 
have them perform the ritual prayer [namaz]. “In return,” says the document, “God will 
bestow upon him [Selim] His benefaction.” Furthermore, Hayrbay was ordered to send 
the news and the order to the regions under his power to do the same.392 Hayrbay, in his 
reply, assured Sultan Süleyman that the ritual prayer was performed for the deceased in 
the mosques of Egypt and people testified to his meriting heaven.393 A similar request 
for a ritual prayer in the name of Sultan Selim was addressed to the Crimean Khan 
Mehmed Giray.394 
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The funeral also served to teach a lesson to the faithful that life is ephemeral and 
that all shall die one day.395 People were moved to contemplate on their own destinies 
upon seeing even the most powerful man of their world dead. Lütfi Paşa says that after 
the body was buried, everyone took a lesson for himself through self-contemplation.396 
Kemalpaşazade stresses this point by saying that those who witnessed the funeral 
procession took a lesson. They were astonished to see that “the Sultan had changed his 
throne with a piece of wood.” Hence, they understood that even the lives of the most 
fortunate must come to an end and that the body was not eternal.397 Nasuh expresses 
this as such: “Those who made the people obey their orders have left behind the crown 
and throne and possessions, they descended under the earth.”398  
The lesson taken by death is not unique to Ottoman or Islamic society; it is a 
universal notion independent of time or geography. Georges Duby, for example, 
describes the notion through the voice of an archbishop of the 13th century: 
At the end of the funeral ceremonies, laid out on the bier before the open 
grave, the earl’s mute body spoke still. It instructed all those present, a 
countless horde, as had been expected. Before their eyes, this body offered 
itself as the image of what each of them would one day be. Inevitably. 
“Mirror” – that is how the archbishop defined it in the sermon he delivered for 
the edification of the crowd. “See, my lords, what the world comes to. Each 
man, when he has reached this point, no longer signifies anything but this: he 
is no more than a lump of earth. Consider this man who raised himself to the 
pinnacle of human values. We too shall come to this. You and I. One day we 
shall die.” Such is the way of all flesh. Here on earth, all is vanity.399 
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Contemporary Ottoman chronicles convey a sense of heavy grief and mourning 
through uncontrolled behavior. Laments, wailing and violent acts of grief such as 
tearing one’s clothes, beating one’s chest, throwing soil on one’s head is a way to cope 
with the transient stage of death in various cultures. Extreme manifestations of grief in 
funerals, extending even to communal suicide as in the case of a few Roman emperors, 
points at the “hiatus in the order of things”, those left behind feeling “diminished.”400 
Such acts are practices that “suggest the dangers of crossing the threshold between the 
spaces of death and life” and mark “the reentry of a mourner into the world of ordinary 
life.”401 It is possible to trace exaggerated modes of mourning in various times and 
places. The public reaction in Nicomedia to the death of Constantine’s death could be 
an example. As the corpse was on its way to Constantinople, people gathering on the 
piazzas and the roads are accounted to have broken into tears and screams, beating their 
chests.402 Such accounts of violent grief are also seen in the Book of Dede Korkud. As 
legend goes when Beyrek’s death was heard, a lament [şivân] broke in his house. His 
companions tossed their headgear on the ground and cried.403 According to a French 
report, soldiers reacted in a similar manner at the funeral of Mehmed II, they were 
“lamenting his death by crying, smearing their faces with dust, beating their breasts, and 
chanting songs about the chivalric exploits of their defunct master.”404 The legendary 
Anushirvan, exemplary Sassanian king of the Shahnama, mentioned in his will that “it 
would be right if all who are noble and benevolent would weep for the death of their 
king.”405 
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Such acts of extreme grief are related by contemporary writers. According to 
Nasuh, the crowd threw soil on their faces and beat their breasts upon seeing the 
coffin.406 Sa‘di relates the lamenting people scratching their chests crying their livers 
out.407 According to Celâlzâde, the people participating in the funeral in Istanbul “cried 
a river.”408 Celâlzâde tells that when the guards at the camp learned about the death of 
Sultan Selim, they tossed their headgear on the ground and started wailing and 
lamenting. Moreover, the tents in the camp were turned upside down.409  
Unlike the inappropriateness of heavy mourning behavior by the successor in 
some other courtly cultures,410 Ottoman accounts demonstrate that it is perfectly normal 
for the successor not only to attend the funeral but to grieve. Contemporary accounts 
also give an impression of Süleyman’s conduct during the funeral. However, his 
mourning behavior is different from the violent demonstration of grief of others. 
Süleyman is never seen lamenting, wailing, beating his chest or in any other violent 
behavior. Having accepted his father’s death as the will of God, thus as something to be 
accepted and endured,411 he cries in a noble manner. The chaotic wailing of lamenters 
creates a contrast to the calm tears of Süleyman which suggests a contrast between 
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chaos and order. His behavior seems to be more in accordance with tradition of the 
Prophet412 compared to the violent mourning of others – though contemporary 
chronicles make no comments about this. Nasuh mentions that Süleyman “cried a river” 
as he met his father’s body.413 Sa‘di also mentions Süleyman’s crying in a very poetical 
way using the conventional “pearl” metaphor for tears.414 However sincere these tears 
were, they should also be seen as “performative tears” meaning that they were shed at a 
“ritualized social situation” and had a discursive effect.415 In this context, Süleyman’s 
tears places him in a social position where as a son he cries for the loss of his father. 
This serves as a way of marking dynastic succession emphasizing the father-son 
relationship. The nobility of his weeping as opposed to the violent grieving of others 
places him in a political position where as a ruler he is in control of himself. This 
contrast serves as a way of differentiating him from the common people who are unable 
to control themselves.  
The transformative nature of the funeral can be traced through the timing of 
participants’ putting on and taking off of “mourning attire.”416 The formal ceremonial 
nature of the funeral is stressed with the uniformity of costume. Black appears to be the 
symbol of mourning as this color is generally associated with sadness, fear, 
helplessness, death and total passivity in various cultures.417 Analyzing the funeral 
representations in Shahnamas produced at various locations and times between the 
                                               
412
 As the tradition goes, when a son of the Prophet died, he cried. When people 
asked him “You, too?” he replied by saying that it was mercy and compassion, (upon 
death) the eye cries and the heart is sad, God tolerates that. See, Karaman, “Ölüm, Ölü, 
Defin ve Merasimler,” p.5. This article provides a useful summary of Islamic rules 
about funerals and mourning based on the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet.  
413
 Nasuh, 10b. 
414
 Sa‘di (SN), 112a: “Hazret-i padişah-ı ‘âlem-penâh yanına inicek, kulzum-ı 
çeşm-i zahârından bî-hadd alay-ı abdâr döküb, ser-i tabûtına eşk-i hasretden akçeler 
nisâr itdiler.” 
415
 On the discursive function of tears, see Gary L. Ebersole, “The Function of 
Weeping Revisited: Affective Expression and Moral Discourse,” History of Religions, 
Vol. 39, no.3 (Feb., 2000), p.214. 
416
 The change in attire as a signifier of change of mood or status is also 
commonly employed in accounts of war. See, Chapter 5, pp.375, 407. 
417
  Hülya Taflı, “Number, Color and Animal Mysticism in Beowulf and The 
Book of Dedem Korkut,” Turkish Studies, vol.3, no.1 (Winter 2008), p.107. 
121 
 
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, Serpil Bağcı has come up with three colors of 
mourning: blue, purple and black. Bağcı demonstrates that although the colors of 
mourning are not necessarily mentioned in the texts of these works, the miniatures 
display consistency regarding color of mourning attire. She points to the clarity of the 
association of these colors with mourning in the common tradition and visual memory 
of the painters and readers alike.418 It is possible to trace the association of black with 
mourning in former Turkic customs as well. The famous Book of Dede Korkud provides 
such instances; for example, when Uruz the son of Kazan fell prisoner and people took 
him for dead, Kazan told that his friends wore black as well as his wife.419 Likewise, 
when the news of Beyrek’s death reached his home, his wife and his companions wore 
black and blue.420 
As far as the funeral of Selim I is concerned, Nasuh mentions that the ranking 
officers of the household troops wore black during the funeral. Nasuh also states that 
Süleyman also wore mourning attire. In the poem that follows, the author mentions that 
the Sultan was dressed in black.421 Celâlzâde, too, describes Süleyman as “dressed in 
mourning attire.”422 Kemalpaşazade describes Süleyman’s attire employing 
conventional literary motifs like the tulip and the daffodil. The author tells that when 
Süleyman received the news of his father’s corpse approaching the city, he changed 
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both his outfit and his countenance.423 Putting on mourning attire or wearing black is 
also employed in the metaphorical sense to emphasize the sense of sorrow and grief. 
Ada‘i, for example, mentions that “the golden-attired sun turned black.”424 
 While accounts focus on grief and sorrow caused by loss and the implication of 
partial destruction of the social equilibrium, this sense of grief had to be removed to 
give way to the sense of a new beginning, or restoring of order. This has to do with 
asserting the belief of continuity which Maurice Bloch describes as “a reassertion of the 
vanquishing and victorious order where authority has its legitimate place.”425 The 
removal of grief after the funeral is reflected in Celâlzâde’s account, for example, 
through the change in attire: “they took off the mourning garments and were rewarded 
with kingly robes.”426 
This change of mood is observed after the burial. Accounts tell that a temporary 
tent was erected above the grave until a mausoleum was constructed.427 The domed tent 
is an ancient emblem of royalty. Temporary burial in a tent is a Turco-Mongolian 
custom, earliest known reference relating to the funeral of Attila in 453.428 It was also 
an Arabic custom. According to tradition, this was applied for the first time during the 
Prophet’s daughter Zainab’s funeral. It was so hot that they felt the need to protect the 
grave diggers from the sun. The practice followed on, for example, the widow of a 
grandson of Ali kept a tent over his deceased husband’s grave for a year. When 
Abdullah b. Abbas was buried in the mosque at Taif, a tent was put over his grave.429 
In dynastic monarchies, royal tombs function to commemorate, exalt, and 
legitimize the dynasty. Examples of huge edifices as such can be observed in various 
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dynastic traditions both in the West and the East; however modes of representation 
vary. A major difference concerning the burial space between the Ottomans and the 
French, for example, highlights distinct approaches to the manifestation of dynastic 
continuity through ancestral tombs. St. Denis was the dynastic burial monument of the 
French kings. When Philip I [d.1108] chose to be buried at the Abbey of St. Benoit-sur-
Loire, his decision was taken as a token of modesty. Abbot Suger, on the other hand, 
associated this preference not with modesty, but with the fear of being obscured among 
so many illustrious kings.430 Having one single dynastic burial monument may have 
been a way to emphasize the continuity of the dynasty,431 but Ottomans resorted to a 
different practice. Tombs of Ottoman sultans have generally been built by their 
successors in the proximity of the mosque complexes they have founded during their 
lifetime. When we look at those built in Istanbul prior to the death of Sultan Süleyman, 
it is possible to see that they are lined up as to form an arch.432 In other words, the 
message of dynastic continuity is not embodied in one single monument, but extends 
into a sequential group of monuments. As such they are considered proclamations of 
Ottoman dynastic legitimacy in architectural and ceremonial terms. Pointing out to the 
dissimilarity of this practice to other Islamic societies, Gülru Necipoğlu asserts that 
“unlike other Islamic tombs, often built by living monarchs to glorify their self-image, 
these tombs erected by reigning sons to commemorate the dead fathers served to 
accentuate a continuous chain of dynastic succession.”433 Ottoman sultanic tombs have 
also been interpreted as reinforcing the “commemorative character of the mosque” as a 
device to ensure that the memory of its founder lived on. Howard Crane argues that 
these imperial mosque complexes served as “settings for the expression of a set of 
legitimizing values.” Crane lists religious zeal, charity, justice, permanence, learning 
and wisdom among these values which he finds central to the political ideology of the 
Ottoman dynasty, pointing out that these values were also central to the Perso-Islamic 
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ideals with “which the Ottomans sought to associate themselves.” 434 Bringing together 
mosque, tomb and social complex also linked the deceased sultans with institutionalized 
Islam.435 Discussing the traditional proximity of the sultanic tomb to the imperial mosqe 
complex, Crane asserts that this association reinforced “the appearance of the founder’s 
piety as well as make explicit the commemorative aspect of these ensembles.”436  
In previous cases, all deceased sultans already founded their mosque complexes 
themselves. At this point, things get complicated regarding the founder of the mosque 
complex of Sultan Selim. Some modern scholars tend to agree that Selim I already 
begun the construction of the mosque.437 Stephan Yerasimos, on the other hand, 
qualifies the mosque as the first architectural work of Süleyman.438 While the 
inscription of the mosque implies that construction was begun with the order of Selim 
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I,439 contemporary chronicles agree and even stress that it was Süleyman who ordered 
the construction of both the tomb and the mosque complex. If we agree with Crane that 
imperial mosques were significant settings for various functions and values that the 
Ottoman sultans wished to associate themselves with,440 who gets the credit in this 
case? Judging by the accounts of the contemporaries, the credit was given to Süleyman 
at the time. Celâlzâde simply informs that Süleyman later had a large dome, a mosque 
and a soup kitchen made at this father’s burial place.441 According to the account of 
Kemalpaşazade, over the burial place construction of a large dome was ordered, as well 
as a mosque, a soup kitchen, and a guesthouse nearby. Architects and builders were 
appointed for the job, materials were gathered and an “auspicious” hour was designated 
for the beginning of construction.442 Bostan provides a similar account, placing the 
beginning of construction before the 1521 campaign.443 The author dates the completion 
and inauguration of the mosque of Selim I after Sultan Süleyman’s return from the 1526 
campaign. According to Bostan, on the first Friday of Ramadan the first prayer was 
called and the first public feast at the imaret given. The hutbe was also called in the 
name of the Sultan.444 Sa‘di notes that the construction was still going on as he was 
writing. Although the completion date of Sa‘di’s manuscript is not known, it should be 
later than 1522 since his account continues till Đbrahim Paşa’s return from Egypt in 
1525 and Hayrbay is mentioned as deceased [merhûm] in various places.445  
                                               
439
 Tahsin Öz, Đstanbul Camileri I-II, vol.1, 3rd edition (Ankara: TTK, 1997),  
p.129: “Emere bi-inşai hazel cami 2’ş-şerif Sultanü’l-‘âzam elekrem Seyyid-i selâtinü’l-
‘Arab ve’l-‘Acem, mâlikü’l-berreyn ve’l-bahreyn, hadimü’l-haremeynü’ş-şerifeyn es-
sultân ibnü’s-sultân Sultân Selim Hân ibnü’s Sultân Bayezid Hân ibnü’s Sultân Ebu’l-
feth Sultân Mehmed Han – halledaalahu mülkehu ve Sultânehu – ve temme zaliki’l-
imaretü’l-mübareket fi gurre-i şehr-i Muharremü’l-haram liseneti tis’a ve ‘işrin ve 
tis‘amiye.” 
440
 Crane, “The Sultan’s Mosques,” p.206 
441
 Celâlzâde (SN), p.222: “Sonradan hazreti Pâdişâh[-ı] sa‘âdet-intizâm 
üzerlerine kubbe-i ‘âli ve câmi’-i cennet-makâm ve ‘imâret-i güzîn-i hayr-encâm 
yapdılar.” 
442
 KPZ, X:24-5. 
443
 Bostan (TSK), 12a-b. 
444
 Bostan (MK), 79b. 
445
 For the continuing construction, see Sa‘di (SN), 113a: “hâliyâ yapılmaktadır 
inşallah.” For Hayrbay as “deceased” see for example, ibid, 119b. 
126 
 
Some modern scholars have argued that the mosque and mausoleum of Sultan 
Selim is far away from the center of the city. In this respect, the location isolates the 
complex from the main axis stretching from the imperial palace through the Divanyolu 
to Edirnekapı.446 This ceremonial route passes along the major imperial mosques, 
namely Hagia Sophia, Bayezid I, Mehmed II and the later Şehzade. Although this 
assertion may seem reasonable, when seen in relation to the previous complexes along 
the route from the Palace, the location of the complex of Selim I completes an arch in 
the middle of which the later Süleymaniye stands. Furthermore, the complex is less than 
a kilometer far from the complex of Mehmed II; and it is clearly visible from the 
Golden Horn. Contemporary chronicles also place the location of the complex in the 
city.447 Later chronicles show that the so-called “isolation” of the mausoleum did not 
hinder new sultans visiting the tomb on special occasions such as the ancestral tomb 
visits on accession. Murad III, for example, first visited the tomb of Ayyub and then re-
entered the city from Edirnekapı. He first visited the tomb of Selim I, followed by those 
of Mehmed II, Şehzade Mehmed, Süleyman, Bayezid and lastly his father Selim II’s 
tomb in Hagia Sophia.448 The Safavi ambassador who arrived in Istanbul following the 
death of Sultan Süleyman was kept in the city for three days before being transferred to 
Edirne to greet the new sultan. He was deliberately taken to see the mosques of Sultan 
Süleyman and Sultan Selim I.449 Such visits involving the mosque and the mausoleum 
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of Selim I confirm the significance attached to the complex as an inevitable link in the 
architectural and ceremonial visualization of the dynastic chain. 
If we regard the burial as a “rite of separation” with the markers of separation 
such as the coffin and the grave, the alms and meals offered after the funeral can be 
regarded as a “rite of incorporation.” Following Arnold van Gennep’s definition, the 
purpose would be “to re-unite all surviving members of the group with each other…  in 
the same way that a chain which has been broken by the disappearance of one of its 
links must be rejoined.”450 The funeral is also associated with feeding the poor. In a 
universal sense, it is the duty of a ruler to make sure his subjects are fed properly. Thus, 
the meal after the funeral signifies one last attempt to provide for the needs of the 
people.451 In return for the meal, prayers are ensured for the deceased. I shall once again 
to Georges Duby and the funeral of William Marshall: 
The body is no longer seen. It has disappeared under the earth to rot there in 
peace, carefully boxed. However, though invisible it still manifests its power 
once again, and sumptuously so. In the most earthly manner – nourishing, 
presenting food and drink, giving others occasion to rejoice. According to 
custom, it presides over a final banquet, as the master of the house, the 
seigneur who is never better loved than when he distributes bread and wine. 
He has told his heir that he desires that one hundred poor men be present, and 
be fed. Let them eat and drink with him. Or rather, from him. For such indeed 
is the function of these posthumous agapes: the dead man’s soul requires that 
the living pray for it, and the food distributed after the burial can be regarded 
as the payment for these prayers, perhaps even more profoundly, as their 
equivalent.452  
Public meals and distribution of alms following Selim I’s burial can be seen in 
this respect. These acts not only publicize the piety of the Sultan, but also suggest an 
implication of wealth and abundance at the beginning of a reign. All contemporary 
accounts emphasize the sense of prosperity after the distribution of alms. For example, 
according to Sa'dî, so much was distributed by the Sultan that day that no sign of 
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poverty was left.453 Kemalpaşazade also underlines that after the alms and meals, there 
were no more hungry or needy people.454 
Accession was generally legitimized only after the funeral of the deceased 
ruler.455 In this sense, the ultimate transference of sovereign power occurred thereafter. 
The Shahnama, for example, provides such an instance as “Dara grieved for his father’s 
death, and exalted the royal crown of Persia above the sun.”456 Following the Shahnama 
manner, Ada‘i asserts that “after Süleyman grieved for his father, he made the throne 
his seat.”457 There are implications in some chronicles about the transference of ruling 
power following the funeral.458 Lütfi Paşa, for example, after offering their condolences 
the people congratulated Sultan Süleyman on his acquiring sovereignty.459 Celâlzâde’s 
account, too, reflects the actual transfer of sovereign power only after the funeral:  
After the burial was completed and that sun was placed under ground, the 
considerations of his majesty and valor reached the end, the universe turned 
into paradise with the joy-giving face of the young Shah and Konstantiniyye 
turned into a display of beauties with the smile-generating face of the blessed 
monarch [Hüdâvendigâr-ı kâm-kâr]. With the help of God, without any harm 
coming to peace and security, with everyone at peace, at the time of changing 
of the sultanate and transference of caliphate, with the eyes of mischief and 
strife asleep, the people were overcome by a festive mood and the people of 
the world rejoiced.460 
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A eulogy written on the death of Sultan Selim and accession of Sultan Süleyman 
demonstrates the simultaneous grief and joy, occasioned by the demise of one and the 
accession of the other respectively. The poem starts by asking “where has Sultan Selim 
gone” and ends by saying “it is the era of Sultan Süleyman.” The first part of the poem 
is a praised remembrance of Sultan Selim whereby the poet lists especially the military 
qualities of the deceased sultan. Seeing Sultan Selim as a remedy to every trouble, the 
poet is apparently trying to cope with the loss, emphasizing this loss by repeating the 
phrase “Kanı Sultan Selim kanı” several times. As the poem moves on, we are 
introduced with a new hope; the poet states his good wishes for the son of the deceased 
sultan. At this point, he wishes a long life for the successor though not abandoning the 
sense of grief over the loss: “Sultan Süleyman sağ olsun, kanı Sultan Selim kanı.” Only 
in the last third of the poem does the poet leave the loss behind and hail the new era. 
Unlike the first two parts where Sultan Selim is appraised, the third part concentrates on 
expectations from the new sultan. These expectations are focused on the generosity of 
the new sultan, which can easily be associated with the accession. The eulogy comes to 
an end with the decisive phrase: “It is the era of Sultan Süleyman” [Sultan Süleyman 
devridir]. Thus, the transformation in the mind of the poet is complete.461 
2.2.4 The Enthronement 
Enthronement marks the last ritual phase of Süleyman’s accession. The 
enthronement consists of two main stages. The first stage is when the various office 
holders and household members present their loyalty through kissing the hand of the 
sultan, the ritual ceremony of the bi‘ât. The second stage is the issuing of the official 
proclamation to provinces and other interested parties, which registers the sovereign 
rights of the sultan.  
A ritual ceremony is by default a formal event. As such the enthronement 
incorporates certain actions “performed by authorized people with respect to eligible 
persons or entities under proper circumstances in accordance with proper 
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procedures.”462 Besides being repetitive and stereotyped, a ritual is likely to occur at a 
special place463 which is the Palace in our case. Rituals also involve special objects. The 
main object defining the bi‘at as a ritual is the throne in our case. A scrutinizing reading 
of the narratives of the Ottoman chronicles brings to mind another question. So far we 
have dwelled upon the urgency to attain the throne which happened to be in Istanbul in 
order to attain the sovereign authority. This sounds pretty much as if the throne was the 
essence. On the other hand, the statements of contemporary authors reflect a valuation 
of the throne with the presence of its possessor. Celâlzâde, for instance, talks of 
Süleyman’s “honoring with his fortune-augmenting shade the throne which remained 
without soul” upon the death of Sultan Selim and “adorning the world-protecting throne 
and the felicitous Ottoman seat with his world-beautifying face.”464 Sa‘di describes the 
situation as “like his [Selim’s] body without soul and his figure without life, his throne 
and realm were left desolate.”465  
We have mentioned previously that Süleyman did not ascend on the throne with a 
coronation or investiture rite. Contemporary Ottoman accounts do not provide a solid 
day for the enthronement. Defining and timing a single obedience ceremony is also 
rather difficult.  However, it is possible to find a ceremonial moment of obedience in an 
enthronement event related by the chronicles. Although no exact date is provided for 
this event, the accounts of the enthronement follow that of the funeral; therefore it 
should have been taken place right after the funeral or on the next day. There seems to 
have been some kind of obedience ritual on the day of arrival.466 Sa‘di, for example, 
places the enthronement on the day of arrival. According to the author, Süleyman 
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ascended a pulpit [kürsi] and showed himself to the public.467 Celâlzâde mentions 
Süleyman being seated on the throne as he arrived in Istanbul, as well. According to the 
author, as Süleyman ascended the throne, Piri Paşa gave orders for the ‘ulemâ  and the 
soldiers to be ready to kiss the sultan’s hand at the imperial divân next day. The next 
day, according to the author, after the prayer at dawn, the Sultan got out and sat on the 
exalted throne [taht-ı mu‘allâ]. Following “ancient custom” ‘ulemâ, müderrisîn, fuzâlâ 
and servants kissed his hand to salute his reign.468 Nasuh mentions that Süleyman 
“ascended the throne in his father’s stead on 18 Shawwal”469 signifying the day after his 
arrival. A letter from Ragusa dated 21 October to Venice, states that Selim’s son 
Suliman came to Constantinople peacefully and on the first day of October assumed the 
crown of the Imperio without anyone being harmed.470 A letter dated 4 October from 
Constantinople by the Venetian bailo Contarini confirmed the trouble-free accession 
Süleyman.471 Contarini reports that Süleyman went to the Palace upon his arrival 
accompanied by his slaves and the janissaries. He rode between the Agha and the Kadı. 
He was presented with the obedience of those present, as well as that of the viziers who 
dismounted to present fealty. This, according to Contarini, was the day before the 
funeral.472 
The ceremonial aspects involved in the event emphasize a renewal of the pre-
existing political status quo as well as a reconfirmation of previous obligations and 
privileges. In other words, the “state” is renewed with the accession of each ruler, also 
implying a contractual mechanism.  With the phase of the enthronement ceremony of 
Süleyman we witness the culmination of the accession process whereby the “cosmic 
order that the death of the previous monarch had broke was renewed.”473 A 
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contemporary expression of the dual concept of disruption and renewal of “state” in 
each period of succession exemplified clearly by Ada‘i. The author states that Selim’s 
person was the life of the realm, and the continuity of the contract of the realm 
depended on his presence. Thus, when he [Selim] was gone, “the body of the realm 
remained lifeless.474 Ada‘i stresses that “throne of the sultanate remained without a 
ruler” upon Selim’s death,475 he immediately informs that although “the father is gone; 
the world is left to the son, the rose garden left to the productive branch.”476 Then, Ada‘i 
expresses that “the state acquired validity when Süleyman sat on the throne.”477 
Contracts often accompany rites of passage.478 According to Cemal Kafadar, bi‘at 
is not merely a matter of kissing hands, but the expression of a contract involving the 
higher ranks of the ruling elite.479 Ertuğ defines the homage as subjects approving the 
ruler individually.480 The bi‘ât [bay‘a] in Islamic monarchical tradition can be regarded 
as the counter part of the oath in Western coronations. On the accession of Mamluk 
sultans, for example, amirs and others would take an oath of allegiance to the ruler as 
sovereign after which the sultan would be enthroned.481  
The ‘bi‘ât involves a very specific act of deference, namely hand-kissing. This is 
a bodily act which requires the participant to kneel down before the recipient. The 
participant is not merely stating his subordination, but physically displaying/visualizing 
it without leaving room for ambiguity. In other words, “[he] identifies his inseparable, 
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indispensable and enduring body with his subordination.”482 Acts of deference, by 
definition:  
contain a kind of promise, expressing in truncated form the actor’s avowal 
and pledge to treat the recipient in a particular way in the on-going activity. 
The pledge affirms that the expectations and obligations of the recipient, both 
substantive and ceremonial will be allowed and supported by the actor. Actors 
thus promise to maintain the conception of self that the recipient has built up 
from the rules he is involved in.483  
An obedience ceremony dramatizes the transference of authority. As 
organizations can be represented symbolically, a person’s allegiance to an organization 
can be represented symbolically.484 Along with establishing who has the ultimate 
authority, this ceremony also defines the degrees of authority along the political and 
social hierarchy. In other words, it ritually defines and manifests the power relations 
between people.485 Participants in such a ceremony through acting as expected transmit 
two levels of messages, one “concerning their own current physical, psychic, or 
sometimes social states to themselves and to other participants” and one referring to 
“processes or entities outside the ritual” which reflects an enduring state.486 In this 
respect, when an official kisses the hand of the new sultan he demonstrates his 
allegiance to the new sultan as well as his acceptance of the set of ties and values the 
sultan represents. He demonstrates this allegiance not only to the sultan, but also to 
other participants. Thus, while on the first level the bi‘ât indicates the confirmation of 
Sultan Süleyman’s right to rule, on the second level it is the confirmation and 
reproduction of the current political system and world view. The whole process is a 
public act of acceptance of a public order visible both to the witnesses and to the 
performer himself, which is not to be confused with the participants’ private states of 
belief. Ritual, in this sense shows the rule and the norm upon which public order is 
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based. Theoretically, refusal to participate is always an option – participation resting to 
some degree upon choice.487 On the other hand, sixteenth century Ottoman politics 
would probably not leave much space for opting non-participation. 
An indispensable part of the enthronement was the distribution of money, gifts 
and promotions which marked the renewal of the contract between the Sultan and his 
“servants.”  As standard procedure, such distribution is exemplified in the Shahnama, 
for instance at the enthronement of Dara: “Then he opened his father’s treasuries, 
summoned his warrior, and distributed their pay. He raised the stipend of those who had 
received four coins to eight, paying one man with a goblet full of coins, another with a 
bowlful.”488 
Modern research on gift-giving, in the very different context of consumerism, 
agrees that gifts are “agents of social exchange and communication” and are “used to 
establish or maintain social roles” as well as “help strengthen social ties.”489 Gift-giving 
in the context of pre-modern societies, furthermore function as a mode of 
redistribution490 and as a bonding device491 to create moral obligation.492 Being public 
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and visible, gifts in this context also legitimize self-assertion. The basic dynamic 
underlying these functions is that gift giving is a reciprocal practice. In our case, the 
reciprocity is not symmetrical. In other words, the Sultan offers something with an 
economical value whereas the recipient reciprocates with a moral obligation. This 
asymmetry, it has been argued, forms the basis of political authority. As the counter gift 
moves away from reciprocity, the proportion of counter-services offered by the 
recipient increase. Counter services figure as symbolic forms of gratitude like homage, 
respect, obligations, moral debt.493 
The accession gratuity paid to the household troops signified “the renewal of the 
contract based on mutuality of ‘benefaction and service’ between the dynasty and the 
household.”494 We witness the virtue of such acts of largesse as a bonding device in 
former chronicles. Fifteenth century chronicler Neşri, for example, has Osman Beg 
advise his son Orhan “never to neglect gifts [in‘âm] and favors [ihsân] to his servants 
[nöker], because man is the slave of gifts.”495 In this sense, we are reminded that the 
virtue of liberality has been one of the building blocks of the Ottoman enterprise from 
the earliest times of its existence. Writing the earlier parts of his history during the reign 
of Bayezid II, Kemalpaşazade dwells on the matter in a similar manner. According to 
the author, when Bayezid arrived in Istanbul to succeed to the throne, he rewarded 
2,000 aspers to each member of the household troops. Kemalpaşazade states that “the 
new ruler bonded the servants to himself through gifts” and “the gifts of the ruler tied 
                                                                                                                                         
them personally, “tying” them, in short, creating a bond between persons. The 
transformation of any given kind of capital into symbolic capital, a legitimate 
possession grounded in the nature of its possessor, is the fundamental operation of 
social alchemy (the paradigm of which is gift exchange). It always presupposes a form 
of labor, a visible (if not necessarily conspicuous) expenditure of time, money and 
energy, a redistribution, in the form of the recognition granted by the person who 
receives to the person, who being better placed in the distribution, is in a position to 
give, a recognition of a debt which is also a recognition of value.” 
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the hearts of the soldiery to the throne.”496 According to Kemalpaşazade, when 
Süleyman ascended the throne, he distributed 2,000 dirhem to each member of the 
household. Ironically, the actual payment was made with coins issued in his father’s 
name [Selîmhâni].497 This should come as no surprise since the right to issue coins is 
part of the accession process and it would have been impossible to prepare coins in 
Süleyman’s name both in terms of time and perhaps “political correctness.” Other than 
the gratuity, the cavalry were given a rise of five dirhems and the infantry a rise of two 
dirhems. Office and fief holders also got raises.498  
The amounts paid to the household troops and the raises they received were 
carefully recorded in Venetians reports, moreover these reports were sent from Venice 
to other “Christian princes.” According to these reports, 607 sacs were taken out of the 
treasury on 22 October for the purpose of these extra payments. Each of the sacs 
contained 50,000 aspers. In the report one ducat is calculated as 50 aspers, which results 
in a sum of 607,000 ducats.499 Contarini also mentions a quasi-negotiation in 
designating the amounts to be paid between the janissaries and the Sultan as the latter 
disembarked when he arrived in Istanbul.500 
Gifts offered by the Sultan on accession have an economic value, thus can be 
viewed in the sense of redistribution. However, the occasion, the form and manner of 
giving separates it from economic exchange and creates a moral obligation rather than 
an economic one.501  While the gifts – both given to and received from the Sultan – are 
a way of accumulating wealth in an economical sense, within the formal context of 
presentation they also create symbolic capital or rather symbolic power. Being public 
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and visible gifts, in our case, they can be regarded as “demonstrative expenditure” 
which Pierre Bourdieu defines a kind of “legitimizing self-affirmation.” In other words 
power and status becomes recognized and officialized through gifts.502 Actually, this is 
“conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital, which produces relations of 
dependence that have an economic basis but are disguised under a veil of moral 
relations.” Through transforming “arbitrary relations into legitimate relations, de facto 
differences into officially recognized distinctions,” Symbolic capital contributes to the 
reproduction and legitimation of the prevailing hierarchies.503  
The function of gift giving as a redistributive mechanism in Ottoman political life 
is exemplified in an account by Luigi Bassano as he talks about the giving of gifts 
regarding the ambassadors. The author emphasized that this was also a custom among 
Ottomans themselves. He listed the chain: 
 … this custom of gift giving is also current between themselves. The gran 
Turco often gives gifts to his viziers, and the viziers give to governors-general. 
These [give] to the aghas, aghas to governors, governors to the sergeants, 
sergeants to the voivodes, and the voivodes to the cavalry, and the cavalry to 
their inferiors, and like this it goes from hand to hand.504  
Accession did not only have to do with giving but also receiving once again we 
are dealing with a universal notion.505 While members of the household “gave” their 
obedience in return for the gifts and favors; higher ranking members of the system and 
representatives of foreign rulers presented gifts to the new ruler as they came to pay 
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homage and to reconfirm their status.506 The presentation of obedience by officials of 
various ranks or visits of the representatives of tributaries and other states can not be 
regarded only as a ritual of homage. Nor can they be defined as a single ceremony.  In 
one respect, these also seem to function as a fund raising method. Contarini’s report, 
dated 3 November, sheds light on the contemporary perception. According to the bailo, 
Süleyman was troubled about his financial situation after drawing out a substantial 
amount of money from the treasury to pay for the gratuities. When he shared his trouble 
with the grand vizier Piri Mehmed Paşa, the vizier’s reply was: “Signor, do not be 
unhappy. All provincial governors will now come to make reverence and they will 
present you gifts. Thus you will have new income and this way the treasury will be full 
again.”507 First of all, these words show that not everyone came on the day of the 
enthronement. This is hardly surprising since many of the high ranking officials were 
stationed in the provinces. Considering the time it took to communicate the news and 
the time it took for an official to travel to Istanbul, it would days or weeks before an 
official came or sent a proxy to pay his respects. Although the ceremonial in Istanbul 
marked the transfer of authority immediately the day after the funeral, the same was not 
actually true for the provinces; and they were informed only after the enthronement. 
The traveling time and conditions in the sixteenth century taken into consideration, a 
subject in Anatolia learned of this transfer after a few weeks. For example, Carlo Prioli, 
the Venetian consul in Damascus, reports having received the news of Selim I’s death 
on 23 October and having confirmed the news four days later.508 Once the official came 
to pay homage, kissed the sultan’s hand and presented his gifts, it would be his turn to 
receive some kind of recognition. This would be the renewal of his contract/license 
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[berât], usually accompanied by a ceremonial gown. This solemnly marked the 
transference of the individual official to the Sultan’s service from that of his deceased 
father and secured the individual’s place in the system.509  
As we have mentioned above, the second stage of the enthronement is the issuing 
of the official proclamation of accession. According to the chronicles, the day continued 
with the dispatch of decrees to the “well-protected domains” to inform the subjects of 
the painful news of the death of Sultan Selim and the joyful news of the accession of 
Sultan Süleyman in order to “mend the ruined hearts of the people.” The same decree 
also ordered the hutbe and sikke in the name of the new sultan. This order would be 
valid all around Rûm, ‘Arab and ‘Acem. The subjects were also asked to pray for the 
“reign” [eyyâm-ı devlet].510 The hutbe signified the formal declaration of accession as 
well as the legitimization of authority in the sacred sphere. The calling of the Friday 
prayer and the order to issue coins in the name of Sultan Süleyman along with the 
letters officially registered the full transference of sovereignty and power.511  
2.2.5 Declaration of Accession:  
The phases of accession analyzed so far took place in a specific place, namely 
Istanbul as the seat of the throne. No matter how discursive, the ritual elements which 
marked the transference of sovereignty were visible to a limited audience. For the 
accession process to be complete in the universal sense, it had to be declared to the 
wider world in a controlled manner. This was done through the official proclamations. 
Although the proclamation seems to be an imposition of an already materialized claim, 
the replies from the officials and the agreement confirmation requests from foreign 
states resemble a kind of contractual mechanism similar to that observed in the 
enthronement, at least on a theoretical basis.  
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While some accounts just mention that proclamations were sent all around, others 
carefully list the various regions. Such an example can be found in Bostan’s account 
where the author emphasizes that the proclamation reached as far as the limit of the 
“civilized world” [nihâyet-i ma‘mûre]. Bostan’s list includes Anatolia [Rûm], Arabia 
and Persia [‘Acem] which he explains as comprising Hijaz, Yemen, the Arabian 
peninsula, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Egypt, Damascus, Upper Egypt 
[Sa‘id], Ethiopia, Diyarbekr, Kurdistan, Iraq, Armenia, Caramania, Anatolia, Rumelia, 
Greek lands [arz-ı Yunan]. Finally he mentions the lands [diyâr] of Europeans [Efrenc], 
Slavs [Sakâlib], Russians [Rûs] and the steppes [deşt-i Kıpçak].512 The wide spectrum of 
geographic locations point at the wide claim of influence, if not of actual ruling power. 
Such listings are found as legitimizing factors and manifestations of claim in previous 
political traditions as well.513 
The proclamation of accession issued right after the enthronement have a dual 
character. On the one hand, it is a declaration of accession; on the other hand it is a 
confirmation of the recipient’s office. In order to understand the significance of the 
official proclamation of accession, we shall now try to analyze that sent to Hayrbay, the 
governor of Egypt.514 The declaration of accession has a legitimizing nature whereby 
the main tenets of Süleyman’s legitimate claim are introduced through the declaration 
of succession. The following confirmation of office reflects especially two aspects in 
terms of the renewal/confirmation process we are dealing with.  Both these aspects of 
the decree can then be regarded as comprising two parts in themselves.  
The declaration of succession contains two closely related, or rather sequential, 
messages: the death of Sultan Selim and the accession of Sultan Süleyman. These two 
messages convey a personal transition on one hand and a political transition on the 
other. First, Hayrbay is informed that Sultan Selim has died, in conventional words 
“passed from the temporal land to the eternal garden” [arsa-yı fenâdan ravza-yı 
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bekâya]. Then comes the consequence of this death: Süleyman’s accession.515  This part 
of the announcement declares what has been entrusted to Süleyman by the “will” of 
God: keys to the administration of the land and the people, keys to the expansion of the 
religion and the state, reins of the affairs of the realm. According to the document, these 
responsibilities were entrusted to Süleyman’s “sword of power” [kabza-i iktidâr] and 
his “domain of will” [havza-i ihtiyâr]. The divine legitimation provided in the document 
through these elements are then further enforced by stating that the title of “caliph” was 
bestowed on him by God as well as the title of “the shadow of God on earth” [‘umûm-ı 
‘âlemde es-sultân zıllullah fi’l-arz]. This part ends with the date of the enthronement 
and a request for all to thank God for this favor. 
Before listing the orders to Hayrbay, the letter refers to a verse from the Quran. 
This verse is related to the letter sent by Solomon to the Queen of Sheba asking for 
obedience. The quoted part refers to the letter being from Süleyman: “It is from 
Solomon, and is (as follows): 'In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful’.” 
The next verse asks for obedience: “Be ye not arrogant against me, but come to me in 
submission (to the true Religion).”516 Although this second verse was not included in 
the decree, the implication was probably quite obvious for the addressee. Rest of the 
decree, relating Süleyman’s orders to Hayrbay, reads almost like a manifesto of Sultan 
Süleyman’s understanding of good administration. The first order, in this sense, is to act 
justly and protect everyone. Hayrbay is reminded to respect all people with kindness 
without any discrimination of rank. He should make sure that all subjects are righteous 
and they do good deeds; he should employ cheerful manners and eloquent speech while 
doing this. Furthermore, he should “reinforce the regions of the nation” and “put in 
order the troops of the religion”, thereby removing treacherous and hostile cliques. 
Hayrbay is warned that negligence would not be tolerated regarding the protection of 
the realm and the men, due attention to righteousness and mischief, advise on the urgent 
affairs of the realm and the “nation” and attainment of the good will of all ranks of 
“religion and state.” Hayrbay is to take care in all matters regarding the high and the 
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low. It is stated that all people should be at rest under Hayrbay’s “shadow of favor and 
benignty.” Hayrbay should always be alert in improving justice and mercy, removing 
oppression. The last sentence summarizes what is expected: “Your caring eye and 
elevated favor should be on reinforcing the good/divine, and on ordering the garden of 
the Muslims, entering the righteous path and removing mischief.”517 
Hayrbay replied to the official proclamation by sending a man along with his gifts 
and letter. In the letter, he first confirmed his knowledge of the accession with the grace 
of God. This statement can be taken as the acceptance of the legitimate transference of 
authority. Then he went on to list the consequences of Süleyman’s accession, namely 
justice prevailing all around the realm and enemies distraught by his thrust. He 
confirmed that the Friday prayer and the issuing of coins were appropriately performed 
in the name of Sultan Süleyman. Furthermore, he informs that the proclamation was 
read on the day it was received and was announced all around Cairo and Upper Egypt. 
He then reports that Arabian sheikhs have sent their gifts to Cairo and that he sent these 
gifts along with his own.518  
A formal greeting and congratulation either personally or through proxy upon 
receiving the proclamation meant good will and peace, if not subordination.519 Accounts 
mention ambassadors of various countries coming to present condolences for the death 
of Sultan Selim and congratulations for the accession. They presented gifts and kissed 
Süleyman’s hand.520 We encounter various ambassadors received on the way to the 
Hungarian campaign in summer 1521. For example, the Florentine ambassador was 
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received in the camp at Sofia.521 Those who could not come themselves sent their gifts 
through “trustworthy” agents. Mehmed Giray Khan, for example, expressed his 
apologies in the letter he sent along with his gifts. In the same letter he also declared his 
servitude to Süleyman mentioning that the Ottoman court had always been a shelter for 
himself and his father from the time of Mehmed II.522 The Venetian ambassador at the 
court of Henry VIII had to face accusations of “allying with Sultan Solyman to the 
annihilation of the Emperor” when the ‘ahdname was renewed. Ambassador Antonio 
Surian had to explain to Cardinal Wolsey that “the mission of a Venetian ambassador to 
the Turk, it has always been the custom of the State to send one to every new sultan, to 
congratulate him, and confirm ancient treaties, and Sultan Solyman had sent an 
ambassador to Venice, announcing his accession.”523 
The renewal of contracts with foreign powers also happened upon the reception of 
the proclamation. The whole process of the confirmation of peace with Venice upon 
Süleyman’s accession can be traced in detail from contemporary Venetian reports. This 
case is especially interesting because it involves a dual process of change of 
government. The process started with the accession of Süleyman as the agreement had 
to be renewed with each new reign. However, even before the Venetian ambassador had 
a chance to make his case before the Sultan, the Doge of Venice died. Under these 
circumstances, the documents in the ambassador’s possession became invalid; and new 
documents had to be produced for the ambassador to present the Sultan. The 
confirmation/renewal of the peace with Venice could only be realized in December 
1521, more than a year after Süleyman’s accession.  
The first on-site response to Sultan Süleyman’s accession in the name of Venice 
came from the Venetian bailo Tomasso Contarini who was stationed in Istanbul. In his 
report dated 15 October, Contarini wrote that he was asked by the viziers to come and 
kiss the hand of Signor Suliman on a given date. He went to the Palace on 6 October as 
required. He reported that he went “to congratulate His Majesty on his peacefully 
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becoming Signor in place of his father with whom the Signoria had been in peace.” He 
also extended his wishes to keep the peace. Contarini wrote that Süleyman did not 
respond, but he kissed the Sultan’s hand congratulating him in the name of the Signoria. 
That day the Ottoman ambassador to Venice was designated. Contarini admits to having 
dinner with this person who seemed to be wise and prudent. He told Contarini that the 
purpose of his mission was to confirm the peace.524  
The reception of the Ottoman ambassador in Venice is worth noting, for he was 
the first official contact Süleyman had with the outside world as reigning Sultan. The 
ambassador with his train of eight people seems to have reached Venice on 12 
November 1520 without prior notification of arrival. Next morning twenty gentlemen 
were assigned to visit him and make excuses for not having known about his arrival. 
Otherwise they would have sent a suitable delegation to greet and honor him. They were 
also to pay for the expenses of the previous day. Thus the gentlemen, among whom 
Sanuto himself, visited the Ottoman ambassador and made arrangements to take him to 
Collegio the next day. On 14 November, twenty four gentlemen went to accompany the 
ambassador to the Collegio and to conduct him to the Doge. When he arrived, the Doge 
rose from his seat with the help of the pages, approached a little and reached the 
ambassador’s hand receiving him cheerfully.525 On November 14, the ambassador sent 
by Sultan Süleyman presented the Doge his letter dated October 10. The letter 
announced the death of his father and his entry in the “imperial seat” on September 29. 
In the letter, Süleyman stated that he sent his slave for maintaining the peace that was 
with his blessed father, so that merchants and subjects could live in peace.526 Venetians 
do not seem to be satisfied with this explanation. They send Andrea Gritti to the 
ambassador to inquire any disguised purposes. Sanuto emphasizes that Gritti was 
chosen for the job because he was experienced on Constantinople and the Turks. 
However, Gritti was unable to spot any other motive on the part of the ambassador. His 
mission was only to bring the letter to Venice, receive the reply and take it back.527 
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While Contarini’s visit following the enthronement was acceptable as a first 
response, the tension caused by the delay of the Venetian ambassador attests to the 
significance of the process. Although the bailo paid the necessary visits of good will 
during the first days of his reign, Sultan Süleyman required an official envoy from 
Venice specifically sent to congratulate his accession and confirm peace. Venice, 
surely, did not wish to lose the Sultan’s favor. Rumors had already started to spread that 
the Venetian peace was no more in effect because Venetians neglected to re-affirm it. 
When the expected envoy did not arrive for more than a year, Ottoman administration 
became more and more suspicious. In March 1521, Contarini wrote to Marco Minio that 
people were using “strange words” regarding the delay of the ambassador.528 The 
designated ambassador Marco Minio could not make it Constantinople before Süleyman 
left for the Hungarian campaign in May 1521. In his letter dated June 14, Contarini 
related the annoyance of the viziers due to the delay of the ambassador. He also drew 
attention to the fact that many started to believe that “the Signoria was not in peace with 
the Sultan anymore since nobody was sent to re-affirm it.”529 In his letter dated 8 July, 
Contarini again warned the Signoria that many things were being murmured about the 
delay of the ambassador.530 There were even rumors that the Venetians were waiting for 
the result of the campaign.531 Chasing after the Sultan, Minio still had not succeeded to 
find him by the end of July. In the meanwhile, Doge Loredan died in June; and Antonio 
Grimani was elected as his successor. On 28 July, the new Doge wrote Sultan Süleyman 
another letter to congratulate his accession anew. He apologized for not being able to 
deliver this earlier due to the death of the former Doge, Leonardo Loredan. He 
explained that the letter by the former Doge had to be renewed and thus the letter was 
delayed. He also begged that Süleyman believed his loyalty.532 On 28 October 1521, 
after more than a year following Süleyman’s accession, the Ottoman ambassador 
expressed that his master was much surprised that after his accession and his re-
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acquiring Syria the Signoria had been so late to send an ambassador. The Doge had to 
explain that it was not negligence that caused the delay, and that they had assigned 
someone immediately after Süleyman’s accession. However, the ambassador was sick 
for a long while already in Venice and did not get any better either in Corphu or in 
Candia.533  
Venice wrote a congratulatory letter to Süleyman and an envoy was assigned, as 
soon as the news was received. The letter addressed “the most serene and excellent lord 
Solimano.”534 The letter starts with words of sorrow in the face Selim’s death, who is 
referred to as a valiant, wise and just lord – and one who was on good and peaceful 
terms with Venice. The mourning mood suddenly changes in the next sentence which 
refers to the news of Süleyman’s accession. This accession is defined as “happy” and 
“glorious” and as one which was met with satisfaction and joy by all signori and popoli. 
The letter goes on to say that the joy Venice felt on his accession was the more since the 
letters of the bailo confirmed the justness, goodness, wisdom, and valiance of “His 
Majesty.” These virtues, believes the Doge, shall cause him reign for long years with 
prosperity regarding all his dominions and with content of his friends. The letter ends 
with words of congratulation and wishes of sincere and long enduring peace and 
friendship as in the time of Süleyman’s father, informing on the mission of an 
ambassador for this end.535  
Even though the above mentioned letter was written instantly, in early 1521 
Venetians were still trying to designate the ambassador, and the nature and worth of 
gifts to be sent.536 Marco Minio, the ambassador in question, left Venice on 21 May 
1521.537 By that time Süleyman had already marched off for the campaign. He reached 
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Istanbul on 27 September;538 but he had to wait until Sultan Süleyman returned from the 
campaign. His first audience took place in the beginning of November.539  Minio’s 
report demonstrates reluctance on where he should have found the Sultan. He seems to 
have planned to find him on the way; but then he waited in Istanbul. The ambassador’s 
report also provides details of the reactions to his delay.540  It was only then that the 
agreement negotiations speeded up. 
Although the text of the agreement closely resembles those of the former 
treaties,541  Minio’s accounts show that many rounds of negotiation preceded the final 
text. While the final agreement is considered to be a “renewal” of peace, earlier practice 
regarding the peace agreements [‘ahdname] demonstrates that these were not mere 
renewals or confirmations, but carefully negotiated documents. In the case of the 1503 
treaty, for example, at least three documents were prepared through 20 months of 
negotiations: a preliminary Ottoman text, a Venetian text sealed by the Doge and the 
final Ottoman ‘ahdname.542 
The similarity of the texts both in terms of wording and content imply a strong 
sense of continuity and stability.543 Another factor providing the sense of continuity is 
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the reference all texts make to the peaceful relations during the reign of the previous 
ruler. Although there are only slight differences in wording, each document contains 
some unique articles not found in the previous one. This is hardly surprising since 
particular situations of the moment must have had some effect. On the other hand, 
Süleyman’s text seems to possess a firmer stance compared to that of Bayezid II and the 
origin of this change of stance can be traced back to Selim I’s text.  
Selim’s and Süleyman’s texts begin with the same expression.544 Both Selim and 
Süleyman introduce themselves as “sultânü’s-selâtin, burhânü’l-hâvâkin Sultân ... Şâh 
bin Sultân ...”, whereas Bayezid introduces himself only as Sultan Bayezid bin Sultan 
Selim Şah. Bayezid’s text informs about his accession and tells how rulers from all 
around came to him for treaties of peace. Bayezid mentions his father’s friendship with 
the Doge of Venice and says that he himself saw that being in peace with Venice would 
be effectual in keeping the order of the realm.545 Neither Selim’s nor Süleyman’s text 
contain such an explanation or justification. Both texts directly mention that the 
Venetian Doge has sent an ambassador to the sultan’s court to request “a renewal of 
peace” [tecdîd-i ‘ahd] based on the friendship of the deceased father and that they 
(Selim and Süleyman respectively) accept the offer of friendship and peace.546 The vow 
which follows is quite simple in both texts: “I swear by God...” In the 1482 text, 
however, Bayezid swears on “[his] sword, the souls of his father and ancestors, the 
heads of [his] sons, [his] head and life, the reverence of the 124,000 prophets, the soul 
of the Prophet, the power of the Quran, [his] religion and the God.” The numerous 
tokens put forth for a persuasive pledge in the 1482 text are absent in the latter two 
texts. This absence along with the lack of pre-meditation as to the usefulness of the 
agreement suggests two things. Firstly, the renewal agreement seems to have become a 
quasi-automatic device in the regular course of relations. Secondly, neither Selim nor 
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Süleyman felt the need to fortify their credibility through putting forward almost 
everything they valued. An oath by God seems to be assurance enough. It is also worth 
noting that the oath binds the Ottoman sultan before God and not before a Christian 
ruler.547 
There are a few differences between the 1482 text and the later two. The 1482 text 
refers to the current Doge and the one who shall succeed him, while the 1513 and 1521 
texts specifically mention the Doge by name and do not refer to successors. Thus, 
neither Selim I nor Süleyman bound their successors. This feature of the texts 
emphasizes the principle of renewal with each new sultan, and reinforces the idea that 
each reign is a new beginning.548 There is an article in all three texts pertaining to the 
inviolability of places Venice might acquire in the future. The 1482 text does not bring 
any limitations as to the nature of these possible conquests. The 1513 and 1521 texts, on 
the other hand, specifically mention that these possible conquests should not be Muslim 
lands, should not be within Ottoman borders and should not be Ottoman tributaries. The 
addition of such a warning demonstrates not only a precaution to avoid a possible casus 
belli, but also a demanding and authoritative stance by the Ottoman sultan. This 
demanding and authoritative tone becomes more and more apparent in the 1521 text, 
whereby it is stated that when Venetian ships chance upon any ship authorized by 
Sultan Süleyman, they should fold their sails to demonstrate their friendship and 
obedience. Another article in the 1521 text – but not in the former ones – requires that 
any prisoners taken from pirate ships should not be executed but sent to Süleyman alive. 
Another addition to the 1521 text relates to conflicts the bailo himself might be involved 
in while in Istanbul. According to this article, if somebody has a conflict with the bailo, 
the case shall be heard at the imperial council. If the sultan is away in campaign, the 
case shall be heard by the judge with the presence of the guardian of Istanbul. Such 
seemingly small details gradually add up to convey a more sophisticated and superior 
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image of the Sultan while the general content and wording keep the appearance of 
dynastic continuity.  
2.3. Marking of Sovereign Authority 
So far we have seen a generic accession process. At this point, it would be proper 
to talk about the medium-term consolidation of sovereign authority through which 
things start getting personalized. In other words, the generic transference of sovereignty 
from the deceased ruler to his legitimate successor is theoretically completed. From this 
point on, Süleyman takes over the authority as an individual person. This process, in the 
medium-term, is marked by two issues. Firstly, he demonstrates his capability of good 
government through the administration of justice. Secondly, he eliminates a major 
challenge to his authority. This section examines how these two issues contribute to his 
image in the medium-term. 
Contemporary chronicles examined in this study all start with an account of the 
first deeds of Süleyman right after the accounts on the enthronement. Without exception 
these deeds are related to justice.  Three of these deeds are conveyed in all accounts: the 
removal of the ban on Persian trade, permission for exiles to return, the execution of an 
oppressive officer. Accounts start with a generic explanation of how justice prevailed 
after the accession of Sultan Süleyman and then go into detail about the three deeds 
mentioned above. Thus, the new sultan moves gradually from being the new link in the 
dynastic chain to being an individual ruler. 
The revolt in Syria following Süleyman’s accession, at a time when he was yet to 
establish a firm standing of his own, may appear as unfortunate at first sight. This 
revolt, however, may also be viewed as a vital step in the process of consolidation and 
integration of a newly conquered region and a newly acquired authority. Selim I 
acquired the land of the Mamluks by military force, but apparently did not have time to 
establish firm Ottoman hold on the area. In other words, securing a firm Ottoman 
standing in the region was a task yet to be completed when Süleyman ascended the 
throne. This situation posed threat and an opportunity for Sultan Süleyman. The threat 
posed by the subsequent revolt was possible territorial loss and a blow on authority, 
which was fought back through military might. Looking back retrospectively, the revolt 
151 
 
provided an opportunity to strengthen Süleyman’s authority through transformation of a 
political challenge to a political crime. Thus, once the rebels were suppressed through 
established means of violence, their actions would come to signify a crime against the 
political norm. Through the “order” brought by the Sultan as opposed to the “chaos” 
caused by the rebels, this political norm, namely the rule of the Sultan, would be 
confirmed and emphasized.  
2.3.1 Making Things Right: Promoting Justice and Removing Oppression 
Ottoman chronicles from earlier times onward begin to relate the reign of a Sultan 
with his administration of justice as soon he ascends the throne. Accordingly, it is 
possible to arrive at an understanding of contemporary meaning of justice. When 
sources talk about justice being the prime virtue, for instance, what do they actually 
mean and are they consistent about the meaning they reflect? The first deeds of 
Süleyman provide an interesting exercise, both in terms of defining justice and the way 
Süleyman appropriated it as a legitimating virtue. Justice [‘adl] is generally defined in 
relation to impartiality and in opposition to oppression [zulm]. Cafer Paşa was accused 
of cruelty and oppression towards the people, as justice required the removal of cruelty 
and oppression. The same justification holds for the execution of some household 
cavalry regimental officers [silâhdâr ağaları]. These incidents help define justice as the 
antithesis of oppression. The removal of the ban on Persian trade was also linked to 
justice because it caused a group of subjects, in other words some portion of the people 
whose welfare the ruler was responsible for, to suffer. This incidence brings to mind the 
concept of justice often emphasized by the “circle of equity” in “Islamic” texts as 
influenced by Persian tradition. According to this formulation, the world is perceived as 
a garden and the ruler as the fence defending the garden: “The ruler is supported by 
soldiers; soldiers are maintained by money; money is acquired from the subjects; the 
subjects are protected by justice and justice is maintained by the ruler.”549  Justice taken 
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out of this equation, we shall realize that subjects would not be protected, thus damaged 
subjects would not be able to produce income, such an outcome would disable the ruler 
to maintain soldiers and if there are no soldiers the ruler would not be able to defend the 
country and the whole order would collapse. These instances reflect a sense of 
collectivity involved with the concept of justice.550 All three instances have another 
common aspect which helps define the notion of justice. In all three cases, it is the 
common people who come up to the new Sultan with a complaint. Sultan Süleyman in 
return lends an ear to these complaints with impartiality, disregarding any notion of 
rank.  
Kemalpaşazade’s title for this section of his work clearly announces that the 
“Süleyman [Solomon] of the Age” abolished the unjust oppression and made the world 
prosperous through justice.551 Starting with a reference from the Quran regarding 
justice,552 the first few sentences of the account seem to be quite conventional. 
Kemalpaşazade says that the Sultan executed the orders of justice and thus made all 
places prosperous. According to the author, Süleyman removed and abolished 
oppression and cruelty from the regions under his protection through the light of justice 
and thus raised the banner of the religion of Muhammad up to the skies. Kemalpaşazade 
also refers to a very conventional phrase in the following couplet, expressing that noone 
remembered the name of Anushirvan in Süleyman’s reign of justice.553 Numerous 
examples of reference to Anushirvan who was famous for his justice can be found in 
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earlier chronicles as well.554 The fifteenth century chronicler Kemal in Selatin-nâme, for 
example, praised Bayezid II saying he was so just that the fame of Anushirvan was 
forgotten. He also related how the troubles of the people had been cleared and the realm 
prospered through justice.555  
Sixteenth century writer Eyyubi dedicates a whole section to Sultan Süleyman’s 
justice. According to Eyyubi, it is justice that gives order to the realm whereas 
oppression brings much harm to the world ultimately causing the demise of the 
realm.556 Sa‘di emphasizes that the first thing Süleyman did was to ensure order in the 
realm. The author starts by a general praise of the Sultan’s attention on justice and law, 
then goes on explaining the specific deeds. First of these deeds in Sa‘di’s account is the 
license granted to exiles Selim I brought back from the Egyptian campaign. The episode 
as conveyed by Sa‘di does not really blame Selim for the suffering of the exiles, but 
puts the blame on the violation of an imperial order. In any case, according to the 
author, when Süleyman ascended the throne he saw how much these people suffered 
and let them go back to their homeland. People appreciated this merciful and fair act, 
showing their gratitude through prayers.557 Thus we are faced with not only a just ruler, 
but a merciful one as well. Sa‘di’s use of the word “specifically” [husûsen] before each 
particular act of justice contributes to the individualization process of Süleyman as the 
Sultan. 
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Bostan ties Süleyman’s sense of justice to a Quranic reference.558 He then goes on 
with a generic description of the effects of Süleyman’s justice on the realm. According 
to Bostan, through justice and care the realm attained such a level of security and order 
that the only danger left was the “dimples of the lover.” As a result all classes were in 
good terms with each other, peace reigned so supreme that “the wolf and the sheep were 
friends.”559 
In May 1518 [Jumada II 924], Selim I had issued decrees to ban trade with Persia, 
effective especially on silk. Through another decree Persian merchants residing in 
Aleppo were exiled to Istanbul.560 On his death bed Selim is attributed to have said to 
Piri Paşa:  
During the last years of my reign I have caused some oppression. My 
intention was the prosperity of the Muslims, my aim was the peace of the 
believers. God is a witness to this. Our inherited lands, which have been under 
our holding from the times of our forbearers and ancestors, were protected 
from the enemy. All circumstances related to saltanat are within our grasp. 
Inform my son about all.561   
Here we are faced with an admittance of a wrong-doing and regret. Whether 
Selim meant the confiscation of silk, we do not know. However, Celâlzâde’s insertion 
of such a passage of remorse can probably be seen in the context of Süleyman’s reversal 
of his father’s policies.562 Absence of references to the Safavis in Ottoman accounts 
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regarding the accession of Süleyman and its aftermath is also noteworthy in this respect. 
J.L. Bacque-Grammont sees the issue as the “totally different stand taken by Süleyman 
the moment he acceded to the throne,” in contrast to his father’s policy of open 
conflict.563 In Bacque-Grammont’s view, not being able to solve the problem through 
military means due to the resistance of the janissaries, Selim I was able to block 
possible conflict in Anatolia by a fatwa and closing the traffic. The embargo also meant 
cutting off Persia from the West.564 On the other hand, Süleyman paid care to the 
smooth operation of Mediterranean trade, as some of his later actions also indicate. The 
ban on Persian trade and confiscation of goods seem to have affected Venetian 
merchants as well. In his letter 4 October, Tomasso Contarini mentioned the matter of 
silk confiscated from Venetian merchants in Aleppo, reporting that the Sultan would 
release it.565 In his letter dated 30 April 1521, Contarini reported that the Signor ordered 
payments for the silk of the Persians, which his father had previously taken away to be 
put in his Treasury. Contarini also wrote that Süleyman gave license to return to many 
that were detained.566  
Kemalpaşazade explains the silk ban in terms of an economical embargo. 
According to the author, Sultan Selim banned all kind of trade and travel between 
Anatolia and Persia with the aim of cutting Ismail’s resources. The ban would have two 
consequences; firstly it would block the flow of weapons to Safavid land. Secondly, 
Safavid finances would decline since their income depended on trade dues. 
Kemalpaşazade says that the ban grew more and more strict, thus creating many 
misunderstandings resulting in confiscation of even unrelated goods. Thus, 
Kemalpaşazade emphasizes, when the ban was reversed workshops started working 
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again, shops were back in business and merchants satisfied. He is actually talking about 
a revival of trade.567 
Celâlzâde explains that in the days of Selim I, Persians acquired their weapons 
and other military needs from Anatolia. The author argues that the only solution Selim 
could find to wipe out the Safavis from Anatolia was to ban all kinds of trade and 
communication. However, not everyone obeyed the orders regarding the ban. Those 
who defied the order would be punished through confiscation of goods caught. 
According to the author, the orders remained susceptible to abuse around the border 
regions. Thus some officials seized the goods of innocent people, thus bringing about an 
oppressive practice. Those who suffered from these practices, the innocents as well as 
the merchants kept complaining but “the late Sultan would not lend them an ear, saying 
that they should be patient because this was a caution taken in the name of religion.” 
Celâlzâde then goes on to narrate how these aggrieved subjects came to Süleyman’s 
threshold and begged for mercy, how through clemency he ordered their goods to be 
returned, how the distribution was performed by the treasurers in full in a strictly 
equitable fashion and how these subjects prayed for the sultan in gratitude.568 
While informing his readers about the removal of the Persian silk ban, Sa‘di 
admits that a great amount of the goods of the Persian merchants were seized by the 
order of Selim I, although these merchants had documents entitling their trade which 
was supposed to protect their goods. The author attributes such action to the abuse of 
officials acting contrary to the orders of the sultan. However, he also says that such an 
act was brought about by the conditions of the time [muktezâ-yı hâl ü müsted‘â-yı 
zaman]. Nonetheless, these merchants had become needy and troublesome. Süleyman 
returned the goods to their owners, thus ensured himself fame for forever, according to 
Sa‘di. Regarding the exiles from Cairo, the author attributes the forced exile to the 
abuse of certain officials acting contrary to the orders of Sultan Selim.569 
Kemalpaşazade also attributes the suffering of the exiles to the wrong-doing of officials. 
Although those who were brought to Istanbul were the descendents of the Abbasids 
caliphs, according to the author, Sultan Selim’s orders did not target them but the 
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trouble-makers. However, officials misapplied the order. Kemalpaşazade claims that 
though Selim realized the mistake afterwards, he chose to ignore the situation because 
he was embarrassed to admit that officials performed a deed contrary to his will. It was 
only upon his father’s death that Süleyman became aware of the situation and remedied 
it by sending these people back. According to the author, it was clear to Süleyman that 
they should be sent back. Kemalpaşazade justifies his point by reference to a Quranic 
verse relating to the divine wisdom of Solomon.570 
Hoca Sadeddin reports from his father’s memories an interesting conversation 
between his father Hasan Can, Sultan Süleyman and Đbrahim Paşa. As the anecdote 
goes, Đbrahim told Hasan Can that Sultan Süleyman contradicted some of the deeds of 
his father and that he wished to learn about the reasons for these deeds. Süleyman 
interfered by saying: “It is not my place to oppose the acts of the deceased. You ask 
about your own doubts.” Upon this remark Đbrahim went on to ask whether a few of his 
deeds were not contrary to the customs of sultans: his imprisonment and execution of 
the envoys of the Shah, his marrying off Taclu Hanım to Taczade, his confiscating and 
transferring the property of the merchants, his imprisonment of a genuine seyyid like 
Mir ‘Abdu’l-Vahhab. Hasan Can clarified the justification of each act. Süleyman 
appreciated the explanations and awarded Hasan Can with a robe.571 This anecdote is 
perhaps one of the clearest indications of a policy change; yet the avoidance of 
Süleyman to directly challenge the decisions of his father indicates the subtle handling 
of the reversal. As the above-mentioned explanations of contemporary authors show, 
Sultan Selim was not blamed for his decisions, although the acts themselves were 
criticized. In this sense, it is possible to see Sultan Süleyman challenging his father’s 
decision but not his father. In other words, distancing himself and blaming corrupted 
officials for the misapplication of orders, Süleyman emerges as a just ruler who 
removes oppression, yet does not tarnish the reputation of the main source of his 
legitimacy, namely his father. 
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Chronicles place oppression as an anti-thesis to justice. Thus, it should come as no 
surprise that one of the first deeds of Sultan Süleyman was the execution of an 
oppressive officer. In contemporary accounts, the execution of Cafer Beğ figures as an 
example employed to demonstrate the justice of the Sultan through removal of 
oppression. Cafer Beğ was the governor of Gelibolu, and the admiral of the Ottoman 
fleet.572 All chronicles agree that he was a cruel and greedy man who hurt subjects 
without justification. All accounts report that he took away people’s possessions and 
killed men for no reason. Upon complaints he was first inspected, and then when his 
guilt was proved he was executed.573 Celâlzâde introduces Cafer Beğ as a man 
“infamous for his oppressive ways, known for blood-shed and looting.” According to 
Celâlzâde’s version of the story, it was one of his own agents [kethüda] who came to the 
Palace to inform about the misdeeds of his lord. Upon this information, Cafer Beğ was 
put under inspection. Once his illegimate activity and oppressive behavior was proved 
contrary to common law [kanûn-ı mukarrer], Sultan Süleyman ordered his execution 
based on religious law [şer‘-i kavîm]. This according to the author, the execution 
signified a warning for those prone to oppression, as well.574 Nasuh dates the execution 
in November 1521 [Dhul-Hijja 927]. He defines the captain’s guilt as “having bothered 
the subjects with his coveting hands whereas he should have been protecting the honor 
of the law of the Prophet.”575 The execution of the admiral of the fleet seems to have 
meant to serve as an example to other high ranking officers. “Seeing this execution,” 
says Kemalpaşazade, “the officers were filled with fear, the poor subjects were filled 
with peace and joy.”576 Bostan also gives this as an example of “oppression being 
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removed from the face of the world.”577 According to Nasuh, Süleyman’s aim in 
ordering the inspection and the following execution [siyâset] was to remove oppression 
through justice.578 Cafer’s execution was also regarded as a sign of the fairness of the 
Sultan, in other words it was an indication that the Sultan did not favor his magnates 
over the common people and treated everyone on equal bases.579  
2.3.2 Challenge Turns into Opportunity: The Challenge of Canberdi Gazali 
“Just as purity requires dirt for its very existence, so do political ideas of national 
interest require those that would undermine them to periodically dramatize their very 
meaning,” argues Albert Bergesen.580 Extending Bergesen’s theory on the creation of 
subversives in order to reaffirm the position of the prevailing authority in the national 
state to include other types of regime, we may conceptualize more clearly the 
transformation of threat into opportunity posed by the revolt of Gazali. Bergesen argues 
that “the modern nation state manufactures subversives to create a ritual contrast with 
its set of collective representations. The function of creating this symbolic contrast with 
images of collective political purposes is precisely to dramatize and reaffirm the very 
meaning of the images of the corporate state.” While arguing that “subversives can be 
undermining the people, the nation or a particular ideology”, Bergesen defines some 
ways of creating opposition to the nation and to all that it stands for. One of the ways 
Bergesen defines of creating opposition to the nation and to all that it stands for is 
“ideological opposition”, whereby the deviants are, by definition, in opposition to the 
central ideology of their countries and this provides the necessary contrast with the 
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nation’s collective purposes. A second way is through attacking or undermining 
national security through use of traitors, spies and the like. 581  
Seen in this context, the revoltees in our case are conflicting figures with the 
central Ottoman ideology and sovereignty. From the Ottoman point of view, as reflected 
in contemporary chronicle the “rebels” challenged the Ottoman sultan who was the 
representative of God on earth, who inherited the right of sword in the region 
concerned. Furthermore, they insulted the religion either by killing Muslims or looking 
up to the “kızılbaş” for help. They put the safety of the realm and the subjects, by both 
inviting the major political and ideological rival of the Sultan to meddle with their 
issues. Furthermore, they oppressed the people through exacting unjustified large sums 
of money thus ruining the land. Thirdly, although they earned their living through the 
Sultan, they betrayed him. This betrayal involved an attempt on the territorial 
sovereignty of the Sultan, as well as attacks on his soldiers, his treasury and his 
people.582 Such charges transform the revoltees into villains and their actions to political 
crime which required severe punishment. 
Canberdi Gazali was the governor of Damascus. After conquering Syria and 
Egypt, Selim I had appointed him governor of Damascus, placing Jerusalem and Gazza 
under his administration. A freed slave of the Mamluke sultan Qaytbay, Gazali was an 
influential lord of Qansuh al-Ghuri and Tumanbay. Upon Selim I’s death, he defied 
Ottoman rule and announced his sovereignty in the region, marking his claim with the 
traditional signs of sovereignty, namely having his name called in the Friday prayer 
[hutbe] and minting coins in his name [sikke]. He also invited Shah Ismail and Hayrbay, 
governor-general of Egypt to join his scheme. Hayrbay not only declined the offer, but 
informed the Sultan about the situation sending along the letters written by Gazali. As 
Gazali laid siege to Aleppo, vizier Ferhad Paşa was sent to take the situation under 
control. The provincial troops of Anatolia, Caramania and Rûm were assigned to help 
Ferhad Paşa along with 4,000 janissaries and the troops of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beğ of 
Dulkadır. Before Ferhad Paşa arrived, Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beğ defeated Gazali and 
removed the siege of Aleppo. Together with Karaca Paşa, the governor of Aleppo, he 
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chased Gazali and defeated him once again. Gazali was ultimately defeated in February 
1521 after the arrival of Ferhad Paşa.583 
Ottoman sources evaluate Gazali’s action as outright rebellion [isyân].584 Ottoman 
chronicles also regard Gazali as a man who awaited an opportunity to rebel. According 
to Nasuh, Gazali believed he found the opportunity when Selim died because he thought 
that there would be a power vacuum. According to Nasuh, Gazali either killed the 
Sultan’s men or converted them to his cause.585 According to Lütfi Paşa, upon hearing 
Selim I’s death Gazali broke his pact [‘ahd] and openly rebelled.586 Bostan argues that 
Gazali suffered from pride and lost his capacity to think, thus he made manifest his 
rebellion. The words Bostan uses for Gazali’s actions all have to do with oppression as 
well as rebellion.587 Chronicles also define his actions as “treason” [hıyânet].588 
Chronicles often emphasize Selim I’s employment of Gazali instead of executing him; 
thereby stressing the villainy of Gazali through not only revolt but betrayal as well.589 
Sa‘di’s moves forth the issue of divine kingship to imply that Gazali’s revolt not only 
targeted political authority but also God’s will. The author argues that since God 
appointed one of His servants to the position of pâdişâh, thus making this select servant 
superior to others; Gazali rebelled against the authority of God.590 Referring to a 
                                               
583
 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi II, pp.296-7; Jorga, Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu 
Tarihi, pp.300-1; Hammer, v.3, p. 6-8. For Venetian reports on Hayrbay’s role, see esp. 
Sanuto: 29:586-9. 
584
 Bostan (TSK), 7a; Nasuh, 13a and 15a; Lütfi Paşa, p.244-5. 
585
 Nasuh, 14b: “… eyyâm-ı fursata nâzir ve hengâm-ı kudrete muntazır olub 
durmışlardı …” and 15a: “eyyâm-ı fetret ve hengâm-ı fursattır diyü…”  
586
 Lütfi Paşa, p.244. 
587
 Bostan (TSK), 7a: tagallub, istiklâl, bagy, ‘udvân. Nasuh uses the word tuğyân 
as well as ‘isyân. Nasuh, 15a. Damascene historian Ibn Iyas also says that Gazali 
“became light headed and thoughtless.” However, one needs to keep in mind that Ibn 
Iyas, though not an official historian, was writing in Ottoman Damascus. See, David 
Ayalon, “The End of the Mamluk Sultanate: Why did the Ottomans Spare the Mamluks 
of Egypt and Wipe out the Mamluks of Syria?” Studia Islamica, no.65 (1987), p.137. 
588
 Sa‘di (SN), 120a; Nasuh, 15a. 
589
 Nasuh, 13b-14a. The author argues that Selim spared Gazali in the first place 
because he was a brave man.  
590
 Sa‘di (SN), 120a. 
162 
 
Quranic verse relating the insistence of the Pharaoh on keeping Egypt for himself and 
his ill-behavior towards Moses, the author draws a parallel between Gazali and the 
Pharaoh. He then goes on with the message Gazali sent to Hayrbay whereby he claims 
right of inheritance with regard to Egypt. Through first reminding the Pharaoh, the 
author nullifies what might otherwise be a legitimate claim based on ancient custom.591 
Similarly, Nasuh states that one who adhered to religion would resort to treason 
whereby the author associates the revolt with a breach of religion. Nasuh also mentions 
the role of pride in the “deviance” of Gazali.592 The author likens Gazali to Dimna, the 
treacherous jackal in Khalila wa Dimna.593 Nasuh also refers to Gazali as “ill-natured 
demon-humored” [div-nijâd-ı bed-nihâd].594 Through such literary devices chronicles 
not only villainize but also demonize Gazali to some extent.  
The effort toward the suppression of Gazali’s challenge is viewed as a campaign 
[sefer] and his defeat as a conquest [feth] in chronicles. Nasuh, for example, defines the 
suppression of the revolt not only as a conquest, but as the beginning of the great feats 
of the Sultan and as a manifestation of the legitimate sovereignty of the Sultan 595 
Although Süleyman was not active in the feat, the success is regarded to be his anyway. 
Nasuh, for example, comments that the Sultan while himself sat on his throne like a lion 
succeeded to make the enemies suffer and change their ways through moving his troops 
against them. Thus, he succeeded in bringing peace and quiet to the subjects under his 
protection.596 All chronicles emphasize the fact that all this happened under harsh 
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weather conditions.597 This, again, seems to be a reminder on how determined 
Süleyman was to remove any trouble or wrong-doing from the beginning of his reign 
on. 
The vast territorial expansion achieved within a couple of years brought with it 
the immediate need of manpower to administer and control the area. Selim I’s decision 
to solve this problem had been to letting the Mamluks survive and appointing a local 
governor rather than an Ottoman one.598 Although this decision was in keeping with 
former Ottoman conquests,599 it was not free of risk. The surviving Mamluks could still 
form a power base and attempt to re-establish Mamluk rule in their former territories 
overthrowing Ottoman rule.600 David Ayalon argues that the vast territory given to the 
jurisdiction of one single magnate was a very dangerous departure from the Mamluk 
policy toward the region. Under the Mamluks Syria consisted of seven provinces, each 
with its own governor or viceroy accountable to Cairo. Such an administrative 
organization made it almost impossible for any one of these men to get powerful 
enough to manifest any ambition to possess the whole region by eliminating all 
others.601 According to Ayalon, the revolt was a direct consequence of Selim I’s policy. 
He goes on to say that this was a fortunate event for the Ottomans as Gazali “gave the 
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opportunity to put an end to their Mamluk experiment in that country.”602 Bacque-
Grammont links the revolt of Canberdi Gazali to Selim I’s policy toward the Safavis 
rather than Süleyman’s accession. The author argues that Selim must have known about 
Canberdi’s communication with Shah Ismail or that Selim could even have schemed for 
the communication for a definite purpose. According to this proposition, if Canberdi 
appeared inclined to revolt, this would give Selim the opportunity to allure Ismail in to 
Syria to help the rebel. Ismail’s movement would then be considered as attack on 
Ottoman soil. In this case, the army would not feel the same way about attacking him. 
But, Bacque-Grammont argues, Selim’s sudden death complicated the scheme and 
Canberdi had to continue on his own.603 Selim I seems to have trusted Gazali with the 
safe-guarding of the Syrian territories against Safavid transgression.  
Damascene historian Ibn Tulun [d.1546] reports that in February 1518 [Muharram 
924] Selim I instructed the newly appointed governor Gazali to watch the Safavis and 
gather information about them. This was the first and only instruction by the Sultan to 
Gazali.604 According to one report, Gazali let Selim I know that any demonstration of 
his disobedience in the region would be just to make the Sophi believe so. Once Ismail 
came to believe in his fake rebellious intentions, Gazali would catch him.605 With or 
without the aim of drawing Ismail into conflict, it seems very probable that Gazali 
planned the insurrection with the intention of restoring Mamluk rule in the region before 
Selim I’s death. According to Sadi, for example, Sultan Selim was aware of the ill-
intentions of Gazali but did not live long enough to eliminate him.606  
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Nasuh’s account on the revolt emphasizes that former mamluks, who were 
dispersed around the region after Selim I’s conquest, kept gathering around Gazali.607 
Damascene accounts also confirm the local popularity and support Gazali enjoyed. 
Local historian Ibn Iyas relates the issue as such: 
When al-Ghazali revolted the people of Syria [ahl al-Shâm], including the 
commanders, the army, the bedouins and the semi-nomads joined him and said 
to him: ‘get up and proclaim yourself Sultan. For there is none in front of you 
whom you have to fear. As for us, we shall fight by your side to death.’ He 
was enticed by their words and proclaimed himself Sultan, and he became 
light headed and thoughtless. And how many a time haste was followed by 
regret! Thus he became Sultan in Syria, giving himself the title al-Malik al-
Ashraf Abû al-Futûhât. People kissed the ground in his presence, and his name 
was mentioned in the Friday sermon in the Umayyad mosque and in the other 
pulpits of Damascus. When he became Sultan people told him: ‘Go to Egypt, 
fight Khayrbak and take possession of Egypt, to which he answered: ‘Egypt is 
in my grasp [fî qabdat yadî]. I shall [first] go to Aleppo608 and liberate it from 
the hands of the Ottomans, so that I shall not have to worry about my rear. 
Than I shall go to Egypt’. Had he marched on Egypt before having marched 
on Aleppo, it would have been better for him, for the army of the Circassion 
mamluks and the people of Egypt [ahl Mısr] and all the bedouins would have 
risen against Khayrbak and would have joined him [i.e. al-Ghazali], for he was 
well-liked by the people [fa-innahu kâna muhabbaban lil-ra‘iyya].609 
Venetian reports prior to Selim I’s death attest to the fact that Gazali was already 
well-liked and obeyed all over Syria “like a sultan.” A contemporary Venetian observer 
believed that Gazali has much power, resembling that of a sultan. He reported that all 
the merchants were on good terms with Gazali, except for the governor of Tripoli.610 
Captain Bartolomeo da Mosto wrote from the east coast of Cyprus, Famagusta, as early 
as June 1520 that in Damascus Gazali could well be believed to be “sultan.” Along with 
the fact that “slaves” continued to gather around him, the popularity of Gazali led the 
captain to guess that one day Gazali would bring about a change in Syria.611 A letter by 
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Bartolomeo da Mosto, captain of Cyprus, dated 15 September 1520, gives signals of 
unrest in the newly acquired eastern provinces. The borders of the troubled region are 
clearly defined in the letter:  
In all parts, starting from the Greater India and Lower Egypt at the mounts of 
Syria and over the Euphrates, Caramania, Anatolia, Persia and then in the 
Black Sea, this Signor Turco is feared, despised by all neighboring signori. If 
any opportunity comes up they shall rebel, likewise in the land he has acquired 
in Syria. Everyone is on the edge, even if a major war does not break out, they 
wish to keep on raiding until a better opportunity comes up.612  
Captain Bartolomeo’s letter conveys the rumors in Cairo that Gazali would march 
against the Signor Turco because the Sultan was already aware of his schemes. Captain 
Bartolomeo stated that Gazali is well-liked by the Mamluks.613 It is worth underlining 
that this is before Süleyman’s accession. It is also unlikely that anyone in the eastern 
provinces would yet suspect the death of Selim I.  
If Captain Bartolomeo was right in his observations, Gazali seems to have thought 
he found the “better opportunity” with the death of Selim I, as a letter dated 27 October 
by Carlo Prioli from Damascus demonstrates. Prioli says that the news of Selim’s death 
reached the city four days before. He reports that Gazali called on him and said: 
“Consul, he who made everyone suffer and wished to make himself Emperor of the 
universe is dead. Now is the time to awaken and to assail these Turks.” Gazali is also 
reported to have wanted to be lord of Syria and asked the consul what the Signoria 
would think about it. According to this report, Gazali sent messengers to Shah Ismail 
and to Hayrbay to tell them that it was time to act. Prioli also reports that Süleyman’s 
letter of proclamation reached Gazali whereby he was informed about the accession of 
Sultan Süleyman and the renewal of his license as governor of Damascus.614 By 6 
November, the news Gazali’s ambitions were the talk of the people in Beirut. A 
Venetian wrote to his father that “when the news of the death of the Signor turco 
reached Damascus on 14 October, it occurred to signor Gazelli, of slave origin, who 
held Damascus in the name of Signor Turco, to occupy the lordship of Syria for 
himself.” He then tells about how Gazali’s men took hold of Beirut and how the 
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inhabitants were forced to cooperate with him.615 Damascene historian Ibn Tulun 
provides a slightly different timeline. According to Ibn Tulun two messengers arrived in 
Damascus on 24 October [12 Dhu’l-Qada] and broke the news of Selim I’s death and 
Süleyman’s accession. Gazali was in Beirut at this time. Three days later, on 27 October 
[15 Dhu’l-Qada], he returned to Damascus and declared revolt. Two days later he 
besieged the citadel. Ibn Tulun tells that once Gazali took hold of the citadel, he put on 
the Circassian dress and abolished the Ottoman dress, which conveyed that he wished to 
return to the “old ways” as soon as possible.616 
The Venetian bailo in Istanbul wrote to Venice about the revolt on 18 November, 
reporting that Gazali proclaimed himself “sultan” in Aleppo where he was situated with 
a huge number of people.617 An uneasiness regarding Gazali was already murmured in 
Venice in the beginning of November 1520. Rumor had it that Gazelli Signor di 
Damasco who had many followers defied an order from the Porte concerning the 
minting of coins.618 Although Ottoman accounts are silent on any such event, the timing 
of the rumors corresponds to Süleyman’s accession. One wonders whether the defied 
order has anything to do with minting coins in Süleyman’s name. 
Various Venetian reports confirm that upon receiving the news of Süleyman’s 
accession, festivities were held for three days in Damascus, Tripoli and Aleppo.619 
According to Zacharia Loredan, the general provider in Famagusta, at Tripoli the death 
of Selim I and the accession of his son Süleyman was announced on 21 October. 
Loredan confirms having heard that after performing three days of festivities, Gazali 
took hold of the castle of Damascus and killed all the Turks in the city, thus proclaimed 
himself  Soldan.620 Refusal to participate in such an act of deference would be “a way of 
being told that open insurrection has begun.”621 Thus, through executing the 
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celebrations Gazali performed the ritual act of “public acceptance” required of him and 
demonstrated that he knew the rules, which is not necessarily the same thing with “the 
invisible, ambiguous, private sentiment that is socially and morally binding.”622 
Theoretically, not acting up to the set of rules embodied in the celebrations, the 
rebellion becomes even sharper. On the other hand, if Ibn Tulun is right in saying that 
Gazali was not present in Damascus when the news came, the celebrations were 
performed without him thus do not have any demonstrative value on the part of Gazali. 
Ibn Tulun’s account brings Gazali in Damascus three days after the initial receipt of the 
imperial proclamation, by that time the celebrations would be over. 
The revolt in Syria was not only an outright challenge to the authority of 
Süleyman, but also a threat to financial and commercial life in a vital area. If the 
rebellion had to be suppressed immediately to save damage to the Sultan’s prestige and 
authority, it had to be dealt with as soon as possible to eliminate insecurity in the region 
and revitalize trade. The concern with trade is especially apparent in Venetian accounts. 
In a letter dated 12 November 1520, Alvise d’Armer, the lieutenant of Cyprus, reported 
from Nicosia, that Francesco Zacharia left to bring the tribute due to the Sultan. 
However, because of the disturbances which occurred in Syria after the death of the 
sultan, he could not go beyond Tripoli. Thus he forsook handing the tribute and came 
back to Cyprus.623 The Venetian consul in Damascus reported more than once that 
Ferhad Paşa assured him that news would be sent to Cyprus informing that trade was 
safe and merchants could resume their trade without worrying about being harmed.624 
Venetian merchants seem to have put on hold all their trading activity on the eastern 
Mediterranean. On 6 February, the governor of Tripoli lamented to the authorities in 
Cyprus over the exigency of robes which they needed to give to Arab magnates and 
others. The governor asked the authorities in Cyprus to convince merchants to come 
back to Tripoli. He assured them that it was safe and merchants would not be 
offended.625 Next day, the judge of Tripoli also wrote a letter confirming the words of 
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the governor.626 A Venetian in Aleppo expresses his concern about a possible attack by 
Gazali on the caravan to Mecca, which he thinks would bring great ruin.627 
The letter of the Venetian consul, dated 15 February, confirmed that Ottoman 
forces defeated and killed Gazali on 5 February, and entered Damascus without any 
obstacles. Once the Ottoman troops were in the city, the consul reported, they started 
pillaging the city. The consul’s house was also attacked; however he and his family 
were saved by an esteemed janissary. According to the report, once the pillaging was 
over the consul was summoned by Ferhad Paşa. When he went to the vizier together 
with some merchants, Ferhad Paşa related his misery over the unfortunate occurrence 
and promised to make up for the loss. The consulate also notes that the vizier stated that 
what was done against the Venetians was contrary to the wishes of the Sultan.628 Some 
Ottoman accounts reflect some trouble following the entry of imperial troops in 
Damascus. Nasuh reports that Ferhad Paşa executed an officer of a household cavalry 
regiment [silâhdâr] who behaved oppressively towards the inhabitants of the city. 
According to Nasuh’s version of the events, the rest of the troops were so angry at this 
execution that they attacked the tent of the vizier to kill him. They were only stopped by 
the intervention of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beğ.629 Bostan, on the other hand, defies any act of 
violence in Damascus. He says that on Ferhad Paşa’s orders guards were sent in the city 
before hand. The city was so well protected that the soldiers never a touched a thing 
belonging to the inhabitants.630 Through such accounts of remittal or smooth occupation 
demonstrating opposition against any kind of arbitrary act of violence, the Sultan’s 
reputation of being “just” remains intact. 
The head of Gazali was sent to Istanbul along with a proclamation of victory.631 
Italian reports sent to Venice about the incident suggest that the head was first displayed 
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on a lance in Damascus for three days before being sent to Istanbul.632 Through such an 
exhibition not only a lesson was given, but also the death of the “traitor” was made 
known to all for sure. This instance also served as an example of what happened to 
traitors, as a conventional maxim said: “Do not assume that a traitor can be successful / 
He is either decapitated or hung”633  
While Gazali was executed as a “rebel” and a “traitor”, Hayrbay who refused to 
participate in the movement was rewarded. Venetian reports tell that the Sultan sent 
Hayrbay a richly embroidered robe along with a sword allegedly belonging to Sultan 
Bayezid. According to Venetian perception, these gifts signified the love Süleyman had 
for Hayrbay and meant that he regarded the latter as a father while offering himself as a 
son.634 By communicating Gazali’s invitation to rebellion to the court and thus 
obstructing Gazali’s intentions, Hayrbay was actually following Süleyman’s orders in 
the proclamation. Through advising on the “urgent affairs of the state,” paying due 
attention to “mischief” and thus helping “remove treacherous and hostile cliques” as 
well as “oppression” Hayrbay proves to be a loyal subject of the Sultan in this story. 
Sultan Süleyman, on the other hand, emerges as the overseeing ruler who brought order 
to the realm. 
2.4 First Impressions 
Many of the accounts stress the concept of “merit” in Süleyman’s accession,635 
thus introducing his individuality. Merit, in this case, is based both on the divine grace 
involved in Süleyman’s sovereignty, and on his dynastic qualities. The emphasis on 
                                               
632
 Sanuto, 30:308. 
633
 Lütfi Paşa, p.245: “Hâyını sanma ki ber-hurdâr olur / Ya kesilür başı ya ber-
dâr olur” This reminds one the old wisdom on the decreasing life and livelihood of a 
rebel, see Emre, Terceme-i Pendname-i Attâr,  Azmi Bilgin (ed.) (Đstanbul: Enderun 
Kitabevi, 1998), p.114. For an earlier use of the exact same couplet by an Ottoman 
writer see, Tursun Beg, Tarih-i Ebu’l-Feth, p.118.  
634
 Sanuto, 30:308. 
635
 See, for example, KPZ, X:36-7: “…liyâkât ü istihkâk ile yer yüzinde hilâfet 
hil‘âtini ve saltanat libâsını giydi…” 
171 
 
merit, especially in earlier accounts, implies a legitimizing tone, or even a confirmation. 
According to Sadi, as the crowd gathered to welcome Süleyman on the day of his 
arrival into Istanbul they saw that he was a “Shadow of God” [sâye-i Allah]. He 
emphasizes this point by stating that “on his royal face, the blaze of state [envâr-ı 
devlet] and marks of sovereignty [âsâr-ı saltanat] were so apparent that the brightness 
of the rays of the sun appeared dim as a candle light in day light.”636 Describing the 
enthronement, Sadi mentions that looking at Süleyman’s face the onlookers saw “a 
youth with the mind of an old sage.” They also realized his likeness to Sultan Selim in 
terms of valor and magnificence [şehâmet ü mehâbet]. They liked and appreciated what 
they saw.637  
The celestial signs inaugurating Süleyman’s sovereignty can also be observed in 
contemproary accounts. A featured aspect of Süleyman’s succession, in this respect, is 
his being the tenth “caesar” and sultan from the Ottoman dynasty.638 In the beginning of 
his account, Bostan makes astronomical/astrological designations. Looking at the 
location of the planets on the day of Süleyman’s arrival, he interprets the signs 
regarding the coming reign and states how auspicious it was to be. According to the 
author, Scorpio was on the rise and there was a conjunction of Jupiter, Venus and the 
Sun. Jupiter attested to the stability and endurance of fortune [devlet] and felicity 
[sa‘âdet]. According to Bostan’s “astronomical” interpretation, the position of the 
planets attested to huge campaigns, as well as signifying that the new sultan would 
defeat the enemies of din ü devlet and all nations [tavâ’if-i milel]. The sun signified 
power and majesty, the moon meant that all people would reach prosperity. The 
ascending and descending nodes signified that his army would get stronger by the day 
and his enemies would fall. Through this cosmological reading, Bostan remains assured 
that Süleyman ascended the throne under a very auspicious sky.639 
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Many of the contemporary accounts emphasize the peaceful succession in 
Süleyman’s case. This was the first peaceful succession case Ottomans witnessed after 
that of Murad II in 1451. Nasuh underlines the fact that Süleyman became sultan 
without having to shed blood; he neither had to hurt his father nor fight and kill 
brothers. It was Sultan Selim who worked hard and suffered the troubles of the world 
without being able to enjoy the results. Sultan Süleyman, on the other hand, took over 
his throne and attained fortune.640 Although Sa‘di remains silent about absence of effort 
or trouble on Süleyman’s part, he emphasizes that the deceased sultan having crushed 
the enemy and having taken all kinds of trouble to correct the world, died without 
finding peace for himself.641 Another author of the same conviction is Lütfi Paşa. He 
asserts that Süleyman ascended the throne without strife in the realm.642 Lütfi Paşa goes 
on to state that Sultan Selim suffered the troubles of this world, turning it into an 
orchard by removing its mud and garbage. According to the author “Sultan Süleyman 
took possession of that orchard without effort and hardship, and enjoyed its fruits.”643 
The theme of enjoying the fruits of the efforts of the father appears to be part of the 
political vocabulary. Lütfi Paşa’s phrase brings to mind Machiavelli’s comments on 
succession following an extraordinarily successful father are noteworthy in this respect: 
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David was undoubtedly a man of the greatest excellence in arms, religion, 
and judgment; his ability was so exceptional that after he had conquered and 
overcome all his neighbors, he left to his son Solomon a peaceful kingdom, 
which Solomon was able to preserve with the arts of peace and not those of 
war, and Solomon was happily able to enjoy the fruits of his father’s ability. 
But he was unable to leave the kingdom to his son Rehoboam, who, lacking 
his grandfather’s ability and his father’s good fortune, remained heir to a sixth 
part of the kingdom only with great effort. Bajazet, sultan of the Turks, 
although a man who was more a lover of peace than of war, was able to enjoy 
the fruits of his father Mahomet’s labors; his father, like David, having beaten 
down his neighbors, left his son a secure kingdom that could easily be 
maintained with the arts of peace. But if the present ruler, his son Selim, had 
resembled his father and not his grandfather, that kingdom would have come 
to ruin, and it is evident that Selim is about to surpass the glory of his 
grandfather.644 
Giovio explains that Selim killed his two brothers and many of his nephews so 
that he could leave the Ottoman throne to his son Süleyman without competition.645 
Writing later, Mustafa Ali evaluates the absence of conflict on Süleyman’s accession as 
a benefaction granted from God.646 
As Selim I was perceived with awe in foreign political circles, the news of his 
death was well-received in the West. Actually it seems to have caused great joy among 
the rulers of Christendom. According to Paolo Giovio, Pope Leo was the happiest 
among all. Upon hearing the death of the Soldano, the Pope celebrated the letanie 
earlier, organizing processions in Rome. Leo X sent word all over Europe for 
organizing a campaign against the common enemy. “It was apparent to all,” wrote 
Giovio, “that a fierce lion had left behind a mild lamb as successor, for Solimano was 
young, inexperienced and of very quiet disposition.” But he also stated that later on 
many were to be deceived by this false appearance.647 According to Venetian reports, 
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Pope Leo X received the news while he was out hunting. Confirming what he heard 
with the letters from Venice, he is said to have congratulated the Venetian ambassador 
for such good news. He is attributed to have said: “He [Selim I] was a wicked man, we 
shall now be in peace and Christianity will be able remain secure.”648 Papal reaction to 
Selim’s death seems to be very similar to that of Mehmed II’s.  When Pope Sixtus IV 
confirmed the death of Mehmed II through Venice, he organized a mass at the church of 
Santa Maria del Popolo to thank God with the attendance of all cardinals and 
ambassadors. The “happy news” was announced to the inhabitants of Rome with 
gunfires and bells and was celebrated with fireworks at night.649 
On 11 November, Cardinal Campeggio wrote to Wolsey from Rome saying that 
he received news that the “sultan of the Turks is dead. Selim, the dread of the whole 
world has been cut off by pestilence, and Solyman his son has succeeded.”650 Another 
hopeful reaction came from Hungary. Venetian ambassador in Buda, Lorenzo Orio 
wrote on 18 November that “the death of the Turco has been confirmed there, as well as 
his son’s taking over the state.” Orio mentioned the general opinion on the new Sultan: 
“He’s peaceful and he will not be against Christians.” He also notes that this letter was 
written the day after Hungary received the “news of the coronation of Cesarea 
Maestà.”651 The news reached France via Venice on 5 November. Badoer, the 
ambassador of Venice in France, wrote in a letter dated November 6 about the reception 
of the news in France. When Badoer gave Francis I the news, the king had already 
heard it but Badoer’s statement confirmed the ambiguous news. Present in the room 
were also the ambassador of the Pope and the admiral [Armirajo]. The admiral 
suggested that it was the best time to chase the Turk out of Europe.” Francis replied: “If 
the Pope permits that the other Christian princes do the same, I will be the first to start, 
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and if need be I shall go in person.” Badoer says that the king did not argue any further, 
but only asked about the qualities of the “son of the Turk.”652 
The news of Selim’s death and Süleyman’s accession spread mainly from 
Venice.653 The news seems to have reached reached Venice on 21 October.654 On 2 
November it was confirmed through a letter from Ragusa, dated 23 October, that “the 
son of the signor Turco, named Sulaiman peacefully became Signor in 
Constantinople.”655 The first piece of information to the world about the qualities of 
signor Suliman was from Tomasso Contarini in his letter dated September 30. Since the 
letter was written on the day Süleyman arrived in Istanbul, the bailo could not have seen 
or heard much about him yet. Nevertheless, he informed Venice that Süleyman was 25 
years old, just and of perfect ability [qualita perfeta]. He also conveyed his hope that 
the new ruler would keep the peace with the Signoria.656 His letter, dated October 4, 
containing pretty much the same description was sent to other Christian rulers by the 
Signoria.657 His report dated 15 October provides further information since he had an 
audience with Sultan Süleyman by then. He was better informed. According to this 
report, the Signor was 25 years old. He was tall and lean. He had a delicate complexion. 
His neck was a little too long. He had a small face, a hooked nose, a thin mustache and 
little beard. He had a very agreeable face. His skin was white, but pale. Contarini 
reported the general opinion of the people that Süleyman was wise, prudent and liked to 
study. Contarini also heard people saying that he was a peaceful man who wanted to 
attend to his pleasure and thus wished that Piri Mehmed Paşa govern. The report also 
mentions Süleyman’s three sons. According to Contarini, everyone was hopeful of his 
good government.658 Contarini’s remark seems to reflect the general mood occasioned 
by Süleyman’s accession both domestically and in the foreign political arena. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the issue of transference and marking of 
sovereign authority. In this context, we have tried to trace the transformation of Prince 
Süleyman into Sultan Süleyman through a process involving a set of ceremonial and 
symbolic devices rather than a single moment of accession. As we have seen, the 
process started with his arrival in Istanbul which has a dual significance. Revealing the 
death of Sultan Selim on one hand, the arrival manifests Süleyman’s claim on and 
appropriation of the “throne.” In this sense, we have interpreted the arrival as the initial 
phase of transference of sovereignty. In this initial phase, we have seen that 
appropriation of the seat of government along with the imperial household formed the 
basic elements of the transformation in question. This seemingly smooth appropriation 
was based on established norms emphasizing dynastic right and divine right of kingship. 
Yet the dominance of the sense of an end versus a beginning in contemporary accounts 
hinders an absolute perception of total transference of sovereignty.  This takes us to the 
second phase of accession whereby the defunct sultan is transformed into a valued 
ancestor, giving way to the new ruler. Marked by the funeral of Sultan Selim, we have 
argued that this phase to signify the transition between the end and the beginning. The 
funeral ceremonial complete with the reception, the procession and the service at an 
imperial mosque served as elements of dynastic continuity in this transition. So did 
Süleyman’s presence as a dominating figure helped break the sense of an abrupt end 
and beginning. The construction of a mosque and tomb complex further reinforced the 
point. Now that Süleyman was left as the sole claimant of sovereignty, we have 
identified the third phase with the quite ambiguous term of “enthronement.” This phase 
marked the transference of sovereignty through presentations of obedience. While 
subjects, or dependents, of various ranks presented their loyalty through acts of 
deference, they also confirmed their acceptance of the transformation. When an official 
kisses the hand of the new sultan he demonstrates his allegiance to the new sultan as 
well as his acceptance of the set of ties and values the sultan represents. The ritual 
[bi‘at] figures both as “symbolic representation of social contract” and as 
“consummation of social contract.”659 This silent contract was confirmed by Süleyman 
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through bestowal of gifts and promotions, as well as renewal of offices. The 
transference of sovereignty was registered by yet other means in this phase; namely the 
official proclamations sent to interested parties emphasizing once again dynastic and 
divine right to rule along with the right of hutbe and sikke. With this the transference 
was complete and sovereignty now rested with Sultan Süleyman. 
In the second part of this chapter, we have examined how Sultan Süleyman 
marked and established his sovereignty as an individual ruler in the first few months of 
his reign. As we have seen, the main notion employed in this sense appears to be justice. 
Justice as understood by contemporaries in opposition to oppression and in relation to 
impartiality is perceived as the main building block of “social order” in sixteenth 
century mentality. It is not only a virtue expected of the ruler, but a God-given 
characteristic of kingship. In other words, by performing deeds of virtue, Sultan 
Süleyman not only proves that he is an able ruler but also the divine sanction related to 
his rule is confirmed. We have also argued that a major rebellion turned out to be an 
opportunity to strengthen his newly acquired sovereignty rather than proving to be a 
threat to his authority. Through criminalizing an “independence” attempt, Sultan 
Süleyman was able to emerge as a liberator removing oppression. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“THE WORLD-CONQUERING RULER”: SULTÂN-I CĐHÂN-GÎR 
Power easily acquires titles but titles do not acquire power.660 
3.1. Defining the Problem: Consolidation of Sovereign Power and Building a 
Reputation for Sultan Süleyman 
Having discussed acquisition of sovereign authority through ceremonial and 
conceptual means of in Chapter 2, this chapter examines consolidation of power vis-à-
vis the person of Süleyman, most specifically through building a personal reputation 
based on military prowess and values attached to it. Sixteenth century was a time when 
the association between glory and military success was at the peak. Such an association 
in collective mentality required bold expansionist policies. The campaigns Sultan 
Süleyman personally led in 1521 and 1522 indicate how war making became a tool in 
consolidating his sovereign power and building a reputation at the beginning of a new 
reign. The underlying motives of the respective conquests of Belgrade661 and Rhodes662 
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and were made compatible with justifying motifs, in other words legitimized. Codes of 
political behavior, military strategy, and ritual instances reveal how actions and 
processes were legitimized and rationalized. Lastly, we shall take a look at the official 
presentations of the two campaigns which themselves project the desired image. 
Comparison of domestic and foreign reception of the two campaigns provides at least 
some insight to the compatibility or incompatibility between projection and its reception 
as well as any differences or similarities between domestic and foreign perceptions.   
Much of the manner in which Sultan Süleyman achieved his reputation in the 
medium term seems to be in line with Machiavelli’s rhetorical, though also pragmatic, 
remarks on reputation building. According to Machiavelli, a man can build himself a 
reputation in three ways. Firstly, from his father, as people expect the son to resemble 
the father. However, this kind of reputation is risky because if the man does not live up 
to the expectations, it will soon collapse. Secondly, he can keep worthy company 
around him and people would think that a man who keeps such good company should 
be reputable. However, he still needs to prove himself or the goodwill will cancel out. 
Thirdly, one can perform some extraordinary deed to prove himself, which Machiavelli 
praises as the most effective and lasting method.663 Süleyman had the advantage of not 
only royal birth but that of being the unchallenged heir to throne and titles of an already 
acknowledged ruler, Sultan Selim. Furthermore, he inherited not only the realm and 
titles of his father, but his father’s reputable men as well. In this sense, as we have 
discussed in the previous chapter, he already had a generic image before him which he 
could, or rather was expected to, appropriate. The enthronement, pledges, proclamations 
and even the suppression of a major rebellion on his account in the first few months 
following his accession completed the ceremonial and conceptual appropriation of this 
image in the short term. In the medium term, how was the image to be actively 
appropriated, maintained and enhanced? How was it to be transformed from the generic 
image into a tailor-made one? Retrospectively speaking, the most obvious device in 
transforming the generic image of a newly enthroned sultan of the House of Osman into 
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a tailor-made image of Sultan Süleyman in the medium term seems to have been war-
making.664  
Utilizing the benefit of time, such an approach allows understanding how the 
underlying motives, norms and consequences of these campaigns function as constituent 
elements of the reputation and image of Sultan Süleyman.  
3.2. Waging War in Early Sixteenth Century 
War was an integral part of sixteenth-century mentality which inevitably brought 
with it the assumption that all princes should be skillful war leaders. Another current 
assumption was that all states must be prepared to fight at any time due to jealous and 
ambitious neighbors. Belief in cycles, whether fatalistic or moralizing, meant that total 
absence of war was not natural; it was either too good to be true or it meant luxurious 
degeneration.665 War in the sixteenth century was also a way to advance one’s position 
in peace negotiations. If one could sufficiently damage the enemy or acquire some 
territory, he would have an upper hand at negotiations.666 Early modern states were 
military institutions to a large extent. In this sense, the capability to master military 
activity was a major expectation from the ruler. The honor and reputation gained 
therewith was vital. As Frank Tallett puts it: 
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Moreover, although monarchs saw it as their duty to maintain social 
harmony, promote trade and industry and see to the welfare of their subjects, 
their chief concern was with the pursuit of gloire which was attained chiefly 
through the waging of war; while the major task of their bureaucratic and 
fiscal apparatus was to procure the resources of men, money and supplies, 
which were the essential prerequisite of this pursuit.667  
It is not surprising to see Süleyman waging war to a neighbor as one of the first 
actions of his reign. Not only did Islam impose the duty of jihad, but also the prevailing 
ideology of kingship required engagement in war. As was the case with his 
contemporaries,668 the power newly acquired by Süleyman required that the credentials 
be set right at the beginning of his reign, or else he would risk seeming weak and 
becoming victim to a neighbor. A keen observer of early sixteenth-century politics, 
Machiavelli not only emphasized that “nothing brings a prince more prestige than great 
campaigns and striking demonstrations of his personal abilities”669 but defined weak 
rulers as “those who are not engaged in preparing for war.”670 The honor and reputation 
obtained through war was the keystone of Charles V’s grand strategy, for instance.671  
Islamic theory regarded war to be a natural phenomenon in the context of the 
relations of Muslims to non-Muslims. This conception of war was based on the Islamic 
claim of universality. In other words, perpetual warfare was deemed inevitable until the 
entire world subdued to Islam. The division of the world as the Abode of Islam [dârü’l-
Islâm] and the Abode of War [dârü’l-harb] is perhaps the most evident expression of 
the conception of war in Islamic political thought.672 Fourteenth-century historian Ibn 
Khaldun [d.1406] was perhaps the first Muslim writer, other than jurists shaping Islamic 
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theory, who maintained that war was a natural social phenomenon caused by the self 
interest or emotional motives of men. He categorized war into four types: tribal wars, 
feuds and raids, jihad and wars against rebels and dissenters. While the first two types 
were not just, the last two were legitimate.673 
Warfare was believed to be essential to leave a strong kingdom to successors. War 
also meant asserting personal power and demonstrating military prowess. In this 
respect, especially the first campaign a new ruler engaged in meant a lot in building and 
fostering a reputation. A monarch was expected to demonstrate his potential for both 
defense and aggression in the early years of his reign.674 Such expectations were further 
reinforced by works dedicated to monarchs at the beginning of their reigns or as they 
were about to embark on campaign. In England, for example, on the eve of Henry 
VIII’s first war against France, Richard Pynson published a new edition of a chivalric 
treatise by Guido della Colonne, The hystorye, syge and destrucyon of Troye. The 
treatise was initially published in translation back in 1420 and dedicated to Henry V 
who was praised to be worthy of ancient heroes. The two supreme virtues praised in the 
treatise were success in battle and ruling justly in peace.675 Likewise, a treatise on 
martial arts was written by Nasuh el-Matraki in 1529, and was copied with additions in 
1532. Both dates relate to two major campaigns undertook by Sultan Süleyman. In 
Tuhfetü’l-Guzât, Nasuh dwells on the necessity to excel in the art of war, as well 
describing various weapons and their use along with historical explanations.676 Thus, 
war-making was promoted for and employed by sixteenth-century monarchs as a tool 
for consolidation and advancement of sovereign authority both internally and externally. 
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It is possible to view motives, or rather origins, of sixteenth-century wars in three 
loose categories under glory, religion, and security of the realm. Although voiced 
frequently by contemporary rulers and writers, these motives were not necessarily the 
actual or the only reasons of war. These categories often functioned as legitimating 
guises. Now we shall try to define these categories in comparative perspective and see 
how these motives functioned in the “making” of Sultan Süleyman. 
3.2.1. For the Sake of Glory 
Dynastic or personal aggrandizement through warfare constituted a large part of 
the reputation package in the sixteenth century, no doubt. As we have seen above, glory 
mattered in the political world. The glory part of our problem reflects two sets of binary 
oppositions influent on the image of Süleyman: House of Osman versus others, and past 
versus present. These two sets of oppositions are intricately interrelated. On one hand, 
Süleyman’s efforts and skill are taken for granted as a member of the House of Osman. 
Thus, his success is linked to ‘the glorious past of the dynasty’ so that his success 
aggrandizes not only himself but the dynasty. In this sense, the glory of Süleyman re-
legitimizes the dynastic claim and places the whole dynasty as superior to other ruling 
dynasties. On the other hand, Süleyman’s ability to acquire Belgrade and Rhodes, two 
targets attempted but not acquired by ‘his illustrious forefathers’, presents him as 
superior to them.  
His contemporaries considered, Süleyman was not unique in hurrying to build 
himself a reputation through war. Ascending the throne in 1509, Henry VIII attempted 
to lead a campaign into France. As he saw it, he had to pursue glory on the battlefield to 
achieve “true majesty.”677 Though he sent some troops, he was not able to march in 
person for a few years. When in 1513 he pledged himself in a Holy League with the 
Pope, Ferdinand of Aragon and Margaret of Savoy on behalf of Maximilian I against 
King Louis XII of France, his intention was to invade Aquitaine, Picardy and Normandy 
in two months. Henry argued that his subjects would fight more willingly and 
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successfully if they fought under their king. He was convinced that by embarking on his 
first military exploit in such an important war, he would be able to “create such fine 
opinion about his valor among all men that they would clearly understand that his 
ambition was not merely equal but indeed to exceed the glorious deeds of his 
ancestors.”678 As the memories of English victories over the French were still fresh in 
the minds of the people, Henry VIII was “determined to re-create the glorious exploits 
of the Black Prince and Henry V.”679 Martial ability of Henry VIII was promoted by a 
laudatory speech given by the royal secretary Richard Pace during the English-French 
peace talks in 1518.680 
In the declaration against Luther, issued on 19 April 1521, Charles V undertook to 
defend the Church and faith against heresy. He reminded that his ancestors were loyal 
sons of the Holy Roman Church who have defended and augmented the Catholic faith. 
He now saw it as his duty to inherit the task of these illustrious ancestors among whom 
were the “most Christian emperors of the noble nation of Alemania,” the Catholic kings 
of Spain, archdukes of Austria and Burgundy. He argued that it was his duty to imitate 
them both by nature and heredity.681  
When Francis I invaded Italy in 1515, it was the first year of his reign. This move 
was a sort of continuation of the Italian wars begun by Charles VIII in 1494 with the 
intention of affirming territorial and dynastic rights. Through attempting to recover the 
lost territory and complete what had been prepared by Louis XII, Francis I would not 
only regain the land lost by his predecessors but also avenge their defeats as well as 
satisfying the expectations of the commanders and nobles.682 
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When we take a look at Süleyman’s major eastern counterparts, we see that they 
not only embarked their careers with war, but built themselves kingdoms with their 
swords. Departing from his hide-out at Lahidjan in 1499, Ismail assembled an army at 
Erzincan a year later and lead a campaign into Shirvan. Defeating the Akkoyunlu army 
at Sharur and attaining control over Azerbaijan, Ismail was crowned in Tabriz in 1501. 
By 1503, he was ready move against the “enemies of state and religion” to destroy 
them.683 In India, on the other hand, Babur defeated Đbrahim Lodi in 1526 gaining 
control of a large part of India. His next move was against the Hindu Rana Sanga in 
1527. After this victory over the kafir at the Battle of Khanwa, Babur took the title of 
Ghazi. The narratives relating the battle are replete with references to the Quran.684 
Süleyman’s hunger for glory has often been emphasized by contemporary 
sources. An on-site observer of the siege of Rhodes, Fontanus, for example, pointed this 
out many times. In a speech supposedly made by Süleyman announcing the decision to 
attack Rhodes, Fontanus had him say: “I seek nothing for myself other than glory; to 
you [soldiers] I give the benefits.”685 In his account, Fontanus had Süleyman declare to 
Philippe Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, Grand Master of Rhodes: “I do not make war to 
acquire gold, or riches; but for glory, for fame, for immortality, and to enlarge my 
imperio.”686  
It seems as if Süleyman has deliberately chosen Belgrade and Rhodes for this 
purpose. These targets implied a total change of direction. Whereas Selim I 
concentrated on Eastern borders, Süleyman turned to the opposite direction. If we 
remind ourselves the reversal of Selim I’s other policies as discussed in the first chapter, 
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this change of direction might bring to mind the possibility of the son challenging the 
policy of an over-powerful father. Though such an argument seems quite attractive, 
proof is impossible.687 If we approach the issue not as a change of direction, but as a 
deliberation of direction, supportable arguments do exist. Capturing these castles was a 
bold enough move in the general sense which would bring Ottoman dynasty glory. 
Ottoman chroniclers emphasize the strength of both fortresses both technically and 
historically.688 Such impregnability689 seems to make the ultimate conquest the more 
praiseworthy. Yet it was even a bolder move on the part of Süleyman’s person because 
such an action implicitly challenged Mehmed II, already the epitome of Ottoman 
monarchy. Although Ottoman narratives do not specifically phrase the issue as such, 
references to previous failures clearly imply the point. As Kaldy-Nagy argues, people 
expected new conquests from the new Sultan, not only the keys to a few castles. The 
conquest of Belgrade meant a great triumph in the minds of people who still have not 
forgotten the unsuccessful siege performed by Mehmed II.690 Thus, targeting Belgrade 
as the first feat would contribute immensely to a starter’s reputation. Mehmed II seems 
to have remained a terrifying memory in the minds of the Europeans during the first half 
of the sixteenth century. Even an aloof observer such Guicciardini paralleled Selim I 
and Mehmed II:  
... he [Selim] was incited by the memory of his grandfather Mohammed, who 
with much weaker forces and a little navy sent to the kingdom of Naples, had 
by an improvised attack conquered the city of Otranto, and opened a door and 
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fixed a position from which  he continuously vex the Italians (if death had not 
intervened).691 
According to Lopez de Gomera, sixteenth-century Spanish historian, Süleyman 
attacked the most important bastions of Christendom – Belgrade and Rhodes – to prove 
that he was the strongest and most important ghazi of the dynasty.692 Jacques de 
Bourbon, who actively participated in the defense of Rhodes, was convinced that 
Süleyman engaged in the siege of island not only to secure the seaway to Syria, but also 
to continue the tradition of bravery set forth by his forefathers Mehmed II, Bayezid II 
and Selim I.693 A very experienced observer of sixteenth-century political arena, Sanuto 
himself was impressed by Süleyman’s deeds. In a conversation among friends, he 
emphasized that Süleyman had taken Rhodes when neither his father nor grandfather 
could.694 An anonymous French account of Rhodes, translated into English soon after 
the conquest, expressed one of the motives that led Süleyman to attack Rhodes as 
follows: 
He might followe the doings of his noble predecessours, and shewe himselfe 
very heire of the mightie and victorious lord Sultan Selim his father, willing to 
put in execution the enterprise by him left the yeere one thousand five hundred 
twentie and one.695 
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Capturing Belgrade was thus not a novel idea when Süleyman ascended the 
Ottoman throne. The aspirations can be traced back to 1440 when Murad II wished God 
grant it to his offspring, seeing that the fortress was unattainable.696 Contemporary 
Ottoman sources usually draw a parallel between Mehmed II’s unsuccessful siege and 
Süleyman’s conquest of Belgrade. Similar comparisons abound in earlier Ottoman 
chronicles, though not necessarily on the basis of individual Ottoman rulers but Islamic 
rulers in general. Similar arguments can be seen for Mehmed II upon capturing Istanbul 
which was attacked by many rulers before him but would not surrender to anyone. 
Similarly, Oruç Beğ credits Bayezid II who captured Moton, an area never before 
captured.697 In this sense, reference to an earlier ruler to exalt the current Sultan 
constitutes neither novelty nor an unusual commendation. What empowers this 
comparison is the identity of the compared ancestor, since Mehmed II was seen by his 
contemporaries as the epitome of the Ottoman dynasty. Thus, challenging Mehmed II 
above all rulers further enhanced Süleyman’s claim. Bostan, for example, reminds his 
readers that the conquest of this castle was not granted to any ruler before; not even 
Mehmed was able to capture it though he had fought hard.698 According to 
Kemalpaşazade, one of the driving motives for Süleyman to capture Belgrade was to 
wash away the embarrassment of Mehmed II’s unsuccessful siege of 1456. The author 
first praises Mehmed II for acquiring various territories. However, the conquest of 
Belgrade had not been granted even to so “superior a ruler who had moved ships on 
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land to conquer Kostantiniyye.” He had tried nevertheless, and now it was mandatory 
for Süleyman to eradicate unbelief from this fortress and wash away the 
embarrassment.699 Celâlzâde does not miss the opportunity to praise Süleyman moving 
the failure of Mehmed II to the fore. He reminds his readers that the “infidels” prided 
themselves with the cannons Mehmed II had to leave behind at Belgrade. The author 
argues that restoring the cannons and saving Belgrade was a task reserved for Sultan 
Süleyman.700 Spandounes also dwells on the “embarrassment” saying that the “Turks 
were beaten off and their sultan withdrew in disgrace and with heavy losses.”701  
An examination of the reflections of Mehmed II’s siege of Belgrade in earlier 
chronicles demonstrates that the siege was not regarded as a major failure. This is not 
surprising, of course. Many of these earlier chronicles were presented to Mehmed II’s 
son Bayezid II. Even if some authors did see the 1456 siege as a failure or 
embarrassment, saying so in a work that was supposed to glorify the dynasty and 
impress the current ruler would not be very appropriate. Just as these authors had felt 
the need to glorify Mehmed II, Süleyman’s contemporaries needed to do the same for 
their monarch. To this end, they seem to have employed the 1456 siege as a failure 
which would exalt Süleyman over the most exalted member of the dynasty. Tursun Beğ, 
exemplifies a contemporary projection of Mehmed II’s siege of Belgrade. According to 
Tursun Beg, for example, it was because of the greed of the soldiers for booty that the 
army had to abandon the castle, although the simulated retreat tricked the enemy to the 
open field. The author describes the result of the battle as “a holiday for the Muslims” 
[ehl-i Đslama bayram]. Emphasizing that the castle was “almost” conquered, Tursun 
Beğ goes on to explain that the “merciful pâdişâh was satisfied with this clear victory” 
[pâdişâh-ı âtıfet-şi‘âr bu fethi mübîn ile iktifâ itti] because his soldiers were tired and 
wounded. The author justifies the return with the maxim “return is the best,” although 
he mentions that the Sultan intended to come back because he regarded Belgrade as his 
legitimate prey [av kılınmış şikârumdur]. Tursun Beg also projects the reaction of the 
Hungarian king to Mehmed II’s retreat. Allegedly, the “king” believed that “the Turk 
retreated in shame” [terk-i nâmûs idüb sındı]. A few days later, he died because of a 
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wound caused by a ‘ghazi’. Tursun Beğ describes the death of Hunyadi as God’s 
punishment upon the oppressors. He also states that with the “king’s” death Mehmed’s 
primary intention, namely “the death of the rival” [katl-i rakîb] was realized.702 The 
whole account shows that Tursun Beğ, a contemporary of Mehmed II who attended 
many of his campaigns, regarded the result not as a failure but victory, let alone as an 
embarrassment. On the other hand, the projected perception of the “Hungarian king” 
demonstrates that contemporary mentality considered retreat as embarrassment. In this 
sense, once the 1456 episode comes to be perceived as ‘retreat’ the abandoned siege is 
transformed not only into failure, but also ‘embarrassment’. 
The conquest of Sabacz [Šabac, Böğürdelen] can be seen in a similar perspective. 
The fortress was built during the reign of Mehmed II by Ishak Beğ and his son Isa Beğ. 
As Ottoman chronicles saw it, although the castle fell into Christian hands later on, it 
was actually part of Süleyman’s inheritance. Ottoman sources regard the capture of 
Sabacz as “liberation” [istihlâs] rather than conquest. In other words, Süleyman 
captured what was already his. Furthermore, in Christian hands Sabacz was transformed 
into “a nest of rebellion and sedition.” Here we find a second justification for the 
conquest. Thirdly, Süleyman acquired it with his sword.703 Although Süleyman is 
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reported to have remarked: “this is the first castle I conquered, it should prosper,”704 the 
fame acquired through more famous targets as Belgrade and Rhodes seems to have 
overshadowed the conquest of Sabacz.705 
The conquest of Rhodes functions similarly for building Sultan Süleyman’s 
reputation. Contemporary chronicles approach the conquest as great success because 
“the island never gave in to a ruler before.”706 Kemalpaşazade reinforces his argument 
further saying that “the hand of no groom of jihad has ever touched the skirt of the bride 
of conquest.”707 Rhodes also poses another challenge to Mehmed II. In 1480, an 
Ottoman armada unsuccessfully laid siege on the island for three months. The memory 
of Mesih Paşa’s unsuccessful attempt poses an opportunity for Kemalpaşazade, for 
example, to emphasize the intention on Süleyman’s part “to wash away the stain of 
embarrassment” of yet another failure.708 Writing in late sixteenth-century, Sadeddin 
relates his father’s testimony to a speech by Selim I in opposition to another attempt on 
the island. In this speech, Selim I allegedly scolded his viziers that he had not yet 
forgotten the “shame of Rhodes at the time of my great forefather Sultan Mehmed Han 
Gazi” and asked them whether they intended to “double that gloom.”709 The origins of 
Sadeddin’s anecdote can perhaps be traced back to the conception of the court physician 
Ramazan as he expresses some of the general opinions of his time, regarding why 
Ottomans before Süleyman did not capture the island through the speech he has 
Süleyman recite. According to this passage, although Ottoman sultans had conquered 
much farther lands, they did attempt on Rhodes because it was too strongly protected. 
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Rhodians possessed much defense equipment and knowledge of how to use it. 
Furthermore, their knowledge of the sea surpassed that of the Ottomans, and their united 
stance with no discord amongst themselves discouraged the Ottomans from attacking 
the island.710 Seen in the light of Ramazan’s comments, the perception of the late 
sixteenth-century writer Sadeddin confirms an established view of Süleyman’s image in 
connection to the conquest of Rhodes. By the late sixteenth century, then, Süleyman 
was regarded as so successful a sultan that he could capture an island that even his most 
daring father would not dare to attack. Furthermore, “washing away the embarrassment” 
through this seemingly impossible feat, he was exalted over all the previous members of 
the dynasty.   
Giovio informs his readers that Süleyman, a year after acquiring Belgrade, 
decided to capture Rhodes against the advice of Piri Paşa and other commanders who 
reminded him of the hardship suffered by Mehmed II when he undertook the task.711 
Fontanus, on the other hand, claims that Süleyman did not expect the same outcome 
because he believed that Mehmed II was misadvised in calling Mesih Paşa back too 
soon.712 Süleyman, however, did not ignore the risks involved either. According to 
Fontanus, Süleyman [Il Turco] was described as a young man with excellent ability, 
whose wisdom seemed to be more than his years. Thus, the young Sultan saw the ability 
of Rhodians to oppose force with force, and was convinced that they would not be 
forced to obey as easily as did the Albanians. According to Fontanus, Sultan Süleyman 
did not rule out the possibility that what happened to his great-grandfather Mehmed 
could happen to him, that fortune and war could be deceitful.713 In the same speech, 
Fontanus has the notorious Ottoman captain Kurtoğlu refer to the possible concern of 
the Sultan regarding the failure faced by his predecessors. However, the captain 
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encouraged him by reminding him of his predecessors’ failure in capturing Belgrade, 
and his success in conquering the castle “regardless of the fact that it was stronger than 
ever.”714 
There is also evidence of Selim I’s planning a campaign on Rhodes, although 
never actualized.715 According to the so-called Haydar Çelebi Diary, although 
preparations were completed for the siege of Rhodes in 1519 [926], the plans were 
abandoned. The diary provides two reasons for the change in plans. Firstly after a 
consultation, the affairs with Shah Ismail were considered more important than the 
conquest of Rhodes. Secondly, campaign season was over.716  Some foreign accounts 
mention an expected attack on the island by Sultan Selim. According to Venetian 
correspondence, Francis I sent help to Rhodes for they believed that Selim would attack 
the island in June 1520. However, the armada never set sail.717 Lütfi Paşa mentions that 
for Rhodes Süleyman made use of the ships his father prepared for a ghaza to Europe 
[Frengistân].718 Ramazan provides a parallel between Süleyman and his father in that 
through the conquest of Rhodes Süleyman opened the sea route for pilgrimage, as the 
latter had done for the land route.719 According to a poem in Nasuh’s account, the duty 
of capturing Rhodes passed on to Bayezid after Mehmed II, then Selim and finally 
Süleyman.720 The anonymous chronicler of the siege of Rhodes also mentions Selim’s 
preparations and his death interfering with the plan. This author has supposedly seen 
Selim I’s last will whereby he urged his son to capture Belgrade first and then 
Rhodes.721  
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Tabib Ramazan, as he thanks God at the end of his account of the siege of 
Rhodes, clearly expresses the superiority of Sultan Süleyman over his predecessors: 
“Thanks be to God who granted these two conquests [Belgrade and Rhodes] not to prior 
caliphs like Selim, Halim [Bayezid II] and Sultan Mehmed Han but to Sultan Süleyman 
Han.”722 These words add another dimension to the superiority of Süleyman in terms of 
military prowess and ability as the author underlines throughout his account; such an 
expression poses Sultan Süleyman to be specially favored by God. Since Ramazan 
wrote his work to impress Süleyman and was not commissioned to do so by anyone. As 
such, he probably thought that this was what the Sultan would like to hear. Regardless 
of the author’s motive, the phrase demonstrates clearly that the concern for surpassing 
predecessors factored in Süleyman’s and/or his contemporaries’ minds, and that the 
motif was used to enforce his image. 
3.2.2. For the Sake of Religion 
Religion often appears as a causal factor in sixteenth-century wars; however it is 
actually a means of legitimizing pre-existing conflicts.723 In terms of the 1521 and 1522 
campaigns, religion provides the most crucial binary opposition, namely Muslims 
versus “infidels”, employed in justifying warfare and enmity. The main tenets of the 
justification of warfare, in this respect, are found in Quranic verses and traditions of the 
Prophet. The most well known and most frequently used verse says:  
Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor do they 
prohibit what Allah and His Messenger have prohibited, nor follow the 
religion of truth, out of those who have been given the Book, until they pay the 
tax in acknowledgment of superiority and they are in a state of subjection.724  
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Süleyman was not alone in imposing himself as the “protector of the religion” 
either. His eastern counterparts Ismail and Babur also claimed the title.725 The early 
Safavi conception of ghaza seems to be similar to that of the Ottoman’s. In discussing a 
victory of Shah Ismail against Shirvan Shah, Hasan Rumlu explains how “the wind of 
victory and conquest blew toward the flag of the exalted Hâkân through the assistance 
of God and strong fortune” and how the possessions of the defeated were left on battle 
ground as booty.726 When Ismail decided to attack Azerbaijan, he “put on his priceless 
body the armor of Godly assistance” and aimed at “fighting those who were on the 
wrong path.”727 While it is very hard to come by instances of Ottomans praising or even 
acknowledging ghaza efforts of the Safavis,728 Ottoman claims to ghaza and glory find 
recognition in Ahsenü’t-Tevârih. Bayezid II and his army, for example, are praised for 
fighting the “infidels.” The size of Bayezid’s army is described as more numerous than 
the sand in the desert and coined as “distinguished for success”, while his ships deemed 
excellent. Hasan Rumlu’s details on the ships assert that such ships were so expensive 
that they could only be built by pâdişâhs.729 On the other hand, in conflict between the 
Ottomans and the Safavids, Hasan Rumlu denotes the Safavis ghazis whereas he refers 
to the Ottomans as “Rûm.”730 In his Memoirs, for example, Babur mentions leaving 
Agra against Rana Sanga for the “Holy War.”731 Babur’s claim to ghaza was recognized 
by the Safavids as long as the effort suited their interests. For example, when Ismail sent 
support to Babur against the Uzbeks, Babur and his soldiers are referred to as ghazis.732 
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Such accounts demonstrate the relevance of the ghaza in the reputation of a Muslim 
monarch. Through playing the ghaza card as he ascends the throne, Süleyman not only 
fulfills domestic expectations, but excels as a superior monarch committed to the duties 
imposed by Islam within the Muslim world.  
Muslim monarchs were not the only ones to promote religion as a motive for war 
in the sixteenth-century. Their counterparts in Europe employed the concept of a “holy” 
war for their own ends. In the western world holy war, in other words crusade was 
generally defined as “a military expedition against infidels” who were enemies of the 
faith or the enemies of the Papacy.733 The ideal of a crusade against the Ottomans was 
not a new idea in the 1520s. With the Ottoman expansion in the fifteenth century, 
various crusading projects had been proposed. On one hand, Christian rulers of Europe 
wanted to stop the Ottoman invasion; on the other hand, some rulers dreamed of 
recovering Jerusalem. The conquest of Constantinople and rapid territorial loss in the 
Balkans further provoked such projects.734 Pope Leo X declared a universal peace 
among Christian princes on 6 March 1518.735 Apparently, the recent acquisitions of 
Selim I had intimidated the Pope who feared an Ottoman attack in Italy. The plan was to 
approach from three directions, the capital being the ultimate goal.736  
Among contemporary monarchs, Charles V was perhaps the most insistent to 
employ the ideal of a crusade to further his reputation. Charles V constantly uttered his 
intention to fight the Turk – though never made a step toward its realization – in the first 
                                               
733
 Mia Rodriguez-Salgado, “La Cruzada sin Cruzado,” p.203.  
734
 Ibid, p.204; Robert H. Schwoebel, “Coexistence, Conversion, and the Crusade 
against the Turks,” Studies in the Renaissance, vol. 12 (1965), pp. 164-187. 
735
 At this point we need to keep in mind that Süleyman probably knew about the 
plan of Leo X. As mentioned earlier, he was in Edirne on Rumelian guard at the time 
and he informed his father who was in Egypt. See, Spandounes, On the origin of the 
Ottoman Emperors, p.65-6. See Sanuto, 25:124 for earlier suspicions. For Süleyman’s 
guardianship at Edirne during 1517 and his correspondence with his father, see, 
Münşe‘at, I:491, 494, 498 
736
 Guicciardini, History of Italy, pp.300-1. For Leo X’s plan and memorandum to 
Christian princes, also see Geza Perjes, The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: 
Mohacs 1526-Buda 1541, Maria D. Fenyo (trans.) (Colorado: Boulder, 1989), pp.46-8. 
Leo’s plan involved voluntary financial contribution from all princes and a universal tax 
from all Christian peoples. As for the campaign itself, the Emperor along with 
Hungarian and Polish cavalry, German infantry; France, Venetians, other Italians, Swiss 
foot soldiers, Spain, Portugal, England would participate.  
197 
 
years of his reign, as a propaganda tool “to raise his reputation and diminish that of his 
rival.”737 Charles V himself grew up in an environment which cherished crusader ideals 
along with knightly values. Believing strongly that the crusade was an ideal that brought 
his ancestors great honor and reputation, Charles often emphasized his commitment to 
fighting the ‘infidels’.738 Pope Leo’s declaration gave Charles the opportunity along 
with others to prove his hand in the competition between princes to realize a crusade.739 
During 1517-1520 Charles was trying to establish his authority in Spain. Pursuing 
aggressive policies towards the Muslims in the Mediterranean was already a popular 
approach. Charles’s advisors knew that associating the young king with a hero leading a 
holy war would strengthen his authority and reputation. Thus the projected discourse 
claimed that Charles wished to conserve peace with Christian rulers so that he would be 
able to fight the infidels, more accurately “enemies of [our] Catholic faith.” As far as 
this narrative went, he intended to move against the enemy employing all his kingdoms. 
Charles took it as his obligation to participate in this war for various reasons. Firstly, 
this was an opportunity to gain the “honor of God” and to defend his “holy Catholic 
faith.” Secondly, he was required by the Pope to participate. Thirdly, he would prove 
the world that he is a truly “Christian king.” Fourthly, he would show the world that he 
merited the heritage of “kings who had many and glorious victories against the 
infidels.” The claims and phrases employed reflected the “habitual vocabulary” of all 
Christian princes of the era.740   
The approach of Francis I toward the idea of crusade was similar. In December 
1515, Francis had already made up his mind to go on a crusade in person with all his 
might. Such a project would not only earn him honor and reputation, but would 
strengthen his hand in the future competition for emperorship. He also thought the 
timing to be convenient to pursue his ambition since France was in peace with most of 
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the Christian princes and Ottomans were busy fighting in the east.741 After Pope Leo 
X’s declaration of universal peace and call for crusade, Francis organized a spectacular 
ceremony in December 1518. He told the papal legate that he would participate in the 
crusade.742 Leo X had given absolution to France for a crusade which already 
announced on 4 January 1517. In March 1518, solemn processions were realized in 
Rome to invoke God’s assistance against the Turks. Such demonstrations of intention 
posed Francis as the “Most Christian King” indeed.743 Even by early 1520, rumors still 
circulated that Francis would join the expedition against the Turk in person and that the 
Pope had sent money for the defense of Belgrade.744  
Truth was, the death of Emperor Maximilian in January 1519 had put an end to 
immediate crusade plans. Competition for the title of emperor replaced the competition 
for the glory of the crusade. The election of Charles in June 1519 did not break the 
inactivity. Everyone was aware of the accumulation of great power in the hands of one 
monarch, but no one was sure whether he would be able to maintain it. The resistance in 
Spain, religious and social divisions in the imperial lands and the vulnerable situation of 
Italian lands were seen to cloud his capacity. Thus, all plans for a major crusade were 
suspended.745   
Contemporary Ottoman chronicles all attribute the campaigns in 1521 and 1522 
firstly to Süleyman’s commitment to ghaza.746 Kemalpaşazade’s almost romanticized 
introduction to his account of the 1521 campaign introduces serious contemplation on 
Süleyman’s part. According to the author, Süleyman gave much thought to what made 
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the Ottomans superior than other rulers. After much contemplation, he realized that the 
answer lay in their efforts of jihad and ghaza, as well as the fame of success acquired by 
word-of-mouth.747 This line of thought is consistent with Machiavelli’s argument that 
fear engendered by past victories help break the determination of the enemy.748 
Kemalpaşazade legitimizes the attack on Hungary by the Quranic verse commanding 
fighting against unbelievers who are close by.749 
Kemalpaşazade’s use of jihad and ghaza in the same sentence may not be just 
another Ottoman rhetorical device. As various scholars have discussed in relation to the 
early Ottomans, although the terms have often been interchanged in modern 
scholarship, jihad is not the same as ghaza. Early frontier lore as well as canonical 
works makes this distinction. Recent scholarship emphasizes that jihad as a word does 
not mean “holy war” or “just war”, but “striving.” Classical Islamic theory identifies 
four types of jihad: by heart, by tongue, by hands, by the sword. By heart means 
fighting the devil against temptation; this is the greater jihad. Second and third types 
have to with supporting the right and correcting the wrong. The fourth is actual war 
with unbelievers and enemies of the faith.750 In sources the term “jihad” is usually 
followed by the phrase “in the path of God” [fi sabil Allah]. Thus even when this phrase 
is not used, by association jihad comes to denote fighting for the sake of God. On the 
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other hand, the term “ghaza” comes from the Arabic ghazw which denotes pre-Islamic 
booty attacks. Thus the association of the term with raiding and plunder is inevitable.751   
Scholars have also suggested that jihad had a defensive quality whereas ghaza had 
a proactive nature. In other words, jihad is understood to be a military undertaking, in 
the narrower sense of the word, when the whole community [umma] of Islam is under 
threat. Ghaza, on the contrary, is raiding activity which requires no immediate or 
potential threat to the community although the ultimate aim is associated with the 
expansion of Islam.752 The Ottoman conception of ghaza evolved against the 
background of the earlier frontier conditions in Anatolia in late thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. The late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries witnessed the weakening 
and gradual collapse of central authority as well as the struggle of principalities which 
initially served as frontier forces of the weakening central authority. In this respect, 
ghaza as a frontier activity combined religious motive with the prospect of booty 
through raiding. It is not within the scope of this study to dwell on how the Ottoman 
enterprise turned out to eliminate all major and minor competitors in the struggle of 
becoming the power in Anatolia; suffice it to say that ghaza as a unifying force in the 
earlier phases was a major factor.753 Defining ghaza as a “powerful and unifying device 
available to conquerors on the frontier, more so than tribalism, origin, religion, 
language, or culture,” Linda Darling emphasizes that as an ideology ghaza was “flexible 
enough to be represented as an orthodox Islamic activity to the ‘ulemâ, an unorthodox 
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activity to the antinomian Sufis, an economic activity to the tribesmen, and a political 
activity to the aspiring rulers.”754  
Sixteenth-century political realities were different than those of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, of course. Thus, one would expect a transformation of the ghaza 
concept as employed by the sixteenth-century Sultan contemplating on how to proceed 
with his reign. Speculatively speaking, Süleyman's conception of ghaza must have been 
quite different than that of Murad I, for instance. Süleyman was not the ruler of a 
promising frontier principality competing with others like itself for 
territorial/ideological supremacy. Nor was he the head of a newly flourishing dynasty 
which needed to attract similar ones. He was the sultan ruling over a vast realm with a 
highly organized administrative and military system, which were inextricably linked. 
His rivals were not relatively petty frontier principalities or weakened kingdoms, but 
full-fledged and relatively powerful princes with well-organized administrative systems. 
His commanders were his subjects and slaves rather than powerful magnates.755 In this 
sense, his stake in ghaza differed from that of Murad I who had to employ ghaza for 
more practical purposes such as a unifying element for various parties, acquiring 
financial gain to re-distribute among his followers, and standing out among similar 
power holders. The Safavi conflict also required a different stance which brought 
religious argumentations of war to the fore. Süleyman was actually employing the claim 
made by Mehmed II when he wrote to the Mamluk Sultan that he was chosen by God to 
be the leader of Muslims in ghaza. When Selim I destroyed the Mamluks, he added yet 
one more claim Mehmed II’s claim of leadership in ghaza, namely that of being the 
protector of the holy cities and the pilgrimage route.756 Thus, Süleyman inherited a very 
powerful ideological tool to build a reputation on and to justify his aggressive expansion 
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policy. On the other hand, whether the concept went through such a transformation in 
the minds of lesser individuals who were actually to do the fighting is less clear.757  
As emphasized above, ghaza involved not only spiritual, but temporal rewards as 
well.758 Earlier Ottoman narratives emphasize the financial rewards of ghaza quite 
strikingly. Neşri, for example, explains that Osman had two motives when he decided to 
pursue the ghaza as his father did. He would thus “earn his bread” without having to 
depend on any sultan for his sustenance, and acquire both the temporal world and the 
eternal one.759 The Gazavatname of Murad II depicts incentives offered to the 
individual participants of a ghaza. Those who come and fight for the sake of Islam were 
to have whatever they want.760 While talking about one of the sieges of Mehmed II, 
Tursun Beg mentions that the soldiers of the sultan were moved by the idea of spiritual 
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reward of the ghaza and the hope of share of the booty.761 While the overall emphasis 
on Süleyman’s conception of ghaza is generally framed in a religious and ideological 
perspective, the material rewards attached to ghaza are by no means neglected; this dual 
significance of ghaza finds expression in contemporary accounts. Celâlzâde, for 
example, tells about the material incentives offered to the soldiers during the Belgrade 
siege. A sancak was promised to the first ghazi who succeeded in erecting the flag on 
the castle as the leave for plunder was announced. Only then do we hear of the soldiers 
rushing to offer their lives in the name of religion.762 The proclamation of victory also 
testifies to the relevance of material rewards as well as spiritual ones. The proclamation 
mentions that the soldiers headed for Belgrade only after acquiring goods in Syrmia 
[Sirem]. As for those who died fighting at Belgrade, the proclamation underlines that 
they went to heaven.763   
Tabib Ramazan, a contemporary of Süleyman, explains his views of the concept 
of ghaza in his account of the conquest of Rhodes. He emphasizes that the spiritual 
reward of ghaza is similar to a holy day. If a man dies in action, his sins will be 
forgiven. Furthermore, he will be spared the interrogation on the bridge to Paradise and 
directly go to heaven to be accompanied by the holy creatures there. The author 
supports his views through well known verses of the Quran.764 Apparently, not even 
Ramazan, who appears to be a very devoted Muslim, was confident enough of the 
sufficiency of spiritual reward to secure the courage and efforts of men. He goes on to 
mention the material rewards promised by the Sultan. The first man to get to the castle 
would receive a sancak. Once in the city, soldiers were given leave to take anything 
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they could; including goods, children and women, except for weapons.765 Speeches of 
encouragement constructed by Ramazan demonstrate that ghaza promised something 
for everyone. For the religious, there was the hope of spiritual ghaza; for the brave and 
ambitious the promise of glory. For the poor, there was the prospect of goods and 
slaves; for the rich, the promise of virgins to satisfy their desires.766 During Süleyman’s 
siege of Belgrade, on the other hand, we witness specific instances of official 
declaration of plunder. One example is on 4 October [2 Dhu’l-Qada] when Süleyman 
commanded plunder and ‘ulemâ encouraged the soldiers for jihad.767 At a call for 
plunder during the siege of Rhodes, the announcement stressed that the rocks and the 
soil belonged to the Sultan, while the rest to the ghazis. In other words, everything was 
open for pillage, but the land itself.768 
The perception of ghaza as a religious duty of the ruler is demonstrated clearly 
through various proclamations. According to the proclamation of victory sent to the 
judges of the realm following the conquest of Belgrade, when Süleyman ascended the 
throne he knew that he had to direct his efforts to jihad and ghaza. Therefore, he 
investigated those who were in error [erbâb-ı dalâl] and found that the “desperate 
Hungarians” [Engürüs-i meyûs] were such.769 The proclamation of victory following the 
conquest of Rhodes to the same recipients about a year later elaborated the issue further 
with the God-given duty to “conquer and remove the signs of unbelief [küfr]” and “to 
remove and restrain the oppression of oppressors.” As far the document goes, it was for 
this reason that he continuously put “his sword to ghaza and jihad against the infidels.” 
Thus he set out to “save” Rhodes as was his ““pious kingly custom and accepted royal 
convention” [adet-i hasene-i şahane ve sünnet-i merziyye-i hüsrevâne].770 According to 
Sa‘di, Süleyman wished to attack the infidel every year so that he could wipe away 
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unbelief from the face of the earth. Rhodes was chosen, according to Sa‘di, because it 
stood on the way of Islam.771 Nasuh also dwells on the theme of jihad as a religious 
duty. His wording demonstrates not only a duty, but also the grace and spiritual 
guidance of God in the performance of this duty. According to the author, Hungary was 
chosen as the target of jihad because it was hostile to Islam and engaged in unbelief 
[küfr].772 Celâlzâde’s emphasis on the desire of the soldiers to pursue jihad773 reinforces 
Süleyman as the “rightful caliph” who should order and command the collective duty 
jihad. In such efforts, Süleyman was following the examples of previous Muslim rulers. 
For example, Mahmud of Ghazni (d.1030), as told by his court historian Utbi, saw his 
expeditions to India as “a jihad to propagate Islam and extirpate idolatry”: “The chief of 
Thanesar was… obstinate in his infidelity and denial of Allah, so the Sultan marched 
against him with his valiant warriors for the purpose of planting the standards of Islam 
and extirpating idolatry.”774  
Reading the chronicles and correspondences, one can clearly trace how an issue of 
territorial and political supremacy translates into a matter of religion at stake. That the 
ghaza ideology is strongly emphasized in Ottoman sources is hardly surprising. In this 
context, religious motives provide a pretext to reinforce political power.775 Non-
Ottoman sources reflect a similar effort on the part of King Louis II of Hungary, the 
adversary of Sultan Süleyman. Although it may not be appropriate to call these efforts 
as a call for crusade per se, we see that when King Louis approached European rulers, 
he did so by moving forth the “extreme danger Christendom faces.” We meet many 
such instances in Venetian accounts. According to Lorenzo Orio’s report dated 6 July, 
the King said that “this is a matter of great importance and Christendom should unite 
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against this Turco.”776 The argument put forth to the Pope by the ambassador of King 
Louis in July 1521 is not much different: “You need to attend to moving the Christian 
princes to action, to make peace among themselves and to attend to the eminent danger 
to Christendom [Christianità].” Moreover he adds that it is the Pope’s duty as the head 
of Christendom to find a remedy to the discord and to direct their forces against the 
Turco.777 European power-holders, though not neglecting to employ the “Turkish 
threat” for their own purposes, were not keen on sending the help King Louis demanded 
for the “protection of Christendom.” The Pope blamed the French for being hostile and 
rejecting the possibility of peace in Italy so that Europe could attend to the “Turkish 
matter.”778 The news of Süleyman’s march into Hungary caught the European monarchs 
at Calais as Henry VIII was mediating peace talks between Charles and Francis. Charles 
and Francis reacted similarly to the news; both expressed his desire for peace and 
crusade, accusing the other of inciting and continuing the conflict.779 The Venetian 
ambassador in France wrote on 23 June 1521 that “the person of the Turco is belligerent 
and a great enemy of the Christians, he wants to make a campaign against Christians. 
The French king said he would soon see his end.”780 Charles V sent an ambassador, 
already too late, to inform King Louis that the king should not doubt that next time he 
would come to help in person.781 In some sense, the European response to the threat 
posed by Süleyman confirms his claims to ghaza. In other words, as Süleyman reflects 
his military plans in relation to a religious duty, Western monarchs perceive the threat in 
religious terms as well. Thus both parties benefit from an ideological cover instead of 
appearing greedy in terms of territorial and/or political concerns.  
We have argued that ghaza, or rather, associating warfare with a religious motive, 
brought forth a crucial binary opposition: Muslim versus the “infidel.” The projected 
conflict between the Muslim and the “infidel” easily becomes the struggle between 
good and evil, or right and wrong. A striking example of such an inversion can be found 
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in Tabib Ramazan’s account of Rhodes.  Ramazan attributes the Rhodes campaign to 
the will of God. According to the author Süleyman went on this campaign because God 
answered the prayers of the prisoners at Rhodes. Otherwise, Ramazan thought that it 
was not appropriate to go on campaign every year.782 In stark contrast to the godly 
intentions of Süleyman, Ramazan introduces the Devil as the moving force of Rhodians. 
According to the author, the islanders prayed for the graces of the Devil to survive the 
siege.783 As Ramazan’s account moves further, the Devil speaks to them from within the 
idols, addressing the Rhodians as his “servants.” According to the author, seeing that 
they were crying, the Devil told them to amend their ways if their crying was the result 
too much sin, rebellion and defiance of his orders. The devil added that he knew what 
has been happening and told them that they would be safe with him. Mimicking literary 
conventions as to make the argument more credible, he referred to the biblical story of 
Egypt and Joseph. Then he promised the islanders that when Turks entered the city, they 
would receive help. He assured them that his soldiers were more numerous than those of 
the Turks, even more numerous than those of Solomon. After explaining himself as 
such, the Devil went on: 
Oh, those who worship none but me! Rejoice, oh those who wish to be with 
us in Hell and oh those who avoid mingling with Muslims in Heaven! Rejoice 
with complete happiness at all times and hours; do not grieve as do the 
residents of Heaven, and do not surrender the castle to Sultan Süleyman 
Han.784  
Ramazan, then, announces the real aim of the Devil which was to have all the 
islanders killed so that he could torture them in Hell. Because, Ramazan asserts, if the 
islanders surrendered, many of them would come to believe in Muhammad and thus be 
saved from Hell. Furthermore, according to the author, “infidel” women would bear 
Muslim children who would curse the Devil.785  
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The episode constructed by Ramazan regarding the association of the people of 
Rhodes and the Devil is worth examining for the inversion of conception. The actions of 
the people are actually in accordance with common belief. They pray for salvation. 
However, the target and agent of salvation are inversed. In other words, a Muslim or a 
Christian would normally aim Heaven through worshiping God; whereas this 
conception is inversed in Ramazan’s account as he defines the aim as Hell and the 
object of devotion as the Devil. According to Ramazan’s construction, losing hope of 
saving the island as they see Süleyman re-building old Rhodes, the people go to the 
Grand Master to request that he kill them all because they were now desperate. 
According to Ramazan, Rhodians believed that they would not be able to go to Hell, 
join their ancestors and the Devil if they were killed by the Turks. Since they had no 
other option but death or enslavement, they were doomed to lose their chance to Hell. 
They saw as their only way to salvation death in the hands of the Grand Master.786 A 
similar narrative device of inversion can be found in Lütfi Paşa’s account whereby he 
describes the people of Rhodes praying to St. Jean for salvation. The author evaluates 
the situation as the people hoping for help from an idol.787 Such narrative inversions 
pose Islam as the true religion of God while devaluing Christianity and thus moving 
Süleyman forth as striving in the name of the “true religion.” 
Ramazan’s construction was probably not pure fiction, but an inversion of the 
actual Rhodian deliberation or their assessment of the current situation. An eye witness 
report from Rhodes, dated 16 March 1523, relates a Rhodian council deliberating on 
surrender. According to this account, seeing that things are going from bad to worse, on 
8 December the Grand Master and the Council assembled to evaluate the current 
situation and to take measures. They dwelled on the impossibility to fight back any 
longer due to the lack of munitions, victuals, and men. Furthermore, some walls were 
already compromised making it possible for individual attackers to enter the city. 
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External help, on the other hand, was nowhere in sight. Given these circumstances, they 
expected only the worst consequences: they would all be killed by the sword; women 
and children would be enslaved; many would be made Turk in which case the blame 
would fall on the administrators. Thus they decide to send an envoy for negotiation: 
The great Turke would not oppresse us to forsake our faith, but only would 
have the towne, it were much better then, and tending to greater wealth to save 
all the iewels above sayde, that should be defiled and lost if they came in the 
handes of the enemies of the faith. And so to keepe so much small people, as 
women and children, that they would torment and cut some in pieces, others 
take, and perforce cause them to forsake their faith, with innumerable 
violences, and shamefull sinnes that should be committed and done, if the 
town were put to the sword, as was done at Modon, and lately at Bellegrado. 
Whereby they did conclude that it were better, and more agrreable to God, for 
to take the treaty, if it were proferred, then for to die as people desperate and 
without hope788  
The state-of-mind reflected in Tabib Ramazan’s account of the Rhodes campaign 
confirms fears of the people at the regions under attack in the face of expected atrocities 
by Ottoman soldiers. The author gives an account of the intentions of the soldiers on a 
night right before an attack on the city. According to Ramazan, those soldiers who were 
already rich were in a state of arousal; they did not sleep until the morning “entertaining 
themselves with the prospect of joys they were to have the next night together with the 
families and virgins of the infidels.” Ramazan’s description of the soldiers’ entry to the 
castle next day maintains this state of mind: 
Ghazis who were filled with joy over the thought of uniting with the female 
slaves and women of Rhodes upon conquest, came to the castle with a swift 
move reminiscent of that of Ferhad who cut through the Mount of Bistun 
thinking of uniting with Şirin.789 
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3.2.3. For the Sake of the Realm 
Territory was a dominant concern in the figurings of rulers in the sixteenth 
century: whether defense of land already held, or the acquisition of more land for its 
own sake or of land of perceived “vital interest.”790 Territorial motives were not 
projected as such but linked with some sort of threat or insult against the realm. Causes 
related to the safety of the realm and the order of the world figure as another major 
motive, or legitimating guise. Such causes – regardless of being actual, perceived or 
projected – introduce yet another crucial binary opposition: justice and oppression. By 
sixteenth century standards, whether Christian or Muslim, war had to be justified. War 
for the sake of expansion or mere glory was not acceptable and would not do well for 
one’s reputation. The European idea of “just war” had to do with a lawfully instituted 
government defending land, faith, goods, and liberty. War was only to be waged at the 
command of a legitimate authority, with moderate means and for the right intentions. In 
this respect war was legitimate not only in the case of direct threat but also several 
offenses such as reprisal for acts of piracy, avenging insults to ambassadors, defending 
allies or friends, reaction to a broken treaty by another party and stopping another 
supplying enemy with men, munitions or food.791 The theory of “just war” had one 
fundamental purpose: “to examine all the possibilities and avenues whereby war could 
be controlled and turned into an ethically satisfactory means of justly settling the 
differences of the contending parties.”792 Rulers took care to use a “universally 
recognized principle to justify aggression”: the defense of patrimony or faith; revenge 
for a wrong done to the dynasty or an individual; redress of breaches of peace; non-
compliance of treaties. However, the idea of a “just war” was stretched as to include 
almost everything by the early sixteenth century.793 Erasmus criticized this elasticity, 
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saying “Today if a neighboring kingdom is rather more prosperous throughout, it seems 
almost a just cause for starting war.”794 In The Education of a Christian Prince, 
Erasmus saw war only as the last resort: “The good prince will never start war at all 
unless, after everything has been tried, it cannot by any means be avoided.”795 Luther, 
on the other hand, admitted that it was a “Christian act and an act of love confidently to 
kill, rob and pillage the enemy, and to do everything that can injure him until one has 
conquered him according to the methods of war.”796  
Thinking of Kemalpaşazade’s narrative on Süleyman contemplating, there is no 
evidence that either Kemalpaşazade or Süleyman ever read Machiavelli’s ideas on 
political and military power building. Yet, Süleyman knew that he had to keep up the 
military reputation. It would probably be safe to assume that sixteenth-century mentality 
and imperial logic brought similar conclusions:  
Thus, anyone explaining the cause of such good fortune would find it quite 
easily, because it is certainly true that when a prince or a people achieves such 
a reputation that every other prince or people nearby is afraid to mount an 
attack alone and remains in a state of fear, it will always happen that none of 
them will ever attack unless driven by necessity, so that a powerful prince or 
people will have, as it were, the choice of waging war upon whichever of its 
neighbors it chooses, while holding the others at bay with its diligence. Such 
neighbors will easily be kept at bay, partly because they respect this power and 
partly because they are deceived by the means used to lull them to sleep. 
Other, more distant powers which have no dealings with them will consider 
these matters too remote to concern them; they will continue in this error until 
the fire reaches them, and when this occurs they will have no means of 
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extinguishing it, unless they employ their own forces, and their own forces 
will be insufficient, since this one will have become extremely powerful.797  
Islamic jihad did not imply limitless violence, either. The Quranic messages 
regarding fighting unbelievers are rather ambiguous. While some verses limit fighting 
with aggression from the other party, some imply direct attack. In the Islamic sense, 
expansion had a different significance as well. Since the ultimate aim of Islam was to 
have all people in a single community [umma], expansion through war was regarded as 
a way of reaching eternal peace rather than aggression. In this respect, it was also 
obligatory to invite the adversary to accept Islam before attempting aggression. Military 
coercion was justified only if the invitation was declined. The frequent employment of 
the term fütûhât, which denotes “opening”, rather than victory in contemporary 
accounts demonstrates this point.798 An Ottoman military officer himself Nasuh, in his 
Tuhfetü’l-Guzât, identified the origin of the concept of ‘ghaza’ as the second year of the 
Hegira. According to Nasuh, the first ghaza of Islam was that of Bedr. Even in this case, 
the aggression was caused by infidels attacking Hamza with no reason,799 rather than a 
direct attempt at Islamic expansion. Accounts relating to the causes of the 1521 and 
1522 campaigns as seen through the eyes of the contemporaries demonstrate that neither 
King Louis of Hungary nor the Knights of Rhodes were targets of Süleyman’s 
aggression simply because they were “infidels” who had to be exterminated in the name 
of Islam.  
As far as the 1521 campaign is concerned, Ottoman chronicles emphasize the 
“insurrection and rebellion” [isyân ü tuğyân] of the Hungarian king as a major factor in 
the designation of the target.800 According to Sa‘di, Süleyman’s purpose was to achieve 
“victory in the conquest of the gate of jihad” [nusret-i feth-i cihâd itmeğiçün] by 
conquering Belgrade. Sa‘di explains further that Belgrade was not a random choice 
merely for the sake of jihad, but that the decision was based on the fact that they were 
attacking Islam and creating unrest. As Sa‘di’s story goes, Süleyman’s ancestors had 
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tried to deal with it, but neither Bayezid II nor Selim I had the opportunity. Thus, those 
lands had found the chance to prosper. Belgrade was the key of the infidel lands [mülk-i 
küffârın miftâh-ı pâyidârı]; by capturing the city Süleyman would cause great misery to 
the “infidel” [küffârın bağrına dâğ-ı hasret ve hasâret].801 As Celâlzâde has it, while 
Selim wished to take Persia and Egypt under his dominion, Süleyman longed for ghaza. 
He had heard about the “insurrection and rebellion” of the Hungarian king. According 
to the author, King Louis of Hungary was one of the two people who sided with the 
Devil on Süleyman’s accession.802 Lütfi Paşa explains the choice by referring to the 
breach of peace by the Hungarian king.803 According to Nasuh, not only was the 
Hungarian king an unbeliever but also physically hostile to Islam.804 
Establishing the main motivation of the 1521 campaign as ghaza, Kemalpaşazade 
goes on to provide more solid reasons for attacking Hungary. The main purpose of the 
Sultan, according to the author, is to eradicate [istisâl] “infidel” presence around 
Rumelia. The most likely target in this respect was Hungary since it shared borders 
along many directions with Ottoman territory. However, geographic proximity was not 
the only factor. According to Kemalpaşazade, after the crushing defeats of Varna and 
Kosovo at the hands of the Ottomans, no further war was waged on them and their kings 
were not put to such tests. Growing too proud, they came to be quite unruly. After citing 
the general faults of the Hungarians against the Ottomans, Kemalpaşazade goes into 
specifics. The Hungarian king, whom the author describes as famous for his strength 
among the Christians, not only neglected to send ambassadors and gifts on Süleyman’s 
accession but would not agree to pay tribute, either. Süleyman had no choice but to 
attack as required by the rules of sovereignty.805 The passage suggests two main issues. 
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Firstly, on the border of the Ottoman lands, Hungary may be seen as a perceived threat. 
Leaving territorial and political motives aside, one sideline view of the 1521 campaign 
would be the notion of encirclement. In other words, curbing down the power of a 
hostile neighbor would be a matter concerning the security of the realm.806 Positioned as 
guardian of Rumelia during his father’s reign, Süleyman already had an opinion about 
possible hostile intentions of Hungary. He had not only imprisoned a Hungarian envoy 
during that time, but sent warnings to his father regarding Hungarian plans of 
aggression.807 Secondly, in the minds of the contemporaries the fact that the Hungarian 
king did not send an ambassador or gifts, or refused to renew an agreement, signified a 
slighting of the authority and power of the Ottoman sultan as they wished to conceive it.   
Contemporary non-Ottoman correspondence reflects two main causes regarding 
the Hungarian campaign of 1521. The political instability and dissension among the 
lords of Hungary figure as a factor motivating Süleyman for action, rather than an 
opportunity. The trigger is given as the ill-treatment of Ottoman envoys in Hungary. 
The Venetian bailo in Istanbul, Tomasso Contarini, informed that the Sultan marched 
off to the campaign with all his forces and related the two opinions current among the 
residents regarding the motives beneath the campaign: “They say he went because of 
the dissension in the Kingdom of Hungary. Others say he went to avenge the two 
messengers he sent to the King who were not well-received and ill-treated.”808 In this 
expression, we can find both opportunity and motive.  
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The ill treatment of envoys as triggering aggression seems to be a universal 
excuse employed by many a ruler throughout history.809 Hungarian scholarship has 
designated that the Ottoman ambassador Behram Çavuş was already at Buda in 
December 1520.810 Two strands of thought can be found regarding the visit of Behram 
Çavuş. The first argument is that Behram Çavuş was in Buda for the renewal of peace. 
According to Pal Fodor, the peace agreement involved either tribute or right of transit. 
In both cases, the Hungarian reaction would be to take the offer as injury to sovereignty 
and incompatible with external relations. A Ragusian historian mentions that an 
agreement dated 28 March 1519 containing the right of transit under certain conditions 
meant that the offer simply involved the renewal of the existing agreement.811 This 
assumption does not seem unreasonable since we know that a new accession rendered 
prior agreements invalid and that they had to be renewed. The second argument is that 
the envoy was only a trick by the Ottomans to buy time. The campaign decision was 
already made. The purpose of the envoy was to mislead if not provoke the Hungarians. 
Thus, the detention of the envoy was rather the pretext than cause. This argument is 
supported by the fact of the absence of the issue in the proclamation of victory.812 
Neither do contemporary Ottoman chronicles mention the presence or ill-treatment of 
an Ottoman envoy at Buda. The involvement of the envoy becomes an issue in later 
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accounts such as Ali’s and Peçevi’s.813 On the other hand, the Venetian envoy in Buda 
Lorenzo Orio’s letter in April confirms some kind of detention of the Ottoman 
ambassador. Orio informs Venice that the lords and barons were assembled in Buda to 
discuss the options of peace or war with Signor Turco. He mentions that they were 
armed. He also reports that the ambassador of the sultan is there and kept in custody as 
customary.814 
Accounts on Rhodes also dwell on the security and defense of the interests of the 
realm and the people. According to Celâlzâde, although Süleyman had his mind set on 
Buda, he was directed by the unrest caused by the Efrenc on the seas. Thus he decided 
on Rhodes to prevent them from hurting the merchants.815 Among the reasons of the 
Rhodes campaign Kemalpaşazade mentions that Rhodes was home to the “infidel 
robbers who did not give in to anyone,” and yet they harmed everyone.816 Ramazan 
gives the motives as conquering the island, freeing the prisoners and clearing the way 
for the pilgrimage.817 An anonymous account circulating in England by 1524 saw the 
security of Levant for his subjects as one motive of Süleyman. According to this 
account, his subjects complained about the damages caused by Christian “men of war 
received into Rhodes.” Therefore: “He tooke conclusion in himselfe, that if he might put 
the seyde town in his power and subjection, that then he should be peaceful lord of all 
Levant, and that his subjects should complain no more to him.”818 
Fontanus puts the justification of the Rhodes campaign in the mouth of a naval 
captain, Kurdoğlu. Being a “man of war and fierce nature” Kurdoğlu was one of the few 
men who supported Süleyman’s intention of capturing Rhodes. According to Fontanus, 
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it was this notorious captain who brought to the attention of the Sultan the sufferings of 
the people through the hands of Rhodians. As the account goes, he told the Sultan that 
people complained of being robbed, towns plundered, and animals slaughtered. 
Furthermore, they could not fight back those “Rhodian corsairs and segnati of the 
Cross” on their own. Fontanus reveals that the captain was not merely speaking his own 
mind, but he was asked by these people to ask the Sultan for help. Thus, it was on their 
behalf that he begged the Sultan “in the name of the Prophet” to free his people from the 
“cruel enemy” and slavery. Then comes the punch line: “Do not forget that it is not only 
people suffering, but your public honor and your name. Will you let some thieves and 
murderers destroy your camps, plunder your lands, kill your people and harass the 
whole of our sea?”819 
As Fontanus puts two speeches in the mouths of Kurdoğlu and Süleyman 
respectively, to justify the campaign, an Ottoman source Tabib Ramazan expresses his 
arguments through the alleged speech of the Sultan at Rhodes. The first argument he 
puts forth is that of proximity, causing concern to Süleyman because the island stands 
“in the middle of the conquests” of his forefathers. The second argument is the superior 
knowledge of the islanders the sea, which gave them the opportunity to get in the way 
of pilgrims and merchants, to take them prisoners, to exploit and abuse them under 
miserable conditions.820 The third argument introduces the issue of Cem Sultan. 
According to the speech, Rhodians imprisoned Süleyman’s great-uncle without fearing 
his grandfather Bayezid, causing his predecessors to suffer for not being able to save 
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him. This suffering made them think that this was the one place that the infidels hit hard 
on the Ottomans.821  
Another projected motive of the Rhodes campaign was the freeing of Muslim 
prisoners on the island. The motif of liberating captives seems to be an important 
element in sixteenth-century image-making. Charles V’s releasing of the captives in the 
Tunis campaign, for example, was depicted in the tapestries. The Latin inscriptions on 
the tapestry expressed the gratitude of these prisoners. The effect of this liberation 
reached as far away as Nuremberg, as demonstrated by a poem written by the 
shoemaker Hans Sachs. The poem emphasized that the Emperor had gone to Africa “in 
person”, that he released Christian captives and that he “converted many heathen.”822 
According to Tabib Ramazan’s version of the Rhodes story, these prisoners prayed to 
God to send Sultan Süleyman to their rescue, just as He did in the case of Belgrade.823  
An Ebu Bekir ed-Darani, who paid his way out of the island around 1503, expressed his 
amazement at the lack of reaction by the Sultan as far as Rhodes was concerned while 
saving the prisoners was a “duty of his just like praying and fasting.”824 A letter to 
Selim I, probably dated March 1513, by a run-away Ottoman prisoner from Rhodes 
confirms the presence of Muslim slaves on the island as well as their hope of rescue by 
the Ottoman Sultan. The writer of the letter also informs the Sultan of the opportunity 
presented by the death of the grand master and the absence of the new one.825 
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Although a minor consequence rather than a major motive in contemporary 
sources, as far as Rhodes is concerned, a potential pretender to the throne is an issue 
that also seems to have preoccupied Süleyman: Cem’s son.826 According to a foreign 
observer who left the island with the Grand Master, through his viziers, Süleyman asked 
the Grand Master for the deliverance of Cem’s son upon entering the city. Although the 
Grand Master tried to hide him, he was finally forced to submit. Piri Paşa had told him 
that “the Signor wanted him above anything else.” When Adam requested the grand 
vizier to spare his life, Piri Paşa said that it was impossible.827 The campaign diary notes 
without comment that a son of Sultan Cem was found in Christian disguise and 
executed along with his son. His wife and daughters were sent to Istanbul.828 The 
proclamation of victory, on the other hand, remains silent on the issue. 
3.3. Making War 
So far we have tried to analyze the legitimating motives of the decision to wage 
war on specific targets. Now we shall try to understand the constituent elements 
involved in warfare as a rational and a ritual activity. As such we shall look at the 
strategic elements involved in specifying the targets, the significance of Süleyman 
commanding the campaigns in person, the ritual instances involved during various 
stages of the campaigns, the mode of appropriation of the towns concerned and the 
mode of termination of the campaigns. Since war-making is not violent action without 
any rules, each of these elements contributes to the overall image of a warrior monarch 
when played by the book, as Süleyman is projected to have done. 
3.3.1. Weighing the Opportunity 
                                               
826
 Spandounes, p.67; Sanuto, 34:61; KPZ, X:179-80: “sûret-i fesâda maddedir.” 
827
 Sanuto, 34: 61: “sichè il Signor si ha cavá etiam questo stecho di l’ochio cum 
farli morir." For the death of Cem’s son, see ibid, 67. 
828
 Münşe‘at, I:538. 
220 
 
Some scholars have moved forth the argument that until 1526 there was a lack of 
unified and organized Christian attempt to check Ottoman advance. Among internal 
strife and fear, an equally important factor in this lack of response was the belief in the 
ability of Hungary to defend itself. As long as it continued to serve as a buffer zone, 
European princes found no reason to engage militarily.829 It has also been argued that 
Hungary took pride in this role over a couple of centuries.830 Both modern scholarship 
and contemporary views agree that struggles within and among European states 
diminished their ability to compete with Ottomans. Especially the struggle between 
Charles V and Francis I seems to have directly helped Ottoman frontier advance. 
Religious dissention and strife also moved the focus away from the “Turkish threat.”831  
In 1520, Hungary was instable politically. The young king Louis II did not enjoy 
much authority among the nobles. The great lords were competing for power and 
tightening control over the peasants who as a result seem to have been indifferent to 
defending their land. Thus, the Hungarian army lacked the variety of participants 
Hunyadi had when defending Belgrade in 1456. Hunyadi’s army had students, peasants, 
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craftsmen, and vagabonds.832 It may be speculated that the popular support enjoyed by 
Hunyadi was not present.  
The alleged indifference of Hungarian peasantry resulted also from a perceptional 
element. In the 1520s, Hungarian peasants believed that Ottomans were made of iron 
and hence invincible. The common belief was that resistance was useless because God 
had turned his back and the God of the conquerors was stronger for the time being.833 
The economic depression followed by the death of Corvinus hindered the development 
of cities and caused an unfavorable balance of trade. This caused Hungary to be defined 
as “a rich land, poor country.” The Ottoman advance and threat required the 
maintenance of border castles which took almost all annual income for decades. With 
the collapse of economy, Corvinus’s reforms were abandoned. The Hungarian King was 
in dire straits. To solve immediate problems, feudal arrangements were re-introduced 
causing aristocracy to gain the upper hand. The authority of the crown declined along 
with coordinated defense efforts and centralized command.834 Many modern scholars 
put the blame of the loss of Belgrade on the King and his inefficient military machine. 
Ferenc Szakaly, for instance, charges “the unpreparedness of the king of Hungary’s 
military machine” regarding Ottoman success in Belgrade which he defines as a 
“strategically misguided and completely improvised campaign.”835 Another Hungarian 
scholar Andras Kubinyi blames the lords who did not respond to the call-to-arms 
because they would not give up harvest.836 
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Not only the weakened authority of the King, but the general decline in the  
border defense system, developed by Corvinus in the fifteenth century, seems to have 
reduced Hungary’s military ability. The castles at the border were in bad repair. 
Unfavorable political, social and economic conditions did not permit renovation. No 
sign of change was apparent until 1521, there was not money anyway. Croatian-Bosnian 
border fortresses were mostly in decay. Hungarian garrison soldiers had already 
devastated the border areas in the beginning of the century.837 Around 1520, in a speech 
to the Diet, Istvan Werboczy described the situation as such: 
... these confines have been destroyed due to the constant attacks by the 
Ottomans, peasants have been expelled from the estates of the castles; in many 
places, especially in Bosnia and Croatia, only desolate fortresses have 
remained, only desolate walls…838 
The situation in Hungary did not improve much even after Süleyman left Istanbul. 
On June 28, the Venetian ambassador in Buda Lorenzo Orio wrote that the King 
requested help from the Pope, the Emperor and Venice, as well as King Ferdinand and 
the Wallachian king. Orio believed that even though soldiers and money were gathered 
at Buda, it was impossible for the Hungarians to defend themselves alone.839 Orio’s 
observation probably echoed the common concern. In August, Sir Richard Wingfield 
wrote to Wolsey informing him of the visit made by a Hungarian ambassador to the 
Emperor. The ambassador had asked for help admitting that they would not be able to 
handle the situation on their own.840 By October the situation seems to have grown even 
worse. Luca Corvato, sent by the Venetian deputy of Friuli to explore the situation in 
the Hungarian camp reported that the Hungarian army was in no shape to pursue the 
enemy. They lacked order and were not united. Corvato pointed out to the discord 
between the people and the rulers stating that the king enjoyed little obedience.841 
Lorenzo Orio, who stayed there for 55 months and witnessed the Hungarian reaction to 
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the 1521 campaign at Buda, paints a rather gloomy picture of the situation. Relating his 
overall mission in December 1523, Orio reports that the King had no understanding of 
administrative issues and left the handling of finances in the hands of others. Although 
he tried to prepare an army to meet the Ottoman challenge in 1521, it was no use 
because Hungarian leaders [capi] let the case be lost for neglect and discord among 
themselves. Orio believed that if there were even one commander, Hungarians could 
have harmed the Ottomans.842 Orio’s secretary, Francesco Massaro, confirmed Orio’s 
observations in a letter dated 5 October 1523 to the Doge. He reported that the Sultan 
saw much discord in Transylvania and Croatia, thus decided on a campaign to Hungary. 
Hungarians, on the other hand, preferred to flee rather than fight back because of the 
dissension among the nobles.843 Italian writer Guicciardini expressed that the Ottomans 
would eventually find an opportunity in attacking Hungary which was “weakened in the 
hands of a child-king governed by prelates and barons of the realm, who were in 
disaccord among themselves.”844 Louis II seems to have tried everything he could to 
counter an expected Ottoman attack on Hungary. Venetian ambassador in Buda, 
Lorenzo Orio, reported in his letter dated July 16 that King Louis made the ultimate call 
for war:  
He sent an unsheathed sword to all barons and others for them to come to 
camp with the people they are obliged to bring, and this is the ultimate 
authoritative command: a rare thing, nobody remembers this being done in this 
kingdom before.845  
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King Louis’s efforts did not escape Ottoman attention either. On 4 August [29 
Shaban], Bali Beg is reported have brought news about the preparations of an army by 
Hungarian King, upon which Süleyman ordered boats to go about the Danube to face 
the challenge if necessary.846 He also sent for help to every major court in Europe. 
Hungarian envoys were sent even to the Diet of Worms in April 1521. Basing their 
argument on being a buffer-zone between the Ottomans and the Germans, they asked 
for preventive help from German princes to repel the enemy if need be. However, 
German estates were not to be convinced. They only promised that they would not let 
Hungary stand alone if and when it was actually attacked.847 Interestingly, we find an 
abundance of accounts on how each wrote to another asking for support on behalf of the 
Hungarian king rather than directly providing military or financial help. The King of 
Poland, for example, wrote to the cardinals requesting that “they persuade the Pope to 
help Hungary against the Turks who have already entered the country.”848 Nevertheless 
European rulers were hesitant to take action. Although all seemed very enthusiastic 
about an attack on the Turk two years earlier, the balance was now disturbed and 
everyone had his own issues to resolve. As Guicciardini put it: 
Now, although these preliminaries were set in motion with great hopes, and 
although everyone accepted the truce, and everyone declared himself, with 
ostentatious and magnificent speeches, to be against the Turk and to be ready 
(if the others concurred) to lend all their strength to so just a cause, 
nevertheless, since each of them considered the danger uncertain and very far 
off, and relating more to one state than to another, and since it was very 
difficult, and required a long time to introduce such a sense of zeal and 
universal a union, private interests and advantages prevailed.849 
The most likely candidates to support Louis II, namely Charles V and Ferdinand 
were engaged with their own issues. Charles V still had to consolidate his authority in 
his lands. He was in trouble with the French. In 1518, the Castilian Cortes had given 
him a demand list of composed of eighty-eight articles. He had even received a plea 
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from the Cortes that he should learn Spanish.850 However, he received the ambassador 
sent to him by Louis II. Although he did not do much to relieve the concerns of his 
brother-in-law, he sent the ambassador to England to ask for support: 
The bearer, the ambassador of my brother-in-law, the king of Hungary, has 
told me of the distress in which his country is, from the invasion of the Turk. 
Many towns have been taken, and the rest will be soon subdued, if aid is not 
given by other Christian princes. I have done what I can, considering the war 
which Francis has so unjustly commensed against me, and am determined to 
do more when my affairs will allow of it. The said ambassador has a 
commission to the King and yourself and has asked me to write to you in his 
favor. His petition is reasonable and necessary for the preservation of 
Christendom.851 
On 11 August 1520, Charles officially declared that Ferdinand would be the ruler 
of the Austrian territories. The settlement was negotiated throughout the following two 
years. The first settlement was signed at Worms on 23 April 1521. Leaving Austria, 
Styria, Carinthia and Carniola under Ferdinand’s control, Charles distanced himself 
from the Ottoman threat. The arrangement met with resistance in Carniola and Carinthia 
which threatened to suspend “Turkish aid.” In 1521, Ferdinand married the sister of 
King Louis, Anna, at Linz.852 Ferdinand was perhaps the most likely prince to provide 
King Louis with help, not only because of his marriage to the sister of the Hungarian 
king; but also if Hungary fell, Ferdinand’s territory would be the next target for the 
Ottoman army. However, when he arrived in Austria in 1521, Ferdinand had to face his 
own problems. The legal and administrative structures established by Maximilian were 
about to collapse. Being raised up in Spain, Ferdinand himself was not acquainted with 
local customs and organization. He was not even able to speak the language, when he 
had to talk at a meeting of the estates he had to use a translator. Furthermore, he had to 
face a hostile population and the growing challenge of Lutheranism with no firm 
financial base. Hostility was also directed to his advisors and his reliance on them.853 A 
letter dated 15 October 1523 by secretary Masaro, who accompanied the Venetian 
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ambassador Lorenzo Orio in his long Hungarian mission, reported Ferdinand’s 
unpopularity among his subjects as well as among the Germans. According to Masaro, 
Ferdinand owed this strong unpopularity to his “tyrannical actions” such as the 
execution of several German barons and unusually high taxing. Furthermore, he was 
vindictive and not as liberal as he ought to be.854 In short, in the beginning of 1520s 
Ferdinand still had to establish himself as an independent ruler. 
The crisis of Rhodes, too, came up at an unfortunate moment for European 
monarchs. Charles V and Francis I had newly begun to fight. Henry VIII had decided be 
involved in this war in favor of Charles. Pope Leo X died on 1 December 1521 and his 
successor Adrian VI did not arrive in Rome until 29 August 1522. In other words, the 
new Pope had neither time nor opportunity to organize Christian forces. The whole 
affair once again turned into a rhetorical demonstration of mutual accusations, each 
blaming the other for being unable to help Rhodes.855 The death of the grand master of 
Rhodes posed yet another opportunity. Allegedly, a knight named Andrew Merall, who 
aspired to be Grand Master himself, was so disappointed when not elected that he 
informed Süleyman of the opportunity at hand. According to his report, there was never 
a better time to capture Rhodes because the grand master was new, part of the walls 
were taken down, some Italian knights had rebelled against the new grand master, and 
“all Christian princes were busie warring upon each other.”856 Whether such a report 
was ever sent to Süleyman is doubtful, however the arguments set forth seem to 
summarize the current situation quite accurately. 
After the siege of 1480, the possibility of an Ottoman attack remained a major 
issue at Rhodian council meetings, putting the knights in a defensive position until the 
final conquest in 1522. Following grand master d’Aubussone’s [d.1503] pleas to the 
Pope and various Christian rulers in 1501 for concerted action, many such attempts can 
be observed by the Rhodians who warned Europe of the risk and asked for assistance. 
Their pleas usually found rhetoric support, but assistance on military resources never 
actualized. Each change of reign seems to have triggered new fear of an Ottoman attack 
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on the island.857 Rhodes prepared for defense, for example, when grand master 
D’Amboise died in 1512, the same year Selim I acquired the Ottoman throne; 
fortunately for the Rhodians, Selim was busy elsewhere.858 In the case of the 1522 
siege, rumors of a possible Ottoman attack were current in European courtly circles 
long before Süleyman set sail. Writing to Wolsey on 1 February 1520 from Rome, 
Campeggio mentioned that the Turk was preparing an attack against Rhodes.859 In a 
letter dated 24 July 1522, Charles de Lannoy warned Charles saying that Rhodes was 
the bulwark between the Turco and Christendom. If Charles did not help the island, 
warned Lannoy, it would be lost exposing Sicily to worse danger.860 These rumors were 
no doubt kindled by the communications of the Grand Master who was as sure of an 
attack as he was sure of Ottoman preparations. He requested help even from as far away 
as England. On 19 March 1522, he wrote to Wolsey for support, expressing his certainty 
of an Ottoman on Rhodes.861 On 17 June, he wrote to Henry VIII sending the French 
translation of a letter by Süleyman and said that the Ottoman fleet was already in 
sight.862 
Süleyman’s stake at the internal conflict in Europe seems to have loomed large in 
the minds of foreign observers in both cases. Spandounes mentions that Süleyman was 
well aware that Christian princes were divided and fought among themselves as he 
seized the opportunity to attack Belgrade. He also emphasizes that the physical vacancy 
of the papal seat as Süleyman laid siege on Rhodes and the lack of French help to the 
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island due to “harassment of other Christian princes” provided the Ottomans with 
opportunity.863 Venetian gossip reports a conversation between some Venetians and the 
viziers at Rhodes regarding the lack of external help to the island. The Venetians 
supposedly told the viziers that such a campaign could never be realized if Venice 
intervened in support of Rhodes. Rumor has it that the viziers concurred.864 Fontanus’s 
account brings forth the divided situation and the improbability of Christian help to 
Rhodes again in the alleged words of Kurdoğlu to Süleyman: 
And if you consider well, you will see that the Prophet Muhammad looking 
out for you, has given you a divine occasion; that is Christians are occupied 
among themselves in civil war, they have the mood for everything else other 
than you.865 
Ottoman chroniclers do not suggest any such seizing of opportunity. However, 
Süleyman was already well aware of what went on in the West of the Ottoman realm 
long before his accession. It has been mentioned in the first chapter of this study that he 
served as guard of Rumelia during the Egyptian campaign of his father. Venetian 
intelligence shows that Süleyman was very interested in the condition of his Western 
neighbors and counterparts. Venetian accounts abound with conversations between the 
viziers, the bailos and the ambassadors on European affairs. Minio’s report, dated 28 
February 1522, demonstrates careful deliberation on the destination of the next Ottoman 
target. The Venetian ambassador informs that the viziers kept asking him questions 
about the power of the Pope, his financial means, and the potential manpower of the 
Emperor and the French king. They were also interested in their mode of relations with 
Venice. Furthermore, they inquired about Rome specifically asking Minio how many 
days it would take to get to Rome from Constantinople and the easiest way to get there. 
They also wished to know whether Minio thought the Pope would help the 
Hungarians.866  
                                               
863
 Spandounes, pp.65-6. Leo X died in 1522, it took several months for his 
successor Adrian VI to arrive in Rome from Spain where he served in the name of 
Charles V. Though Adrian tired to procure help for the island when he came to Rome, it 
was already too late. 
864
 Sanuto, 34:16-7. 
865
 Fontanus, “Guerra di Rhodi,” 94a. Fontanus then puts the same conviction in 
Süleyman’s mouth on 94b. 
866
 Minio, Relazione, pp.20-1.  
229 
 
3.3.2. Strategic Targeting 
Modern scholarship has still not reached a consensus on whether Süleyman 
intended to occupy Buda and annex Hungary as he embarked on the 1521 campaign. 
The confusion is caused by two factors. The first factor is the inconsistency of 
contemporary Ottoman sources about the target of operation. While they leave no doubt 
as to targeting Hungary, Buda appears as a possible target along with Sabacz and 
Belgrade.867 This inconsistency keeps us from determining the intention for sure. The 
second factor detaining from a clear judgment on the matter is the fact that Buda was 
not occupied for the next twenty years, although Süleyman had the chance more than 
once. This ambiguity has resulted in two strands of thought explaining the choice of 
Hungary as Süleyman’s first target, especially in Hungarian scholarship.868  
The first strand, best represented by Pal Fodor, revolves around the theme of 
gradual occupation as the aim from the beginning in 1521.869 Fodor attributes the 
decision to march into Hungary on the onset of Süleyman’s reign to the “one step 
eastward, one step westward” policy of the Ottomans. According to this argument, the 
East was already exhausted as a result of Selim I’s campaigns when Süleyman ascended 
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the throne. Heading westward would give the East some breathing space. On the other 
hand, the ruling elite and especially the janissaries were discontent with warfare among 
Muslims. Based on this argument, Fodor concludes that “Süleyman, intent on 
consolidating his power, had practically no other alternative, but to turn his back on his 
father’s political ‘testament’ that passed on to him the assignment of solving the Persian 
problem.”870 Seen through this perspective, Süleyman’s attempt on Hungary seems like 
the natural response to the current situation. Some scholars have defined Süleyman’s 
Hungarian policy in terms of gradual occupation. In keeping with Halil Đnalcık’s thesis 
of methods of conquest, the process consists of four subsequent phases. The first 
involves devastation of borderlands which serves a dual purpose of wearing down the 
enemy and reconnaissance of territory. These raids are followed by a concentrated 
attack in the best possible opportunity after which the imperial army leaves the region to 
a pro-Ottoman administration. Ultimately, when the time is right, the region is annexed 
with a final campaign.871 Following this strand, the 1521 campaign can be viewed as a 
performance of the first of these phases.  
Whereas the second strand, led by Geza Perjes, argues that the occupation of 
Hungary was a gradual process due to the Habsburg threat. This line of thought 
concludes that Süleyman had no intention to occupy Hungary, but to preserve its 
territorial and political integrity as a buffer-zone as an anti-Habsburg measure.872 When 
viewed in this perspective, the 1521 campaign may be viewed as coercive action to 
consolidate the borders and to gain an upper hand in relations with Hungary. 
Pal Fodor dwells on the effect of the wishes of the political elite on Süleyman’s 
decision to attack Hungary. Fodor argues that from the start on the aim was to defeat 
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Hungary and occupy Buda, simply because Hungary was the neighbor.873 Tayyip 
Gökbilgin, on the other hand, dwells on the influence of wishes of a different sector of 
the political elite, that of the Rumelian commanders. According to this perspective, they 
were aware of the opportunity offered by the chaotic political and economical situation 
of Hungary.874 
All these views are a result of knowledge of what happened in the next decades. 
As Feridun Emecen has warned,875 the benefit of time might cloud our judgment. 
Therefore, we shall go back to the contemporaries to understand how they perceived the 
situation – although some of them also knew what ultimately happened. The key to the 
ambiguity of target in the 1521 campaign perhaps crystallizes at the divan of Sofia 
where we find two competing views as to where to proceed. Each party during this 
meeting tries to reinforce his argument through presenting the safest way to acquire 
Buda eventually. Sa‘di says that Süleyman’s initial target was Buda because he meant 
to end the rule of the King with his sword by aiming his capital directly; but he was 
convinced to take Belgrade first because such a stronghold should not be left behind. 
According to Sa‘di’s version of the story, the viziers were also concerned about the risk 
involved in going too far. They were worried about possible unrest at the other end of 
the realm. Through the words of the viziers, the author emphasizes that the Sultan had 
newly ascended the throne.876 Sa‘di’s expression suggests that Süleyman had yet to 
consolidate his power. According to Celâlzâde, it was Piri Paşa who proposed to capture 
Belgrade at the council of Sofia. In the opinion of the grand vizier, Belgrade was the 
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key to Hungary and the “obstructing barrier of the rebel and the corrupt” [erbâb-ı 
tuğyân ü zelâlin sedd-i sedîdi]. He foresaw that once Belgrade was captured, it would 
lead to many other conquests. But if they passed on to Buda before securing Belgrade, 
the enemy would have the chance to assemble there and pursue the Ottoman army.877 
Nasuh is of the same opinion; it is not reasonable to go for the king before taking 
Belgrade.878  
Belgrade was a stronghold of vital strategic importance. It stood on one of the two 
lines of the Hungarian-Croatian defense system going from Szöreny to Klis [Clissa] and 
Skradin [Scardona] at the Adriatic coast.879 While the possible fall of Belgrade was sure 
to create a huge breach in the defense system, it was a pre-requisite for a decisive attack 
on Hungary. By-passing would be impossible.880 Whether European or Ottoman, 
contemporary sources emphasize the key position of Belgrade. The significance of 
Belgrade as the “key to Hungary” reflects in Venetian correspondence numerous 
times.881 Writing from Buda on 6 July 1521, Venetian ambassador Lorenzo Orio says 
that Belgrade is “the gate of this Kingdom” and asserts that once the Ottomans take it, 
they could go over the plains to “wherever they pleased.”882 Writing almost two decades 
after the conquest, Giovio describes Belgrade as a stronghold of not only Hungary, but 
of all Christendom.883 According to the late fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicler Neşri, 
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when Mehmed II saw Hungary, he realized that Belgrade was the key. Therefore, he set 
his mind on “opening that gate.”884 Sa‘di identified the castle as a “throne on the way of 
ghaza” [reh-güzâr-ı gazânın hârı] and the “strong key to the infidel lands” [mülk-ı 
küffâr-ı nâ-bikârın miftâh-ı payidârı].885 It has been argued that Mehmed II’s siege of 
Belgrade in 1456 was aimed at subduing Hungary so that the Empire could extend into 
Eastern Europe. This aim has been considered as part of Mehmed II’s claim to universal 
rulership which involves the idea of One God, One Emperor. In this line of argument, 
Mehmed is believed to have considered that once he won Belgrade, he would have little 
trouble with the Hungarians later on. As Hungarian sources have it, “He would be in 
Buda, eating his evening meals in peace in two months.”886  
Contemporary accounts suggest that this key role of Belgrade was the logic 
behind Piri Paşa’s insistence on the conquest of Belgrade. Ahmed Paşa, as the opposing 
party, insisted on capturing Sabacz because it was a Muslim castle which had fallen to 
Christians. He was appointed to ensure its “salvation” [istihlâs]. According to Ahmed 
Paşa’s plan, once Sabacz was acquired, they would go on to Buda, the seat of the throne 
of Hungary. Although contemporary chronicles seem to side with Piri Paşa in favor of 
Belgrade as the initial target, Ahmed Paşa’s insistence on Sabacz might not have been 
in vain, either. Some Ottoman sources mention that Sabacz was originally built in order 
to capture Belgrade.887 When Corvinus took the fortress in 1476, he believed that his 
realm would not be safe as long as this stronghold was in the hands of the Ottomans. 
Corvinus’s conquest of the castle was celebrated festively in European cities.888 In this 
sense, Ahmed Paşa’s initiative may be seen as a strategic move since re-capturing 
Sabacz would strengthen the hand of the Ottomans in attempts of further expansion. 
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Ultimately, with both strongholds acquired, Süleyman’s chances for further expansion 
in Hungary were strengthened.  
Rhodes was a place of both strategic and symbolic significance. Besides lying on 
the naval pilgrimage route to Mecca, corsair activity supported by Rhodes posed a 
threat to Ottoman commerce on the Mediterranean after the conquest of Syria and 
Egypt.889 Andrew Hess has pointed out the vulnerability to influence from Christian 
rulers that Arab provinces were exposed to after the Gazali incident. The Portuguese 
navy was also close by. So Süleyman’s decision of Rhodes probably had to with 
consolidation of his father’s conquests. Furthermore, the revenue of Egypt, as well as 
the tribute of Cyprus, needed to be secured.890 Nicolas Vatin provides evidence of 
Rhodian involvement in the Gazali incident and communication with Ismail for anti-
Ottoman initiatives. Such actions, as Vatin sees it, were a way to produce confusion in 
the Ottoman realm.891 Even by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the strategic role 
of Rhodes was precarious. As Palmira Brummett expresses, “in 1503 Rhodes and 
Cyprus were the two easternmost bastions of Christian power in the Mediterranean. 
They served as centres of intelligence gathering, transit ports and military bases.”892 
While talking about the Rhodes campaign Ottoman chronicles emphasize 
protection of the sea routes for trade and pilgrimage as a duty, the conquest of Rhodes 
imply three main objectives: securing Mediterranean trade, consolidation of Syria and 
Egypt, preparing conditions for safer expansion. An eyewitness account relating the 
siege of Rhodes and the aftermath attests to the point. Gabriel Taragon, a merchant, tells 
about Ahmed Paşa’s attempt to persuade him to stay. According to Taragon, Ahmed 
Paşa emphasized the convenient location of the island being situated between Syria, 
Cyprus, Constantinople, Candia and others. The vizier also mentions that the Sultan 
intends to make campaigns to Candia and Cyprus because he does not want to have 
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anyone else in this sea. “When this happens,” says Ahmed Paşa, “Rhodes will be very 
comfortable and appropriate place for merchants.”893 
Guicciardini defined Rhodes as “a bulwark of Christian religion in those seas, 
although they were notorious for the fact that, spending all their days in piracy against 
the ships of the infidels, they also at times pillaged Christian vessels.”894 Venice itself 
seems to have suffered major damage from corsair activity sponsored or hosted by 
Rhodes, through direct pillaging or causing misinterpretation of culpability. When two 
Venetian vessels were captured by Rhodian ships in 1506, Venice retaliated by sending 
four galleys to attack Rhodian vessels. They did not necessarily have to pillage 
Christian vessels to cause harm to European trade. When Rhodian vessels seized a 
Genoese ship carrying 150 Muslims and valuable merchandise on the account of the 
Mamluk Sultan Qansuh al-Ghuri, the sultan reacted by confiscating all European goods 
and detaining the Venetians, French and the Catalans. As evidence put forth by 
Brummett shows that although these raids were not planned and carried out by the 
official navy, but through the efforts of individual Rhodians, they were regulated by the 
Order.895  
3.3.3. Strategic Command 
Following on the lead of Durkheimian theory, besides territorial gain, the 
campaigns of 1521 and 1522 have functioned to recreate a bond and a sense of renewed 
solidarity as the new Sultan ascended the throne. In the previous chapter, we have 
discussed the transformation of the “servants” of Sultan Selim into those of Sultan 
Süleyman in a rather conceptual and ritualistic manner. Throughout these two 
campaigns, these “servants” did serve their new master and were actually rewarded in 
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return. Thus, mutual ritual pledges were transformed into solid reality and became part 
of the regular flow of the bond between Sultan Süleyman and his army.896  
Süleyman stayed at and around Belgrade several days after the conquest, holding 
court and hunting. During the courtly gatherings many officials were rewarded and 
promoted. Among the most prominent is Bali Beğ, who seems to be figure as a key 
actor during the whole campaign in contemporary accounts. First he was awarded a 
robe of honor along with 30,000 aspers on 2 September [29 Ramadan]; two weeks later 
he was appointed governor to Smederevo [Semendire] and Belgrade with a revenue of 
900.000 aspers. Although the campaign diary does not mention any bayram ceremonial 
and leaves the entries of the first three days of Shawwal almost empty, we witness 
consequent promotions on the divan of 13 September [10 Shawwal]. A janissary officer 
[sekbanbaşı] was given a sancak, the janissary colonel [kethüda] was promoted in his 
place, and the almoner filled the vacant post. Several janissaries, imperial guards, and 
stable staff were either appointed to household cavalry regiments or given fiefs.897  
Süleyman’s presence in the 1521 and 1522 campaigns was significant in the sense 
that they were also instruments for him to appropriate the army.898 Although he served 
administrative roles during his princehood, unlike many of the previous princes-turned-
sultans, he lacked firsthand experience in the battle field. The 1521 campaign was his 
first direct experience in warfare; even more importantly, it was his first experience 
with the army which was now his. Trust is a mutual issue; in this respect, this was the 
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first experience of the commanders and the soldiers with Süleyman. Hence, the mutual 
need for demonstration of capability. Venetian gossip refers to Süleyman’s anger as the 
siege of Belgrade continued without improvement. The prolongation of the siege period 
seems to have upset Süleyman; at least that is the impression Venetians had. Writing 
from Ragusa, Lorenzo Gritti communicated what he heard from a bread-seller who just 
returned from the Ottoman camp. According to this rumor, the Sultan had told his men 
that in the time of his father they had done great things; now they were being counter-
attacked and achieved little honor in battle. This was perceived by another Venetian 
from Ragusa as Süleyman scolding his army for not knowing how to fight.899  
Süleyman attended both campaigns in person, although we do not find him 
actually fighting with sword in hand. However, contemporary sources make sure to 
delineate his commanding and coordinating presence. We find platforms built at 
appropriate places for him to observe what goes on in the field and to command 
accordingly. In the 1521 campaign, according to the campaign diary, the Sultan 
personally oversaw the bridge preparations on the Sava after the conquest of Sabacz. He 
observed work done and gave orders accordingly, standing on a platform built for him, 
every day from the dawn to dusk.900 Likewise, he observed Belgrade from a hilltop as 
he arrived and, after examining the possible sites of battle, he ordered action. The 
campaign diary mentions him doing the same every day fighting takes place.901 The 
campaign diary of Rhodes also presents Süleyman on horseback surveying the various 
parts of the island frequently and holding court to shape strategy.902  
Tomasso Contarini wrote to Marco Minio on 8 May 1521 that the governor-
general of Rumelia [Ahmed Paşa] did not want the Sultan to progress on campaign in 
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person, but that the viziers wished his presence to “provide reputation to the 
campaign.”903 If this account has any truth to it, the viziers seem to have been right, for 
a report from Buda dated June 28 confirms the fears of the Hungarians about the Sultan 
marching in person. The lack of confirmation seems to have augmented the fear.904 
When he decided to go on campaign to Rhodes, Süleyman was warned that it was not 
safe for him to go in person risking powerful storms or hostile navies. “But Solimano  
who has heard from his father that victories are not complete if the Signore has not 
acquired them with his own hand, thus he decided to go on the island in person.”905 A 
foreign account calls the day of Süleyman’s arrival on the island as “unhappy for 
Rhodes. For his coming, his presence and continuall abiding in the fielde is and hath 
beene cause of the victorie that he hath had.”906 Contemporary significance of leading 
military enterprises in person is apparent in Machiavelli’s complaint that princes impose 
the duty of war on others and keep a distance to avoid danger, instead of engaging 
personally in war:  
If we do occasionally witness a king of our own times go to war in person, 
we do not believe, nevertheless, that his actions will give rise to other methods 
that deserve higher praise. Hence, if kings engage in such an exercise at all, 
they do so with great pomp and not for any other laudable purpose.907 
 Although personal engagement by the ruler in war involved the danger of the 
collapse of the whole army in case he fell, Süleyman seems to have found a mid-point 
balance by being present but not actually fighting in his first two campaigns.  
We have seen that Süleyman played by the book as the campaign decisions were 
made. His actions as commander during the campaigns demonstrate a similar concern to 
make things the correct way. Both peaceful surrender cases were justified on the Islamic 
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law.908 As he set foot on Rhodes, Süleyman’s first act was to offer peaceful surrender to 
the islanders. Kemalpaşazade refers to this act as the tradition of the Prophet.909 Islamic 
law prohibited forced conversion and unjustified violence. Thus before attacking the 
attacker had to offer a choice. The attacked could prefer to convert or accept the poll tax 
directly. Opting not to accept these terms meant that he would have to fight. Losing the 
fight entailed expropriation, slavery and even death. In either case, once surrendered or 
conquered he would acquire the zimmi status and could not be forced to convert. All 
schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence agreed on the lawful nature of jihad; however it 
was not lawful to make war on a people without first inviting them to join Islam.910 
Sheikh Burhanuddin Ali of Marghinan [d.1196] of the Hanafi school explains this as 
such: 
… because the Prophet so instructed his commanders, directing them to call 
the infidels to the faith, and also because the people will hence perceive that 
they are attacked for the sake of religion, and for the sake of taking their 
property, or making slaves of their children, and on this consideration it is 
possible that they may be induced to agree to the call, in order to save 
themselves from the troubles of war… If the infidels, upon receiving the call, 
neither consent to it nor agree to pay capitation tax, it is then incumbent on the 
Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because 
God is the assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, 
the infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the 
Prophet, moreover, commands us to do so.911 
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Not only Islamic commands, but also Turco-Mongolian conventions required a 
call to submission before attacking. Voluntary submission was the first principle of the 
Great Yasa of Cinghis Khan:  
When (the Mongols) have need to write any letter to rebels, and they must 
send an envoy, let them not threaten with the great size of their army and their 
numbers, but let them say only, If ye will submit yourselves obediently ye 
shall find good treatment and rest, but if you resist – as for us what do we 
know? [But] the everlasting God knoweth what will happen to you.912  
Süleyman also seems to have taken care not to repeat the mistakes of his 
predecessors. Before marching into Hungary in 1521, he ordered the frontier 
commander Mihaloğlu Mehmed Beğ to meet with the Wallachian army and pass on to 
Transylvania to block possible external help to the Hungarian King.913 The unsuccessful 
siege of Rhodes in 1480 had lasted three months. Although Selim I was advised to try 
once more to acquire the island for the security of the seaway from Syria and Egypt, the 
project was never materialized. Selim’s furious objection to the attempt as told by 
Sadeddin was motivated by the insufficiency of gunpowder. Selim did not believe that 
four-month stock of gunpowder would be enough to get the island which he believed 
required double that time.914 Süleyman must have given some thought to these examples 
since the materials landed on the island for the siege demonstrates that he was ready for 
a long and hard period of siege.915  
The size of the army seems to have been an important element in strategy, though 
not the only factor in evaluating force.916 According to Ramazan, the large number of 
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soldiers he assembled for Rhodes was one of the two greatest strengths Süleyman 
depended on – the other was the council.917 A Venetian observer who happened see the 
Ottoman camp after the truce was impressed by the number of “valiant men” Süleyman 
still had even after so many losses during the siege.918 The Venetian captain-general 
Domenigo Trevisan relating his opinions on Rhodes, on 30 March 1523, believed that 
Turks were not as expert as they thought they were. According to Trevisan, Ottoman 
army owed its success to their number rather than their “knowledge of conquering 
cities.”919 Some foreign observers, on the other hand, were impressed not only by the 
size of the army, but the quality of men as well. An observer who left Rhodes with the 
Grand Master reported “never having seen more beautiful or orderly men before.”920 
Methods used by the Ottoman army would make Machiavelli proud. Machiavelli 
praised Roman tactics which involved surrounding the city on all sides and attacking 
from all sides which made it possible to capture the city in a single assault. If this was 
not enough, they broke the walls, dug tunnels to go under the city, constructed wooden 
towers to level with defenders, put earthen embankments to reach the walls.921 
Süleyman’s army engaged all methods from time to time, but the last tactic catches 
attention especially in Rhodes where it came about after deliberation.922 The victory of 
proclamation reports that the island was surrounded by all sides. The campaign diary 
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cites an interesting anecdote about the force of the method digging tunnels to blow up 
the castle, which is one of the most conventional methods of the Ottoman army. As the 
story, the gunner of Rhodes promised not to let even a single man walk on the island. 
However, soon seeing that Ottoman soldiers were all around, the Grand Master scolded 
his gunners. The men replied by saying, “We did not know that the Turk would come 
from under the ground.”923 This anecdote reflects a pride in the method and the 
conviction that it was an efficient strategy which caught the enemy unprepared.  
The surprise element seems to have played an important role in sixteenth-century 
warfare. Strange sights and sounds were used to surprise or even terrify the enemy.924 
According to the campaign diary, the sound of cannons terrified everyone and prevented 
defensive efforts during the siege of Rhodes.925 Kemalpaşazade and Lütfi Paşa mention 
two elephants prepared by Sultan Süleyman for the 1521 campaign.926 Elephants have 
been reported to accompany the army to the 1526 campaign, too. We have observation 
of elephants also in the 1526 campaign. Kemalpaşazade mentions them walking like the 
graceful clouds [sehâb-ı reftâr] before the Sultan as he marched out of the city on 23 
April 1526.927 The Venetian bailo at the time, Bragadin, also refers to two elephants 
walking in the procession as the Sultan departed ceremonially for the campaign.928 
Luigi Bassano, in a more general manner, describes the role of elephants in the 
departures and arrivals of the Sultan in the city before and after campaigns. 
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Emphasizing that this was an “honor reserved for the elephant,” the author describes 
entertainment involving elephants at such occasions.929 
3.3.4. Appropriation 
A short term process of appropriation followed the confirmation of military 
victory through submission of the besieged town in both of the cases under 
examination. This was a dual process whereby the conquered town was appropriated 
simultaneously in imperial and Islamic terms. The conversion of churches into mosques 
and the appointment of a judge marked the newly acquired status of the city as part of 
the realm of Islam. The ceremonial entry of the Sultan, leaving a garrison, ordering re-
construction, sending part of the local population to Istanbul constituted an imperial 
claim of the town’s newly acquired status as part of the Ottoman realm. The ceremonial 
involved in the process functioned in such a way as to reflect a synthesis of the Sultan’s 
dynastic, imperial and religious supremacy.  
After the conquest we witness the generic post-conquest steps in Ottoman sources. 
In both cases since the castles ultimately surrendered; therefore, they were treated 
within the âmân [peaceful surrender] tradition. In other words, the keys were delivered; 
the lord of the castle paid his respects. In return, he was awarded a robe and the town 
with immunity from attrition.930 Celâlzâde talking about the conquest of Belgrade 
evaluates the âmân in return for surrender as a suitable act for the Sultan.931 The Next 
day happened to be Friday. This is the day when Süleyman entered the town, or rather 
took possession of the town ceremonially. Celâlzâde’s account reflects a typical post-
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conquest entry. Ottoman banners were erected on towers, and a call to prayer was made. 
The Sultan was praised. Churches were cleansed – meaning they were converted to 
mosques. Friday salas were called and finally Süleyman performed the Friday prayer 
together with his officials and the ghazis.932 This was followed by the appointment of a 
judge and a castle keeper to each of the castles conquered.933 The entry in the campaign 
diary for 30 August [26 Ramadan] is as follows: 
Today the castle of Belgrade was conquered with the help of God. After noon 
the gate of the castle opened and the infidels together with their possessions, 
women and children started to come out. Janissaries went in and erected the 
banner of their commander on the hisar. The muezzins of the sultan read the 
call for prayer on the walls. Piri Paşa and defterdar Mehmed Çelebi went to 
the tower to confiscate the treasury. Following them, Hüsrev Beg’s – 
commander of Smederevo [Semendire] – banner was taken and the band 
played. In the afternoon, the council met and all household members were 
called to join the meeting fully armed. When everybody assembled, notable 
infidels along with the castellan of Belgrade came to kiss the sultan’s hand. 
They were presented robes of honor. Heralding drums were sounded three 
times to announce the good news drums were beaten thrice. The janissaries’ 
red and yellow banner was taken up to the fortress, there accompanied by the 
beating of drums. Infidels were transferred to ships until evening while the 
Serbians were kept at the lower castle. Thanks be to God, the conquest was 
achieved on a holy day, both Kadir and Friday night. It has been exactly thirty 
days since the fortunate [devletli] padişah arrived in joy [sa‘âdetle] to 
Belgrade, the fortress was conquered on the thirtieth day.934  
The most obvious symbolic act of appropriation right after the conquest is the 
conversion of the churches to mosques and the performance of the Friday prayer by the 
Sultan. Generally we see that sources symbolize the inclusion of newly conquered city 
in the Abode of Islam [dârü’l-Islam] through the conversion of the major church into a 
mosque. Once the Sultan performs the Friday prayer in the converted temple, 
appropriation seems to be complete. This process is often identified as a “cleansing” 
[tathîr] process. In the case of Belgrade, Süleyman entered the city the day after the 
actual conquest which happened to be a Friday. He performed the Friday prayer in a 
church converted into a mosque.935 The first royal entry in a captured city being on 
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Friday seems hardly like pure coincidence. According to the campaign diary, Süleyman 
entered Sabacz and Syrmia on Friday, 27 July [21 Shaban].936 The same thing goes true 
for Süleyman’s entry in Rhodes. Ottoman troops went in the castle on 24 December [5 
Safar]. Süleyman entered the town and performed the Friday prayer on 2 January [14 
Safar].937 As the campaign diary reports, the first call to prayer was made on 25 
December [6 Safar], the day after the entry of the troops, in the name of the Sultan; 
however this was not Friday and the Grand Master had not yet left town. Ten days were 
allowed for the islanders to leave as negotiations were completed on  December [30 
Muharram].938 Süleyman seems to have waited first until the grand master and the 
inhabitants – those who wished to – left the island, and then for the first Friday. In this 
sense, conversion is a two-fold event which is completed only after the Sultan attends 
the Friday prayer.  
Ottoman sources dwell a lot on the church of St. Jean at Rhodes. Lütfi Paşa 
explains the significance of the church for the Christians by relating a Christian belief 
that whoever asks for forgiveness at this church would be forgiven regardless of the 
severity of the sin committed.939 Ramazan uses the opportunity to devalue Christianity 
in opposition to Islam by associating the church with unbelief, idols and devil.940 
When Süleyman entered the city, his banners were erected all around the town, 
according to Kemalpaşazade. The Grand Master wearing the robe of honor presented to 
him kissed the hand of the Sultan and was given leave. Talking about the conversion of 
the church of St John into a mosque, the author mentions that it was built by the revenue 
obtained from Bayezid II for Cem.941 Foreign rumors have it that after Süleyman prayed 
in the church of Saint John which he converted into a mosque, and he boarded his ship 
and saw what his army has done to the city; he ordered the re-construction of the city 
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through joining it to a province and assigning janissaries.942 According to the campaign 
diary Süleyman entered the city on 14 Safar, Friday, the day after the grand master and 
others left. The church of Saint John was converted into a mosque and he performed the 
Friday ritual there.943 The proclamation of victory also emphasizes the conversion of 
churches into mosques. The place was cleansed [tathîr and tanzîf].944 A similar 
argument of cleansing is found in the prisoners’ prayer of Ramazan. This episode also 
associates Süleyman’s actions with those of the Prophet by referring to Muhammad’s 
“cleansing Mecca from idols and gloom.”945 This can be associated with the Quranic 
verse associating unbelievers with impurity.946 
Ottoman accounts on Belgrade also dwell on the customary practice of forced 
relocation.947 In keeping with this practice, a certain part of the local population was 
sent to Istanbul. According to Celâlzâde, inhabitants who wished to go to Hungarian 
soil left, and the rest were exiled to Istanbul.948 Sa‘di even gives a number of the exiles 
as 500 houses and tells that they were settled around Yedikule.949 The campaign diary 
mentions that because “Hungarian infidels wished to go their own realm” the Sultan put 
                                               
942
 Anon., Summariu[m] der brief auß Candia, von geschichten der stadt Rodiß, 
wie dem Türcken übergeben ist worden, s.1., 1523, p.5. One Venetian report cites 
10,000 janissaries, 4,000 cavalry and 20 galleys. Sanuto, 34:8. Also see ibid, 14, 17. 
943
 Münşe‘at, I:539; Bostan (TSK), 40a; Sanuto, 34:61, 90. 
944
 Münşe‘at, I:525. 
945
 Ramazan, p.97. 
946
 Quran, 9:28. For the concept and Shiite emphasis see, Bostom, “Jihad 
Conquests and the Imposition of Dhimmitude,” p.32. 
947
 For relocation as a routine Ottoman settlement policy along with other 
elements of appropriation such as leaving a garrison representing sultanic law, a judge 
representic Islamic law, see Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman war and warfare, 1453-1812,” in 
War in the Early Modern World, 1450-1815, Jeremy Black (ed.) (Florence, KY, USA: 
Taylor & Francis, Incorporated, 1998), p.151: “It was Ottoman practice to leave a 
garrison, representing sultanic law, a judge, representing Islamic law, and Muslim 
preachers in all newly-conquered territories. Fortress and mosque symbolized the 
sultan’s presence in these early cities, sometimes built within the Christian towns, but 
equally often built apart. Relocation of populations into Balkan territories and, after 
1453, to the new imperial capital was a routine policy of Ottoman settlement.” 
948
 Tabakat, 63b. 
949
 Sa‘di  (SN), 143a. 
247 
 
them on ships and sent them to Slankamen to be sent to “their lands.”950 Others on the 
other hand, who were defined as Serbians, were sent to Istanbul accompanied by a one 
of the lesser household cavalry regiment.951 These expressions also point at one of the 
aspects of appropriation. Through the process of converting the “land of the 
unbelievers” into the “realm of Islam” those who were not willing to become part of the 
converted world order were disposed of. In this case, there seems to be an ethnic 
awareness relating to the ownership of the land. The “Hungarians” of the castle who did 
not belong in Belgrade anymore were sent to “Hungary” which is defined as their 
“vilâyet”; whereas those who were defined as “Serbs” were put through forced 
relocation. Both forms of deportation seem to be perfectly valid and legitimate 
according to the proclamation of victory.952 In other words, while “Hungarians” were 
deported out of the Ottoman realm, “Serbs” were treated as Ottoman subjects through 
the customary application of relocation within the Ottoman lands. 
Appropriation also involved securing the lives and possessions of the inhabitants 
of the conquered areas. Looking out for the immediate interest of the local population 
was a practical concern as well as an ideological tool devised for the demonstration of 
justice. Leaving aside the religious maxims, protection of the subject population was a 
practical concern for it was the tax base.953 Back in 1461, when Stjepan Tomasevic the 
King of Bosnia informed the Pope about his concern about Mehmed II attacking his 
kingdom, he was discouraged not only by the castles built by Ottomans in his realm but 
also by the sympathy he had from the peasants. He complained that Ottomans promised 
freedom to peasants who readily believed out of ignorance. Without the help of the 
peasants, feared Tomasevic, nobles would not be able to hold their castles which would 
open the way to Hungary and Venice after Bosnia.954 Various reports relating to the 
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Rhodes campaign confirm careful attention to the safety of those who stayed on the 
island. Two reports by Ahmed Paşa to the Sultan after the conquest demonstrate that 
although there were a few isolated instances of misconduct, measures were taken to 
protect the lives and belongings of the inhabitants. Measures cited by Ahmed Paşa were 
directed at the security of both island and inhabitants. Smaller cannons were located in 
the fortress, whereas the mouths of the larger ones were directed at the mountains and 
the fuse holes downwards. A sufficient number of janissaries were left on the island for 
guard. The newly built port was also guarded by enough men. The stones, iron balls, 
etc. fired during the battles were gathered and stored. The surrounding villages and 
towns were put under protection. Ahmed Paşa emphasizes that “there shall be no 
oppression or assault on anyone under the reign of my sultan; the city and the 
surroundings are well under protection and security.”955 Relating the conquest of 
Rhodes a few years later, Sa‘di repeats the comment: “Under the reign of the pâdişâh 
refuge of the world nobody oppressed anyone, nobody broke his limits.”956 We also see 
that there was effort on the part of Ottomans to convince merchants to stay and to keep 
commerce flowing. There are also accounts stating that many of the local population of 
Rhodes preferred to stay.957 
The terms of peaceful surrender offered to Rhodes are listed in many different 
sources, probably because they were found to be quite generous by contemporary 
standards as even foreign observers attested. Those who chose to remain on the island 
would be exempted from taxes for five years; this offer would be valid for those who 
wished to leave later rather than immediately with a three-year option. Those who 
stayed were promised immunity from military recruit [devşirme], this right would be 
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extended for their children and successors as well.958 Along with the promise of non-
violence, it was stated that the Ottoman army would leave immediately with only 
Ahmed Paşa staying with a small force to protect the artillery. 25 knights would be 
handed in to the Ottomans as hostage.959 Rumors circulated that Süleyman had issued a 
letter declaring that all who wished to leave the island could do so without any harm 
and that all those that wished to stay would not be harmed either. Those who preferred 
to stay would be exempt from taxes for five years.960 There are many accounts 
mentioning that the Turks observed the pledges made.961 This served in a way to 
demonstrate an example. In other words, the respect shown to the terms of surrender in 
Rhodes was to demonstrate others that if they were conquered, they had no reason to 
worry.962 Conversely, many foreign accounts mention that the fall of Belgrade and the 
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treatment of the inhabitants there were among the factors in the decision to surrender.963 
Trevisan’s report confirms that the conditions were observed by the Ottomans. He 
reports that everyone was able to leave without trouble and that some even went back 
for their belongings without the Turks intervening in any way.964 
As the surrounding islands submitted their keys, Ahmed Paşa tells that they were 
also supplied with castle guards and commanders. Flags, banners, equipments, etc. were 
recorded down and the books were given to the commanders. Muslim prisoners in these 
islands were transferred to Anatolia.965 The conquest of the surrounding islands is 
justified by Kemalpaşazade with Kos [Istanköy] as home to pirates and Bodrum 
harming merchants.966 
3.3.5. Ceremonial Occasions 
The campaigns of 1521 and 1522 showcase several ceremonial occasions. These 
occasions serve various functions ranging from building solidarity and preparing 
participants face violence, to consolidating and displaying sovereign power. These 
ceremonial occasions bring together various aspects of ritual construction, which 
involve religious, imperial and dynastic messages to form a coherent and established 
image of the Sultan as well as his rule. The ceremonial occasions observed during the 
campaigns incorporate all three sectors of Ottoman society: the military establishment, 
the religious establishment and the subject population. These occasions provide an 
opportunity for interaction between the Sultan and the various sectors whether 
individually or simultaneously. 
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Unlike his European counterparts, Süleyman never took on a “royal progress” per 
se, and neither did his predecessors.967 Examining European court cultures, one can see 
that the progress was a political weapon which served to consolidate support for a 
regime, to popularize its attitudes, to take these attitudes to the roots of local 
government. Moreover, the progress “made concrete the abstract of the crown in the 
actual presence of the ruler.”968 When viewed in the perspective of rite of a royal entry, 
this sort of reception gives the people the opportunity to identify with the power of the 
ruler. It also makes clear the subservience of local authorities to the central ruler. In this 
sense, the ceremonial observed can be considered an attempt to tie the periphery to the 
center.969 It is possible to say that hunting expeditions and campaign marches did the 
trick in the Ottoman case. 
The march to Belgrade, especially, seems to have served as a kind of “royal 
progress” for Süleyman. We need to keep in mind that this was his first official 
appearance in the provinces as Sultan, a point well noted by Sa‘di.970 As he journeyed to 
Edirne, people were all over the roads along the way to see the Sultan. When he arrived 
in Edirne on 8 May [20 Jumada II] the people of the city welcomed him and presented 
their gifts. Two days later, Ahmed Paşa the governor-general and the commander of 
Rumelia came to present his gifts and kiss the Sultan’s hand along with other 
commanders.971 On 10 June [4 Rajab], Ahmed Paşa greeted Süleyman at Plovdiv 
[Filibe] with the people of the town presenting their gifts. This is also when the 
Rumelian forces paraded before the Sultan.972 A week later, as the sultan arrived in 
Sofia, the people of the town presented gifts.973 On 25-26 August [21 and 22 Ramadan], 
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Şehsuvaroğlu Üveys Beğ and Karaca Paşa came to present their gifts and kiss hands, 
respectively.974 One interesting feature observed in the campaign diary is the 
participation of religious students [suhte] to the march from each major stop. On 2 June 
[25 Jumada II] students of Edirne are reported to have raised their banner and joined the 
ghaza. Those of Plovdiv and Sofia did the same, respectively on 12 June [6-7 Rajab].975 
The march and the stops not only meant presenting gifts to the Sultan for the resident in 
towns on the route, but also an opportunity to present their complaints and grievances. 
The law code for Sofia, for example, mentions some subjects living at Sofia addressing 
the Sultan on his way to Belgrade in 1521 to present their complaints.976 During the 
march, Sultan Süleyman also accepted various envoys. The campaign diary mentions 
Moldovian 22 May [14 Jumada II] and Crimean 5 June [28 Jumada II] envoys visiting 
the Sultan to present gifts and kiss his hand, during the earlier phases of the march.977  
Venetian reports mention a Florentine envoy visiting at Sofia.978  
The campaign diary for the Rhodes campaign displays similar entries. On 1 July 
[6 Shaban], for example, Süleyman was greeted at Kütahya by the governor-general of 
Anatolia Kasım Paşa along with the commander of the janissaries Bali Ağa. The next 
two days witnessed hand kissing and gift-giving by the governor-general and 
commanders of Anatolia followed by the governor-general and commanders of 
Rumelia.979 The gathering at Kütahya, as the case was at Sofia in 1521, served not only 
as a demonstration of mutual loyalty, but also to set the strategy. Here Ramazan, for 
example, takes the opportunity to praise the sultan for taking counsel.  According to the 
author, four main orders were given at the gathering: the enemy should be destroyed, 
the oppression over the subjects should be removed, assault or harm to anyone’s family 
and possessions should be prevented, and everyone should keep to the duty he was 
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assigned to.980 Tabib Ramazan takes the opportunity at this point to associate the Sultan 
with his namesake Solomon. According to the author, this gathering was so crowded 
that no king or ruler had seen such a huge gathering, except for Solomon and here were 
even more people.981  
On 11 August [18 Ramadan], as court was held at Rhodes, Hayrbay’s gifts were 
present and the soldiers sent by him kissed the Sultan’s hand. Another such occasion 
was the arrival of the captain of Magrib and the envoy who presented their gifts and 
kissed hands on 11 October [20 Dhu’l-Qada].982 What we witness in these accounts is a 
kind of homage ceremonial, involving two different sets of audience/participants. 
Firstly, the newly ascended Sultan gets a chance to receive homage of the ruled 
population. Secondly, he gets a chance to bond with the provincial military members.  
Visiting the tombs of ancestors was a conventional ritual event before any 
significant action. Before marching out of the city in 1521, Süleyman visited the tombs 
of his ancestors as well as that of Ayyub.983 Besides asking for help from the ancestors, 
Quran was read at these locations as well as distribution of alms to the poor and the 
needy.984 Süleyman seems to have been careful not to hurt the sensitivities of the people 
regarding the role of piety and invocation of saints in conquest. As the story goes, 
Mehmed II had asked for the spiritual assistance of men of velâyet before attempting the 
conquest of Constantinople. When he was confronted by a saint after the conquest, he 
boasted: “Mevlana, I have acquired it with my sword.” Then when he set his mind on 
getting Belgrade and was on the verge of losing all hope, he once again turned to God 
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and the prayers of the people only to be confronted by a abdal in the army camp who 
told him to “go get it with [your] sword.”985  
The arrival of the Sultan at a specific location also called for some sort of 
ceremonial action. In the 1521 campaign, for example, Sultan Süleyman passed on to 
Syrmia among fires of cannons and guns, with banners before him. The diary 
emphasizes that such festivities were performed at wherever he passed.986 A festive 
greeting is noted upon Süleyman’s arrival at Kütahya on the way to Rhodes, where he 
was ceremonially received by the governor-general of Anatolia Kasım Paşa, the 
commander of the janissaries Bali Ağa and the commander of the irregular foot soldiers 
[azeb] Ali Ağa.987 Venetian sources emphasize the festa on the occasion of Süleyman’s 
crossing over to the island from the mainland with artillery and band playing.988 Such 
festivity is also recorded in the campaign diary whereby the passage of the Sultan to the 
island was celebrated by firing cannonballs from the ships. Only then did the 
fighting/war start.989 Ramazan takes the opportunity to describe Süleyman’s crossing 
employing ambitious Islamic imagery. The author associates the ship carrying the 
Sultan with the arc of Noah in terms of providing fast arrival at the target. It is also 
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associated with the throne of Solomon, which reached the destination swiftly carried by 
the wind. His horse is associated with Burak, the horse which “swiftly” took the Prophet 
to God on the night of Miraç.990  
At some points in the march, we witness demonstration of largesse on the part of 
the Sultan through bestowal of benefactions, collectively or individually. On 7 August 
[14 Ramadan], for instance, Ahmed Paşa was rewarded a robe of honor as well as a 
bejeweled sword and two thousand pieces of gold. Although the explanation for such 
rewarding in the middle of a siege is not provided, we may assume that it was because 
he had fought a difficult battle the day before.991 On the way to Rhodes, a similar 
ceremony took place at Kütahya. Ramazan mentions that being appreciated by the 
Sultan encouraged the participants and “cats turned into lions.”992 
Another occasion which provided a ceremonial opportunity was the bayram 
following the holy month of Ramadan. Interestingly, the 1521 campaign diary does not 
mention any sort of celebration,993 whereas that of Rhodes records that on 24 August [1 
Shawwal], viziers and commanders of all ranks kissed the Sultan’s hand as was 
customary. Although the ceremonies did not last long and they resumed their positions 
around the castle, the bayram was not neglected. The campaign diary reports that the 
Sultan he sat on a golden throne [kürsi-yi zerrîn] after the morning prayer, and received 
his men. A banquet followed the hand-kissing ceremony, after which everyone returned 
to his assignment.994 The banquet as the “basic metaphor for re-distributive power and 
function of the sovereign figure”995 at such instances functioned both as a motivational 
device and a bonding tool.996 
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Both campaigns coincidentally present us with yet another ritual opportunity, this 
time based strictly on the dynastic concept. Süleyman received the news of the death of 
his son on the way back from Belgrade. This was an occasion for solemn mourning 
whereby court was held for the grandees [â‘yân] to kiss the Sultan’s hand.997 Being the 
soldier he was, Nasuh says that though Süleyman was sad about the death of his sons, 
the happiness of the conquest prevailed.998 According to Bostan, after the ceremonial 
mourning at the army camp, Süleyman accepted the death of his son as God’s will and 
endured the loss patiently.999 The Venetian ambassador Marco Minio wrote to Venice 
that on 30 October one of the sons of the sultan was buried. He was 9 years old. On the 
17th, a daughter died. About five days before the arrival of Minio another son died. 
Informing that now there was only a two-year old son left, Minio says: “But the Signor 
is young, he can have other children. The pashas accompanied the deceased son to the 
sepulchre on foot and he will make great charity according to his custom.”1000 One 
happier ritual occasion occurred during the 1522 campaign: a son was born to the 
sultan. In a dynastic monarchy, this would no doubt mean very good news if not a 
blessing. The news of the birth of Prince Mehmed was received in the camp on 31 
October [10 Dhu’l-Hijja]. The birth was celebrated in the camp with sacrifices and 
distribution of alms. The messenger who brought the news was rewarded a robe as 
required by “salvet ü sürûr.”1001 The bailo wrote that a son was born to the Sultan in the 
Palace.1002 According to Kemalpaşazade, the new born was named Selim after his 
grandfather. Nasuh, on the other hand, says that he was named after his royal ancestor 
Mehmed.1003 The mistaken identification of Kemalpaşazade could be a scribal error or a 
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careless slip of the pen. Either way, both accounts emphasize one common notion: 
dynastic continuation – and emulation.  
Looking at the ceremonial occasions during the campaigns, the absence of one 
major ritual event strikes the eye, namely the triumphant entry. Süleyman seems to have 
entered Istanbul rather quietly on his return from both campaigns. He is recorded to 
have arrived by boat directly to the Palace both in 1521 and 1522.1004 According to 
Venetian reports, Süleyman arrived in Istanbul on 19 October 1521 with three ships 
around midnight and went directly in the Palace. Grandees had gone out to meet him 
two days ago believing them he would arrive by land. But Süleyman, for some reason, 
had boarded the galley at Silivri. The next two days witnessed the arrival of three 
pashas and the governor general of Rumelia. The commander of the janissaries had 
arrived ten days ago and Ferhad Paşa a few days earlier. A ship was sent to Ferhad Paşa 
and the pashas went to greet him as disembarked.1005 
3.4. Projection and Reception 
3.4.1. Official Projection  
The main type of document which projects the official version of a campaign is 
the proclamation of victory [fetihnâme]. The proclamation of victory provides us with 
the key elements employed in the making of the image of the Sultan. In otherwords, 
they provide us with an ideal type image. The proclamation of victory strikes the eye as 
a clean-cut account of the campaign which legitimizes the intention of aggression as 
well as the actions taken, defines it as a glorious imperial victory, and justifies the 
return. Another document that could be considered in this category would be the 
campaign diary [rûznâme]. Being another sort of official projection of the campaign 
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seems to be less rigid about appearing as sterilized. Intended for different audiences, the 
proclamation of victory was directed to the people of the realm, tributaries, and foreign 
power-holders or even to posterity. The campaign diary, however, was probably for the 
few to see on a need-to-know basis. It usually served almost as a guide-book, thus it 
contained several unpleasant instances such as deaths of large numbers of soldiers, 
errors committed by commanders during battles, disasters caused by unfavorable 
weather conditions and even occasions of wrath of the Sultan, which were not revealed 
in proclamations of victory. In this sense, the diaries of both campaigns appear as more 
mundane and relatively truthful accounts. In this section, we shall examine the 
proclamations of victory to understand the key elements making up the ideal image of 
the Sultan. 
Süleyman seems to have showed great care to play it by the book through 
justifying his actions as clearly as possible. As we have discussed above, sixteenth-
century warfare was not about unrestrained force, but required adherence to various 
norms.1006 Although there was no central authority binding the supreme political actors 
of the sixteenth-century, failure to live up to these norms could tarnish one’s reputation 
and claims of legitimacy. In a more practical sense, such a failure would also bring on 
the risk of resistance from the conquered populations. In December 1523, describing the 
Sultan as a good ruler who loved peace, Venetian ambassador Piero Zen reports that 
Süleyman said that he took Rhodes and Belgrade by force because of the “insolences 
they committed against his subjects.”1007 Spandounes repeats this view by mentioning 
that Süleyman attacked Hungary because of the injuries inflicted on him.1008 Such was 
the projection of the official proclamations of victory in both campaigns. 
The proclamation of victory of Belgrade1009 sent to the judges around the realm 
reflects several messages legitimizing Süleyman’s actions and implying God’s grace on 
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the sultan. The proclamation opens with a Quranic verse. The first part of the 
proclamation defines the God-given responsibility of the Sultan to protect his subjects 
and the Muslims in general. This duty, inevitably, brings forth the issue of war against 
the unbelievers and Süleyman’s decision to spare no effort on the way of ghaza and 
jihad. The issue is elaborated with the employment of Quranic verses and traditions of 
the Prophet. The second part of the proclamation introduces Hungary as the target 
designated after an “investigation of those in error” [tetebbu‘-ı tavâ’if-ı erbâb-ı dalâl]. 
The choice is then legitimized in two ways. The most obvious reason is the non-Muslim 
status of Hungary, which provides the religious context of legitimation. The second 
reason provides a dynastic claim based on continued rivalry, namely that Hungarians 
were defeated by the Ottomans many times before. The third part of the proclamation 
comes like an interlude whereby another “deviant” is re-introduced. This section 
provides a brief summary of the Gazali incident, paralleling the Sultan’s plans to fight 
unbelief. As Gazali is blamed for siding with the devil, the message of Süleyman 
fighting evil and unbelief is further reinforced. The fourth part of the proclamation 
resumes the plans on Hungary. The campaign is announced with a formal resolve to 
perform the religious duty of ghaza [gazâ niyyetine] which clearly differentiates the 
action taken from any ordinary act of aggression. The fifth part of the proclamation is a 
brief description of the various steps of the campaign, namely the conquest of Sabacz, 
river crossings on the way to Belgrade, raids in Syrmia, the siege of Belgrade by Piri 
Mehmed Paşa, the arrival of the imperial army and the conquest. These instances 
provide the opportunity to prove the supremacy of the Ottoman army and its 
commanders. Expressions of the strength of the castles in question, and the difficulty of 
the river crossing enhance the success ultimately obtained and transforms it into an 
almost impossible feat. These difficulties, as the text has it, were surpassed through the 
effort and zeal of the Sultan with the help of God [himmet-i şehriyâr-ı sa‘âdet-şi‘âra 
‘avn-i rabbani destgir olub], which again implies Süleyman’s enjoyment of divine 
grace along with his own capability. Descriptions of the raids on Syrmia introduce the 
less-godly aspect of ghaza, namely the satiation of the soldiers in terms of booty. The 
sixth part of the proclamation explains what happened to both parties after the conquest. 
It is clarified that Ottoman soldiers who died during the siege went to heaven as 
martyrs. Thus, both the material and spiritual rewards of ghaza for individual 
participants are confirmed. As the proclamation goes on to explain the consequences of 
the conquest for “unbelievers” who survived, we see a thorough explanation to the 
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effect that all were treated according to the requirements of peaceful surrender. Some of 
them are reported to have “found the right path and converted to Islam” by their own 
choice. Other did not accept Islam, but were spared because they agreed to pay tax. For 
some, neither option applied, so they were “allowed” to leave to go to their king. Yet 
others were sent to the “realm of Islam” according to the maxim that everybody is 
Muslim at birth.1010 The text goes on to explain that although soldiers were “thirsty for 
infidel blood”, the lives of the survivors were spared based on the counsel of the ulema 
because killing them would be against the rules and customs of the religion. The last 
part of the proclamation is a justification of the return. At this point, the specific target 
of the campaign is mentioned, namely the destruction of the King. It is announced that 
the aim was not realized because the commanders who knew the region well thought it 
best to stop since there was not enough time left. On the other hand, it was also resolved 
that they would return at the best opportunity for revenge. This final part projects two 
important messages. Firstly, the termination of the campaign is rationalized based on 
the expected duty of the Sultan, namely taking counsel. Secondly, it is made clear that 
Süleyman has no intention of giving up his determination on ghaza. 
The proclamation of victory of Rhodes1011 written to the judge of Bursa follows a 
similar logic; however the tone of the text reflects a high degree of self-confidence and 
even self-assertion, apparently based on the success of the previous campaign. The text 
starts with a confirmation of Süleyman’s commitment to and success at ghaza and jihad 
with the grace of God. It is emphasized the conquests he has achieved were intended to 
remove “unbelief and oppression” [küfr ü zulm]. The action taken against Rhodes is first 
explained in terms of Süleyman’s “the pious kingly custom” and “the pleasant royal 
convention” [‘âdet-i hasene-i şâhâne ve sünnet-i marziye-i hüsrevânem] of fighting the 
“infidels”, while the damage given by the island to sea voyagers and merchants is 
emphasized later in the text. Then comes the steps of the campaign starting with the 
sending of Mustafa Paşa followed by the Sultan himself. There is a sense of hurry in the 
narrative, also apparent in the Belgrade text, which reflects a sense of urgency and 
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enthusiasm regarding the performance of duty on the part of Süleyman.1012 The 
commands given to the viziers are reflected as decisions based on Süleyman’s natural 
skill in good judgement [‘ayine-i celliye-i hüsn-i tedbîrimde mukarrer olan rey-i sevâb-
nümâyim muktezâsınca]. The strength of the castle and the impossibility of its conquest 
are emphasized; the castle is further defined as the “yearning of rulers” [hasretü’l-
mülûk]. In other words, the proclamation of victory makes it clear that no famous ruler 
set foot on the island since the day Islam was born and many worthy kings yearned to 
take it without realizing their desires.  
Such a narrative once more poises Süleyman as achieving a near-impossible feat 
and raises him above all past rulers of note. Then comes a lively description of war-
making and military methods employed to tear down the castle whereby the defenders 
are associated with unbelief, devilish ways, and rebellion. Following the descriptions of 
damage caused to the city, the text asserts that the islanders had to resort to peaceful 
surrender, whereby this option is projected as the only way left for salvation. Accepting 
their request for surrender and the keys to the castle, Süleyman is presented as a kind 
ruler who has done the right thing by sparing their lives and possessions. According to 
the proclamation, he grants pardon to the survivors through “[his] royal greatness of 
favor and imperial highness of kindness” [‘ulüv-i himmet-i şâhâne ve sümüv-i ‘atıf-ı 
pâdişâhânemden … amanı şerîfim ihsân olınub]. The significance of his “kindness” is 
further supported by a Quranic verse. It is emphasized that after the pardon, inhabitants 
of the city were secured as Ottoman subjects.  
This newly granted security reflects two messages. Firstly, they are now 
transformed into the subjects of the Sultan. Secondly, they were treated respectfully as 
the terms of peaceful surrender required. Then, Süleyman goes on to free the Muslim 
prisoners on the island. The text delineates that all of them, regardless of their age or 
status, were liberated. The expression brings to mind the proclamation of accession sent 
to Hayrbay which required all to be treated equally with no regard to rank. The 
proclamation then reflects on the “cleansing” process and the conversion of the island to 
the “realm of Islam.” According to the text, Rhodes was “filled with unbelief and 
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corruption, but with the help of God and the efforts of the victorious soldiers of Islam, it 
was cleaned and purified.” The final step to this process was the conversion of the 
“temples of idolatry” into “mosques of the Muslims.” The names of the major towns 
that surrendered along with Rhodes are provided and it is noted that they were 
conquered with all their surroundings and lands becoming part of Süleyman’s 
“protected domains.” Having completed the essentials and the results of the campaign, 
the Sultan thanks God once again and expresses his wish to continue his conquests so 
that “the lands of Islam shall be well protected and enlightened through [his] conquering 
flags.” Finally, the judge is told to announce the good news around, to make festivities 
and to pray for the continuity of his reign. In this last part of the document, especially, 
Süleyman seems to have fully appropriated the character of sovereignty along with the 
responsibility that it entails. Not only the Ottoman realms are his domains, but he seems 
to take pride in them being his protected domains. He wishes for the continuity of his 
conquests not only because it is his duty and glory, but also because he takes on the 
responsibility for the protection and enlightenment of the lands of Islam. Even though 
such expressions are generally acknowledged to be rhetorical devices, the tone of the 
1522 proclamation – in comparison to the 1521 one – seems to project a Sultan whose 
self-confidence and status-consciousness is based not solely on inherited titles of 
sovereign rights and duties, but on a sense of self-achievement as well. 
These proclamations did not circulate only domestically, but were also sent to 
foreign rulers. While they served to inform them about the victory, they also had a 
reinforcing effect on the reputation of Süleyman and the Ottoman might in general. 
Through announcing the “glorious victory” achieved by the Sultan and his superior 
army, the message to be taken was probably “beware!” although it was not generally so 
expressed. The grand master of Rhodes, for example, was one contemporary who felt 
threatened and offended by such a proclamation. The proclamation of victory of 
Belgrade sent to Rhodes is generally viewed as Süleyman’s first letter to Rhodes. In this 
letter he presented himself as “Solimano Tsacco per Dio gratia Re de’ Re, Signor di 
Signori, grande imperador di Costantinopoli, e di Trabisonda, Re potentissimo de Persi, 
d’Arabia, di Soria e d’Egitto, Signore dell’Asia e dell’Europa, Principe di Mecca, di 
Aleppo e di Gierusalemme, Dominatore e possessor dell’universo mare.”1013 The letter 
reads like a typical proclamation of victory whereby Süleyman announces his victory 
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and conquest of Belgrade. As Fontanus has it, while congratulating Adams on his new 
post, he tells him to rejoice over the conquest. The Grand Master takes the letter as a 
declaration of war.1014 
Süleyman announced his victories in Belgrade and Rhodes to Shah Ismail, the 
Safavi ruler, in a letter which resembles a proclamation of threat [tehditnâme] rather 
than a proclamation of victory. He let Ismail know that these two castles were what kept 
him from attacking Ismail, emphasizing how strong these fortifications were. However, 
neither could endure the strength of his army and he was able to “liberate” [istihlâs] 
both. Thus “the center of idolatry became part of the realm of Islam, temples of idols 
were turned into mosques of the believers, and unbelieving ways were toppled 
down.”1015 The letter involves a dual purpose. While threatening Ismail to give up his 
sovereign rights to return to being a sufi sheikh, it also promoted Süleyman as the 
champion of Islam. The honor of transforming a region into a land of Islam through 
conquest was part of the collective Islamic mental vocabulary of the time. Süleyman’s 
Mughal contemporary Babur, for example, after his success at Chanderi against Medini 
Rai, proudly announced having “converted what for many years had been a mansion of 
hostility, into mansion of Islam.”1016  
The proclamation of victory of Rhodes to Venice involves four main 
messages.1017 Firstly, it justifies the attack through the misdeeds of the islanders, namely 
hosting malevolent corsairs and harming both Muslim and Christian ships.1018 Secondly, 
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a sense of power is conveyed through the mention of terrible battles and the damage 
done to the defenders. Thirdly, the merciful and just nature of the Sultan is conveyed 
through the acceptance of surrender and Süleyman’s order that nobody should be 
harmed in any way. Fourthly, Süleyman is projected as the legitimate ruler of both 
Muslims and Christians in his realm through the statement of letting those Rhodians 
who wish to remain on the island live peacefully as Christians in other parts of the 
Ottoman realm do. As a whole, the document balances the Islamic claims of Sultan 
Süleyman and poses a more universal projection.  
As far as such universal projection is concerned, it is to be noted that Süleyman 
was not solely the protector of Islam as the Servitor of the Holy Cities, but also the 
protector of the Orthodox Church, a role inherited from Mehmed II when he captured 
Constantinople. Furthermore, the majority of Süleyman’s subjects in the Balkan lands 
were Christians.1019 The universal projection of the proclamations can be observed 
partly in the booty taken from the conquered regions. Among the booty Süleyman 
brought back from Belgrade were some Christian relics. According to Contarini’s 
report, dated 30 November 1521, among these were two remains belonging to saints, 
one a hermit and the other a queen. There was also a figure of Virgin Mary made by San 
Luca along with many crosses and other sacred objects. Contarini reports that the Sultan 
handed these over to the Patriarchate and Christians went with great devotion to see 
them.1020 Spandounes confirms the story, though he says that the Christian population 
had to pay dearly to buy these relics from the Sultan.1021 A report from Candia relates 
Süleyman’s handling of the treasury of St. Jean in Rhodes. When he requested the 
treasury from the Grand Master, he argued that the treasury belonged to the temple and 
not to the Grand Master, therefore it was not part of the possessions allowed to be taken 
from the island. However, the Grand Master “gently begged him to leave the tesoro, in 
other words the relics.” Upon this, Süleyman took only a golden Nonciata with angel 
inscribed ave maria gratia plena in gold.1022 
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Before we continue with the reception of the campaigns and Süleyman’s image in 
relation to them, we should note that Süleyman’s proclamations were not created from 
scratch. They employed an already existing set of codes and terminology already 
meaningful to their audience. A comparison of both proclamations with an earlier 
sample of Ottoman victory proclamations demonstrates that the individual codes 
constituting the overall message of the text are basically identical. The proclamation of 
victory of Lepanto1023 from the reign of Bayezid II, for example, is a rather brief text 
but includes all the relevant elements which we usually consider to have become 
rhetorical usages. The Venetians, as the enemy, are defined as “sinners and unbelievers” 
who have tended towards “sedition” through engaging in “diabolical preoccupations.” 
Thus, in the first part of the text the attack itself is justified through vilifying the 
attacked, as is the case also in the proclamations of 1521 and 1522. This is followed by 
a very brief account of Bayezid’s decision to go on campaign and the victory obtained. 
Once military victory is established, the text explains the peaceful surrender of the 
enemy and Bayezid’s granting pardon thereupon. The wording emphasizes surrender as 
salvation, as we have seen in Süleyman’s proclamations. Just as in the 1521 and 1522 
proclamations, the lives and possessions of the survivors are spared through the pardon 
granted which stems from the “imperial kindness” of the Sultan [vüfûr-ı eşfâk-ı 
pâdişâhânemden]. As expected, the castle then becomes part of the protected domains 
of the Sultan. Finally, the judge is told to announce the news. As seen through this 
example, the proclamations of 1521 and 1522 reflect an already existing set of codes 
understandable by the community they were addressed to. However, the narrative 
structure of the latter texts appears to be more repetitive, detailed and even exaggerated. 
These aspects seem to provide the texts with a more intense feeling of glory and 
majesty, along with a sense of righteousness.  
3.4.2. Domestic Reception 
The domestic reception of the campaigns is harder to uncover. The chronicles and 
documents we have in hand have their own agenda at least partly clouding the sincere 
                                               
1023
 Münşe‘at, I:337. 
266 
 
opinions of their writers. Nevertheless, they do reflect a mentality of the time and 
certain common values and codes in relation to war making.  
Feridun Beğ’s compilation of documents provides the reactions of two prominent 
Ottomans to the 1521 campaign. The writers of the two replies to the proclamation of 
victory of Belgrade come from two different origins of the Ottoman military. Ferhad 
Paşa1024 was a man of devshirme origin who happened to be on guard in the Eastern 
provinces during the campaign after subduing the Gazali rebellion. In his reply to the 
fetihname, Ferhad Paşa first defines the enemy as “the sinful party of cursed infidel 
Hungarians” [fecere-i fırka-i küffâr-ı Engürüs-i menhûs] describing it as “[those] 
unbelieving the prophetic mission Muhammad” [münkirân-ı risâlet-i Ahmedî ve 
mu‘ânnidân-ı nebevet-i Muhammedî]. He repeats a brief summary of the campaign 
taking the opportunity to praise the sound judgment of the Sultan in his commands and 
to emphasize the strength of the castles captured. He emphasizes the importance of 
Belgrade as the “key to the lands of the infidels and source of evil” as well as rebellion 
and sedition [fitne vü fesâd]. He also underlines the fact that the predecessors of 
Süleyman had not been able to conquer it. He wishes that this conquest would herald 
others.1025 Ferhad’s letter very much resembles the proclamation in the sense that it is 
almost as clean-cut and organized. It clearly reflects the status of the enemy as 
“unbeliever” which re-projects the first aspect of legitimation of aggression. It also re-
projects the legitimation of the individual targets as not only centers of unbelief, but of 
sedition as well. Through referring to past failures, it glorifies Süleyman within the 
dynastic chain. And lastly, it projects the promise of future success. 
The writer of the second letter Şehsüvaroğlı Ali Beğ,1026 on the other hand, was a 
local magnate who became an Ottoman during the reign of Selim I, only a few years 
before these campaigns. His reply seems to be less rhetorical and calculated than Ferhad 
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Paşa’s. Ali Beğ asserts that the Hungarians were not able withstand the attacks and 
strength of the Sultan. He confirms the enemy’s rebellious behavior as he expresses that 
all the mischief they have done “fell on their heads with the cannons.” He defines the 
captured strongholds as places of “unbelief” and “polytheism.”1027 Through this brief 
narrative, he reflects his perception of the strength and success of Süleyman and the 
legitimacy of the campaign. The rest of the letter is more interesting in the sense that it 
is a declaration of loyalty. One would remember that although he had sent his gifts in 
proxy, he was not present in person during the accession ceremonies a year ago. The 
pain he takes to convince Süleyman of his loyalty and enthusiasm to serve him is almost 
heart-breaking. His insistence to take part in future ghaza projects suggests some sort of 
disappointment. While this disappointment could be caused by the missed opportunity 
of spiritual reward of ghaza, it seems more likely that Ali Beğ probably felt left out the 
game, and as such left out of favor and confidence. Through seizing the chance to 
congratulate the Sultan on his victory, Ali Beg was actually seizing the opportunity to 
(re-)locate himself within the imperial power structure.1028  
In Ottoman accounts we see many analogies and references to ideal kings. Nasuh, 
for example, associates Süleyman with Darius [Hüdâvendigâr-ı Dârâ-serîr] as he 
relates the return from Belgrade.1029 Sa‘di, on the other hand, cites twice the Quranic 
verse regarding Solomon’s army as tells about the preparations and departure in 
1521,1030 as does Bostan in describing Sultan Süleyman’s campaign departure.1031 
Although these analogies may appear as mere praise and exaggeration when the texts 
are considered in isolation, putting them into an intertextual context demonstrates a 
meaningful construction process. In the previous chapter, we have taken a look at the 
letter sent to Hayrbay announcing the accession.1032 The letter started with a reference 
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to the letter sent by Solomon to the Queen of Sheba. Continuous use of such analogies 
in various texts produced for various purposes by different authors help create an image 
in the long run, based on shared codes.  
Another element observable in some contemporary accounts is the spiritual 
rewards Süleyman earned for the campaign. As far as Islamic thought goes, in order for 
a holy war to be realized, permission and supervision of the caliph or imam is required. 
Furthermore, according to prophetic tradition “The warrior gets his reward [ajr], and the 
giver of the wage [ju’l] gets his reward, plus that of the warrior.”1033 Thus, Süleyman 
receives full credit for giving the opportunity of holy war for the individual salvation of 
others as well as for the collective duty of jihad to the community.1034 This point is 
emphasized especially by Ramazan. Ramazan cites several others reasons for spiritual 
rewarding of the Sultan as well. According to the author, among these were the 
liberating of the prisoners and alms given to them, the opening of the sea route for 
pilgrimage, saving of Rhodes from idols and making it a Muslim land, removing the 
oppression which no one was able to before, spending a lot of personal wealth for the 
conquest, providing lots of food for the soldiers.1035 
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3.4.3. Foreign Reception: Peaceful Lamb Turns into Fierce Lion 
Süleyman’s aggressive moves aiming at the long-expected – yet somewhat taken 
for granted – strongholds of Christendom almost as soon as he ascended the throne have 
rather rapidly produced an image of a dangerous and destructive foe at a universal level. 
As Muslim rulers generally regarded all Europeans under one title,1036 namely Frenk, 
European observers seem to have confirmed the conception through a collective notion 
of Christendom. The above-cited description of Guicciardini of Rhodes as “a bulwark of 
Christian religion,” and Lannoy’s remark to Charles V reminding the island’s role as 
“bulwark between the Turco and Christendom,” reinforce the mutuality of meaning, 
which appears also in Fontanus’s description the Rhodians as “defenders of the borders 
of the Christian Empire in the East.”1037 If Rhodes was regarded as the bulwark of 
Christendom in the East, a similar role was attributed to Belgrade in the West.1038 Sultan 
Süleyman’s acquisition of both in the first two years of his reign seem to have produced 
great awe among European audiences. 
Selim’s death and Süleyman’s accession were received quite optimistically in 
Europe. Ironically, Selim I never attacked any European target in person, yet he was 
considered to be a dangerous threat. Thus, European rulers were relieved to see his 
seemingly “pacific” son take his place. The campaigns of 1521 and 1522 changed this 
expectation. Pope Leo’s crusade efforts were suspended not only because of discord 
among Christian princes, but also by the relaxing effect of Selim I’s death. Guicciardini 
reflects the mood when saying that Selim left his “great empire to Suleiman, his son, a 
young man but reputed to be more mild-spirited (although the results demonstrated 
otherwise) and not disposed to make war.”1039 
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By the time Marco Minio returned from his mission in Istanbul, Süleyman had 
already left a quite a different impression through the Hungarian campaign and the 
conquest of Belgrade. When the Venetian ambassador Minio was asked by the viziers 
why Hungarians did not come to the defense of Belgrade, he admitted that nobody 
actually believed that the Signor would go that far. It was why, Minio argued, the 
Hungarian king was caught unprepared.1040 Minio’s contact with the Sultan was after 
the conquest of Belgrade, thus his impression of Süleyman differed greatly than that of 
Tomasso Contarini more than a year earlier. While Contarini talked about a “peaceful 
man who wanted to attend to his pleasure,”1041 Minio thought that “a Gran Signor such 
as this one can do great things in a short time.”1042 The impression Süleyman left on 
Minio, who saw him after the return from Belgrade for the first time, was of a greatly 
powerful ruler who by now should scare Christendom. He warns that Süleyman will not 
be peaceful, but on the contrary quite belligerent. Minio’s Relazione reflects a perceived 
boost of confidence on the part of Süleyman based on the capture of Belgrade: “The 
expedition he made to Belgrade has given him the expectation that he can win every 
great campaign.” Minio asserts that not only Süleyman, but all high ranking officials 
seem to possess the keys to Christendom because they got Belgrade. These high-ranking 
officials, according to Minio, think that they can easily penetrate into the heartlands of 
Christendom and that they believe the Sultan will not launch any campaigns on anyone 
but the Christians: “He seems to have in his hand the key to Christendom for having 
conquered Belgrade. Mustafa Paşa, governor-general of Rumelia who is a friend of ours 
clearly says that he wants to make war in Hungary.”1043 An anonymous account points 
out the influence of this boost of confidence on the part of Süleyman on his decision to 
attack Rhodes: “The sayd Solyman having this victory, being swollen and raised in 
pride and vain glory, turned his heart agaynst Rhodes.”1044  
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The fall of Belgrade alarmed Europe. On 30 August 1521, Georgius de Eggi, 
captain of Gorizia [Gorica, Gurize], wrote to Vicenzo Capello, deputy of Udine, that he 
was terrified to hear the “mournful” news by way of Graz. The news was that “the 
malignant Turk captured Belgrade, which is the shield of the realm of Hungary and 
these upper parts, through his unending force and power.”1045 On 10 October, Clerk 
wrote to Wolsey from Rome: “… the Turk has destroyed Belgrade; – much fear for 
Hungary, as the King is young and his council divided. If there be war in Hungary, in 
Italy and in France, the earth will be satiated with Christian blood...”1046 The report of 
the Venetian envoy Lorenzo Orio, dated 11 September 1521, reflected the general mood 
at Buda after the fall of Belgrade. According to Orio, everybody at Buda believed that 
the Turk would not be satisfied unless he extinguished Christians.1047 On 30 March 
1522 a letter from the ambassador in Rome was read in Venice. Cardinal Grimani 
thought that the Turk wanted to dominate Christendom and had to be faced. It was due 
to the dissension among Christian princes that he had taken Belgrade and he wanted to 
dominate the Kingdom of Hungary.1048  
Letters from Hungary to Venice at the end of 1521 demonstrate a confusion of 
opinions as to the intentions of Süleyman. While some believe that he has returned to 
settle thing with the Sophi, others are convinced that he will return to Hungary with 
great force. Yet some others expect that he will lead an army up to Dalmatia with the 
hope of acquiring Italy. Many are convinced that he “has the desire to dominate.”1049 On 
the other hand, the significance of this perception should not be exaggerated, for the 
rumors of “desire to dominate” were not exclusive to Süleyman in the 1520s. In October 
1523, secretary Masaro attributed the same desire to Ferdinand. According to Masaro, 
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Ferdinand was so obsessed with power and aggrandizing himself that he wished he 
could dominate the earth and the skies.1050  
Not only post-conquest accounts and rumors but also those during the actual 
fighting also give insight to how public opinion was built. Zuan Antonio di Bonaldi 
writing from Rhodes, as early as 26 June 1522, referred to Süleyman as “this dragon 
who thinks of swallowing the Christian people” and hoped for God’s help.1051 On 10 
October 1522, he wrote that Süleyman had enough force to destroy not only Rhodes but 
the whole world.1052 A captain writing from Rhodes, on 10 August 1522, did not only 
place his hopes on God’s help but also on help from Christian princes. He believed that 
it was their debt to provide help to destroy “this great dog,” for if they did not help it 
would ruin their faith.”1053 
Charles V was well aware that if he did nothing, he would lose prestige. He told 
one of his men, La Chaulx, at the end of August 1522, that he had to demonstrate 
clearly that his only desire was to employ all his forces to destroy “these malevolent 
infidels” just as expected of “the principal Christian prince, protector and defensor of 
the holy Christian faith and religion.” To break the inactivity, he sent Lannoy who 
spoke of a huge rescue force to Rome with the mission to organize a contra-campaign to 
defend the island. Lannoy arrived in Rome in December. While the islanders were 
nearly consumed, Lannoy presented obedience to the Pope and started negotiations.1054 
Charles’s efforts were too late, which brings to mind the possibility that he was only 
pretending to do something rather than spending genuine effort. According to one strand 
of thought, saving Rhodes was not the same thing as a crusade. Furthermore, Rhodes 
was known to be close to France. In either case, neither Francis nor Charles wished to 
divide their forces to spare some for Rhodes. Confronting the Ottoman army would 
require a huge force indeed. Ottoman army was estimated to consist of 300,000 men 
and 400 ships. Christian wars were fought with smaller armies. Moreover, the island 
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was well-fortified and defended itself with dedication.1055 In the meanwhile, European 
powers kept blaming each other for the situation. On 18 December 1522, Gattinara 
wrote to the Pope complaining about Francis keeping Charles from fighting the 
Ottomans:  
As Francis bestirs himself to collect an army, he compels the Emperor to do 
the same… When the Turk sees these things, he will turn his arms against the 
Two Sicilies, will find them unprepared, conquer them, strike a blow at Rome, 
and subvert the Holy See, unless God in His mercy, interfere to save it.1056 
In spite of all warnings, the fall of Rhodes created yet another shock. The first 
rumors of the fall of Rhodes reached Venice on 24 January 1523. In Napoli, for 
example, people did not believe the news and they bet 20 for 100 that it was not 
lost..1057 A letter from Split [Spalato] informs that the news was not given credit for 
until the Turks living nearby celebrated the conquest of Rhodes with festivities and 
fireworks.1058 Eyewitness accounts of merchants and knights soon started to circulate 
around Europe. These accounts were translated in various languages and printed in 
many countries. One such account was translated from French into English in 1524 
through the commission of a Lord Thomas Dockwray, a Prior of the order of Jerusalem 
in England. The introduction of the work describes Süleyman as “cruell bloodshedder, 
enemie of our holy Christian faith, Sultan Soliman, now being great Turke…”1059 
Pope Adrian VI seems to have been much concerned about the loss of Rhodes and 
Belgrade. He sent a letter to Wolsey in February 1523 telling him to inform the king and 
queen of the “unfortunate loss” of Rhodes. The Pope was worried that now these two 
“outworks of Christendom” were lost, the Turk would easily conquer Hungary, Sicily 
and Italy. Adrian VI stretched the threat as far as England. According to the instructions 
of the Pope, Wolsey had to “show what a disgrace it would be if the see of the vicar of 
God were taken by them, owing to the dissension of the Christian princes.”1060 Pope 
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Adrian issued a three-year cease-fire demand to prepare a crusade in March and April 
1523. It was also declared that those who did not respond to the defense of Christianity 
would have to suffer special sanctions.1061 On June 1523, Pope Adrian wrote to Francis 
to settle his private quarrels, and engage in united action against the Turk who “has 
committed much wrong, and stands ready at the door to do much worse.”1062  
The conquest of Rhodes seems to have caused great concern in Hungary as well. 
Louis II wrote to Charles V asking for help on 16 April 1523 saying that the Türckisch 
Kayser would definitely attack Hungary now that he won Rhodes which was a most 
strong state. Louis refers to Süleyman as the tyrant.1063 Charles’s reaction in the Cortes 
of Castile in 1523 was announced on his behalf. Playing on the agony Charles felt on 
the fall of Rhodes, the announcement also took the opportunity to proclaim him as a 
“catholic and just king”1064 Not only was a stronghold which was believed to be able to 
hold on forever lost, but the submission of the city coincided with Christmas.1065 Giovio 
relates a strange happening on the day of the conquest. As Pope Hadrian was about to 
enter the chapel for Christmas ceremonies, the marble architrave over the door of the 
chapel fell down injuring some guards and scaring the Pope greatly.1066 Recording the 
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fall of Rhodes as “the most unhappy event at the end of the year 1522, to the greatest 
infamy of Christian princes, by Suleiman Ottoman,”1067 Guicciardini wrote:  
Once they had departed from Rhodes, Suleiman, for the greater contempt of 
the Christian religion, made his entrance into that city on the birthday of the 
Son of God; on which day, celebrated with endless songs and music in 
Christian churches, he had all the churches of Rhodes, dedicated to the cult of 
Christ, converted into mosques dedicated to the Mohammedan religion, and 
according to their custom all Christian rites exterminated. Thus ended the year 
1522, ignominiously for Christendom; such fruit reaped the discord of our 
princes, which would have been tolerable if at least the example of the harms 
suffered had served them as a lesson for the future. But the disagreement 
among our princes continued, and therefore the troubles of the year 1523 
proved no less than before.1068 
The offer made to the Grand Master of Rhodes and the way he was allegedly 
treated by Süleyman seem to have impressed European observers. Süleyman, 
reportedly, presented the Grand Master with a robe which he took during a campaign. 
Furthermore, he was also provided with biscuits for the journey.1069 Fontanus’s version 
of the meeting between the Sultan and the Grand Master envisions an even more 
compassionate Süleyman and a very humble Grand Master: 
The Grand Master, either by the recommendation or the order of Achimeto, 
dressed in humble garments (those fit for the conquered) came out in the camp 
to the chambers of the Tiranno with a few of his cavalieri in company. After 
six months of fatigue… The Grand Master having had nothing to eat and drink 
until the middle of the day, under the rain, waited in the chambers of the 
Tiranno. Finally he was taken to the presence of the Signore, dressed like a 
slave by the Barbari. They stared at each other in amazement and wonder, 
they looked and contemplated. The Maestro was the first to salute, kissing the 
hand [of the sultan].1070 
This part of the account introduces a humbled and almost humiliated commander 
in the person of the Grand Master. The author chooses to refer to Süleyman as the 
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tyrant, thus aggravating the situation further by covertly invoking deep-rooted 
prejudices. Between the lines, one gets the feeling that the actual villain may turn out to 
be Ahmed Paşa rather than Süleyman himself. In other words, the humbled situation of 
the grand master has not directly been linked to any order of the sultan himself; but it is 
justified through the possible acts of Ahmed Paşa and the code of honor requiring the 
“conquered” to humble themselves. The physical fatigue suffered by the grand master 
adds to the tension. Only then does the author introduce the expected “tyrant” who turns 
out to draw a rather different figure than prejudice would have it as the “conquered” 
performs one final act of submission through the kissing of hands. Süleyman’s reaction 
to this act of submission and to the humbled man is interesting: 
I would have been glad not to see you under these conditions… I am justly 
the winner [vincitore], however I have decided not only to be pious and 
merciful to those who do not deserve it, but also to be most liberal…1071 
Süleyman then offers him to stay on the condition that he repents his faults and 
sins. As unexpected may his behavior may be, the reaction of the Grand Master to this 
“merciful” offer is totally expectable for a Christian audience. Addressing Süleyman as 
“great and merciful Imperadore” and humbling himself further, the grand master 
renounces the offer based on the principle that he cannot change sides.1072 The episode 
ends with Süleyman confessing to the Grand Master that his behavior is not a 
consequence of the enmity he felt toward the latter, but of his “desire to dominate.”1073 
Another foreign account reflects Süleyman as a down to earth ruler: 
The morrow after Christmas day, the reverend lord great master went to the 
great Turkes pavilion for to visite him and to be assured of his promise, the 
which lord he made to be wel and graciously received. And he signified unto 
him by his interpreter that the case so happened to him was a thing usuall and 
common; as to loose townes and lordships, and that hee should not take over 
much thought for it: and as for his promise, he bade that he should not doubt in 
anything, and that he should not feare any displeasure to his person, and that 
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he should goe with his people without feare. With these words the sayd lord 
thanked him, and tooke his leave and departed.1074 
Foreign observers have taken this episode to envision Süleyman as a man who 
had compassion.1075 A 1546 English translation of Giovio’s Commentario relates the 
episode with the side note “the gentle heart of Soliman”: 
Furthermore, Viladame sayde hym selfe that when as he came the second 
tyme to Solyman to ask licence to depart, y he was so gently and kindly 
recevued, that Solyman turning himself to Hebraim Bassa (whom he loved 
entirely, whom also had at y present tyme with him only) sayd these wordes: 
Trulye I can not but be sad to se and behold this unfortunate old man, thrust 
out of his own house, to depart hence with so hevy chere.1076  
Nicolas Roberts, who was one of those who were sent to Süleyman’s presence 
when the pact was made, wrote to England on 15 May 1523 relating his observations. 
According to his report, Süleyman was very wise and very discreet for his age – an 
observation shared by Fontanus. They were taken to his presence in a red pavilion. On 
each side of the pavilion stood two sumptuous gold lions. In the pavilion Süleyman sat 
on a gold chair surrounded by his guards [sulaky].1077  
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The success of Süleyman in two years also caused many fanciful rumors. In 
October 1523 Margaret of Savoy received news from Rome that the Turk already 
conquered most part of the land of the Sophy and would soon have all of it. Then he 
would “have nothing but attack Christendom.”1078 
3.5. Conclusion 
We have argued that by embarking on these two campaigns at the beginning of his 
reign, Süleyman performed a duty expected of a ruler that demonstrated to his 
household and subjects his commitment to the defense of the religion and the protection 
of the welfare of his realm. Moreover, through leading both campaigns personally, he 
found the chance to prove himself militarily, demonstrating that he was in charge of his 
army and had the skill necessary to command it. These two campaigns worked ritually 
to make solid the ceremonial appropriation of the army we have mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore, his leadership and command during the two campaigns, 
as he played by the book, demonstrated the image of an ideal warrior-king crafted with 
codes of behavior based on previous and/or legendary examples. These codes were not 
only legible to the Ottomans but were generally part of the universal political 
vocabulary of the sixteenth century. The specific targets chosen for his initial campaigns 
made a statement in terms of both dynastic and personal glorification. Through 
acquiring the two targets his predecessors were not able to capture, he actually moved to 
the front stage the forgotten “stains” on the honor of his house which could now be 
conveniently used to promote his own reputation. In other words, choosing to start by 
completing unfinished business, under the guise of “washing away the embarrassment” 
in the name of the dynasty, he found the opportunity to glorify his own name. Through 
these achievements he found the opportunity not only to prove himself to be equal to his 
predecessors, but to excel them. In acquiring Belgrade and Rhodes at the start, he 
consolidated the borders of his realm as to allow him further expansion in practical 
terms. However, also he proved that he was capable of achieving things that none 
before him could. In this sense, while his achievement glorified the dynasty on one 
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hand, it glorified Süleyman himself as the most superior member of the dynasty on the 
other, giving the sense of a deliberate challenge to the very lineage of which he was part 
of. Throughout these two years, Süleyman’s image in the Western world changed 
dramatically through these two military exploits and the resulting military victories. 
While in 1523 he appeared to be a most powerful monarch aspiring to destroy 
Christendom at any cost, this image was not solely dependent on sheer use of force. On 
the contrary, beneath the image lay a complex network of shared codes and conventions 
based on precedence and religion.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PERFECT VIZIER: VEZÎR-Đ ASAF-NAZÎR 
The good vazir enhances the fame and character of his sovereign; and the 
kings who have become great rulers of the world and whose names will be 
blessed until the resurrection, have all been those with good vazirs.1079 
 4.1. Defining the Problem  
This chapter examines the rise of Đbrahim Paşa, often defined as the “alter ego”1080 
of Sultan Süleyman, through a series of domestic challenges to authority that Sultan 
Süleyman had to resolve in the early years of his reign. In this respect, we shall try to 
understand the underlying dynamics of various “rebellions” during the earlier years of 
his reign. Rather than providing detailed accounts of these various challenging 
moments, this chapter mainly focuses on what we might define as the consolidation of 
sovereign power in the person of Süleyman in the long term. This process entails the 
gradual replacement of the former officials whom the Sultan overtook from his father’s 
reign by Süleyman’s own ranks. Such a discussion inevitably follows like an account of 
the rise of Đbrahim Paşa, Sultan Süleyman’s famous grand vizier.  
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Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context 
of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry,” p.168. 
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Süleyman took over the chief figures of his administrative ranks from his father’s 
reign. Süleyman’s first grand vizier Piri Mehmed Paşa was Selim I’s grand vizier and 
kept the post as Süleyman came to the throne. Vizier Mustafa Paşa had acquired the 
post in 1519, as well as Ferhad Paşa was first made governor-general of Rumelia under 
Selim I and promoted to vizierate almost instantly. Vizier Ahmed Paşa was governor-
general of Rumelia at Süleyman’s accession. Himself a fast climber Ahmed was not 
even governor-general of Anatolia in 1519. By 1529, none of these figures were on the 
political scene any more.  
The transformation of Sultan Süleyman’s high-level military-administrative ranks 
runs parallel to series of rebellions through which Đbrahim gradually emerges as the 
“alter ego” of Süleyman. Analyzing the various phases of this process, this chapter aims 
to trace the formation of the image of the “ideal couple” in Süleyman and Đbrahim as 
Solomon and Asaf.1081 Such an analysis follows two simultaneous strands. On one hand 
the personal turning points in the career of Đbrahim Paşa shall be examined, which will 
provide an overview of the mechanisms involved in his abrupt appearance in the 
political scene and the public demonstration of such an unprecedented imposition.  On 
the other hand, contemporary acts of rebellion shall be examined in relation to the 
opportunity they provided for Đbrahim Paşa to showcase his capability as well as 
granted-authority. These revolts shall be handled as indicators of opposition to central 
imperial administration, following the argument of Rhoads Murphey who sees the 
revolts from 1520 onwards as an opposition and resistance Ottoman domination and 
centralization by local power holders who wished to maintain their former regional 
power and status – taking into consideration the scattered nature of the rebellions. In 
this respect, the rebellions were not regional expressions of discontent, but pointed at a 
more universal and serious problem Süleyman had to deal with.1082 In this respect, taken 
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282 
 
as instances of crisis-management, the suppression methods employed in these revolts 
and the impressions in the chronicles thereof shall demonstrate the dynamics beneath 
the partnership of Sultan Süleyman and Đbrahim Paşa.  
4.2. Elimination of the Chief Competitor 
In the beginning of the year 1523, no Ottoman would probably anticipate a 
relatively low-level servant of the Sultan to be appointed grand vizier. If experienced 
officials predicted a change in the highest level of Ottoman imperial administration, 
their bets would probably be on Vizier Ahmed Paşa. Having ‘graduated’ from the Inner 
Service of the Palace as janissary commander, Ahmed Paşa was an experienced official 
and commander who served under both Selim I and Süleyman. He was promoted to 
vizierate following his post as the governor-general of Rumelia. His contemporaries 
often praised his capability on the battlefield, as shall be seen below.1083 The grand 
vizier at the time, Piri Mehmed Paşa, though not of military background, was an 
experienced man who climbed his way step by step to the top.1084 Before him, the 
viziers of Selim I also were men who entered military-administrative careers with posts 
of similar rank to that of Ahmed Paşa and they served as governor-generals to Anatolia 
and/or Rumelia. In this respect, Ahmed Paşa had every reason to expect the post of 
grand vizier at some point in life.  
In this context, Ahmed Paşa’s elimination from competition through his revolt is a 
vital part of the story of the rise of Đbrahim Paşa. Although this is not to say that Đbrahim 
eliminated Ahmed through various intrigues, Ahmed Paşa’s rebellion probably 
prevented the formation of an influential anti-Đbrahim faction.  In order to come to an 
understanding of the significance of Ahmed Paşa’s revolt in regards to the rise of 
Đbrahim Paşa and in association with Süleyman’s authority, various issues involved in 
the realization of the rebellion need to be considered. 
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Ahmed Paşa’s revolt can be defined as an act of political violence. As such, it 
follows the three usual observed phases of political violence. The first step to be 
examined in this respect would be the initial formation of grievance, or rather 
discontent, which shall be treated under first two sub-sections below. We shall first take 
an overview of the situation of the Egyptian province following the death of Hayrbay to 
see how possible local discontent might have prepared a convenient base for Ahmed 
Paşa’s revolt. This is to be followed by a discussion of the motives of Ahmed Paşa, 
taking into consideration his personal discontent and possible links with faction 
struggles. While the motives of an highest level Ottoman official gives insight to the 
faction formations within the Ottoman power structure, the political background of the 
region gives insight to the opportunities which made such behavior possible.  
Politicization of discontent and its transformation into violent action, which form the 
second and third phases of political violence, are to be discussed in the third sub-
section. Such a discussion shall demonstrate that the rebellion was marked by a total 
inversion of terms and symbols of sovereign authority; while the suppression and its 
aftermath by the re-insertion thereof. In other words, the actions which signify rebellion 
and lead to the total defiance of imperial authority can be regarded as inversion of 
meaning. In this respect, the measures taken to subdue the revolt and to pacify the 
region in the short term can be regarded as a re-inversion of meaning to re-establish 
Sultan Süleyman’s authority in the region concerned. Finally, we shall trace the 
transformation of Ahmed Paşa’s image through the process in contemporary perception. 
Contemporary perception on Ahmed Paşa not only enhance our  understanding on how 
a major challenge against the authority of the Sultan by a trusted member of his inner 
circle was dealt with, but also delineate the key political values of the time, which were 
then reflected on Đbrahim. 
4.2.1. Opportunity: Egypt After Hayrbay  
In the second chapter we have already discussed the problem of consolidation of 
Ottoman rule in Egypt as one of the first challenges before Sultan Süleyman as he 
ascended the throne. As David Ayalon argues, the revolt of Gazali provided an 
opportunity for the new Sultan to reduce the Circassian population to Egypt where they 
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were easier to keep under control.1085 After the appointment of an Ottoman governor in 
Syrian provinces and the demonstration of loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, the region at 
large seems to have been pacified and a certain degree of stability established for a 
while.1086 However, that balance was shattered following the death of Hayrbay. Both 
Ottoman chronicles and foreign correspondence display unease and tension building up 
in the region. In order to understand the local conditions which allowed for Ahmed Paşa 
to undertake an uprising, we shall first take a brief look at the political situation of the 
region following the death of its last local governor Hayrbay. In the process, we shall be 
able to see that appointment of highest level Ottoman officials was the initial strategy 
tried by Sultan Süleyman.  
Celâlzâde makes it clear in his account that the choice of a vizier to be sent to 
Egypt to take control on the death of Hayrbay was a deliberate decision as the Sultan 
regarded the order of Egypt as a very important matter.1087 This deliberation seems to 
contradict the policy of Selim I. Celâlzâde relates in his Selimname that following the 
conquest Selim I’s grand vizier asked for the newly conquered province. Selim did not 
find it appropriate to appoint so high an Ottoman official to the post along, and he had 
personal suspicions on the character of the then grand vizier Yunus Paşa. Selim tested 
the intentions of his vizier by seeming to approve at first. After confirming his 
suspicions, he had Yunus Paşa executed.1088 
The first Ottoman official to be appointed viceroy to Egypt following the death of 
Hayrbay was vizier Mustafa Paşa, a well-trusted and experienced member of 
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Süleyman’s highest level political circle, as he was the general-commander of the 1522 
campaign.1089 Kemalpaşazade’s account implies that Mustafa Paşa’s appointment was 
temporary; he was to look over the region until the Sultan decided on the most capable 
person for the post.1090 Celâlzâde lists the first tasks performed by the vizier at Cairo as 
sending news of his presence in Egypt to the Arab cities, presenting robes to local 
power holders within the province of Egypt, confirming offices [yerli yerinde mukarrer 
kılındı]. One final task in Celâlzâde’s account strikes the eye: Mustafa Paşa gave 
salaries [‘ulûfe] and allowances [câmegî] to the cavalry [cündi] who held fiefs from 
Hayrbay and to his servants [kûl].1091  This act suggests an attempt to secure the loyalty 
of the remnants of the Mamluk military, as well as an attempt at their final 
transformation and integration in the Ottoman system. The list taken as a whole, on the 
other hand, suggests a protection of the status quo while implying the ultimate power of 
Sultan Süleyman as overlord. In other words, the list reflects a preservation of the 
regular course of things which can be regarded an attempt of smooth transition to 
central administration based on the allegiance of existing power structures. On the other 
hand, considering the fact that the Sultan and the majority of his forces were engaged at 
Rhodes at the time, any other kind of reaction by the center at this point would probably 
destabilize the precarious balances in the region and put Sultan Süleyman in a 
vulnerable position. 
The following turbulence in the region, however, suggests that the strategy of 
appointing a vizier did not work immediately and as efficiently as Süleyman seems to 
have presumed. The first major turbulence after the death of Hayrbay was the rebellion 
of local administrators [kâşif]. The practice of dispatching local administrators called 
kaşif from Cairo to keep the Bedouins in Upper Egypt under control was in use since 
the Mamluk period. By late fourteenth century these commanders were already 
powerful and influential figures in the region. At the time of Selim I’s conquest in 1517, 
they had presented their allegiance to the Ottoman sultan.1092 By definition of the office, 
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the kâşif were well-linked with both the Bedouins and the former Mamluks, which 
explain the relative ease with which an anti-Ottoman faction could be built so 
rapidly.1093 
Led by Cânım Kâşif, who was a former commander of the pilgrimage route, some 
of the local administrators blocked the roads and started “taxing” the rural population, 
as well as killing Ottoman [Rûmî] soldiers and pilgrims on the roads. Mustafa Paşa’s 
solution to the problem was to attract Arabian commanders and notables to the Ottoman 
side through some degree of compromise. In return for allegiance to the Sultan, tributes 
were reduced and they were presented robes. As Mustafa Paşa sent all imperial forces to 
fight the rebels, Cânım Kâşif entered Cairo on 19 June 1523 [5 Shaban 929] with the 
intention of declaring himself sultan.1094 A letter by Zacharia Loredan, Venetian 
captain, from Famagosta dated 16 July 1523 relates information acquired through 
various sources around Alexandria and Beirut about the capture of Cairo by the 
commander of Upper Egypt [Sayto]. Loredan emphasizes that the occupation involved 
no bloodshed or pillaging, and that the populace accepted the occupation willingly.1095  
Celâlzâde attributes the turbulence to the ill-intentions of the “Circassian crowd.” 
According to the author, although the former Mamluks acted as if they were pleased 
with the fiefs they were given upon Ottoman conquest of the region, they never actually 
gave up their aspirations to hold independent power. They accepted Hayrbay’s 
governorship only because they regarded him as one of their own. Once he was dead 
and an Ottoman vizier came to execute the law, they lost their hope of ever attaining 
independent government. The author traces local reaction to the introduction of central 
rule back to a conspiracy which aimed to recover Egypt designed by three men of 
Hayrbay. However, Mustafa Paşa was informed about the conspiracy before they were 
able to act it out. The conspirators were caught and executed. Ottoman sources 
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emphasize that the conspirators intended to kill all “Ottomans” [‘Osmânîler / ‘Osmânlu] 
in Egypt.1096  
Celâlzâde defines the rebels as “the rebellious/wicked crowd” [ta’ife-i bâgî], 
“enemies of the religion” [â‘dâ-yı dîn], “enemies of the overpowering state of the 
sovereign” [â‘dâ-yı devlet-i kâhire-i hüsrevâni]; whereas the Ottoman forces are 
identified with “triumphant banners of the Ottomans” [râyât-ı zafer-şi‘âr-ı ‘Osmânî] 
and “victorious flagstaffs of Süleyman” [â’lâm-ı nusret-nigâr-ı Süleymâni]. According 
to Celâlzâde, their actions disturbed the order of the realm causing the people to 
suffer.1097 Again we can observe the conventional projection of adversaries as evil 
whereas imperial suppressive reaction is regarded not only merely as a breach of the 
authority of the Sultan, but a necessity for the protection of the subjects. 
The final verdict of Celâlzâde about the incident is: “In truth, the Arab lands were 
conquered and subdued with the help of God this time.”1098 However, this does not 
mean that the anti-Ottoman faction in Egypt was wiped out overnight. Factions, by 
definition, tend to be relatively simple and unstable structures formed around an 
individual. The individuals constituting a faction are tied to the leader with personal and 
informal ties. The legitimacy of the leader often depends on short-term interests. A 
faction thus formed then struggles for power in opposition to a similar group. The 
faction exists as long as the political struggle attached to it continues.1099 Celâlzâde 
himself mentions that although “Circassians” at Cairo were killed by the Ottoman 
forces suppressing the revolt in June 1523, some managed to escape by getting in veils 
“like women.”1100 Ahmed Paşa would have found the necessary power base within this 
group of men, now left without a leader but probably not without purpose. Venetian 
reports from Istanbul voiced the opinion that being a “man of war and experienced in 
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government” Ahmed would not have engaged in such an enterprise without some kind 
of foundation.1101 While Sa‘di identifies the opportunity employed by Ahmed Paşa with 
the remoteness of the area to the imperial court and the customary inclination of the 
region to sedition,1102 a later source comments that he “proclaimed sultanate through the 
rebellious and the wicked accompanied by thousands of rabbles and traitors.”1103 
4.2.2. Motive: Political or Personal?  
The turbulent condition at Cairo and surroundings along with an already existing 
powerbase seem to have prepared the convenient grounds for Ahmed Paşa to act as he 
did. The question is why did he choose to mobilize this powerbase for a very risky 
enterprise instead of enjoying the benefits of a post with a high lucrative potential? 
What Ahmed Paşa hoped to achieve through rebellion is also unclear. An institutional 
way to look at the issue could be to see the revolt in relation to faction struggles. 
However, contemporary narrative sources do not provide any clues on of 
correspondence or prior scheming with already existing power groups in and around 
Egypt, or on support from persons in Istanbul. Thus, the whole issue gives the 
impression of a rather personal affair in which an already existing power-base was 
activated.  
Contemporary accounts relate more or less the same story relating to the tension 
between Ahmed and Đbrahim. According to Celâlzâde, Ahmed Paşa expected grand 
vizierate for himself and was very upset when Đbrahim was granted the post. He became 
very much grieved and envied Đbrahim.1104 Ahmed Paşa’s discontent seems to have 
materialized while still in Istanbul through his rejection of Đbrahim’s appointment to 
grand vizierate in the imperial council. Bostan explains the demonstration of the tension 
between Đbrahim and Ahmed through a council meeting whereby Ahmed behaved rather 
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roughly. According to the author, such insolent behavior required that he be sent 
away.1105 Nasuh, too, accuses Ahmed Paşa of ill-intentions caused by his envy for 
Đbrahim. According to the author, the Sultan being troubled by the tension caused by 
Ahmed, sent him to Egypt.1106  
Many contemporaries seem to be convinced that Đbrahim used his influence on the 
Sultan to send Ahmed away so that he himself could become grand vizier. Piero Zen 
shared this view, and interpreted it as Đbrahim’s capability to have everything he wanted 
done.1107 A Venetian letter, dated 13 February 1524, named Đbrahim as the cause of 
Ahmed’s appointment to Cairo. The letter also mentioned that the older slaves, who 
were displeased by the rise of Đbrahim, blamed Đbrahim for the revolt of Ahmed Paşa. 
According to this report, were pleased with the revolt because they believed that being 
regarded as the reason behind the revolt would tarnish Đbrahim’s reputation and status 
since he was the cause of Ahmed Paşa’s appointment to Cairo.1108  
Contemporary accounts attribute Ahmed Paşa’s behavior to his jealousy of 
Đbrahim Paşa, as well as to his ingratitude and greed. Considering the risk involved, 
these explanations tend to sound too simple and may easily be taken as rhetoric excuses 
to vilify Ahmed Paşa while elevating Đbrahim, and Süleyman for that matter. Even if 
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taken literally, greed and envy are not factors to be taken lightly.1109 Thus, 
acknowledging envy and greed as actual factors underlying Ahmed Paşa’s behavior 
helps understanding the dynamics which led him to direct such a large scale 
demonstration of protest, though not illuminating his expectation from the revolt.   
Studies on the advancement paths of Ottoman military-administrative officials 
demonstrate that a man of slave or devshirme origin educated in the Palace, such as 
Đbrahim, would typically go through two consecutive career phases. Firstly, he would 
need to climb his way up in the Inner Service of the Palace through the Lower and 
Upper Chambers respectively. Then he would “graduate” as a ranking household officer 
such as janissary commander, gatekeeper or the like. After some time in the Outer 
Service, he would be given a sancak, thus moving on to the second phase of his career 
whereby he would advance his career through the ranks of the provincial military-
administrative system. In time, he had the chance to be a governor-general and vizier. 
From vizierate he could rise to grand vizierate.1110  Based on this model, and Lütfi 
Paşa’s seemingly uncritical comments, Đbrahim skipped not only steps on the path 
advancement but a whole phase. Ahmed Paşa, on the other hand, appears as a perfect fit 
to demonstrate the model. 
If we try to look at the issue from Ahmed Paşa’s point of view, he probably felt 
justified in his actions since a post he believed to have merited by contemporary 
standards was denied to him.  In this sense, he was not treated justly and that gave him 
the right to react. Although, personal sense of justice is not marked in the chronicles, 
Ahmed Paşa, the second vizier at the time, is not reported to have either oppressed 
anybody or disturbed somebody’s welfare in the various accounts relating previous 
instances with his involvement.1111 If we accept the importance paid to ancient custom 
in matters of state, then we should also expect that the next post for a second vizier 
should have been that of grand vizier. So it should come as no surprise that Ahmed Paşa 
expected the post for himself. However, Süleyman made a very unconventional move 
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when he appointed his chamberlain – if we can use the word – and companion Đbrahim 
to the most elevated and important position in the system. The elevation of an 
inexperienced companion must have caused anxiety and disapproval among the ruling 
elite as Lütfi Paşa stresses, elsewhere, his own provincial experience before he was 
rewarded with grand vizierate.1112 When we read between the lines, we can get a sense 
that the candidate for grand vizierate was expected to go through a certain route of 
advancement; and Đbrahim’s career line at the time lacked many steps of the route.  
What contemporary sources define as envy on the part of Ahmed Paşa – which 
translates into personal discontent – can be explained, under these circumstances, in 
terms of relative deprivation and relative loss of power. Relative deprivation is the 
discrepancy between the expectations of a person and his capability of attaining them. If 
expectation rises and capability does not, the result is discontent. Likewise, if 
expectation remains the same and capability decreases, discontent increases.1113 
Expectation signifies not mere hope of attaining something, but is justifiable. In other 
words, the person who has an expectation believes or has reason to believe that his 
expectation is within his reach.1114 The amount of effort put in attaining or maintaining 
the expectation affects the intensity of the expectation. Thus, the more effort spent 
toward the goal, the higher is the expectation. In case of failure to reach the goal, both 
discontent and frustration are higher. Another factor in the equation is the number of 
opportunities, as well as the number and range of alternative courses of action men have 
for attaining their conception of a good life. Likewise, if another person or group 
achieves the goal while the expectant still feels entitled to it, discontent rises.1115 The 
next question would be on how the resulting discontent and frustration translates into 
rebellion. Ted Robert Gurr argues that men “rebel in order to adjust their power or 
status position to their rising economic position because the lack of power or status 
appears to threaten the gains they have struggled for.”1116 A worse scenario involves 
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relative loss of power involving “elite aspirants” who desire political power. In this 
context, being denied access to the central locus of political power has the potential to 
frustrate such aspirants to the point of revolt.1117  
Assuming that Ahmed Paşa’s expectation was the grand vizierate, and there is not 
much reason to assume otherwise, we have already seen that his expectation was 
justifiable based on his career path. Thus, his value capability was rather high when Piri 
Mehmed Paşa was discharged leaving the post vacant. Already occupying the post of 
second vizier, Ahmed Paşa did not have many alternative routes of promotion. The 
highest position he could hope to achieve was the grand vizierate. However, things did 
not work out as he expected. He was deprived of a post which he worked hard for and 
for which he had the right credentials. As theory goes, even this discrepancy would be 
enough to motivate discontent on the part of Ahmed Paşa. As if these were not enough, 
a person who did not possess half his credentials attained the post. Furthermore, the 
appointment to Egypt signified relative loss of power since he was being sent away 
from the locus of political power, namely the imperial court. In this sense, losing direct 
and easy access to the Sultan would mean loss of influence and status, thus power. 
The resulting “envy and greed” of Ahmed Paşa were neither alien nor unexpected 
to contemporary minds. Among Selim I’s reasons for executing Yunus Paşa who was 
denied the governorship of Egypt, Celâlzâde mentions the Sultan’s concern about the 
disappointment of the grand vizier of having been deprived of the post. The Sultan 
thought that no good would come from Yunus Paşa because the rejection would have 
transformed his heart.1118  With such an example at hand, why Süleyman chose to send 
Ahmed Paşa to Cairo also remains to be investigated. 
Seen through Ahmed’s perspective, the envy attributed to Ahmed Paşa can be 
regarded as the manifestation of protest in the face of a personal sense of injustice. It 
can also be regarded as a critical manifestation of protest against a breach in the system, 
committed by the one person who was required to protect it. 
4.2.3. Inversion of Meaning 
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The mode in which Ahmed Paşa’s discontent came to be politicized and 
transformed into political violence can best be traced through a comparison between 
what he was expected to do in his new post and what he is said to have done. Ahmed 
Paşa’s appointment to Egypt was confirmed by a decree, very similar to that sent to 
Hayrbay on Sultan Süleyman’s accession,1119 which listed the tasks expected of him as 
viceroy of Egypt, his prerogatives, and actions he was to avoid. The post also entailed 
the revenues of the province excluding the ports, as recorded in the decree.1120 
Accordingly, his first and utmost task was to abide the imperial orders and to execute 
them as required, because doing so was a condition of service to the Sultan as well as a 
duty of obedience. His duties in general consisted of ensuring order, bringing 
prosperity, abasing perversion, bonding the estranged,  protecting the realm, providing 
security, guarding the steps of state and religion, removing oppression and rebellion, 
exalting the word of God, safeguarding the minds of the Muslims, arranging the 
regulations of the subjects, organizing offices and posts. In return, he would be 
recognized by all as the “ruler by merit and absolute governor” [hakim bi’l-istihkâk ve 
vâli ale’l-ıtlâk]. Those who were to be subject to his government were listed as groups. 
Whether members of the military or religious sectors, or ordinary subjects, these sectors 
were to obey, revere, and honor him. They were to consult him in all matters. Whatever 
he saw fit, they were to recognize willingly as if it were the order of the Sultan himself 
[benim emr-i şerîfim bilüb]. Likewise, those who opposed his orders would be treated as 
if they defied the orders of the Sultan himself. The document reminded Ahmed Paşa 
that the subjects were entrusted to governors by God, so it was required that he 
protected and defended them with equity. He would not oppress anyone and let others 
do so. He was also to regulate the inspection of the borders, guard the pilgrimage route 
as well as other roads, keep the ports in good shape and provide for safe traveling of 
merchants both by land and by sea. He was also ordered to be on the watch for any 
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signs of sedition, disloyalty, oppression, and lack of service. The decree of appointment 
clearly defined his relationship with the finances of the province. He was reminded that 
the revenues of the province signified the “order of the realm.” He was to send the 
designated amount along with the designated commodities, such as sugar, to the 
imperial treasury. He was to pay the salaries of the imperial troops stationed there, the 
various local officers at the fortress of Cairo and the Circassians employed. He was 
entitled to use the remaining amount as he saw fit “like the vizieral fiefs he formerly 
held.” He was also to guard the imperial revenues in the province.  
Ahmed Paşa’s acts at Cairo which signified rebellion were actually reversal of the 
articles of the imperial decree. Such “rebellious” acts as the confiscation of the imperial 
treasury at Cairo, murdering of Ottoman soldiers, collection of undue taxes from the 
subjects and other sorts of “oppression” were typical acts of defiance. As we have seen 
already in the case of Gazali, such actions were regarded to be direct intrusions on the 
established order .1121   
When we look at Ahmed’s actions, we see that he employed all means and 
prerogatives of sovereignty. The imperial decree of appointment was rather specific on 
the nature of Ahmed Paşa’s function as a representative of the Sultan. While giving him 
considerable authority, it was made clear from the start that he was to obey the Sultan’s 
orders. However the whole significance of the revolt lays in his defying this basic 
principle and appropriating sultanic prerogatives for himself, including the title of 
Sultan, the right of hutbe and sikke. According to Bostan, Ahmed Paşa had the hutbe 
called in his name thus claimed sultanate.1122 Celâlzâde relates how Ahmed Paşa re-
entered Cairo and declared himself Sultan after eliminating potential imperial 
resistance. He changed the coins and the hutbe, becoming a “follower of the Devil” as 
the author puts it.1123 Venetian correspondence provides details on Ahmed’s conduct in 
Egypt. When he proclaimed himself soldan, relates one observer, he appointed four 
viziers for himself, one of whom he hanged upon one of the city gates.1124 Hanging a 
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vizier on a gate for all to see can be evaluated as a public declaration of his 
appropriation of the right of execution which by default belonged to the ruler. In a way, 
this kind of a demonstration linked rite and rebellion on the part of Ahmed.1125  
Nasuh, in couplet, states that by choosing the road to treason [hıyânet], Ahmed 
Paşa actually prepared his own end. The specific act of treason in this couplet 
constitutes of proclaiming himself Sultan of Egypt.1126 These few words by Nasuh also 
reflect the contemporary understanding of treason. By proclaiming himself the Sultan of 
Egypt, Ahmed actually attempts to appropriate the dominion of a territory under the 
possession of Süleyman. In this sense, he is not only defying the authority and the right 
to rule of Sultan Süleyman, but he is forcefully and unlawfully taking something that 
belongs to Süleyman.1127  
The decree emphasized Ahmed Paşa’s task to guard “religion and state” as well as 
“Islamic law and ancient custom.” Celâlzâde describes Ahmed’s crime as “deviation of 
the religious path and averting to defection through removing Egypt from the laws of 
the House”, in other words deviation from the existing order.1128 Sa‘di defines it as 
“separation of Egypt from religion and state.”1129  
Another issue very strongly emphasized in the decree was prevention of any kind 
of oppression. Contrarily, contemporary sources reported a wide range of oppressive 
acts by Ahmed Paşa, which had percussions in terms of both cultivated areas and trade. 
He took goods from the subjects by force; he oppressed the people.1130 Reports from 
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Alexandria convey the opinion that Ahmed was a “cruel man.” According to a letter 
dated 14 April 1524, after seizing a hundred thousand ducats from the people, he still 
wanted one thirds of the wealth of every man. When a man lacked the funds, he tortured 
him greatly.1131 The same observer dwells on the oppressive conduct demonstrated by 
Ahmed, emphasizing that the people suffered a lot because of his actions, especially the 
Jews.1132 Reports from Cyprus and Alexandria also confirm the damage given to trade 
by Ahmed through the mistreatment of merchants.1133 The report of a Damascene 
merchant who confided in Celâlzâde when he was there with Đbrahim Paşa in 1525 
demonstrates the point. This merchant was actually not from Damascus, but trusting in 
the just administration of the Sultan he had put a lot of money into trade in Damascus. 
However, he was soon disillusioned by the fact that former oppressive administrators 
found a way to confiscate his goods and fortune through falsely accusing him of a 
crime.1134 According to another Venetian account, Ahmed lost his case because of  “bad 
government.”1135 There were also rumors that he meant to flee to India with the 
treasury. There he planned build himself a new city, after destroying Syria and 
Egypt.1136 The ports were specifically left out of his jurisdiction with an article in the 
decree granted to Ahmed Paşa on his appointment. This, too, he reversed with the 
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attempt to capture the port of Alexandria. According to Bostan, he used the armory of 
the galleys at Egypt to decorate his own ships.1137  
Another important task Ahmed Paşa was entrusted with was preventing sedition 
in the region and bringing those who were estranged from Ottoman rule into obedience. 
His actions reversed this expectation as well. As we have discussed above, rather than 
securing the loyalties of the groups formerly in opposition to Ottoman administration, 
he seems to have used them as a powerbase for his own intention. According to Bostan, 
he provoked sedition.1138  
According to the decree, Ahmed Paşa was responsible for the imperial and local 
troops stationed at Cairo. In this sense, he was supposed to command them in the 
interest of the imperial administration and provide for the safety of both the troops and 
the finances/equipment related to them. Instead, he killed non-cooperating janissaries 
along with their commander. He confiscated their goods, weapons and horses.1139 Along 
with the general acts of defiance, accounts mention specific crimes directed at specific 
agents of the Sultan. Such is his treatment of Musa Beğ sent by the Sultan to handle the 
problem. As Celâlzâde has it, Musa Beğ was sent to replace Ahmed Paşa in Egypt as 
soon as the latter’s intentions were known in Istanbul. Expecting counter-measures from 
the imperial court, Ahmed had already taken control of the port. In the meanwhile, he 
also got possession of an imperial decree addressed to Musa Beğ for his execution. As 
soon as Musa Beğ arrived, he captured and killed him before he could get hold of the 
decree and realize his mission. Then he killed those who were still loyal to Sultan 
Süleyman.1140 Rather detailed versions of the story are found in Italian correspondence. 
According to various reports by Venetians residing around the region, Musa Beğ was 
killed by Ahmed Paşa who fabricated a false decree ordering the execution of Musa 
Beğ. In this way, he was able to move on with his design without arousing suspicion 
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among imperial troops.1141 An episode in the Menâkıb-ı Đbrahim-ı Gülşenî also 
mentions a forged decree which Ahmed Paşa read to the Sheikh. This document 
supposedly said:  
Although we have appointed you to Egypt as vizier, we have realized that if 
he who holds the dominion of the region is not an independent sultan, the 
affairs of that province would not be in order. Now that my imperial favor 
finds it appropriate to grant the affairs of the sultanate of that region to you 
independently, do as you like.1142  
This episode in Menâkıb-ı Gülşenî puts the Sheikh along with other religious 
figures from the “four sects” in Ahmed Paşa’s tent as his insurrection is manifested. As 
the story goes, the forged decree did not convince the Sheikh who insisted that Ahmed 
repent before it was too late. The “vizier” [hâmânı olan vezîri] of Ahmed warned the 
Sheikh to refer to him as “sultan” and “padişah” instead of “paşa.” Unlike the Sheikh, 
the other religious figures seem to have been convinced that since the Sultan granted the 
right, it would now be required to obey Ahmed Paşa as Sultan. The Sheikh responded 
by saying that if such were the order of Sultan Süleyman, it would have been inevitable 
to accept it. However, the Sheikh implied that the trust put in the document by the 
others resulted from the gifts Ahmed gave them.1143 Regardless of the author’s intention 
to glorify the Sheikh as a model of ethics and insight, this episode sheds light on local 
relations of power and faction.  
Despite Ahmed Paşa’s strong hand in faction building, the revolt was suppressed 
by the pro-Ottoman faction in the region before the imperial troops sent by Sultan 
Süleyman had a chance to reach Cairo. Celâlzâde attributes the suppression of the revolt 
to a Mehmed Beğ. A former companion of Mengli Giray, he was maintained at the 
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court of Selim I when he came in a diplomatic mission. His career path at the Ottoman 
court followed posts in the chancery and treasury until he was finally given a sancak of 
his own. He was assigned to accompany Ahmed Paşa when the latter was sent to Egypt. 
As Celâlzâde has it, when Ahmed Paşa declared himself “Sultan”, he chose Mehmed 
Beğ as his vizier while he himself spent his time in entertainment. However, Mehmed 
Beğ waited for an opportunity to end this affair and he kept in touch with those still 
loyal to Sultan Süleyman. Following various attempts, Mehmed Beğ finally succeeded 
capturing and executing Ahmed Paşa while the imperial army led by Ayas Paşa was still 
on the way around Kütahya.1144  
Mehmed Beğ episode illustrates the organization of those household troops loyal 
to the Sultan as well as the persistence of a local pro-Ottoman faction in Egypt. 
Bostan’s account explains the resistance of the janissaries positioned at Cairo as well as 
some local officers to Ahmed Paşa’s designs. The author also mentions the role of those 
who preferred to cooperate with Ahmed Paşa. Bostan’s account implies that the 
resistance formed around the figure of Mehmed Beğ was a clandestine movement 
involving some sort of bonding based on oath.1145 Bostan’s account demonstrates that 
Mehmed Beğ employed various means to attract men to the pro-Ottoman faction. His 
methods involved the employment of a number of symbolic and traditional devices 
which were legible to the group of men he targeted. One such device was raising the 
banner under which imperial supporters would gather. As this resistance movement 
gained some success, Ahmed Paşa’s followers started to change sides and assembled 
“under the banner of the Sultan” [taht-ı livâ-yı pâdişâhî].1146 Bostan also relates that 
Mehmed Beğ announced “license for pillaging the treasury at the palace” to encourage 
the people.1147  
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Bostan’s account shows that Mehmed Beğ was assisted by some local magnates 
through this counter-movement. When Ahmed Paşa escaped from Cairo to take refuge 
with Bedouin chiefs, Mehmed Beğ sent Canım Hamzavi after him. Shortly thereafter, 
he stationed Canım Hamzavi to safeguard Cairo as he himself went after Ahmed. 
Ultimately, Ahmed was handed in to Mehmed Beğ by a Bedouin sheikh with whom he 
tried to take refuge.1148 
The career of Canım Hamzavi illustrates the role and position of local magnates. 
Canım Hamzavi came from a powerful Mamluk family. His grandfather was a mamluk 
in the household of a local magnate who served as governor of Damascus and Aleppo 
under the Mamluk sultans. His father was raised in this household and served as 
commander of Pilgrimage route before moving to Cairo. His mother was the daughter 
of an Aleppan notable and the sister of Hayrbay. Serving in his uncle’s court, Canım 
Hamzavi was already a familiar figure in Ottoman circles. He visited Selim I in Istanbul 
for various missions. He was the one who brought the accession gifts to Süleyman on 
behalf of Hayrbay. He was also trusted with the family of Hayrbay and Egyptian 
notables held in Istanbul by Selim I when they were released by Süleyman. He also 
commanded one of the regiments sent to Rhodes by Hayrbay. Through his role as agent 
of Hayrbay at the imperial court, he managed to establish and extend a powerbase of his 
own both in Egypt and in imperial circles. When Hayrbay died, he was already an 
influential and powerful man. He accompanied Mustafa Paşa through the procession at 
Cairo when he arrived. He accompanied Ahmed Paşa on his arrival and was appointed 
“an authoritative adviser and pillar of the realm,” probably to keep an eye on him.1149 
Looking at the career of this local magnate who was one of the leaders of the pro-
Ottoman faction in Egypt, one can see that his stakes lay with the victory of the imperial 
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troops. P.M. Holt describes him as “a successful opportunist who passed from Mamluk 
to Ottoman rule, acquiring in the transition both a higher status and increased 
wealth.”1150 
The revolt which broke out in February 1524 was suppressed within a month, 
resulting in the death of Ahmed Paşa. A dispatch dated 28 May 1524, from Sampson the 
English ambassador to Charles V to Wolsey, contained news of a rebellion “against the 
Turk”, informing that the ringleader was slain and his head sent to Constantinople.1151 
There are also reports on Ahmed’s severed head being brought to Cairo first, and 
displayed to the public.1152 Such a display served two purposes, namely making an 
example, and convincing potential supporters of the death of the leader.  
4.2.4. Transformation of an Image: Hero or Villain? 
It should be no surprise that Ottoman historiography coined Ahmed Paşa “the 
Traitor” throughout centuries. Treason was a capital crime in all major sixteenth-
century royal courts, punishable with execution, and specifically with decapitation.1153 
The main factor beneath this perception in Islamic political cultures was the partnership 
between religion and state. As such, the ruler as the viceroy of God on earth had to be 
obeyed. Failure to do so not only offended the rights of the monarch, but was regarded 
as a direct challenge to God.1154  
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Ahmed Paşa’s “treason” probably came as a greater shock than previous attempts 
on “religion and state.” The shocking thing was that the rebel was not an ordinary 
person, but one from the household of the Sultan. Süleyman was reported to be furious 
because such a thing never occurred in the Ottoman house.1155 I have not been able to 
find precedence to such a revolt. Although there are plenty of examples of rebellion in 
the Ottoman realm, they are initiated either by power holders of native origin such as 
Iskender Beğ of Albania in 1460s or Gazali in 1520, by actual or pseudo members of 
the dynasty such as Selim in 1512 (though I would not term it as rebellion) and Mustafa 
in the 1420s, religious claimants and/or pretenders such as Sheikh Bedreddin in 1416 or 
Şahkulı in 1511. One can also cite examples of mutiny by the janissaries based on 
dissatisfaction over wages or gratuities. Ahmed Paşa’s cause actually does seem to be 
the first case of rebellion or serious challenge by a member of the imperial household 
aiming independence. Considering the lack of success of the above mentioned 
challenges and the absence of major household member protest, contemporaries 
probably did not see it coming. 
When he wrote from Candia on 17 March, Marco Minio was very much surprised 
that the Turks would rebel against their Signor.1156 Only a few years earlier Marco 
Minio was equally amazed when he witnessed the absolute obedience to the Sultan 
exemplified in the execution of Silahdar Paşa. What surprised Minio back then was the 
lack of any protest or defense on the part of this influential official who himself was in a 
position to hold many slaves of his own. According to Minio’s version of the story, 
some sergeants [çavuş] were sent from the Palace to the house of the official who was 
to be executed. They told him that it was the Sultan’s decision that he be executed. 
Minio emphasized that no act of defense came either from him or his slaves, members 
of his household only accompanied him in tears as he was taken to be executed. Minio 
perceived the lack of defensive response as the impossibility of opposing the Sultan 
                                                                                                                                         
eradicate the dynasty, to capture the throne for himself, to destroy the sunna of the 
Prophet, and to introduce harmful innovation [bi‘dat]. In other words, by opposing the 
“caliph of the Prophet of God” he opposed God himself. Siyasetname, p.12; Nizâm al-
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based on ultimate obedience.1157  The traces of a tradition of not resisting imperial 
execution can be found in the laws of Chinghis Khan: “Any officer, even of highest 
rank, must accept without recalcitration, any punishment administered to him by the 
special messenger of the khan (even if the messenger is of the lower rank), including 
death sentence.” Such obedience was associated to the principle of universal bound 
service.1158 
Ahmed Paşa was raised in the Palace and “graduated” from the Inner Service as 
janissary commander. He participated in the 1521 campaign as governor-general of 
Rumelia, after which he was appointed third vizier. Upon Đbrahim Paşa’s appointment 
to grand vizierate in 1523, he was sent to Egypt as governor-general upon his own 
request.1159 Following leads on Ahmed Paşa in contemporary Ottoman chronicles is an 
interesting task. While he appears as the hero in the accounts of the 1521 and 1522 
campaigns, he figures as the absolute villain in the accounts of his rebellion. This is 
actually understandable to some extent for obvious reasons. What is surprising is the 
undermining of his prior abilities following his rebellion.  Talking about his promotion 
to vizierate on the retirement of Kasım Paşa, Nasuh praises him for his “adequate 
measures” and “sensibility” as well his valor.1160 We see him as a prominent military 
man whose skills saved the day and were rewarded many times during the 1521 
campaign.1161 In the official proclamation of victory of Belgrade, he is presented as an 
ideal warrior.1162  
Accounts of the Rhodes campaign generally praise Ahmed Paşa. In the fetihname 
of Rhodes to the judges of Bursa, Ahmed Paşa was praised not only in the customary 
terms fit for his vizierial post, but also personally for his valor, bravery, wisdom and 
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prudence.1163 In his account of the Rhodes campaign, Kemalpaşazade praises his 
braveness, experience and effort,1164 as does Tabib Ramazan.1165 In the speech of the 
Devil he constructs, Ramazan has the Devil say to the Rhodians: “I know all about what 
Ahmed did” and lists. He also has the Rhodians admit that Ahmed removed all the 
external obstructions which protected the town, thus giving much credit of the Rhodian 
campaign to Ahmed Paşa.1166 Various Italian observers also give credit to Ahmed Paşa 
following the conquest of Rhodes. While a letter from Candia attributes the victory to 
Ahmed Paşa, a letter by Gabriel Taragon says that “the Signor does little by himself; 
Piri and Ahmed are governing all.”1167 After analyzing various letters Sanuto himself 
comes to the conclusion that it was Ahmed Paşa who gave the victories of Belgrade and 
Rhodes to the Sultan.1168 
Sa‘di informs his readers that Ahmed Paşa was not a trouble maker at the time of 
his appointment to Egypt, though he names him “the deceased Ahmed the traitor” 
[merhûm Ahmed-i hâ‘in]. Talking about the revolt, the author argues that Ahmed must 
have been an ill-witted man from the beginning since if a man has evil in him it will 
surface upon opportunity.1169 Writing much later than the above cited authors, Celâlzâde 
blames and vilifies Ahmed from the start. Celâlzâde is sure of Ahmed’s evil nature 
prone to rebellion and sedition, only that this nature was concealed.1170 Sheikh Đbrahim 
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Gülşeni’s reaction to Musa Beğ’s call for help, as related by Muhyi-i Gülşeni, 
demonstrates a similar opinion. The Sheikh tells that Ahmed’s mind tended towards 
sedition and there was no way to correct it.1171 Bostan, although attributing appointment 
of Ahmed Paşa to Egypt to the fact that he had to be sent away because of his 
inappropriate behavior, nevertheless supports the appointment that Egypt required a 
“fierce and hasty man” as to govern.1172 
While the revolt does not seem to have tarnished the perception of contemporary 
authors regarding Ahmed Paşa’s reputation relating to the 1521 and 1522 campaigns, a 
very sharp difference is observed in Celâlzâde who presents Ahmed as a villain in all 
his accounts. The author demonstrates distrust in Ahmed Paşa in a retrospective 
manner. Celâlzâde’s approach to the issue probably not stems only from the fact that he 
was writing thirty years after the incident, but also from his connection to Đbrahim Paşa. 
When Celâlzâde talks about the death of Selim I in Tabakat, he says that while Piri Paşa 
trusted the body to Ferhad Paşa and the treasury to Mustafa Paşa who were both viziers 
at the time, they saw it fit to send Ahmed Paşa to Edirne to guard the city. The death of 
the sultan was concealed from Ahmed Paşa who was the governor-general of Rumelia 
when Selim I died. The reason for his dispatch to Edirne was to prevent him from 
learning the truth. He was already believed to be ill-bred and impudent, so Piri Paşa 
thought he would never be able to keep the secret.1173 
According to Celâlzâde, Ahmed’s character flaw, namely jealousy, started long 
before Đbrahim’s promotion. He was first jealous of Mustafa Paşa. Discrediting him at 
the Sultan’s sight he gets Süleyman to dismiss Mustafa from the general command of 
the campaign and to appoint Ahmed.1174 According to Venetian reports dated 13 
February 1524, after Ahmed was sent to Egypt, Mustafa Paşa kept trying to tarnish his 
reputation [non ha mai cessato de tuorli la reputation]. Many complaints arrived at 
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court against Ahmed Paşa. He was suspected of having sent all good janissaries back to 
Constantinople. Mustafa, on the other hand, used the advantage of being close to the 
Sultan. As the report has it, Süleyman’s initial thought was to send Ahmed as governor-
general to the Safavi border. In the meanwhile, Ahmed received a secret message 
informing him of the plans of the Sultan to remove him from Cairo. He gathered the 
aghas in Cairo. He killed one of them along with four notable persons saying that such 
were the orders of the Sultan.1175 Celâlzâde mentions that Mustafa Paşa knew that 
Ahmed Paşa was up to something, but was not sure about its extent.1176 According to 
the author, Mustafa Paşa feared what Ahmed could do to him. Thus, avoiding rising 
suspicion, he went to pay his respects to Ahmed even though he was superior in 
rank.1177 
Accounts on the rebellion itself aside, between-the-lines reading of Celâlzâde’s 
work brings out Ahmed’s conflicts with his peers during the previous campaigns. First, 
there is an opposition between Ahmed Paşa who insists on capturing Sabacz to pass on 
to Buda in 1521 and Piri Paşa who insists that the first aim should be Belgrade.1178 
Ahmed’s hostility toward Piri Paşa causes the latter’s actions to be disapproved by the 
Sultan and puts the whole Belgrade operation under risk. Ultimately, Piri Paşa 
convinces Mustafa Paşa on the necessity of capturing Belgrade, who then convinces the 
Sultan. During the process we see Piri Mehmed Paşa being accused of disobedience 
several times.1179 Other sources, on the other hand attribute both Sabacz and Belgrade 
decisions to the Sultan himself, with no mention of a quarrel.1180 A similar reflection is 
observed in Celâlzâde’s account of the 1522 campaign, whereby Ahmed Paşa is often 
seen blaming others with no valid reason. First he provokes the Sultan to discharge 
Mustafa Paşa from the general command of the army accusing him of incapability. 
According to Celâlzâde, the actual reason of his ill-speaking was the jealousy and envy 
he had toward Mustafa Paşa because he wanted to be in command of the campaign. 
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Through provocation, he ultimately did succeed.1181 During the first days of the siege, 
Celâlzâde introduces yet another conflict between Piri Paşa and Ahmed Paşa over the 
method of siege. While Piri Paşa suggests employing another method since cannon fire 
was not efficient in the case of Rhodes, Ahmed insists on cannon fire. As in Belgrade, 
Piri Paşa goes on to do what he thinks best, namely the artificial hills. According to 
Celâlzâde one month was lost because of Ahmed’s insistence.1182 Such conflicts with 
peers also appear in the work of Bostan. The author mentions that Sinan Paşa was 
discharged from Rûm because of the false accusations of Ahmed Paşa.1183 It is during 
such a conflict that Kemalpaşazade introduces Đbrahim Paşa in the scene, through an 
incident involving the sultan’s wrath on Ayas Paşa during the 1522 campaign. Ayas 
Paşa was incarcerated because Ahmed Paşa blamed his inability in Rhodes to the 
Sultan. Đbrahim interfered, begged the Sultan to spare the commander. Kemalpaşazade 
describes Đbrahim as a leading man of the private chamber of the sultan.1184  
Interesting instances are found in the Menâkıb-ı Đbrahim-i Gülşenî, written by a 
follower of the Sheikh. Though Muhyî-i Gülşenî wrote his work at a later period [1569-
1604], his constant contact with various Ottomans of note makes his work an 
illuminating source. According to his story as he confirms from two sources, when 
Ahmed Paşa visited the Sheikh, he was lecturing his followers on the requirement to 
obey [inkıyâd] the imam of the time. When the Sheikh was informed that Ahmed Paşa 
had come along with his troops, the Sheikh commented on the oppressive behavior of 
contemporary administrators. Offended by this, Ahmed Paşa reminded the Sheikh that 
his troops were crowded while the dervishes were few. Sheikh said: the troops of the 
Pharaoh were numerous, but Moses broke their necks with a walking stick. He threw at 
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Ahmed which made his headgear fall from his head. This was taken as a sign that he 
would be decapitated.1185  
Contemporary Arab historian al-Ghazzi repeats the story of Ahmed being jealous 
of Đbrahim’s grand vizierate causing him to revolt. According to the author, Ahmed 
offered the Franks the retrieval of Rhodes in return for support, as well as establishing 
relations with the Safavi Shah. Al-Ghazzi also informs that Ahmed came under the 
influence of a Shi’ite religious man and became a follower of Shah Ismail. The author 
attributes the atrocities he committed in Egypt to his hatred of the Sunnis.1186 Celâlzâde 
is also of the opinion that Ahmed became a follower of the Safavi Shah because he 
needed religious leadership.1187 Ahmed can not hold on for long against the might of the 
Turk, especially that the latter is in peace with the Sophi.1188 
A frequent criticism to Ahmed Paşa’s behavior is based on the concept of 
ingratitude to benefaction. The specific term used in the sources for the kind of 
benefaction Ahmed Paşa received from the Sultan is ni‘met, which also signifies bread. 
The term used for fiefs, dirlik, which constituted the building block of Ottoman 
provincial administration literally meant “livelihood.”1189 In this sense, each Ottoman 
official earned his living and the “bread” on his table as a benefaction from the 
Sultan.1190 Through this he was to serve the Sultan obediently. Accounts relating the 
distribution of fiefs and other posts as well as promotions express this act generally with 
the word ihsân. The word means to bestow or to grant, signifying the Sultan being the 
active agent of the act as if the recipient of the grant was only a passive receiver who 
was required to be thankful. Of course, there is the fact that “disgranting” the 
benefaction was also up to the Sultan, in case he was unsatisfied with the service 
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provided by the recipient. In this respect, the contemporaries saw in Ahmed a man who 
was appointed to Egypt with his own initiative, but yet rebelled. As such he was a 
traitor who paid with his life as necessary. According to Lütfi Paşa, for example, he 
rebelled disregarding the fact that he ate the sultan’s bread, and that he was created by 
the Sultan.1191 Bostan attributes Ahmed’s rebellion to the sense of pride and vanity as he 
came in possession of wealth and troops. According to the author, attaining of such 
power was what allowed for his Pharaoh-like-nature come to the surface. Consequently, 
his ill-conduct caused him to defy the favor and ni‘met showered on him by the 
Sultan.1192 Đbrahim-i Gülşeni is attributed to have lectured Ahmed Paşa many times 
against the dangers of rebelling against one’s benefactor [velinimet].1193 These two 
accounts actually pose a certain code of honor current in the sixteenth century. In the 
beginning of his history, Lütfi Paşa dwells on the issue several times. While he accuses 
the Ghaznavids with betraying their rulers [pâdişâhlarına küfrân-ı ni‘me olub] and 
rebellion; he emphasizes that members of the House of Osman took care not to commit 
such behavior. Referring to earlier histories, the author asserts that Osman Gazi did not 
claim sovereignty because “the Saljuqs were in dominion.”1194 A contemporary of Lütfi 
Paşa, Hasan Rumlu employs the same code when relating the rebellion of Seyit 
Süleyman against Shah Ismail. He, too, was convinced that a man who opposed his 
benefactor was doomed.1195  
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The accusations directed at Ahmed Paşa for ingratitude and treachery create a 
sharp contrast with expressions of gratitude and loyalty in describing Đbrahim Paşa. 
Contemporary chronicles do not compare the two men directly. However, the 
intertwined nature of the rise of Đbrahim Paşa and the fall of Ahmed Paşa allows for a 
clear understanding of contemporary values. Although it is possible to trace clues about 
the reactions and factions against Đbrahim Paşa in the writings of the contemporaries, 
total vilification of Ahmed Paşa gives the opportunity to avoid blaming the Sultan for 
his unprecedented decision. In this sense, a vice of one is corrected into a virtue in the 
other enhancing the image of the ideal vizier in Đbrahim and the ideal couple in Đbrahim 
and Süleyman. 
4.3. Rise of Đbrahim Paşa 
The year 1523 witnessed the rise of Đbrahim, “the darling of Signor Turco” as the 
Venetian bailo in Constantinople Prioli described him as early as 9 April 1523.1196 
However, viewing Đbrahim’s promotion merely as the raising of the royal favorite to the 
pinnacle of the state would be an inaccurate viewing of the situation in 1523. Đbrahim 
rose to grand vizierate directly from hasodabaşı and iç şahinciler ağası.1197 The 
simultaneous appointments and displacements suggest a larger process at work, namely 
a process of re-structuring of high level imperial administration.  
A re-arrangement of offices in the immediate aftermath of major victories is a 
case often observed in Ottoman administration. Such re-arrangement is usually 
employed to reward those who contribute to the success of the campaign in question. 
On the other hand, based on the levels of officials involved the case in 1523 seems more 
like a re-structuring rather than a re-arrangement. Between 1521 and 1523, subsequent 
waves of appointments can be observed.1198 This re-structuring activity concentrates 
around three main underlying factors: post-conquest rewarding, faulty behavior by 
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current officials, vacancies through death of officials. The first wave of promotions 
started around 18 November 1521 [17 Dhu’l-Hijja 927] with the retirement of vizier 
Kasım Paşa due to old age. His retirement left one vizierate vacant which was filled by 
Ahmed Paşa whom Sultan Süleyman took over from his father as the governor-general 
of Rumelia. The general-governorship of Rumelia was granted to the governor of 
Anatolia [Ayas Paşa] and his post was given to Kasım Paşa.1199 The second wave 
following Rhodes involved a general shifting of assignments which can be regarded as 
the usual post-conquest rewarding mechanism whereby those who performed well were 
promoted.1200 A third wave seems to have been caused by the faulty behavior of Ferhad 
Paşa who was discharged from vizierate and appointed to Smederevo, while the current 
governor thereof [Yahyapaşazade Bali Beğ] was transferred to Vidin.1201 Around the 
same time, complaints about the governor-general of the province of Rûm [Sinan Paşa] 
caused his discharge from office. The captain of the armada [Behram Paşa] was 
appointed in his place. Another factor in this wave was the death of several officials 
such as the governor-general of Karaman [Şadi Paşa] and governor-general of 
Damascus [Ferhad Paşa]. Karaman was granted to the governor of Trabzon [Đskender 
Beğ], who was vizier Ahmed Paşa’s uncle. The governor-general of Tripoli [Hürrem 
Paşa] was transferred to Damascus.1202 The fourth wave began with the withdrawal of 
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Mustafa Paşa from Egypt to actively resume his vizieral duties. The governor-general of 
Anatolia [Kasım Paşa] was appointed to Egypt with vizierate, causing a chain of 
promotions. Above mentioned Behram Paşa was made governor-general of Anatolia 
leaving the governorship of Rum vacant. The post was filled by the above mentioned 
governor-general of Karaman [Đskender Paşa] upon his own request. The captain of the 
armada [Lütfi Paşa] was appointed to Karaman, while the chief of the inner treasury 
[Süleyman] was made captain. The governor-general of Rumelia [Ayas Paşa] was given 
vizierate.1203 Through each wave, it is possible to see a chain reaction of which only the 
highest levels are accounted for in the accounts. Although it seems like a complicated 
network of names, the appointee climbs one level with each appointment. In other 
words, up to this point appointments seem to have followed an established route of 
promotion rather than the whims of the sultan. Contemporary accounts confirm the 
merit-based promotion route as Bostan, for example, defines the process as “required by 
the levels of merit” [merâtib-i istihkâk muktezâsınca].1204 These waves finally lead to 
the change at the top level whereby Đbrahim becomes grand vizier. It is this wave that 
we shall examine now.  
4.3.1. Appointment to Grand Vizierate  
Đbrahim was appointed grand vizier in 1523. Old age and inability to please the 
Sultan figure as the most popular explanations on the discharging of Piri Mehmed Paşa 
from the office. Bostan attributes the discharge of Piri Paşa on the faults he made during 
the two years he served Sultan Süleyman.1205 According to Celâlzâde, Süleyman was 
not pleased with his performance during the siege of Rhodes, leading to the grand 
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vizier’s fall from favor.1206 Venetian sources imply Süleyman’s discontent with Piri 
Paşa starting with the siege of Belgrade. The Venetian ambassador Marco Minio 
reports, in his relation dated 28 February 1522, the rumors in Istanbul about the danger 
of Piri Paşa’s dismissal “due to the affairs related to Belgrade.” These were the rumors 
as the Sultan returned to Istanbul, but the grand vizier was sill in his post.1207 According 
to a bread-seller who had been to the Ottoman camp in August 1521, Piri Paşa launched 
an attack without informing the Sultan and his assault was repulsed by the defenders, 
thus costing the lives of many Ottoman soldiers. This, according to the Venetian, made 
the Sultan quite upset towards the grand vizier.1208 On the other hand, Piri Paşa was 
getting old and his health was probably deteriorating. On 27 March 1523 [10 Jumada II 
929] Piri Mehmed Paşa retired due to his loss of energy for old age. According to 
Nasuh, the aged grand vizier wished to retire himself because he thought he was not 
able to perform the tasks required by the office any more. From then on he wished to 
spend his time in worship as to find salvation in the world to come.1209 
Although Celâlzâde praises Đbrahim Paşa and his rising star,1210 his promotion did 
not follow the customary path of rank and file. Contemporary Ottoman sources do not 
let their surprise show, but it is possible to sense minor implications between the lines. 
Although Lütfi Paşa says that no words are enough to explain Đbrahim’s grandeur as 
grand vizier, he does seem to hint at the unusual path Đbrahim has climbed.1211 
Elsewhere Lütfi Paşa stresses his own provincial experience before he was rewarded 
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with grand vizierate. When we read between the lines, we can get a sense that this was 
the normal course of progress to the grand vizierate.1212  
In the Siyasatnama, Nizam al-Mulk dwells on the disadvantages of appointing a 
companion of the ruler to high office and states the differences between a boon 
companion and a vizier: 
A king cannot do without suitable boon-companions with whom he can enjoy 
complete freedom and intimacy. The constant society of nobles such as 
margraves and generals tends to diminish the king’s majesty and dignity 
because they become too arrogant. As a general rule people who are employed 
in any official capacity should not be admitted as boon-companions nor should 
those who are accepted for companionship be appointed to public office, 
because by virtue of the liberty they enjoy in the king’s company they will 
indulge in high-handed practices and oppress the people.1213 
Đbrahim’s appointment to the post of grand vizier has been told in various ways. 
Contemporary accounts mostly start with a general explanation on the need for a vizier, 
going on with the specific motives and expectations of Süleyman in choosing a new 
vizier. After these justifying explanations, they continue by telling why Đbrahim was the 
perfect man for the job. Following their lead, we shall first take a look at why a vizier 
was needed and what qualities were required for the job. Then we shall try to see 
through the eyes of the contemporaries why Piri Mehmed Paşa no longer satisfied the 
need and the required qualifications. Finally, we shall examine what made Đbrahim the 
“right” person for the job and how he acquired the post. 
As far as motives are concerned, accounts imply a tendency on the part of 
Süleyman to replace the ranks he overtook from his father with his own men. According 
to Sa‘di, Süleyman wished to appoint someone who was raised in his own household so 
that he would know his nature.1214 Such a vizier, whose judgments and opinions 
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Süleyman trusted, would then be responsible for the protection of the realm, and the 
affairs of the state.1215  
One of the common notions in the accounts is the grooming [terbiyyet] of Đbrahim 
at Süleyman’s own court. This notion is important in two respects. Firstly, there is the 
issue of loyalty. It has been argued in the context of the Mamluks, “those Royal 
Mamluks a sultan had himself recruited, trained, and manumitted felt loyalty to him as 
their ustadh rather than as their monarch, while no such bond existed between the sultan 
the royal mamluks of his predecessors.1216 The issue of obedience is connected with the 
practice of devshirme, a method devised to ensure well-trained and loyal troops to be 
employed in military-administrative ranks. The practice was based on the Islamic near 
eastern mamluk system which also allowed for the prevention of the development of 
landed blood nobility. The main assumption was that the recruits were cut off from their 
roots, so their loyalty to the ruler would be absolute, an assumption disproven by Kunt 
through the instances of involvement of family relations. 1217 On the other hand, every 
now then one comes by a reference to the mother or father of Đbrahim Paşa in Venetian 
sources. There are numerous references to his father’s sancak.1218 Though this seems 
like a special favor, we must admit that familial relations did not come to a stop when a 
non-Muslim entered Ottoman service as devshirme, or climbed up the career path 
entering as a prisoner or slave; though it is more so with brothers rather than parents. 
During the 1526 campaign, for instance, a proclamation of victory after Mohacs was 
sent to Egypt to Mehmed Beğ, brother of Ayas Paşa. We learn from the campaign diary 
that his brother was one of the privileged members of the imperial household 
[müteferrika].1219 
Ottoman accounts strongly emphasize the proximity to the Sultan which worked 
in Đbrahim’s advantage to achieve the confidence of Süleyman. Đbrahim had been in the 
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private service of the Sultan for a long while. He was well-liked by Süleyman. 
According to authors such as Sa‘di and Nasuh, through his private services and his 
demonstration of absolute loyalty and affection, Đbrahim became very close with 
Süleyman. Hence, Süleyman’s decision on Đbrahim as the ideal candidate for 
vizierate.1220  
A huge wedding festival in imperial scale was organized for Đbrahim Paşa within 
a year of his appointment to grand vizierate. The celebration constituted a spectacular 
public demonstration and imposition of the status and power granted him by the Sultan.  
Shortly after Đbrahim Paşa was sent to Egypt “to regulate” the affairs of the region with 
full authority. 
4.3.2. Proving Ability and Merit 
Đbrahim’s mission to Egypt involves many issues which go beyond the scope of 
this study. Among these issues, we shall focus on those which are relevant to the 
perception of Süleyman’s imperial image. The issue of the vizier becoming the “alter 
ego” of the Sultan through taking on imperial duties as proxy inevitably relates to the 
issue of representation and legitimacy. We shall now try to uncover the dynamics of this 
process whereby the exaltation of Đbrahim and exaltation of Süleyman fuse into one 
single issue. 
Đbrahim Paşa was accompanied by a host of well-versed and experienced officials 
in this mission, most notably Iskender Çelebi and Celâlzâde Mustafa. Although the 
chronicles covered in this study attribute the whole “success” of the Egyptian mission to 
Đbrahim, the accompanying group probably had a major role to play.1221 
According to Lütfi Paşa, Kasım Paşa wrote to the Sultan from Egypt that the 
income of the region did not cover the costs. He recommended that someone who would 
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be able to take control of Egypt should be sent there. In that case, some revenue could 
be spared and sent to Istanbul. Upon this Süleyman sent Đbrahim to inspect the situation 
and to see if this was actually true.1222 
According to Sa‘di, troubled by the unease around Egypt, Süleyman thought of 
sending someone to regulate the affairs and pacify the region. Among the list of 
characteristics of the person to be sent were good knowledge about administration, and 
ability to control himself, as not to rebel since he would stay there for a while. It turned 
out that Đbrahim fit the description. Đbrahim himself proposed to go. As Sa‘di has it, 
Đbrahim told Süleyman that the Sultan does not need to go there in person. He can order 
the performance of this honorable task to his servant Đbrahim who would go there with 
the “dignity of the fortune of the grace of the sovereign” [‘izz-i yümn-i himmet-i 
pâdişâh-ı gerdûn-bârgâh]. He would do such a good job in those provinces that it 
would be known until the end of time. He would execute the enemies of his 
magnificence if the Sultan would allow him.1223 Süleyman appreciated Đbrahim’s offer 
and decided to send him. He was to return to his tasks of grand vizierate as soon as he 
put things in order in Egypt.1224 
According to Nasuh, although various officials were sent to Egypt they all came 
back without being able to put things in order. Therefore the subjects in the region kept 
suffering, which troubled Süleyman. He discussed the situation with the viziers.1225  
According to Bragadin’s reports dated 19 October 1524, Đbrahim’s itinerary 
included Alexandria, Cairo, Damascus and Syria. Bragadin reported that Đbrahim went 
“to regulate the affairs” with “full authority of the Signor himself” [con tutta quella 
autorità come la persona dil Signor]. The bailo also emphasizes that the affairs in those 
regions deteriorated after the death of Hayrbay.1226  
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Đbrahim left in September 1524 [Dhu’l-Hijja 931].1227 Đbrahim’s departure from 
Istanbul was also a memorable occasion. Among all the grandees who went along to say 
farewell was the Sultan himself. Bragadin provides an impressive picture of the farewell 
of Süleyman and Đbrahim whereby the Sultan not only accompanied him for some miles 
on the sea, but the two men exchanged kind and sweet words, along with touching head 
to head. The bailo also mentions the amazement of governors and commanders present 
before such a demonstration of affection.1228 Such esteem for Đbrahim on the part of 
Süleyman as he accompanies the vizier for some miles on the sea is confirmed by 
Ottoman sources.1229 
Süleyman went to Edirne after Đbrahim’s departure, with Ayas Paşa, part of his 
household, his mother and the sultane. He meant to stay until Đbrahim’s return.1230 
According to Sa‘di, his main intention in residing in Edirne at this time was engaging in 
hunting as it was the perfect season for the exercise.1231 
The imperial decree given to Đbrahim for the mission was read at Gelibolu, hereby 
the infantry chiefs were informed of the situation.1232 The decree gave Đbrahim the 
license to appoint and discharge all sorts of officials in the “Arab” provinces.1233 One 
interesting stop on the way to Egypt appears to be Chios, whereby the Christian 
notables of the island [Nasara beğleri] presented gifts to Đbrahim and threw feasts in his 
honor.1234 
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The pompous arrival of Đbrahim Paşa in the Southern provinces seems to have 
impressed all observers.1235 Celâlzâde relates that he entered Cairo on 2 April 1525 [8 
Jumada II], and was greeted with cannonball fires from the fortress and festivities.1236 A 
quite detailed eye witness account of Đbrahim’s entry into Cairo is provided by a 
Venetian resident at the city who watched the procession in a shop together with the 
vice-consul and other merchants. Entering the city with great pomp, Đbrahim Paşa was 
greeted by the Circassians [zercassi], cavalry and janissaries stationed in the city, five 
thousand in total. The procession ran through the main street of Cairo. They were 
followed by the thousand janissaries who came with Đbrahim. Each hundred had a 
commander on horseback, handsomely dressed. These were followed by his own men 
also handsomely dressed. Little behind them was Đbrahim by himself. The writer 
describes him as a man smaller rather than grand. He was dressed in gold and had a 
fessa on his head. He rode a white horse with golden trappings. The horse was also 
ornamented with jewels, mainly rubies, diamonds and turquoise.  It was said that the 
trappings was given to him by the Sultan and cost 170 thousand Venetian ducats. 
Đbrahim passed through the crowd saluting everyone. Then came three of his pages 
[garzoni] dressed in gold and jewels, then the treasurer. All were dressed in ceremonial 
gowns. Then came his cavalry troops all well-dressed with their lances and banners with 
his coat-of-arms in blue and white con. Before him the janissaries carried his standard 
which was made of gold. After these cavalry troops passed, more men on horseback 
followed. Little behind them followed the garzoni dil signor, all dressed in gold, then 
came the Circassians. Then two red covered carriages passed, in which the observer 
thought were most beautiful boys [garzoni]. The scene is described as “so much pomp 
and magnificence that not Sultan Ghuri or anyone before him entered so magnificently.” 
Đbrahim went to the castle in this fashion, where a rich banquet was prepared for him. 
He dined with all present, after the banquet everyone left. The gatekeepers were ordered 
not to let anyone into the castle other than the designated audience days, as the custom 
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of the Sultans. Đbrahim is evaluated to be just in administration, and liberal toward the 
poor. The writer mentions that they have not yet been to “kiss his feet” because he was 
still tired from the journey; they were visit him the next day with gifts.1237  
The whole episode of ‘Đbrahim Paşa distributing justice’ involves the concepts of 
representation and legitimation. As Sa‘di has it, Đbrahim Paşa announces to the people 
that whoever has been oppressed should let him know. He also lets them know that he 
represents the “chain of justice” of the Sultan and that the orders of the Sultan are at his 
discretion. The responsibility to move that chain belongs to the people and the 
responsibility to act thereon to remove oppression belongs to Đbrahim.1238 Relating this 
call to complaints, Celâlzâde emphasizes Süleyman’s insistence on the execution of the 
laws. This is also a proclamation of Süleyman’s role as the “defender and applier of the 
law of God.”1239 The notion of the “chain of justice” in this episode seems to draw 
heavily on the legendary chain with bells which Anushirvan had set up in front of his 
courts, so that people with grievances could easily reach him.1240  
Đbrahim Paşa’s dealings in Egypt are evaluated as tasks for the providing of order. 
He seems to have performed the task through elimination of anti-Ottoman figures, 
integration of former anti-Ottoman forces, establishment of Ottoman law, securing 
loyalty of influential sectors of the society, tranquillizing the ordinary subject 
population. Kemalpaşazade praises the justness of Đbrahim in his dealings in Egypt and 
Syria. According to the author, he gave “order and arrangement” [nizâm ü intizâm] 
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through the “custom of justice and rules of equity” [âyin-i ‘adâlet ve kavânîn-i nısfet]. 
As a result, according to the author, he succeeded in providing order in the region, 
regulated the affairs of sailors and villagers, made those who meant sedition obey, and 
attracted those rebelled to submit under his protection.1241 Bostan emphasizes the 
justness of Đbrahim not only through his inspections and “distribution of justice” all 
along the way, but the care paid to not hurt the subjects in any way. Over and over again 
Bostan mentions that horses and camels were rented or bought from the locals who 
realized the transaction willingly.1242 
Celâlzâde’s conversation with the Damascene merchant, mentioned above, also 
puts light on the nature of Đbrahim’s mission. When Đbrahim Paşa came to administer 
justice in town, the merchant in question attests to have gotten back what was his. As a 
way of thanksgiving, the merchant decided to spend part of the money he recovered on 
charity for the sake of the “continuity of the fortune and happiness of the just Sultan 
who sent the Vizier” and the “increasing of the eminence and fortune of the Vizier.”1243 
This episode is very illuminating in the sense that it clearly reflects the nature of the 
relationship between the Sultan and the Vizier, as well as how a subject should perceive 
that relationship. First and foremost, the source of trust is the Sultan himself. However, 
he is represented by his officials in the provinces. This signifies that a malicious act 
committed by an official shakes directly the trust put on the Sultan himself. Likewise, a 
beneficial act on the part of the representative directly reinforces the trust on the Sultan. 
In this case, although Đbrahim Paşa is praised for his good deeds, the final credit goes to 
Süleyman since he is the one who initially solved the problem by sending a capable and 
just delegate.  
This issue finds a parallel in another episode of Celâlzâde based on his 
conversation with Đbrahim Paşa at Cairo. As Đbrahim frees some prisoners as charity, he 
makes it clear to Celâlzâde that this pious act belongs to the Sultan and that the Sultan 
should be credited for it in the sight of God. Then he goes on to explain the reasoning: 
“This humble servant of his was less than an insignificant particle; and reached such a 
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high degree of fortune and glory through his world-illuminating gaze.”1244 This point of 
Đbrahim’s power descending from Süleyman is emphasized in the account of Nasuh as 
Đbrahim asks to be sent to Egypt in the name of the Sultan. Đbrahim argues that being a 
humble servant of the Sultan he has been raised by him to the top. If people there saw 
this and his obedience things would be in order. He also alludes to other servants of the 
Sultan who have acted otherwise there.1245  
 Đbrahim seems to have followed the itinerary mentioned above. He has been to 
Aleppo and Damascus before moving on to Cairo. In both cities, he investigated those 
prone to sedition and deals with them. According to Sa‘di, he “marked the justice of the 
Sultan” and “put the Sultan in the minds of the inhabitants.”1246 According to Celâlzâde, 
it was a favor from God that Đbrahim had to go by land because of stormy weather on 
the sea. By going through land, he was able to observe the injustice and oppression 
taking place in the provinces. Thus, everywhere he passed by, he had divân and 
distributed justice. Those who were oppressed were relieved, while those who 
oppressed were punished and executed.1247 
Đbrahim Paşa seems to have employed various means of pacification and 
regulation. In some instances, we see him applying harsh measures like direct 
execution; in others covertly intimidating potential resisters. Yet in others, we see him 
negotiating. He was to use a similar strategy to end the series of rebellions which broke 
out in Anatolia at large during 1526-1528.1248  
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An example of execution would be the case of an Arab commander Ömeroğlı 
Şeyh Ali, who had an issue with obeying the Sultan. Celâlzâde states that he was the 
actual reason of Đbrahim’s mission. This commander had not come to the previous 
governors, thus it was thought that he would reel eventually. Before Đbrahim’s arrival he 
was sent an invitation and letter of goodwill [istimâletnâme]. This time, he came out of 
fear of Đbrahim Paşa, but because of suspicions he was executed upon arrival.1249 
The harsh measures Đbrahim took in Syria and Egypt did not escape the attention 
of foreign observers. A letter written from Tripoli by the merchant Pasqualin Negro on 
10 February 1525 talked about the fear caused by Đbrahim. Negro also reported that he 
killed many subassi and judges. Negro also voiced public expectation about Đbrahim 
rebelling “and doing what the other one has done.”1250  
An example of covert intimidation would be the case of a commander of Aleppo, 
who presented Đbrahim Paşa precious gifts. Aware of the commander’s misdeeds, 
Đbrahim spread word that he would not be tricked by such gifts and the commander 
would be executed upon a single complaint about his oppression. Upon hearing this, the 
commander gave back to the people what he had unlawfully got from them.1251 
Đbrahim Paşa’s ultimate deed at Cairo is the renewal of the law code1252 in relation 
to the complaints by the people upon his call. He summons the former law codes. He 
goes over those of Qaytbay, Qansuh al-Ghuri, Hayrbay and Ahmed Paşa. He puts away 
the innovations set by the latter. As a result of meticulous work, a law code protecting 
the interests of both the subjects and the imperial treasury is compiled. This was 
accompanied by the preparation of an imperial law code relating to the affairs of central 
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administration.1253 The law code prepared during Đbrahim’s mission at Cairo is a rather 
insightful document. It dwells on a number of issues including legitimization of Selim 
I’s conquest of Egypt, the accession of Süleyman, the need for the post of vizierate and 
justification of Đbrahim’s selection for the post. 
In keeping with the imperial decree, we see Đbrahim making the necessary 
appointments before he left Cairo. He also promoted and rewarded the imperial troops 
stationed in the region, promoted those whose services were appreciated. The ‘ulemâ, 
sheiks and the poor of Cairo were also rewarded “on behalf of the Sultan” [tasaddukât-ı 
pâdişâhîden].1254 These acts of largesse probably signify more than usual demonstration 
of imperial favor. They should probably be seen in connection with a systemized 
attempt on Đbrahim’s part to secure the loyalties of the region and to prevent the bases 
for future anti-Ottoman faction formation. 
The reports of the Venetian bailo in Constantinople emphasize the affection 
Süleyman had for Đbrahim when the latter was in Egypt. Initially, according to 
Bragadin’s report dated 19 October, his mission in Egypt would last six months, since 
the Sultan “cannot live without him.”1255 Süleyman not only sent him gifts throughout 
his absence, but wrote to him with his own hand twice a month.1256 Furthermore, there 
were rumors that the Sultan did not want to return to Istanbul until Đbrahim did.1257 
Giovo also emphasizes that the Sultan could not be without Đbrahim so he called him 
back from Egypt.1258 These reports are verified by Ottoman sources to some extent. 
Bostan, for example, mentions that Süleyman did not trust the other viziers in the 
absence of Đbrahim; therefore council meetings were done twice a week instead of the 
usual four meetings. The author also relates immediate call-for-return made to Đbrahim 
Paşa upon a janissary mutiny which broke in Istanbul.1259 
                                               
1253
 Tabakat, 127a; Nasuh, 96a-b. 
1254
 Bostan (MK), 57a-b. 
1255
 Sanuto, 37:269. 
1256
 Ibid, 38:56 [dated 29 January 1525]. 
1257
 Ibid, 38:163 [dated 4-7 March 1525]. He was in Edirne in a great hunt. 
1258
 Giovio, Commentario, p.diiii: “non potendo sofferire il Signore l’absenza sua, 
richiamato con favorite lettere torno à Constantinopoli.” 
1259
 Bostan (MK), 58a, 59a. 
325 
 
4.4. Official Projection and Public Reception 
The official projection of Đbrahim Paşa’s rise can best be traced in the long 
preamble to the law code of Egypt prepared during Đbrahim Paşa’s mission there 
provides a rather clear understanding of the significance of vizierate and the nature of 
his authority. 
The preamble of the 1524 law code presents the contemporary understanding of 
the post of vizierate. First of all, it was imperative that the Sultan should entrust the 
affairs of the realm to a capable and insightful vizier. This person was expected to be 
someone approved and accepted by those whose consensus mattered. He should be a 
wise man with a reasonable mind. He should be privy to the secrets of the sultanate, in 
other words a confidante of the Sultan. He was expected to remedy the wounds of those 
inflicted by oppression.  Such a candidate for the post had to be free from the vices of 
anger and bribery. He should be one who went through the upraising the Sultan and 
grew with his favors. He should also be an ethical man who abided religious rules. 
Other than being a loyal servant of the Sultan, the ideal candidate would need to be 
courageous on the battle field as well as capable of strategic thinking.1260 Sultan 
Süleyman, according to the law code, found the appropriate candidate in Đbrahim 
through God’s inspiration. The text brings out a parallel with Abraham through citing a 
related Quranic verse: “O Fire! Be thou cool and a means of safety for Abraham.”1261  
The analogy of Abraham [Halil] continues with the statement of Đbrahim’s closeness 
and loyalty to the Sultan: “When, with sincere servitude, day by day, he obtained the 
exclusive devotion of closeness, his Excellency the caliph of the Glorious Lord granted 
the exalted position of the friendship like the one of Halil.”1262  
                                               
1260
 Akgündüz, Kanunnameler, 6:94, 146 [for the facsimile of the document 
preserved in Süleymaniye, Ayasofya, no.4871, fols.118a-157b, see Akgündüz, 
Kanunnameler, 6:141-176]. For an English translation, see Buzov, Lawgiver and His 
Lawmakers, pp.216-7. 
1261
 Quran, 21:69. 
1262
 As translated in Buzov, Lawgiver and His Lawmakers, pp.216-7. For the 
Ottoman text, see Akgündüz, Kanunnameler, 6:146 [facsimile]: “Đhlâs-ı ‘ubûdiyyetle 
yevmen fe yevmen ihtisâs-ı kurbet tahsîl itmeğin Hazret-i Halîfe-i Rabb-ı Celîl rütbet-i 
vâlâ-yı Halîl erzânî kılub…” 
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Through such closeness, according to the document, Süleyman had the chance to 
realize the capability of Đbrahim in terms of solving the problems of the realm and 
eliminating the enemies of the state. At this point, the idealness of Đbrahim for the post 
in reflected through a poem [mesnevi], which simultaneously glorifies Süleyman as 
well, and thus establishing the concept of the perfect couple often employed by future 
authors: 
Reason says, o Shah of pure character, 
May the throne of equity be adorned, justice has triumphed 
While such a pillar of the state stands upright 
It is a sin to give the vizierate to anybody but him 
Is it reasonable that, while that pure rose exists 
The rose garden of justice be filled with thorns and sticks? 
You are Solomon; it suits you to have Asaf 
At your gate men and jinn stand in ranks 
While in his hand both pen and sword are obedient 
It is unjust for others to be grand viziers 
While every commander is obedient to his command 
The position of high commander [beğlerbeği] going to others would be unjust 
No king had come to rule like you 
Nor has this court seen a slave like him.1263 
The diploma of general-command [ser‘askerlik berâtı] granted to Đbrahim Paşa 
in April 1529 is perhaps the best self-expression summarizing the issue.1264 The 
composer of the document, Celâlzâde explains the basic need for a general commander 
with the over-expansion of the territories under the rule of the Sultan.1265 While the title 
of the post implies a military position, the tasks involved and the list of people to obey 
suggests an overall delegation of responsibility and authority. The document is written 
in the first person, thus reinforcing the impression of a statement of self-projection. The 
first part of the document asserts Sultan Süleyman’s divine right of kingship through 
                                               
1263
 As translated in Buzov, Lawgiver and His Lawmakers, pp.219-20; For the 
Ottoman text, see Akgündüz, Kanunnameler, pp. 95-6, and p.147 [facsimile]. 
1264
 For the text of the document, see, Tabakat, 180a-182b; Münşe‘at, I:544-6. For 
a comparative transcription of the text, see, Yılmaz, ‘Koca Nişancı’ of Kanuni: 
Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, pp.234-246. 
1265
 According to the author, the Sultan told him to prepare a diploma of general-
command because it had become impossible to handle the affairs of the realm on his 
own due to the fact that his “realm expanded by the grace of God.” Tabakat, 179a. 
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numerous Quranic verses.1266 After establishing the Sultan’s divinely appointed duties 
of administration and conquest, the text clarifies that the order of the world was 
entrusted to his sovereign power. This point is emphasized through expressions such as 
“He [God] stretched the board of the degree of my majesty and prosperity to the highest 
summit of Sultan the shadow of God on earth” [bisât-ı merâtib-i şevket ü ikbâlimi zirve-
yi ‘ulyâ-yı es-sultân zıllullah fi’l-arz da bast eyledi]. Then follows a statement about the 
over-expansion of the realm: “The land of sultanate and dominion is rather wide, the 
limits of the dominion and the districts of the country are very extensive” [‘arsa-i 
saltanat ü cihândâri temâm-ı füshâtde, dâ’ire-i mülk ve hıtta-i iklîm kemâl-i 
vüs’atdedir]. Emphasizing that this is an ongoing situation, the document dwells on the 
requirement to be thankful to God. The second part of the document is a general 
justification of the appointment based on precedence, modeling on an abstract notion of 
past rulers. This part is also supported with verses from the Quran.1267 The third part 
announces the name of Đbrahim Paşa as general commander who is appointed for the 
“guard and protection, and control and preservation of the lands and paths under [my] 
dominion.”1268 However, before this announcement, the suitability of Đbrahim Paşa for 
the job – and grand vizierate – is demonstrated through a long list of his characteristics, 
which is very similar to the list provided in the preamble to the law code of Egypt. As 
grand vizier, Đbrahim Paşa is expected to take over a long list of duties: restoring laws of 
justice, marking customs of clemency and equity, ordering the affairs of the realm, 
arranging and strengthening the foundations of borders and roads, closure and distention 
of the affairs of the realm and the people, fastening the decisions of the land, putting in 
order urgent affairs of caliphate, and diminishing observances of oppression and 
corruption.1269 With this diploma the whole population seems to be placed under 
Đbrahim Paşa’s command. Although the document first cites various military ranks, the 
following terms such as “natives of the realm and residents of the region” [kuttân-ı 
memâlik ve vuttân-ı vilâyet] and “the high and the low in total, and all mankind” 
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 Quran, 3:26; 35:2; 2:105; 19:57; 4:59; 12:38.  
1267
 Quran, 2:130; 2:251; 21:101; 37:164. These verses reinforce Sultan 
Süleyman’s position as divinely appointed ruler. 
1268
 Tabakat, 181b: “kalem-rev-i iklîm-i saltanatımda vâk‘i olan memâlik ü 
mesâlikin hıfz ü hırâseti ve zabt ü siyâneti içün.” 
1269
 Ibid, 180b. 
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[muhassılân havâss ü ‘avâm ve kâffe-i enâm] reinforce the overall effect. The document 
calls for over-all and all-time obedience to Đbrahim Paşa in his capacity of commander-
general [her zamanda ‘umûmen ser‘askerim bilüb]. As such, he was to be treated with 
utmost reverence. More importantly, what he said was to be regarded as if the Sultan’s 
spoken word. He was to be obeyed absolutely in every matter pertaining to the 
“state.”1270 The diploma gives all responsibility of campaigns to Đbrahim Paşa, as well, 
even those realized with the presence of the Sultan. The document ends with warnings 
against disobeying the decree and resist Đbrahim Paşa.1271   
Ottoman narrative accounts are full of references to the epitome of vizierhood 
Asaf in relation to “Solomon of the time,” and to Đbrahim [Halil] the beloved 
companion of God, as well as Aristotle in relation to Alexander. In this respect, 
contemporary writers seem to have found the perfect couple in Süleyman and 
Đbrahim.1272 The analogies not only praise Đbrahim as the ideal vizier, but Süleyman as 
well, since the rulers associated with these viziers were ideal kings themselves.  
In Sa‘di’s words, upon his appointment to grand vizierate, Đbrahim became the 
“Asaf of the age” to the “Solomon of the time.”1273 Implicit or explicit references to the 
perfect couples of the past can be traced in disguise throughout Sa‘di’s account. An 
implication probably quite legible to the contemporary audience was Đbrahim’s offer to 
go to Egypt. Although neither Sa‘di nor any other contemporary author took the job of a 
Sultan as lightly, the reasoning put forth and responsibilities to be delegated in this 
instance are reminiscent of the words of Buzurjmihr to Anushirvan as related in the 
Shahnama:  
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 Tabakat, 182a: “her ne der ise ve her ne vech görürse benim lisân-ı dürer-
bârımdan sâdır olmuş kelâm-ı sa‘âdet-encâm ve emr-i vâcibü’l-ihtirâmım bilüb, sözini 
semm‘-i tahkîk ile ısgâ ve hüsn-i kabûl ile telakkî eyleyüb, devlet-i kâhire-i sâhib-
kırânîye müte‘allik olan cümle-i mehâmm-ı umûr ve kâffe-i mesâlih-i cumhûrda 
emrinden ve sözinden tecâvüz ü ‘adûl ve inhirâf ü zühûl eylemeyeler.” 
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 Ibid, 182b. 
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 For a typical Perso-Islamic treatment of such perfect couples, see Nizam al-
Mulk, Book of Government, p.173. Among those perfect couples listed by Nizam al-
Mulk are Solomon and Asaf, Moses ad his brother Aaron, and Anushirvan and 
Buzurjmihr. 
1273
 Sa‘di (SN), 163b. According to Sa‘di, Đbrahim never favored or disliked 
anyone without reason, but administered justice as circumstances required. 
Furthermore, he not only regulated the affairs of the realm, but served for the good of 
the Sultan in both worlds. 
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However glorious a king might be, it is his vizier’s job to be an ornament to 
his court. The king’s business is hunting and warfare, wine and rejoicing, 
generosity, justice, and feasting; he knows how his predecessors reigned and 
follows their example. It is the vizier who must accumulate wealth, maintain 
the army, combat gossip, and hear suppliants for justice; it is his heart and soul 
that are troubled by worries about the administration and treasury.1274 
Kemalpaşazade’s introductory passage to his account of the 1526 campaign 
provides an almost formulaic expression of the relationship between Sultan Süleyman 
and Grand Vizier Đbrahim Paşa: “Never has such a sword-bearing Sultan cast his 
shadow on the exalted throne of the caliphate, nor has such a unerring [sâyib-i tedbîr] 
vizier stepped on the office of vizierate [dest-i sadâret].”1275 In a way, they seem to 
make a perfect team. Before expressing his formulaic view, Kemalpaşazade answers the 
self imposed question: Through whose efforts do the ghazis achieve their desire of 
ghaza? In the answer, we see that the Sultan now has a partner in the credit taken for 
providing the opportunity for ghaza, in other words a road to spiritual salvation for 
those participating.1276 While expressing this partnership, one of the references defining 
Đbrahim Paşa is “semiyy-i Halîlü’r-Rahmân.” Halîl signifies both the prophet Abraham 
and a loyal friend; and not only any loyal friend but that of God. Through a verbal pun, 
Kemalpaşazade reinforces the significance of Đbrahim Paşa in relation to Sultan 
Süleyman. The reference to Halîlü’r-Rahmân, in a way, exalts Süleyman himself almost 
to a divine status. Another interesting play of words reflects the relationship each has 
with ghaza. Kemalpaşazade refers to Süleyman as the “granter of the victory-bringing 
banners of victorious Islam”, whereas to Đbrahim as the “raiser of the flags of ghaza.” 
While the first expression seems to imply a more passive yet administrative and 
organizational responsibility, the second expression suggests action.1277 
                                               
1274
 Ferdowsi, Shahnameh, p.714. After his visit to the Ottoman court in 1524, the 
impression of Piero Zen was that Süleyman was more into the joys of life than making 
war. Sanuto, 37:142. 
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 KPŞZ, X:196: “Ne ancılayın Sultân-ı sâhib-i şimşîr-i ‘arş-serîr pâye-i hilâfete 
sâye salmışdır ve ne buncılayın Vezîr-i sâyib-tedbîr dest-i sadârete ayak basmışdır.”  
1276
 See Chapter 3, p.268. 
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 KPŞZ, X:196: “nâsıb-ı râyat-ı nusret-âyat-ı Đslâm-ı zafer-encam” vs. “râfi’-i 
livâ-yı gazâ.”  
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As his narrative goes on, Kemalpaşazade comments further on the pair. Süleyman 
is referred to Melik Şah and Đbrahim as Nizam al-Mulk.1278 The referral to Nizam al-
Mulk has a dual significance. On the one hand, Đbrahim is likened to the epitome of 
vizierhood. On the other hand, he is described as the “order of the realm” [nizâmül’l-
mülk]. The author describes Đbrahim’s qualities again in a two-fold manner. His ability 
in the battlefield is matched with his sound strategies [sâyib-i tedbîr]. Thus he is 
described as a young man with this warrior skills and an old man with this 
administrative abilities.1279 This dual-qualification is emphasized in his handling of the 
Egyptian matter. When he was sent to these provinces with the order of the Sultan, he 
handled the matter with “good strategy” [hüsn-i tedbîr] and “blow of sword” [darb-ı 
şimşîr].1280 The same dual-qualification is also found in Kemalpaşazade’s referral to 
Süleyman. He is the “world-conquering Sultan” [Sultân-ı cihân-güşâ] and the “order-
issuing Hâkân” [Hâkân-ı fermân-fermâ].1281 
The sense of partnership reflected in Kemalpaşazade’s account is also 
demonstrated by a rumor Bragadin has heard while he was in Istanbul. In his letter 
dated 5 February 1526, the bailo summarizes a prophecy supposedly discovered in a 
book by Süleyman and Đbrahim when they were children. According to the prophecy:  
… some day one will come out of the Palace who would not have had any 
prior office and will be first vizier and governor-general of Rumelia and his 
name would be  Imbrain. The Ottoman Sultan of his time will do many things 
which his [ancestors] could never do…1282 
Performance of two ceremonial departures from Istanbul on the occasion of the 
1526 campaign demonstrates contemporary questions regarding the perception of this 
partnership. Firstly, Đbrahim Paşa left with the army on 14 April [2 Rajab]. He returned 
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 KPŞZ, X:200: “Nizâmü’l-Mülk olmışdur o düstûr / Cihân mülkinde olaldan 
Melik Şâh / Bu düstûra Nizâmü’l-Mülk şâgird / o sultân-ı cihâna kul Melik Şah,” and 
“Pâdişah-ı mihr ki sipihr-bârgâh ü sitâre-sipâhdur, başına zerrîn külâh urunub bu 
zeberced serîre çıkaldan, anun nazîri vezîr mesned-i müşeyyed-i vezârete ayak 
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 Ibid, 201. 
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 Sanuto, 41:95. 
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next day after putting the army in the charge of the Rumelian kethüda and defterdar, 
only to re-depart with the Sultan later. His tabl ü ‘alem were also given to these; and 
they were given command to move towards Sofia for the general assembly of the 
army.1283 This double departure has brought various explanations. While some 
contemporaries attributed Đbrahim’s return to the inseparability of Đbrahim and 
Süleyman on the personal level,1284 others explained the first departure as a requirement 
of his post as governor-general of Rumelia and the return as a necessity of grand 
vizierate.1285 Salih Çelebi combines the two opinions. According to Salih Çelebi, 
Đbrahim had to leave in advance for the assembly of the Rumelian troops in his capacity 
of governor-general of Rumelia, according to “ancient custom.” However, he was called 
back by the Sultan. His presence was required alongside the Sultan because their 
seperation was impossible.1286  
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 Nasuh, 100b. Celâlzâde mentions that Đbrahim came back on 23 April [11 
Rajab]. Tabakat, 133a. 
1284
 Kemalpaşazade mentions that Đbrahim was both grand vizier and general 
commander of the Rumelian army, but the main emphasis of the text is on the 
inseperability of Đbrahim and Süleyman. KPZ, X:224-5. Nasuh follows Kemalpşazade’s 
views on the issue and repeats in a linguistically less complex manner, Nasuh, 100b-
101a: “Kendünin imâm-ı mehâm cumhûr-ı enâma müte’allik umur-ı ‘azâmın masaddur-
ı saltanatdan sadrı ve zuhurı huzurına mevkûfdı. Anın şu’ûrı ve vukûfı olmadın bir 
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me’abdan infisâle mecâl ve cenâb-ı kâmyâb-ı afitab-menziletden iftirâke ihtimâl yoğidi. 
Ana binaen ‘inân-ı yek-rân râm-licâmı zikr olan menzilden makam-ı siyâdete ve 
makarr-ı sa‘âdete ki kemân gibi kuc görenlerin makaridi döndürdi.” 
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 Bostan (MK), 62a-b: “… Rumili Beğlerbeğiliği vezîr-i â‘zam Đbrahim 
Paşa’nın ‘uhdesinde olub hem vezîr hem beğlerbeği olmağla bir rûz-ı firûz zerrîn ‘alem 
açub şevket ü haşem gürûh-ı hadem ile mahrûse-i Kostantiniyye’den hurûc idüb, bir 
hûb mürgzâra nüzûl gösterüb ‘alem-i zafer-peykeri Rumili kethüdâsına ve defterdarına 
ısmarlayub, leşker cem’ine göndarub vezâreti muktezâsınca girü kendü südde-i sa‘âdete 
geldi.”  
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 Sâlih (TSK), 19a-b. Salih Çelebi’s expression gives the impression of a more 
administrative link rather than a personal one: “ ‘Đlm-i ‘âlem-ârây-ı muhît idi ki der-i 
devlet-penâhdan infikâkı devlet ü ikbâl gibi bir an ma‘kûl değilidi.” Salih Çelebi 
[d.1565] is the younger brother of Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi. Born in 1493, Salih 
pursued a career in the learned establishment. He started as a student of Kemalpaşazade, 
and transferred to the Sultan’s teacher Hoca Hayreddin upon Süleyman’s accession. In 
1520, he was also appointed to an institution in Edirne with his first müderris post. In 
1524, he was appointed to Đstanbul. In 1540s he served as judge in Aleppo, Damascus, 
and Egypt. For his life, see, Uzunçarşılı, “Celâlzâde Mustafa ve Salih Çelebiler,” 
pp.422-439. 
332 
 
Đbrahim Paşa’s rise was far from being a smooth transition to power. Although 
Sultan Süleyman did his best to demonstrate the favor he bestowed upon his favorite, 
contemporary accounts are replete with acts of discontent toward the grand vizier. There 
are various instances of mutinous behavior especially on the part of the janissaries 
which revolved around the person of Đbrahim. While these instances point at the 
discontent directed at Đbrahim Paşa, they simultaneously provide hints about 
Süleyman’s authority.  
According to Celâlzâde, the anti-Đbrahim faction in Istanbul was relieved by his 
departure to Egypt. They thought he would stay there forever; however when he was 
summoned back by the Sultan, “their hearts were filled with hatred” and many envied 
him. Their intention was to keep Đbrahim away and so they provoked sedition. The 
author relates that in the guise of janissaries some “irregulars” [levend] and “mischief-
makers” [müfsidîn] rebelled in Istanbul on 16 May [23 Rajab], targeting the houses of 
Ayas Paşa and Abdüsselam the treasurer. Houses and shops of the Jews were plundered. 
Next night, Đbrahim’s house was targeted. The night after that, janissaries assembled at 
the Palace to inform the janissary commander that they had nothing to do with the 
sedition. Not only did the janissaries deny involvement in the mutiny but demanded that 
those responsible be found. When the ringleaders were found, Celâlzâde informs us, the 
janissaries themselves left the mutineers no escape but killed them. The commander of 
the janissaries Mustafa Ağa was blamed for the mutiny and was executed by the order 
of the Sultan.1287 According to Bostan, on the other hand, the misconduct of the 
janissaries was the result of mismanagement of the viziers. The author does not directly 
associate the unrest with Đbrahim. As Bostan has it, the janissaries were angry because 
the Sultan did not come to the Palace on his arrival from Edirne but went to his palace 
on the Anatolian side. To demonstrate their dissatisfaction, they attacked the “houses of 
the viziers” [paşaların evleri]. Upon hearing the mutiny, the Sultan immediately crossed 
the Bosphorus. Janissaries quieted down on his arrival at the Palace. The commander of 
the janissaries, Mustafa Ağa, was executed for triggering the mutiny.1288 
Both of these accounts suggest an effort on the part of their writers to distance 
the Sultan from the mutiny. Putting the blame on the mismanagement of the viziers, 
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 Tabakat, 129a-130a. Also see Lütfi Paşa, p.253. 
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 Bostan (MK), 58b-59a. 
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Bostan avoids attributing any sort of inability in government to the Sultan. In 
Celalzâde’s account, on the other hand, not only the Sultan is disassociated from the 
mutiny, but his army as well by pointing at the irregulars.1289 
As mutiny is a demonstration of discontent and grievance on the part of 
subordinates, any link between the mutineers and the “servants” of the Sultan would 
damage his image. Mutiny also signifies a challenge to and a divergence from the 
existing order of things. As Süleyman’s main duty as sultan was to maintain order, any 
failure to do so would again weaken his reputation. Furthermore, Elihu Rose, for 
example, defines a mutiny as “antithesis of discipline.” Discipline being the foundation 
of the military, and military representing the monopoly of the legitimate instruments of 
violence which is the sine qua non of statehood, a mutiny signifies a self-inflicted 
challenge on the state’s control over its military and thus a challenge on the existence of 
the state itself. 1290  Palmira Brummett argues in a similar manner as she defines mutiny 
in the Ottoman context as “an idea which expressed divergence from the ideals of 
righteous exercise of authority and loyal obedience.”1291 
 Venetian reports also relate some discontent about Đbrahim Paşa. Piero Zen 
attributes the web of jealousy around Đbrahim to his immense influence on the 
Sultan.1292  According to Piero Bragadino’s letter dated 21 May, janissaries attacked and 
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 Later on in his work, Celâlzâde reports a mass-execution of irregulars, who 
were often accused of starting unrest, on 24 February 1528 [3 Jumada II 934]. The 
incident started with the plundering of a house and the murdering of the inhabitants near 
the hospice of Sultan Selim; irregulars were instant suspects. In order to put a stop to 
trouble provoked by this sector, all idle non-Muslim levends [bî-kâr ve bî-zan’ât 
levendlik üzere olan kefere-i fecere] found in the streets, bazaars, taverns of Istanbul 
were arrested and executed publicly. Celâlzâde says that eight hundred of them were 
thus killed. According to the author, this was done to be a lesson to those who intended 
to provoke sedition. Tabakat, 176a. 
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 For a theoretical discussion on mutiny, see, Elihu Rose, “The Anatomy of a 
Mutiny,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 8, no.4 (Summer 1982), p.562-3: “Mutiny is 
antithetical to an ethos whose fundamental tenets are duty, loyalty, honor, and 
patriotism, and the unit that participates in a mutiny brings discredit upon itself, its 
officers, and its service.” 
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 Palmira Brummett, “Classifying Ottoman Mutiny,” Turkish Studies 
Association Bulletin, vol.22, no.1 (1998), p.94. Brummett emphasizes that “these acts of 
rebellion signified the gap between expectations and realities in the Ottoman hierarchy. 
They served to illustrate the degree to which the state could tolerate rebellious behavior 
and the degree to which that behavior was perceived to put the state at risk.” 
1292
 Sanuto, 37:143.  
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pillaged Đbrahim’s house, killing his mother.1293 Unfavorable attitudes toward Đbrahim 
are also observable through Venetian gossip from Istanbul. One such rumor was that 
when the commander of the janissaries complained that the state now had two heads, 
implying the excessive power of Đbrahim, Süleyman had him strangled.1294 Given the 
trust put on Đbrahim by Süleyman, it seems quite natural that people were confused 
about the nature of authority which the Sultan appeared to share with his grand vizier. 
In a society for which old wisdom mattered, the appearance of a two-headed state was 
probably incomprehensible.1295 Another rumor has it that the Sultan had an astrologist 
drowned because he spoke malevolently about Đbrahim.1296  
Not even a strict proclamation such as the 1529 general-commandership decree 
prevented occasional protests. During the campaign of 1529, the janissaries challenged 
Đbrahim Paşa in person. They managed to detain him in a church and insulted him. They 
wanted him to ask for gratuities from the Sultan on their behalf. They did not release 
him until he promised to do so, although he initially declined their request. Several 
officers were hurt in this minor mutiny.1297 On the other hand, such mutinous behavior 
should perhaps not be over interpreted since there are other instances whereby vizieral 
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residences were attacked by groups of household regiments. One such example would 
be in the early months of Sultan Süleyman’s reign. As Celâlzâde has it, some members 
of the cavalry regiment went to the houses of some viziers to create mischief, but the 
ringleaders were executed as soon as the Sultan heard of this.1298 
In his relation to the Signoria on 4 November 1524, Piero Zen dwells on the 
affection Süleyman has toward Đbrahim, mentioning that they have been together since 
they were children. Zen describes Đbrahim as a 29 year-old man “who does everything 
and what he wants is done.”1299 On the other hand, Đbrahim was not the only grandee of 
the time who was attributed with so much power; his contemporary counterpart Wolsey 
has often been credited with almost monopolizing political power due to Henry VIII’s 
trust in him.1300 Later in the sixteenth century, Leicester’s dominance at the court of 
Queen Elizabeth I was described as such: “[His] reign is so absolute in this place (as 
also in all other parts of the Court) as nothing can pass but by his admission.”1301  
The relazione presented by Piero Bragadin, who served as bailo in Istanbul, in 
Venice on 9 June 1526 is full of details on the person Đbrahim Paşa and his relationship 
with Sultan Süleyman. Although his report includes all sorts of rumors and hearsay, it 
provides current perceptions on Đbrahim exactly because of this uncritical feature. It is 
also noteworthy that the bailo has observed the formation of discontent with Đbrahim 
Paşa’s sudden rise and the gradual acceptance based on the favor and affection of the 
Sultan. Bragadin, describes Đbrahim as “the heart of the strength of the Signor.” 
According to the bailo, whatever Đbrahim wished to do, he did. The Sultan would not do 
anything without his counsel. Bragadin says that Đbrahim is of Parga, thus a Venetian 
subject.1302 According to the bailo, Đbrahim was an elegant man, who took delight in 
many things; he read books on the Romans, the life of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, 
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history, wars, and philosophy;  he liked to compose music with a Persian residing in his 
house. He liked to be informed about the rulers of the world, of sites, lands, and other 
things. Bragadin believed him to be well-educated, and reported that he was well-versed 
in the laws of faith. The bailo mentions that Đbrahim bought “every fine object that he 
could.”  He reports that Đbrahim and the Sultan have been together since they were six 
years old; and dwells on the Sultan’s love toward Đbrahim and how he cannot remain 
without him. As Bragadin has it, Đbrahim frequently slept in the Palace with the Sultan 
on a bed next to his, and they were together everyday. The Sultan wrote him notes with 
his own hand and sent with a mute of his; in reply Đbrahim either came in person or 
wrote him what to do. Bragadin also informs on the income of Đbrahim, saying that the 
150,000 ducats income consisted of two parts: 100,000 because he was vizier, and 
50,000 because he was the governor-general of Rumelia. The bailo seems to have been 
impresses by the number and appearance of Đbrahim’s slaves. Numbering 1,500, these 
young men, who carried gifts on their heads, were dressed in gold garments and silk and 
scarlet.  The bailo mentions the “beautiful house” given to Đbrahim by the Sultan, 
mentioning that it was restored after being partly ruined by the janissaries. Bragadin 
provides some family information saying that he was married but did not have children. 
His mother and two brothers were at the Palace. The mother, “who turned Turk” [fata 
turca] and stayed in a house nearby, did many favors to Christians. The father had a 
sancak near Parga with an annual income of 2,000 ducats. Defining him as friend of the 
Signoria, Bragadin describes Đbrahim as a just and wise man. The bailo reports that 
Đbrahim brought much jewels from Cairo, and presented some as gifts to the Sultan. As 
Bragadin has it, when the Sultan sent him to Cairo, he wanted to grant that land to 
Đbrahim; but the grand vizier declined the offer, and administered the region rightly as 
he stayed there. He was first despised by many, but now that they have seen the Sultan 
likes him very much, they all made friends with him, just like the mother and the wife 
of the sultan, as well as the other two viziers.1303  
The “information” provided by Bragadin on Đbrahim’s family members cannot be 
verified in Ottoman accounts. In this sense, the rumors on the family members can be 
regarded as demonstration of the perceived power and influence of Đbrahim Paşa. 
In his letter from Istanbul, dated 17 April 1529, Piero Zen reports that the Sultan 
made Đbrahim Paşa “governor of his Empire” [governador del suo imperio]. This 
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diploma gave Đbrahim the authority to dismiss governors and governors-general. Along 
with the diploma, he was rewarded with a stable of horses, gowns and money.1304  
Two years after the 1529 diploma, Paolo Giovio’s comments in his Commentario 
provide an instant impression of the “perfect couple”: 
I have heard from trustable people that he often says he has the right to the 
Roman Empire and the West by virtue of being the successor of Emperor 
Constantine who transferred the Empire to Constantinople; and be informed, 
Your Majesty, that he remains resolute on Christian affairs and minutely 
informed, and holds the disposition and forces to take on more fights in one 
stretch; he has marvelous understanding of everything, and is adorned with 
many virtues; he lacks the signs of vices of cruelty, avarice, and infidelity 
which were present in his predecessors Selim, Bayezid, Mehmed; furthermore, 
he is religious and liberal, with these two he will easily go to Heaven because 
the religion preaches that justice, temperance and liberality wins the hearts 
soldiers, and plants hope of some reward in all conditions of humanity who 
seek to enhance fortune; also gifted with the same virtue is Đbrahim Paşa, who 
with exceptional and unprecedented authority governs everything; he is just in 
every action, and of unpretentious nature, and chaste, patient, and resolute in 
audiences; and the other Paşas honor him like a patron, and one can say that 
his authority is almost equal to that of the Signor both in affairs of war and in 
civil matters.1305 
Đbrahim’s famous speech to Hieronymus von Zara in 1533 perhaps illustrates best 
the position of the grand vizier and the point where his partnership with Süleyman: 
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It is I who govern this vast empire. What I do is done; I have all the power, 
all offices, all the rule. What I wish to give is given and cannot be taken away; 
what I do not give is not confirmed by anyone. If the ever great Sultan wishes 
to give, or has given anything, if I do not please it is not carried out. All is in 
my hands, peace, war, treasure.1306 
These words sound rather bold and vain to be uttered by a servant of the Sultan, 
no matter how favored he is. Đbrahim’s biographer Jenkins argues that “Đbrahim seems 
to have lost his head” in uttering such dangerous words; however these words actually 
echo those in the diploma of general-command. As such, this diploma implies more full 
delegation of sovereign responsibility rather than sharing of sovereign authority. The 
authority that is invested in Đbrahim Paşa, in this sense, should be regarded as a 
necessity that comes along with the responsibility rather than bestowal of extraordinary 
power. Sultan Süleyman delegated responsibility and authority in regional terms starting 
with the beginning of his reign, as exemplified with the cases of Hayrbay and of Ahmed 
Paşa in Egypt. The uniqueness of Đbrahim Paşa’s diploma of general-command lies in 
its scope, which covers the whole realm. As such, this document is a demonstration of 
the self-positioning of Sultan Süleyman, with the contribution of his image-makers, 
above everything. This self-perception appears to be the foundation supporting the 
claims on universal sovereignty pursued in the 1530s, not least with the influence of 
Đbrahim Paşa.  
4.5. Conclusion 
The process we have tried to uncover in this chapter shows that Sultan Süleyman 
gradually formed a team of his own by replacing men he overtook from his father with 
those he saw fit. The fact that he did not instantly attempt such revision suggests that he 
observed and evaluated the men around him through the course of his first couple of 
years, and that he tried to make informed choices. In the process, he would gradually 
come to delegate his imperial authority and responsibility to a man of his own choice. 
This process of gradual delegation of authority ultimately ends up almost in sharing the 
authority almost as equals.  
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In this chapter, we tried to trace the rise of Đbrahim Paşa in the context of the 
major challenges faced by Süleyman during the first decade of his rule. Đbrahim’s 
sudden and unusual rise has been associated with the growth of the authority of the 
Sultan to an unprecedented level as to almost ignoring social and political norms. Ebru 
Turan argues in a recent study:  
The sultan could disregard merit and competence as conditions of social 
mobility and constitute ranks and status through his own favor. In this way, the 
sultan’s will and personal power came to supersede everything else, and he 
came to be defined as the sole force in the formation of public order.1307  
At first sight, it may seem as if this sort of empowering a “favorite” was regarded 
a natural right by Sultan Süleyman and reflect his “absolute” authority. On the other 
hand, the process we have tried to trace points at a gradual evolution whereby we see 
Süleyman imposing Đbrahim on the relevant audience step by step – and over and over 
again – before actually creating him as his own “alter-ego.” The employment of a 
rhetoric aimed at persuasion along with successive ritual instances imply that 
Süleyman’s seemingly arbitrary decision was not expected to be taken smoothly and 
willingly. His mission to Egypt, shortly after a wedding on imperial scale, appears as a 
device to consolidate the image of a powerful vizier through providing the opportunity 
to prove his meriting the position. The following campaign in 1526, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, proves Đbrahim’s military capability. By the return of this campaign, 
his handling the problems in the provinces provides the last step to the full 
transformation of the Sultan-Vizier relationship projected by the general-
commandership decree of 1529.  
Đbrahim Paşa’s rise involves a dual process whereby both he and Süleyman as his 
master rise. The appointment of Đbrahim Paşa, in this respect, can be regarded as a self-
confident move on the part of Sultan Süleyman to impose in full his own power and 
authority on the system that depended largely on precedence and conservation of 
convention. The preamble of the law code for Egypt can be regarded as a written 
statement of the level of self-confidence and self-positioning achieved by Sultan 
Süleyman at this point. In this sense, the document does not only serve to justify the 
unconventional rise of Đbrahim Paşa, but also to impose, herald, and shape the evolving 
image of Sultan Süleyman. The extension of Đbrahim’s responsibilities and prerogatives 
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to cover the whole realm with the diploma of general command in 1529 seems to be a 
powerful expression of not only the sense of partnership between the two men, but also 
of the self-image of Sultan Süleyman as an all-powerful monarch above everything. 
341 
 
CHAPTER 5 
“THE KING OF KINGS WHO CONQUERED HUNGARY”:               
ŞEHĐNŞÂH-I ENGÜRÜS-SĐTÂN 
You know that new events bring new counsels.1308 
5.1. Defining the Problem:  
This chapter examines the 1526 campaign of Sultan Süleyman into Hungary. 
Known as the Mohacs campaign, the movement of Süleyman’s army has been the focus 
of many scholarly arguments. The defeat of the Hungarian army at the battlefield and 
the death of King Louis II as a consequence have led historians to regard the battle as a 
watershed in European history. This view has put the battle itself in the center of the 
campaign, as well as transforming the two hours of fighting into the reason of the “fall 
of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary.” In this respect, the “Mohacs campaign” came to 
be one of the building blocks of nationalist histories, either lamenting the “dreadful 
Turkish occupation of Hungary” or exalting the “glorious deeds of the Turks in Europe” 
depending on the window one prefers to look through.  
Refraining from both discourses, this chapter argues that the 1526 campaign 
aimed neither at the total destruction of the Kingdom of Hungary nor the direct 
annexation of Hungarian lands into the Ottoman realm. The near-annihilation of the 
Hungarian army and the demise of Louis at the battle of Mohacs, as a consequence, 
brought Sultan Süleyman a new degree and type of power and prestige which was not 
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foreseen. In this respect, this chapter aims to examine the dynamics that led to the 1526 
campaign, the motives and opportunities involved, the strategies employed as things 
developed. Observing the development of the campaign through the intentions, 
expectations, strategies and impressions of the various parties concerned, we shall try to 
arrive at a more complete picture and to see how this picture functioned within the 
image building process of Sultan Süleyman. 
Until recently Hungarian historiography has often vilified the “Turks” and blamed 
Süleyman’s military machine for the “misfortune” and “sufferings” of the Hungarian 
“nation” for 150 years of “servitude”. Although many Hungarian historians have 
dwelled on the internal chaos and the inefficiency of contemporary Hungarian 
administration, the resulting analysis generally projected a tragedy caused by a 
terrorizing tyrant who took advantage of the weakness of his neighbor. In a volume 
published in 1982, Laszlo M. Alföldi, for example, simplified the issue to reflect an 
army of obedient and fanatically religious slaves under the command of an absolute 
ruler who was “able to command all the resources of his empire, human and material 
alike” defeating a greedy and self-centered European nobility which “wasted its energy 
on pleasures and Renaissance intrigue.” Alföldi also identified the battle of Mohacs 
with the famous Cannae, as “a modern battle of envelopment and annihilation with 
Sultan Süleyman appearing as the sixteenth-century Hannibal.”1309 Leslie S. Domonkos, 
in an article in the same volume, spoke with an even more romantic nationalist tone 
asserting that after Mohacs the nation was divided, the country was mutilated and 
maimed, Hungary was no longer master of its own destiny and was dependent for its 
very existence.1310  
Turkish historiography, on the other hand, has taken the accounts of Ottoman 
chronicles at face value and developed a glorifying approach which mirrors the epic 
approach mentioned above. In this version of the story, the 1526 campaign figures as a 
breaking point as well, often implying Ottoman supremacy in Europe achieved through 
the genius of Sultan Süleyman. The most recent example of such an approach can be 
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found in the work of Muhittin Kapanşahin on the western policy of Sultan 
Süleyman.1311 Based solely on a verbatim reflection of contemporary and near-
contemporary Ottoman chronicles, Kapanşahin explains Sultan Süleyman’s purpose in 
waging the 1526 campaign as “termination of the evils caused by neighboring states” 
and “ending Hungarian oppression, removing enemy threat from the lands of Islam, 
performing the duty of jihad, and taking the sun of Islam to farther lands.”1312 Tayyip 
Gökbilgin, a modern Turkish scholar who is an expert on the Süleymanic era, has 
suggested expanding the argument with the inclusion of the international issues of 
1520s. Gökbilgin mentions the imperial diets, especially the Diet of Speyer in 1526 and 
the discussions on Hungary at these diets, Papal-Hungarian relations, other diplomatic 
relations, Hungary’s internal condition saying that all these factors can help shed light 
on the issue in an expanded context. However he, too, dismisses them arguing that they 
are only background issues which did not have direct influence on Ottoman politics.1313  
Such quasi-nationalist approaches simultaneously exalt and demean both 
parties.1314 Instead of adopting an ideologically loaded approach which inevitably 
revolves around a victor versus victim duality, this chapter considers various viewpoints 
to get closer to the actual view as contemporaries saw it in 1526. In this respect, the 
approach of recent scholarship, which has broken the restricted viewpoints of nationalist 
discourses and explanations revolving around Ottoman expansionist imperial 
discourses, has been insightful in the main argument of this chapter. Studies by Rhoads 
Murphey [2001] and Feridun Emecen [2007] have approached earlier evaluations with 
caution, warning against analysis which look through the lens of 1541 and what 
happened thereafter. Instead, their work was prompted by the context and prevailing 
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conditions pertaining specifically to the 1520s. These scholars conclude that 
Süleyman’s actions in Hungary were not based on a premeditated grand design that 
would intentionally lead to eventual annexation and direct rule, but were decided as 
situation required.1315 Feridun Emecen emphasizes that although the battle of Mohacs 
has come to be regarded as a “frequently referred beginning” which determined the 
framework of the gradual development of Ottoman administration and policy in 
Hungary, it should nevertheless not be forgotten that the direct result was the fall of the 
“ancient Hungarian Kingdom” and not Ottoman occupation.1316 Rhoads Murphey 
argues that Süleyman’s Hungarian policy was more a situationally developed one, 
rather than a grand design to occupy Hungary. He suggests that the main element of 
Ottoman success in the Balkans from 1430 onwards was their adopting the role of the 
protector of Orthodox population against a potential Latin invasion. In this respect, 
Murphey argues, Süleyman took care not to offend his Christian subjects by engaging in 
direct offensive action without good reason and/or provocation/justification.1317 
According to Murphey, the aim in the aftermath of Mohacs was not annexation, but 
“pacification and stabilization of the frontier through nurturing concessionary 
regimes.”1318  
The place of the Battle of Mohacs in terms Ottoman policy on Hungary has been 
evaluated differently in the debate between “buffer-zone” and “gradual 
incorporation.”1319 Perjes problematizes the issue by rejecting what he coins the 
“Mohacs Complex” prevailing in Hungarian historiography which links the fall of the 
kingdom with one single battle. Perjes opposes this “fixation on one event” along with 
the humiliation, suffering, loss of life and goods that preceded and followed it; and 
proposes looking at the wider context between 1521 and 1541 to see that the initial 
Ottoman intention was not to destroy and annex Hungary but to make it a “buffer 
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state.”1320 Geza Perjes defines the Ottoman objective to force Hungary into peace 
through destroying its army and occupation of its capital.1321 After detailed analysis 
Perjes concludes that although Mohacs was a military victory, it was a political defeat. 
Since the King was dead, the road to peace negotiations had come to a dead end, 
clearing Ferdinand’s road into the midst of Hungary.1322 In accordance with Perjes, 
Gustave Bayerle argues that the 1526 campaign was a “punitive expedition” which did 
not aim at major territorial expansion. Bayerle is guided by the fact that the campaign 
came to a halt and Ottomans returned. In his view, the campaign accomplished more 
than what was expected.1323 Halil Inalcık argues that the initial Ottoman intention was 
to keep Hungary as a vassal state like Moldovia since direct rule would be too difficult 
and too expensive.1324 
Pal Fodor, on the other hand, argues that Ottomans intended to occupy Buda as 
early as 1521. He evaluates the 1526 campaign as part of the gradual annexation 
strategy of the Ottomans, arguing that a vassal state would cost more than direct 
occupation.1325 The decision to take Buda, according to Fodor, had a dual intention: “the 
conquest of the country through the occupation of Vienna and the diminution of the 
excessive financial costs caused by the sustenance of a vassal in Hungary.”1326 
Following Fodor’s position, Szakaly sees the 1521-1541 period as gradual conquest.1327 
                                               
1320
 Perjes, Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, p. xv. 
1321
 Ibid, p.76. Here Perjes also introduces a theory of “Süleyman’s offer” which 
intends to make Hungary a vassal state to use for transit. 
1322
 Ibid, pp.270-1. 
1323
 Gustave Bayerle, “One Hundred Fifty Years of Frontier Life in Hungary,” in 
Bak and Kiraly (eds), p.227. 
1324
 Inalcık, Classical Age, p.35. If Lütfi Paşa is correct in saying that 20,000 men 
were left at Buda in 1541, the point can be well-understood. The point is also 
emphasized in the 1541 proclamation of victory. Münşe‘at I:551. 
1325
 Fodor, “Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520-1541,” p.271-2. Also see 
Peter Sahin-Toth, “A Difficult Apprenticeship: The Integration of Hungary into the 
Habsburg Monarchy in the 16th Century,” The World of Emperor Charles V, Wim 
Blockmans and Nicolette Mout (eds.) (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 2004), p.253, whereby the author evaluates the open conquest of Buda in 
1541 as “presumably that was his intention from the beginning.” 
1326
 Fodor, “Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary,” p.272. 
346 
 
He suggests that Ottoman occupation of Hungary started in 1526 with the occupation of 
Syrmia: 
Consequently, the occupation of Syrmia by the Turks should be considered as 
an event of great moment in the history of the Turkish occupation of Hungary. 
To such an extent that in our opinion, it would be more appropriate if 
Hungarian historiography in the future, dated the beginning of the Turkish rule 
over Hungary from the occupation of Syrmia, rather than that of Buda. That is, 
from 1526 rather than 1541.1328 
Looking back from 1541, the period 1521-1541 actually gives the impression of 
“gradual conquest”. However, if we try to move along with the historical conditions 
building on from 1520 on, the huge step of the establishment of the province of Buda in 
1541 should be seen not in terms of Ottoman ambitions of expansion per se, but in the 
context of Habsburg confrontation. After 1526, Süleyman’s imperial action in 
Hungarian soil is closely parallel to Ferdinand’s attacks. Caroline Finkel, for instance, 
asserts that Ferdinand’s intentions on Buda and the Hungarian crown have caused a 
change of direction in Ottoman policy toward Hungary. Finkel states that the death of 
Louis II at Mohacs has brought the Ottomans face to face with Habsburg power while 
they expected to deal with an independent Hungary.1329 The same seems to have been 
true in 1541. The difference is that finding a legitimate and powerful local magnate was 
not as easy this time. Therefore, they had to stay to block Ferdinand. 
Ottoman chronicles mention the performance of the usual post-conquest actions 
regarding Buda only after the 1541 campaign, which clearly targeted Buda itself. Lütfi 
Paşa, for example, lists the usual steps taken: appointment of janissaries and others for 
protection, procurement of victuals and arms, conversion of churches into mosques. 
According to the author, with the appointment of a governor-general, Buda was directly 
turned into an Ottoman province.1330 The general tendency in European conquests was 
tying the conquered town or region to the province of Rumelia. In this sense, the 
creation of a separate province and the appointment of a governor-general [beğlerbeği] 
                                                                                                                                         
1327
 Szakàly, Ludovico Gritti in Hungary, p.101. 
1328
 Ibid, p.106. He also argues that the tri-partite division of Hungary should be 
dated to 1526. 
1329
 Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream (London: John Murray, 2006), pp.123-4. 
1330
 Lütfi Paşa, p.294. Drawing upon these actions, Fodor sees 1541 as the turning 
point. Fodor, “Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary,” p.274.  
347 
 
rather than a governor [sancak beği] for Buda was out of ordinary practice. Geza David 
explains this seeming anomaly through the conviction that only an official at the level 
of governor-general could match the power of Habsburgs, both in military and 
diplomatic terms.1331 David’s findings about the lack of hinterland and unpreparedness 
of the treasury for the appointment of a governor-general1332 reflect a spontaneous 
decision rather than a step in a decades-long plan.  
In this chapter, we shall examine the 1526 campaign in three respects to 
understand both the contemporary dynamics shaping the western policy of Sultan 
Süleyman, and the impact of the 1526 campaign on the image and the reputation of the 
Sultan. An examination of target identification shall provide insight into current 
political dynamics and Süleyman’s position within the current conjecture. An 
examination of the campaign itself shall help highlight the situational – though not 
coincidental – nature of the campaign. This will also let us see that each phase is loaded 
with meaning. Lastly, we shall look at how this campaign was projected and perceived 
by contemporaries. 
5.2. Identifying the Target 
A brief survey of contemporary Ottoman sources points at a specific geographical 
target, namely Buda.1333 However, since authors of these accounts were already aware 
of the result of the campaign, naming of Buda as target seems to be backward projection 
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 Geza David, “Ottoman Administrative Strategies in Western Hungary,” in 
Studies in Honour of Professor V.L. Menage, Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (eds), 
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rather than an ultimate target deliberately planned. The campaign diary, for example, 
introduces the intention of the campaign under the title of “destruction of Buda” [kasd-ı 
tahrîb-i Budin].1334 Although, the diary sets the destination as Buda at the beginning of 
the text, it is later mentioned that Süleyman decided to move on to Buda on 30 July [20 
Shawwal], after the fall of Petervarad [Varad, Varadin, Petrovaradin].1335 Such 
inconsistencies and ex posto nature of the accounts call for an examination of the 
reasoning beneath the strategic targeting process as well as the various discursive and 
situational factors involved in order to better understand the motives of the 1526 
campaign. 
5.2.1. Motive 
The motives of the 1526 campaign, as reflected in contemporary Ottoman 
accounts, can be examined on two levels. The first level involves what we might call 
legitimizing motives while the second level involves the more practical or situational 
motives.  
On the first level, authors define two main driving forces under the decision to 
wage war: “the sake of religion” and “the sake of the realm.”1336 These two legitimizing 
motives seem to complement each other in the accounts, as they are listed starting from 
the generic moving on to the specific. In other words, Süleyman was primarily ‘moved 
by the wish to perform jihad’ in the general sense. Once this was set, then it was 
obvious to contemporary authors that he would wish to pursue the effort against 
Hungary because of ‘its proximity and the imminent danger it posed to the Ottoman 
                                               
1334
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realm’.1337 Similar to the cases of 1521 and 1522, the repetition of these discursive 
motives at the beginning of contemporary accounts suggests that these were inevitable 
elements in the maintenance and enhancement of the image of the Sultan. 
On the second level, we find the more practical and situational motives involved 
in the decision of the 1526 campaign. Ottoman accounts reflect two main motives, or 
rather causes, on this level: liberation and avenging of King Francis of France, and 
initiating offensive action in the face of a potential united Christian offense. Both claims 
have to do with the political scene of the time. Although there is no direct evidence that 
the growing Habsburg dominance was perceived as a major threat by the Ottomans at 
this point, the fact that both claims involve Habsburg presence suggests that the 
campaign may partly be regarded as a precaution taken against Habsburg domination.   
French provocation as a motive underlying the 1526 campaign may at first sight 
seem like a romantic story with a propagandistic touch. ‘A quest to save a major 
European ruler who is imprisoned by an invader’ functions as a noble cause for waging 
war. On the other hand, contemporary evidence reflects the larger issue at hand. We 
shall now look at the contemporary sources to understand Sultan Süleyman’s position in 
the political turmoil of Europe in the context of Habsburg-Valois rivalry, as well as the 
impact of this rivalry in the Ottoman decision to attack Hungary in 1526.  
Ottoman accounts introducing the French connection as a more specific reason of 
the campaign dwell on the nature of the conflict between Charles V and Francis I, 
which eventually led to the involvement of Sultan Süleyman.1338 According to the 
                                               
1337
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author, the Sultan has promised to save the king of France from the king of Spain. This 
promise was given upon the French King’s request from the Sultan because “he 
demonstrated his devotion to the Sultan.”1339 Kemalpaşazade’s account, which echoes 
in those of Nasuh and Sâlih, starts with an explanation the significance of the imperial 
crown. The author describes the struggle between the two kings over the crown going 
on from the death of the “Çesâr” [Emperor], as well as over the associated territories. 
According to Kemalpaşazade, as part of the ongoing wars “the lord of Spain” [Đspanya 
beği] had victory over the “lord of France” [França beği] with the help of Hungary. The 
author, mistakenly, relates that Francis I managed to escape, and took refuge in a castle 
where he was trapped.1340 After explaining the context of the French appeal, 
Kemalpaşazade dwells on the decision of Francis I and his advisors to approach the 
Ottoman court to ask for help to “overcome and avenge the enemy” through a 
“demonstration of attachment” [izhâr-ı intisâb]. The author also relates Francis’s 
proposition that the Sultan should deal with Hungary [def‘ ü ref‘] so that the French 
would be strong enough to fight the force of Charles.1341 Salih Çelebi dwells in length 
on the nature of the imperial crown and bases the Habsburg-Valois conflict on the 
claims of each party on the crown. The author relates the pressure on Francis I due to 
the plans and actions of Charles V, with the cooperation of Louis II, to occupy his land. 
According to the author, the French King appealed to the Sultan for assistance in this 
matter.1342 These accounts reflect a deep-rooted conflict which has been going on for 
decades both in terms of titular and territorial claims. Although Francis I is not 
acknowledged as the “prisoner” of Charles V, he is presented as being trapped without 
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the capability to resist. The appeal to Sultan Süleyman, in this respect, positions the 
Sultan as the only power with the capability to challenge Charles V.1343 
 One of two French envoys sent to Istanbul, following Pavia and the imprisonment 
of Francis I, was killed on the way around Bosnia; but the second envoy Jean Frangepán 
managed to reach Istanbul in December 1525 with a letter requesting the Sultan’s 
help.1344 Secondary literature attributes the authorship of the letter to Francis I’s mother, 
Louise of Savoy, who was regent at the time of Francis’s imprisonment after the Battle 
of Pavia. The letter asked for the cooperation of the Sultan to block the growing power 
of Charles V. Süleyman is said to have promised her a campaign on Hungary, which 
was an imperial ally, to break the Emperor’s power. However, Francis’s captivity was 
over by then and he supposedly sent a letter of thanks to the Sultan rejecting the offer of 
help.1345  
One contemporary source points at the involvement of the Queen Mother. The 
report of Ferdinand’s envoys to Istanbul in 1533, Jerome de Zara and Cornelius 
Schepper, relates that Đbrahim Paşa told them how the Queen Mother sent a letter to the 
Sultan informing him about the captivity of his son and how she asked for Süleyman’s 
help to restore his son, the “King of the Franks”. The letter has not survived; the claim 
is based on the words of the envoys.1346 On the other hand, Süleyman’s letter of reply to 
the French approach, published in Charriere’s Negociations, is addressed to Francis 
himself. This letter is dated February 1526 [Rabi II 932]. It clearly expresses that a 
French envoy named Frankipan has come to the Sultan’s court, bringing news of an 
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enemy assault on Francis’s land. Furthermore, through the envoy Süleyman learned that 
Francis was in captivity and that he requested the Sultan’s help for his “liberation” 
[halâs]. In the letter, Süleyman first consoles Francis on the grounds that what happened 
to him was not an anomaly, for it was a normal thing for rulers to be defeated and to be 
taken prisoner.1347 The rest of the letter is an expression of Süleyman’s ever readiness 
for war, both to drive the enemy away and to conquer new lands as he followed the 
footsteps of his predecessors.1348 Although the letter does not explicitly talk about 
attacking Hungary, it does hint at some military action on behalf of the French king if 
necessary. We should also note that the honorific “bestower of crowns” [tâc-bahş] 
figures among the titles listed for the Sultan. 
The presence of a French envoy in Istanbul to ask for assistance against Charles V 
is also confirmed by the reports of the Venetian bailo Bragadin, dated 29 December 
1525. According to Bragadin’s report the initial preparations for a campaign were 
already on the way by then. Bragadin informs about the commands sent to the provinces 
to organize for the march, as well as the issuing of extraordinary tax of 15 aspers per 
person to be collected throughout the realm. The bailo also mentions the presence of a 
French envoy, who urged the campaign. The French envoy, according to this report, 
proposed to wage war both by land and by sea to “liberate his King.” If the Sultan did 
not help, the envoy argued, his King would have to accord with the Imperador who 
would then become the “ruler of the world.”1349 The French were probably not entirely 
wrong in having this impression. The victory at Pavia and the imprisonment of the 
French king seem to have accelerated the efforts of Charles’s advisors to make him the 
monarch of the world. In a letter to Charles after the battle of Pavia, Ferdinand wrote 
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him that he was now the “seňor” of the whole world.1350 In his report dated 8 January 
1525, the imperial envoy to the Pope stated that the only way to solve the problem of 
the Lutherans and to deal with the Turks was to increase of His Majesty’s power. 
Gattinara, too, found this to be true.1351 In his official report on Pavia, Alfonso de 
Valdes, an influential Latin secretary in the imperial chancellery, referred to the 
Spaniards as the “elect people of God.” According to Valdes, the victory at Pavia set 
Charles free to attack the Turks, to recover Constantinople and Jerusalem. In this way, 
Charles was to become the one shepherd of the one flock. In his consultation in July 
1526, Gattinara also urged Charles V to this direction.1352 
In a later report, Bragadin informs that the French envoy was sent back in the 
beginning of February 1526 with a commandment with gold seal in a crimson sack. He 
was given 10,000 aspers and a robe of honor.1353 Bragadin’s letter is dated 5 February 
1526, coinciding with the date on the official letter to the French king. An entry by 
Sanuto on 28 March 1526 is worth noting in this respect. Sanuto mentions meeting a 
man named Zuan di Frangipani, a relative of Cristopher Frangepán, who was in 
Constantinople in the name of the French king. According to Sanuto, he was now on his 
way to France to present the letter of the Sultan to the King. According to the above-
mentioned Frangepán, the Ottomans wished to have two armies, one against Italy and 
one against Wallachia. However, in his registry Sanuto notes that this information was 
not true because it contradicted the bailo’s letter dated 5 February.1354 This Zuan di 
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Frangipani whom Sanuto met in Venice at the end of March is no doubt Jean Frangepán 
– or Frankipan – identified in the sources mentioned above. Since he was personally 
involved in the discussions at the Ottoman court regarding the issue, his information 
may well reflect the initial plan which seems to have engaged a more direct way to 
block Charles V. The impact of the letter to Sultan Süleyman is also apparent in terms 
of motivation, even if it is not the reason underlying the 1526 campaign. Although 
Francis I was still captive while negotiations continued, the Treaty of Madrid was 
signed in January between Charles and Francis. The French king was free in March 
1526, which would have given Süleyman time and opportunity to cancel the campaign 
if the sole motive was the liberation of the King of France. In other words, the first 
proposition of the approach which was to liberate Francis I was invalidated by the time 
the Ottoman army departed.1355  
The second proposition which was to prevent Charles V from growing over-
powerful as to “become the ruler of the world” was still valid, though. The gradual 
recognition of the Habsburg problem is apparent in Kemalpaşazade’s description of 
Charles V. According to the author, Charles was the “Lord of Spain” [Đspanya beği] as 
well as the “King of the realm of Germany” [melik-i mülk-i Alaman]. He possessed 
much wealth and many brave soldiers. He was so oppressive that other rulers 
complained from him and could not stand him. According to the author, he was always 
ready for war, both on land and sea. Furthermore, he was always ready to attack on 
Muslims and Rûm, only waiting for an opportunity.1356 On one hand, this account points 
at the threat posed by Charles V on the Ottomans. On the other hand, it introduces him 
as a universal problem. In this respect, Süleyman takes the center stage in the solution 
of not only an Ottoman problem but a universal one. 
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The involvement of a French envoy and the presence of a letter of proposed 
cooperation harbors little doubt under the light of these clues. The authorship of the 
letter, on the other hand, will probably remain a puzzle until the original document is 
found – if ever. So far modern research has taken Charriere’s publication as evidence. If 
the letter was actually written by Louise of Savoy, it should be seen as part of the 
queen’s efforts to save his son rather than a direct attempt at Ottoman alliance or 
provocation for that matter. It should be noted that Süleyman was not the only major 
contemporary power holder she applied to. She also got in touch with England, Venice 
and Rome during the same period. In June 1525, she proposed an alliance to the Pope 
and Venice to drive the imperial troops out of Italy to put pressure on Charles to release 
Francis. Although Venice seemed to agree eventually, the Pope drew back. From Henry 
VIII she got a promise that he would influence Charles to liberate Francis.1357 In the 
letter to Süleyman, the Sultan is actually positioned as a figure of counter-balance. In 
other words, Süleyman is presented as a major player in the political arena, who is the 
only one that can face the power of the Emperor. In this sense, Süleyman figures not as 
the “cruel infidel tyrant” but a powerful legitimate monarch who is expected to restore 
the power balance in Europe. 
The second practical or situational motive of the 1526 campaign seems to be 
initiating offensive action in the face of a potential united Christian offense.  According 
to Lütfi Paşa, after the conquest of Rhodes, Rhodians who took refuge in Europe 
blamed Europeans for not helping them and letting the “religion of Christ” be crushed 
by the Türk. Upon this the power holders of Europe contemplated that as the Türk 
already captured Belgrade and Rhodes, he would move further unless he was stopped. 
Thus they made peace and asked for three years to prepare. They sent to the King of 
Hungary to let him know that they wanted him as “leader” [baş ve buğ] in their efforts 
to “erase the Türk from the face of the world.” France, Spain, the Pope and all 
Christendom would provide him with soldiers and goods. They expected him to recover 
Rhodes [Sencan]. Thus a general call-to-arms [nefir-i ‘amm] was announced. The 
people contributed much to these efforts; even women sold their stools and yarn to 
contribute saying “el-gaza”. Upon hearing these preparations, the Sultan decided to 
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move on ghaza himself.1358 Lütfi Paşa’s employment the word Türk to refer to the 
Ottomans parallels contemporary European accounts which refer to the Ottomans as 
Turk. Using the word several times as he relates the united plans of Europeans, Lütfi 
Paşa seems to have authenticized the episode in contemporary mentality. In other 
words, he employs the common European terminology to denote his own society. On 
the other hand, he uses the word gaza, in other words Ottoman-Islamic terminology, to 
denote the military plans of Christians against his own society. This can be taken as a 
case of mirroring conventional terms and values by Lütfi Paşa to emphasize the scale of 
the threat posed by Hungary through the possibility of a united Christian initiative; 
which eventually justifies Süleyman’s military action as a preventive precaution.   
Ottoman concern about the intentions of Charles V and Clement VII was not 
totally rootless. Not only did Charles play for world monarchy, but he targeted the 
Ottomans to achieve this end, as the above stated evidence exemplifies. One of the first 
actions of Pope Clement as he ascended the papal throne had been to send papal legates 
to European courts to urge them to stop fighting each other and unite against the 
Turk.1359 After the battle of Pavia, Charles V is said to have confessed to the Polish 
ambassador that “now that he had the upper hand, he hoped to secure peace in 
Christendom so as to join Ferdinand and the King of Poland in their fight against the 
Turk.”1360 A letter from Madrid to Venice, dated 7 April 1525, reports a Papal envoy to 
Charles offering to unite for defense against the common enemies. Charles was 
sympathetic to the offer; furthermore he replied that he was not only pleased to unite in 
defense but also in offense against the common enemy.1361 Among the clauses of the 
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peace agreement between Charles V and Francis I, there is one referring to the Pope’s 
convening all Christian princes to make universal peace in order to go against the 
Turk.1362 In March 1526, both Charles V and Clement VII were sending envoys to 
Europeans courts to ask for anti-Ottoman support for Hungary. Although this is a 
defensive measure taken by the emperor and the pope, Ottoman authors may have 
perceived it as war preparation. The truth was far from the building of a united Christian 
front against the Ottomans. A front was building all right, but this was an anti-Habsburg 
front consisting of France, Pope, Venice, Florence and Francesco Sforza who eventually 
came together under the League of Cognac on 22 May 1526.1363  
5.2.2. Opportunity 
The political situation in Hungary and in Europe in general seems to have 
provided an opportunity for Sultan Süleyman to probe going further in the west. The 
loss of border castles, internal strife, and financial hardship were factors weakening the 
potential of Hungarian resistance to an Ottoman attack. With Charles V and Francis I 
continuously in conflict, the prospect of foreign help was not much promising either. As 
in 1521, the struggle going on in Europe provided an opportunity for an Ottoman attack. 
Peter Wilson explains the conflicts in 1520s as follows: 
Before 1530 the incomplete nature of European states affected the 
international context of war. The distinction between civil, or internal, and 
international, or external, wars remained ill-defined, while the spread of 
confessional strife created new links between domestic and foreign conflicts. 
Nonetheless, the Reformation did further the division of Europe into distinct 
political units by shattering the traditional concept of a universal Christendom 
and elevating feuds between individual princes, aristocrats and cities to inter-
state wars.1364 
With the fall of Belgrade and Sabacz the outer line of the Hungarian defense 
system almost collapsed totally. The defense system established by Corvinus consisted 
of two lines of fortresses. The outer defense line was aimed to ward off direct attacks, 
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whereas the inner defense line functioned to mobilize troops. Along the line Zimony 
[Zemun, Semlin] and Szabacs were already lost in 1521, followed by Orsova, Knin and 
Scardona in 1522, Szöreny [Severin] in 1524. Syrmium fortresses of Petervarad and 
Slankamen [Szalánkamen] fell in 1526. The fall of these fortresses meant not only the 
loss of strongholds, but also the soldiers and the material sources attached to them. With 
the collapse of the southern defense line, the zone which was to protect and defend the 
kingdom was lost.1365  
We have already discussed the precarious position of Hungary in political, 
financial and military terms. When King Louis II succeeded his father King Vladislav in 
1516,1366 royal authority was already weakened as well as finances. King Louis also 
inherited the hostility between various classes in the country which did not help 
remedying the situation. The “bloody peasant uprising” of 1516 had been put down 
savagely by the landlords, not enhancing the royal image. Furthermore, the queen Mary 
of Habsburg and her German advisors, many of whom were sympathizers of Luther, 
were resented by the Hungarians. King Louis’s career in Bohemia was not much 
brighter; even though Bohemia enjoyed better resources social dissension was a barrier 
before efficient employment of these resources.1367 Kubinyi describes the period 
between 1521-1526 as one of “polarization of internal conflicts,” defining three centers 
of power each with a primary objective of fighting the Turk: the King, the higher 
nobility and the lesser nobility.1368  
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After 1521, Europeans also seem to have harbored serious doubts about 
Hungary’s potential to block Ottoman advance on its own. A letter by Massaro, 
secretary to Lorenzo Orio the Venetian ambassador in Buda, written in 1523 
demonstrates the author’s belief that Hungary was destined to doom because of the 
vices inherent in the characters of the nobles. Massaro reported that they were the cause 
of every misfortune the country suffered because they liked neither other nations nor 
those of their own. Each thought of his own interest and robbed the people; although 
they seemed to be friends they hated each other in private. They were always in 
dissension and plotted against each other. According to Massaro, it was only the 
innocence of the King that divine justice did not let Hungary be destroyed by now.1369 
Carlo Contarini informed from Vienna, in a letter dated 15 October 1524, that 
Hungarian nobles protested to the King to do something before the kingdom fell into 
pieces at the hands of the Turco. The King, in turn, protested that he would do so, if 
only they would cooperate. And finally, the King’s intention to go against the Turk was 
publicly announced.1370 Giovio underlines the detoriation of reputation suffered by 
Hungarians after King Matthias, both in terms of military discipline and general order. 
The Italian observer describes the situation as such: “The Hungarians of Louis did not 
have anything but the appearance of bravery, not based on the true practice of arms; and 
with beastly intrepidity, all of them presumed to smash the Turks into pieces at the first 
encounter.”1371  
Ottomans closely monitored the strength of Hungary. An undated report from 
Yahyapaşazade Bali Beğ to the Sultan mentions the gathering of Ottoman troops from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as commanded by the Sultan. In his report the Rumelian 
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commander also informs the Sultan that “Hungary has no position or strength that 
would have to be taken into consideration.”1372 
Ottomans were well aware of the turmoil in Europe as well, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Not only the Venetians, but also the reports of the frontier commanders and 
French agents were links of the information chain.1373 The capture of Francis I in the 
battle of Pavia also seems to have interested the Ottomans. Bragadin informs Venice 
about the Ottoman reaction in his letters written in early April 1525. The news reached 
Constantinople through Ragusa on 26 March. Bragadin seems to have waited for the 
letter from Venice, which arrived a few days later, for confirmation. When the bailo 
communicated the news to vizier Mustafa Paşa, he did not believe easily. Sending the 
news to Edirne to the Sultan, Mustafa Paşa took this to be important news and 
wondered whose side Venice would take.1374 Bragadin seems to have informed Đbrahim 
Paşa as soon as he got the news. He wrote, on 30 March, that he spoke with Đbrahim and 
told him about what happened in France.1375 In July 1525, the Venetian bailo kept 
answering Ottoman questions concerning the Pope and the potential allies of the 
Emperor, wondering most whether Venice sided with him or not. They were also 
informed about Luther through various channels. Bragadin informs that the governor of 
Bosnia sent a priest who told that “Martin Luter is made Pope against the Pope in 
Rome.” Interestingly, Ottomans found a common link between their faith and Luther’s 
in that “he does not want figures to be put in the church just like us.”1376 
In early 1526, European efforts to balance the power of Charles began to escalate. 
At the end of March, Venetian and Papal envoys visited Francis I to convince him to 
join an anti-Habsburg league. On 10 May 1526, Lannoy was officially informed that 
France would not give Burgundy. This meant the defying of the agreement between 
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Charles and Francis. Francis argued that the agreement was not valid anyway because it 
was exerted under force and his subjects would not permit giving away part of the 
patrimony. The Holy League of Cognac was formed on 22 May 1526. The League 
brought together France, Rome, Venice, Florence and Francesco Sforza in Milan to 
counter the power of Charles V in Italy.1377 With the involvement of Venice in the 
League and the preceding negotiations, we may safely assume that the Ottomans were 
well aware of these developments as well. 
Another opportune situation, if not opportunity, was the relatively peaceful 
position with regard to the Safavis. Shah Ismail died, and his 12 year old son who had to 
deal with his own issues succeeded him in 1524. Before then a stalling strategy seems to 
have continued for some time between the Ottomans and the Safavis, in disguise of 
diplomatic dialogue. In September 1523 an envoy sent by Ismail was received. Tajeddin 
Hasan Halife offered condolences for the death of Selim I and best wishes for the 
accession of Süleymanin the name of Shah Ismail.1378 The Safavid diplomatic mission 
in 1523 has been carefully observed by Piero Zen in Istanbul. From Zen’s reports we 
understand that the Safavi envoy, who arrived in September, was not received by the 
Sultan until late October. Zen reported that the envoy entered the Ottoman realm with 
500 horsemen, however no more than twenty were allowed to go further. When he was 
finally given an audience, Sultan Süleyman told him that if his master wished for peace, 
he should hand in Baghdad.1379 In his letter dated 29 November 1523, Zen informed that 
the peace was finally concluded in late November 1523. The envoy was presented his 
gifts including a fully equipped horse bedecked with gems, and a golden robe of honor. 
Following the presentation of gifts, the Safavi envoy went to Đbrahim’s residence for a 
banquet.1380 In the meanwhile, Shah Ismail is reported to have proposed to Charles V 
and Louis II alliance and unifed military action against the Ottomans. In this letter, he 
expressed his intention to attack in April 1524.1381 Shah Ismail’s proposal of concerted 
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action is confirmed with a report, dated 28 May 1524, to Wolsey from his agent at the 
Imperial court: “It is hoped that the Turk’s love of pleasure will hinder his enterprises. 
The Sophy has sent an ambassador to seek the Emperor’s alliance with him.”1382 
However Shah Ismail died in May 1524. His son Tahmasb was only 12 years old, and 
had to face internal conflict before he could plan any attack on his neighbor. 
5.3. The Campaign 
This section examines the campaign itself to see the various phases involved and 
identify the function of each phase in terms of the contribution to the public image of 
the Sultan.  
Briefly, Sultan Süleyman left Istanbul on 23 April 1526. He followed the usual 
route through Edirne to Sofia where the different wings assembled to form the Ottoman 
army. Marching through Niš to Belgrade, the river Sava was crossed. While the frontier 
forces attacked and subdued some of the Syrmian fortresses, Đbrahim Paşa was sent to 
besiege Petervarad which gave in after a siege of two weeks. The army marched on to 
cross the Drava to reach Buda. Meanwhile King Louis with the Hungarian army 
marched to Mohacs where the two armies collided on 29 August. With the Hungarian 
army destroyed, the Ottoman army advanced to Buda without encountering resistance. 
Sultan Süleyman entered Buda. Two weeks later Ottomans left without taking any 
permanent measures to keep the city or its surroundings. The Ottoman army marched 
back in two wings as it plundered the country side. Sultan Süleyman was back in 
Istanbul on 13 November 1526.1383 
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5.3.1. The Departure 
The departure of the 1526 campaign provides a colorful instance to examine 
various ritual, symbolic, and spiritual elements, often observed in Ottoman campaigns 
in general. Employment of each of these elements functioned to enhance Süleyman’s 
image, as a Sultan enjoying the grace of God through performing the expected pious 
actions, and caring for established spiritual symbols and values. Military ritual, on the 
other hand, reinforced the ideal of order that is associated with the presence of the 
Sultan. 
Sultan Süleyman departed on 23 April 1526 [11 Rajab].1384 The exact day was 
carefully designated by astronomers,1385 and it was no ordinary day but the day of Hızır 
and Đlyas [Khadir and Elijah].1386 The sixteenth-century Ottoman Hızır was a fusion of 
the Islamic prophet, the pre-Islamic Turkic sage, and St. George of popular Byzantine 
Christianity.1387 This fusion as a more general process is defined by two dynamics by 
John Renard, namely Islamization and Indigenization. In other words, an already 
existing non-Muslim hero figure is adopted and internalized by the Islamic tradition 
while an already Islamic figure takes on local character.1388 These two dynamics were 
clearly at work in Anatolia much earlier than the sixteenth century. Speros Vryonis 
explains the link as follows: 
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The most vital element in Byzantine popular Christianity was hagiolatry, a 
phenomenon which markedly affected popular Islam, the Muslims tending to 
absorb the cults of certain saints by equating the saints with particular Muslim 
holy men: St. George and St. Theodore with Chidr Elias, St. Nicholas with 
Sari Saltik, St. Charalampos with Hadji Bektash. Other saints were approached 
in times of need and peril even if they had no rationalized relationship with a 
Muslim saint (as for instance St. Amphilochius-Plato, St. Eugenius, St. 
Phocas, St. Michael, St. Photeine, St. Mamas, St. John Roussos, etc).1389  
Hızır is usually known as a saint of last minute rescue and requests. It is believed 
that once a year, on 23 April – or 6 May – he receives requests, following which these 
requests are granted through the following year. Hızır is most probably transformed 
from an ancient Middle Eastern god associated with vegetation and water. The Arabic 
al-kidr means “the green man” referring to a hadith of the Prophet which reports the 
appearing of grass behind Hızır as he sat on dry ground. One myth associates Hızır with 
the Old Testament prophet Elijah. While Hızır was the protector of Muslims on land, 
Ilyas was the protector on the seas. On Hızır-Đlyas Day these two would come together 
to “reaffirm their agreement about the parts of the world in which each would serve as 
last-minute rescuer and patron of travelers.”1390 Another important aspect of the figure 
of Hızır is his companionship to both Moses and Alexander. Especially important is the 
role of Hızır as Alexander’s guide in the Shahnama tradition. As the “world-conqueror” 
heads for the Land of Darkness in search for the Water of Light, he finds an excellent 
guide in Hızır who leads the way guiding the army by day and vanishing at nightfall. 
When their paths diverge, Alexander loses his way whereas Hızır follows the right path 
to God.1391 Another legend brings Hızır and Alexander together in the building of a 
protective wall for an innocent and weak clan against the attacks of the mythical tribes 
of Gog and Magog.1392 Whether Süleyman or his advisors made the connection is a 
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matter of speculation, but considered in relation to the “French proposal” suspecting an 
implication of a symbolic attribution seems tempting. 
Ironically, St. George was the patron saint of the Order of the Garter, the most 
prestigious princely order in the sixteenth century. Founded by the English king Edward 
III in 1348, Saint George was an appropriate patron because of his crusading 
associations. The 25 knights of the Order met annually on 23 April, the day of the 
patron saint. By 1526 both Charles V and Ferdinand were already admitted in the Order. 
Francis I was admitted around 1527.1393 The military support associated with the saint 
must not have slipped the minds of the Hungarians either in 1526; the planned date of 
assembly for the Hungarian army also happened to be St. George’s day, as Burgio wrote 
to Rome a month earlier.1394  
Before marching off, Süleyman seems to have completed three main 
requirements. Following Celâlzâde’s account,1395 we can define these three 
requirements. Firstly, he declared his intention for jihad. In other words, the campaign 
was legitimized from the start in religious terms as a duty rather than being an 
aggressive action per se. Secondly, he resigned himself unto God. In other words, he 
demonstrated his belief in the contemporary conviction that God’s will occurred 
whether he was victorious or not. While such a demonstration signified Süleyman’s 
strength of faith on one hand, on more practical terms it also pre-diminished the risk of 
blame on the Sultan in case of defeat. Thirdly, he prayed on the soul of the Prophet. 
This can be seen as an indication of the continuation of jihad from where the Prophet 
left off. It is also another reinforcing factor as the prayer not only honors and 
commemorates the Prophet but is an invocation.  
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These actions seem to have been performed by Süleyman’s person, not 
necessarily as public demonstrations. It is through the written accounts that they become 
public demonstration of the piety of the Sultan. Another set of actions completes the 
public demonstration phase of this assertion, namely the tomb visits. As we have seen in 
the 1521 and 1522 campaigns, the Sultan visits the tombs of his ancestors for their 
support and favor [istima‘â-yı himmet ü ‘inâyet], and that of Ayyub calling on him for 
conquest and victory [istimdâd-ı feth ü nusret]. The distribution of alms and prayers to 
secure victory are again standard procedure.1396 On one hand, the tomb visits emphasize 
Süleyman’s image as a ruler who puts his trust on God as a pious ruler should do. On 
the other hand, they underline the dynastic tradition.1397 An episode in Feridun Ahmed 
Bey’s account of the last campaign of Sultan Süleyman in 1566 specifically underlines 
the obligatory nature of tomb visits. According to the author, these visits were required 
by Ottoman tradition and by royal custom. This may seem like a conventional cliché 
employed in many passages for various issues. However, in this case, Süleyman did not 
feel well enough to complete the route and resigned to the Palace after visiting the tomb 
of Ayyub. The grand vizier of the time [Sokollu Mehmed Paşa] completed the visits, the 
related Quran-recitals, and alms-giving activities in his stead.1398 
Süleyman’s departure appears to be a diligently orchestrated event, showcasing 
both majesty and order.1399 According to Celâlzâde, the household troops assembled at 
the second courtyard [divân meydanı] of the Palace. 12,000 janissaries stood in 
ceremonial order composing two wings. The household cavalry corps also stood in line. 
Viziers, other military commanders and officials were ready in rank and file to the 
appearance of the Sultan. The author describes imperial guards and the spare horses as 
well as the preparation of flags and banners. With sunrise, the Sultan appeared. At his 
apperance the halberdiers [çavûş] shouted praises and the imperial band started playing. 
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The flags and banners were untied, and the flag-staffs started moving. The musketeers 
shot fires. As the Sultan and his company left the Palace and marched in procession 
through the city towards Edirnekapı, people had already filled the streets to see the 
Sultan. As Sultan Süleyman passed through, people prayed for the “continuity of his 
state” [devâm-ı devlet].1400  
Now, let us consider the symbolic elements employed in Celâlzâde’s account. The 
author employs the expression “tâpûya nâzır oldılar” as he relates the waiting at the 
courtyard for Süleyman’s appearance.1401 The word tâpû can be perceived in two ways; 
either as an “exalted person,” or as an “act of homage.” In this case, if we assume that 
this term was deliberately employed to reflect both meanings, then we can talk about a 
confirmation of loyalty before the Sultan sets off for the campaign. In the poem cited 
before this description, Celâlzâde takes the opportunity to remind that the janissaries 
and members of the household cavalry corps were “slaves of the Süleyman of the day” 
[Süleymân-ı zamânın kûllarıdır]. The Sultan appears only at sunrise, and like the sun 
itself.1402 The sun analogy, as one would instantly realize, keeps coming up with each 
appearance of the Sultan as we have seen in his arrival to Istanbul back in 1520 and in 
the various phases of his previous campaigns. While such recurrent employment of the 
analogy may give the impression of a merely rhetorical device, the symbolic 
connotations discussed in previous chapters suggest otherwise. In other words, while the 
sun analogy exalts Süleyman on one hand, on the other hand it poses a responsibility on 
his person. As all evil vanishes under the light of the sun, Süleyman as the sun is 
expected to drive away all evil on the world, in this case evil being unbelief.1403 The 
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emphasis on ceremonial order, with everyone in his place according to his rank, 
reinforces the general ideal of the “order of the world” in the presence of the Sultan. 
This sense of order contrasts sharply with Kemalpaşazade’s description of the 
procession in town, whereby people gathered on the streets to watch. Kemalpaşazade 
describes a rather noisy and chaotic atmosphere, with trumpets and drums sounding. 
However, the author also describes officers [yasavul] shouting and pushing people to 
clear the way,1404 implying the sense of order. The gathering of the inhabitants of the 
city on the streets, along with their prayers, suggests not only the display of the might of 
the Sultan’s household, but also a collective enterprise inclusive of the people of the 
realm. As such, Sultan Süleyman appears to enjoy not only the loyalty of his subjects 
but their spiritual assistance.  
Venetian bailo Bragadin and ambassador Zen have watched Süleyman’s 
ceremonial departure. In his relazione, Bragadin talked in detail about the “departure of 
the army, in other words the Household [Porta], of the Sultan from Constantinople with 
great pomp.” According to his observations, the viziers were in the front with Mustafa 
Paşa in the litter [leticha]. The Sultan was dressed in gold as was Đbrahim. The bailo 
mentioned that Đbrahim was even better dressed than the Sultan, and wore many pieces 
of jewelry. He described the luxurious attire of other grandees and officers. The bailo 
also noted the two elephants accompanying the procession. Bragadin informed his 
audience about the camp, set some miles from the city with 1500 tents. He also 
explained that all people of the region, and those from far away, had come to see the 
Porta. 1405  
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him to. Ibid, 529.  
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5.3.2. The March 
The march brings forth the three aspects which are indispensable in the public 
image of the Sultan. Firstly, his role as the administrator is reflected in the dispensation 
of justice and rewards on the way. Secondly, his role as the supreme authority is 
reflected in various ceremonial occasions such as hand-kissing and rewarding 
ceremonies, and presentation of prisoners and castle keys. Thirdly, his role as the 
commander is reflected through the strategical orders he gives throughout the march. As 
such, we find the opportunity to understand further the elements which mark Süleyman 
as ‘magnificent’ and ‘just’ warrior sultan. We should also note that through the 
successful execution of Süleyman’s orders, Đbrahim takes center stage. In this respect, 
we find the opportunity to dig a little deeper into the nature of their relationship. 
We have already talked about the campaign march functioning as some kind of a 
royal progress. The same function is observed in 1526. Contemporary chronicles project 
the Sultan distributing alms to needy people along the way, accepting the thanks and the 
complaints of subjects, and giving public feasts. As he administers justice wherever he 
goes, according to Kemalpaşazade for example, he makes the subjects happy.1406 The 
same is true on the return march, as well. Kemalpaşazade emphasizes once again that 
the Sultan gave joy to those on his way through “showers of favor” [bârân-ı ihsân].1407 
The choice of the word “bârân” is worth noting with the favorable and sacred 
connotations it has in both the Islamic and the Turkic traditions.1408 The emphasis on the 
Sultan feeding the subjects along the way and solving their grievances, in a way, covers 
the destructive potential of an army on the march. In this respect, the march which can 
actually involve unfavorable consequences for the population on the route becomes not 
devastating but rewarding. 
Ceremonial departures and entries can be observed throughout the campaign. The 
first such example is the departure from Halkalı Pınar, the first stop, to Edirne. 
                                               
1406
 KPZ, X:230-1.  
1407
 Ibid, 354. 
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 See Ögel, Türk Mitolojisi, pp.266-274. 
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Celâlzâde relates that the action of “tâpû” was performed by the viziers and officials, 
after which flags and banners were untied, drums were beaten and the band played.1409 
In a way, we see the whole process of setting on the march, which took place only a day 
earlier, being repeated. We could interpret this repetition as the Sultan’s departure with 
the army.  
Another element of the march is the assembly of the army. We can identify three 
main points of assembly through which the various wings of the army come together to 
make a whole. The first point of assembly is the first camp at Halkalıpınar where the 
Sultan with his household joins the Rumelian troops who were already taken there by 
Đbrahim. The Sultan and the army halted at Edirne for five days, whereby the governor-
general of Anatolia along with other commanders came to pay their obedience to the 
Sultan through gift-giving and hand-kissing.1410 On 5 May [23 Rajab], the envoy of 
Moldovia [Karaboğdan] brought the tribute. He and the envoy from Chios presented 
their gifts and were well treated.1411 Such ceremonial instances observed at the camp at 
various phases of the campaign, in a way, imply the moving of the Sultan’s “palace” 
together with his army. This impression is emphasized not only by accounts likening the 
camp to paradise, but also with associating the camp with the city.1412 Such an 
association is noteworthy both in symbolic and strategic terms.1413  
We see that the Ottoman army generally becomes one single entity at Sofia. In 
1526, the assembly of the Ottoman army took place at Sofia, as it did in 1521. The 
imperial army reached Sofia on 28 May [16 Shaban]; next day the commanders of 
Rumelia and Anatolia joined the divân for the hand kissing ceremony,1414 whereby they 
officially joined the imperial campaign. The army halted at Sofia for five days, whereby 
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 Tabakat, 136a. 
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 Bostan (MK), 63a.  
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 Münşe‘at, I:554; KPZ, X:231; Sâlih (TSK), 26b. 
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 For an example see, Tabakat, 135a. 
1413
 Machiavelli dwells on the necessity of the camp to appear like a “mobile city” 
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encampment. Machiavelli, Art of War, p.125. 
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 Nasuh, 103a-b; KPZ, X:231. 
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the commanders of Rumelia came to pay obedience with gifts and hand-kissing.1415 
Kemalpaşazade tells that it was through Đbrahim Paşa’s command that the army 
remained there for a few days for the preparations.1416 Salih Çelebi mentions an initial 
reception whereby the Rumelian commanders greeted Đbrahim Paşa and were favored in 
return. The hand-kissing ceremony involving the Sultan was then realized on 1 June [20 
Shaban].1417  
Another important aspect of the march is the inspections at key points. Especially 
the river crossing poses an opportunity for an assessment of forces before the campaign 
focuses on armed action. Such an inspection also serves to determine if all equipment is 
in order.1418 The first inspection seems to have taken place at Edirne whereby the 
household troops were inspected upon the Sultan’s orders.1419 We observe another such 
inspection at Sofia.1420 Salih Çelebi provides a vivid description of the process. This 
time both Rumelian and Anatolian troops were inspected on two separate days. Salih 
Çelebi describes the Sultan riding through the two wings of the Rumelian army. This 
inspection seems to have earned Đbrahim the appreciation of the Sultan. A similar 
inspection is recorded for the Anatolian army.1421 Another inspection occurred during 
the Sava crossing at Belgrade before the actual crossing upon the orders of the Sultan 
before the grand vizier. Süleyman reached Belgrade on 29 June [19 Ramadan].1422 We 
see that the final preparations and assembly of the army including ships and heavy 
artillery took place at Belgrade, where the Sava was crossed. The martolos and azeb 
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 Bostan (MK), 63b; Nasuh, 103b. 
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 KPZ, X:234. Nasuh, 103b; Tabakat, 136b. 
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 Sâlih (TSK), 26a. The campaign diary notes the same day for the ceremony. 
Münşe‘at, I:555. It is perhaps worth noting that it was Friday.  
1418
 The inspections performed at key points seem to reflect a discrepancy 
between the functioning of the Ottoman and Hungarian armies. Perjes, for example, 
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Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, p.224 
1419
 Sâlih (TSK), 24a. 
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 Münşe‘at, I:555; Bostan (MK), 63b-64a. 
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 Sâlih (TSK), 26b-27a. 
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 Nasuh, 105b; KPZ, X:241. 
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from Smederevo, Zvornik and Vidin as well as frontier azeb and kürekçi joined the 
army at Belgrade. At this point, the household army was distributed weapons.1423 
According to the campaign diary, Đbrahim Paşa personally stood by the bridge and 
inspected the soldiers before they crossed. Those who were not equipped as necessary 
were beaten and their fiefs were taken.1424 Bostan’s account of the inspection and the 
crossing provides some clues on both the practical and symbolic significance of the 
Sava crossing at Belgrade. While the inspection served strategical purposes as to assess 
the condition of the army and designate any insufficiencies in terms of arms and men, it 
also provided an opportunity for commanders to demonstrate their skills in maintaining 
armed forces. As Kemalpaşazade has it “they presented their forces with the zeal of 
honor.”1425  
On 8 July [28 Ramadan], the frontier lords [akıncı beğleri] came to the camp for 
festivities. The Sultan decided to perform the holiday marking the end of Ramadan [‘îd-
i mübârek] at Belgrade. On 11 July [1 Shawwal], at the time of night prayer Đbrahim 
Paşa’s ceremonial band played. All commanders, except for those charged with 
guarding the camp, were present. A huge banquet was served.1426 We should note that 
this is Süleyman’s first time in Belgrade after the conquest. As such, the timing of the 
march as to stop at Belgrade appears to be a deliberate choice. As the presence of 
influential and reputable frontier commanders, such as Hüsrev Beğ and Bali Beğ, is 
specifically mentioned in the accounts, the location of Belgrade as a convenient cue 
point for various segments of the Ottoman army may also have played a role in this 
decision. Such a celebration at a critical juncture of the march functioned as a 
motivational device, as well.1427 
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 Bostan (MK), 64b-65b; KPZ, X:242. 
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 Münşe‘at, I:556: “Cebe cevşende noksanı olanlar döğilüb ve tımarları alınub 
öte yakaya geçürdiler.” Also see KPZ, X:241-6; Bostan (MK), 65b-66a. 
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 Münşe‘at, I:557. Bostan explains the significance of the bayram as the day of 
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 For the significance of such festive occassions and banquets during the march, 
and before battle, see, Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, p.152.  
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River crossings, at least as far as the 1526 campaign is concerned, also reflect a 
passage to the enemy territory, in other words a transition from peace to war. The 
distribution of arms at Belgrade during the Sava crossing implies that from this point on 
the army should be ready to fight at any time; in other words, it implies a kind of 
transition to the war-zone. Bostan, for example, probably does not expect us to take the 
implication; he makes the transition quite clear as he informs us that the commanders 
“changed from the gowns of feasting to those of fighting.”1428 Once the crossing is 
completed, Bostan states that the army now moved in the Abode of War [dârü’l-harb], 
in other words “the quarters of the enemies of the faith” [â‘dâ-yı dîn].1429 This crossing 
at Belgrade signifies the passage to the enemy soil. Kemalpaşazade’s statement that 
Đbrahim entered the realm of unbelief [dârü’l-küfr]1430 implies Belgrade as the border.  
A similar transition is found at the Drava crossing at Eszék [Osijek, Esseg, Ösek]. 
After the conquest of Petervarad, as the army headed for Buda, the river Drava had to 
be crossed.1431 Once everyone crossed the Drava at Eszék the bridge was destroyed, 
along with the town, its houses, churches and gardens.1432 The underlying motive was to 
prevent soldiers from going back.1433 Bostan explains the reason as cutting the link 
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 Bostan (MK), 65b: “ümerâ-yı saf-ârây bezm kaftanlarından rezm haftanlarına 
girüb”; KPZ, X:242: “bezm kabâsından çıkub libâs-ı be’s-i rezme girdiler.”  
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 Bostan (MK), 66a. 
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 KPZ, X:241. 
1431
 Sultan Süleyman crossed on 21 August [13 Dhu’l-Qada]. Münşe‘at, I:560; 
Bostan (MK), 69b-70a. Others mention different dates, probably because the crossing of 
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 Münşe‘at, I:561; Nasuh, 120b-121a. A similar strategy is employed in 1529 
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51:518. 
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 Lütfi Paşa, p.258; Nasuh, 120b; KPZ, X:283. Although Nasuh frequently 
draws on Kemalpaşazade almost verbatim, in this case while Kemalpaşazade attributes 
the decision of destruction of the bridge at Eszék to Đbrahim, Nasuh gives the credit to 
Süleyman himself. This is one of the many instances where one can observe the 
transition of Đbrahim’s status from “makbûl” to “maktûl” within the course of less than a 
decade. This is also a striking instance of the need for caution when interpreting the data 
provided by chroniclers. Kemalpaşazade’s account of the campaign was completed in 
March 1529 when Đbrahim was at the peak of his power, whereas Nasuh’s account was 
completed after the death – and disgrace – of Đbrahim. In other words, Kemalpaşazade 
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between the Abode of Peace [dârü’l-emn] and the Abode of War [dârü’l-harb]. This 
way, the soldiers would be in unity both in intention and fate, they would think only of 
fighting the enemy.1434 Nasuh takes the explanation to an even clearer level stating that 
with the destruction of the bridge it would be clear to the soldiers that the only way for 
their survival was to fight.1435  
The Drava crossing not only demonstrates the mobile nature of the Abode of War 
as it moves further with the advance of the Ottoman army, but also provides another 
instance of strategic decision making, as the bridges are burnt down. According to 
Machiavelli, ancient commanders understood the power of necessity to make soldiers 
fight stubbornly; for this purpose “they often opened to the enemy a path that they could 
have closed to him, while to their own troops they closed a path they could have left 
open.”1436 The Strategikon, too, warned against trapping the enemy without leaving 
room to escape because trapped soldiers would fight better than usual if they felt they 
were fighting for survival.1437 In this case, this rule of the thumb is reversed to ensure 
superior effort on the part of the attackers making it absolutely necessary to fight.  
Contrarily, the bridge at the Sava crossing at Belgrade was not destroyed, but 
troops were assigned for its protection.1438 The renewal of strategy at the Drava crossing 
can perhaps be explained by the news of Hungarian activity that reached the Ottoman 
                                                                                                                                         
had his reasons for giving the credit to Đbrahim in many instances, just like Nasuh had 
his own limitations for not doing so. 
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 Bostan (MK), 70a: “nehr-i Drava üzerinde olan köpriyi bozub dârü’l-emn ve 
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 Nasuh, 120b: “Zilkâdenin on ikisinde cisr-i mezbûrdan yümn ü ikbâl ve nusret 
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duralar.”  
1436
 Machiavelli, Discourses, p.289. Seventeenth-century writer Montecuccoli 
suggested destroying roads and bridges after the army passed in order to force them to 
fight. This way, according to the author, they would be “deprived of all hope and every 
means of saving themselves through flight.” Tallett, War and Society, p 48. 
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 Strategikon, p.108. 
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 Bostan (MK), 66a. KPZ, X:241. The author says that the bridge remained 
intact until the army returned. 
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camp at this point. Until the Drava crossing, the Ottoman army moved without 
encountering much resistence, and the Hungarian army was nowhere to be seen. 
However, as the Ottoman army reached the Drava around Eszék, several instances of 
alarm caused by enemy movement can be detected from the campaign diary.1439 In this 
sense, the awareness of a nearing confrontation and of Hungarians intentions to stop the 
Ottoman army on the Drava crossing may have caused Ottoman leadership to take 
harsher measures to avoid foreseeable risks. 
In his account on the destruction of the bridge after the Drava crossing, 
Kemalpaşazade demonstrates his awareness of the Hungarian plan to destroy the 
bridges in order to kill the Ottoman soldiers. He says that the King sent Tümûr Pavlî 
[Pal Tomori] for the task. However, the King was at a loss to understand the nature of 
the ghazis. The author claims that the ghazis were not afraid to die; on the contrary they 
actually looked forward to become martyrs on the “path of ghaza.” He also mentions the 
surprise of the King as he heard that the bridge was already destroyed, and “the road of 
escape” blocked. The author claims that this information terrified the King, as he saw 
that the Ottoman soldiers were not to leave.1440 This episode taken with the reason of 
the destruction of the bridge introduces three ‘roads’: the road of escape [râh-ı firâr] 
which is the bridge; the road of salvation [râh-ı halâs] which is fighting the enemy; and 
the road of ghaza [gazâ yolı] through which the first two roads converge to create a 
binary opposition. In other words, what the Hungarian king is attributed to regard as the 
blocking of the chance to survive is inversely reflected as the opportunity for salvation 
both in worldly and spiritual terms. Interestingly, this episode also seems to negate the 
above mentioned reason for the destruction of the bridge as cited by all of our Ottoman 
sources. In other words, we are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, we have leaders 
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 Münşe‘at, I:560. The diary records several instances of precaution during the 
period between the arrival at Eszék and the completion of the bridge. On 12 August [4 
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who believe that the soldiers were willing to escape from the battle field. On the other 
hand, we have soldiers who were more than willing to die for the sake of ghaza, let 
alone considering escape. Rather than attributing this dilemma to the confused minds of 
Kemalpaşazade and Nasuh, it should probably be seen to reflect the actual challenges 
faced by Süleyman and the efforts made to render these challenges invisible to various 
domestic and foreign audiences by disguising under a veil of order and religious zeal.  
River crossing is not only an important part of military strategy but is also part of 
the symbolic baggage. The river does not only pose a geographical border but a 
symbolic one as well. Since it is related with unfavorable conditions such as 
vulnerability, cold, illness, injury and even death, crossing over successfully signifies 
survival. Ottoman accounts often identify river crossing with the legendary bridge to 
Paradise [Sırât].1441 It is the commander who “enables” men to cross over without harm. 
The prospect of anger, frustration and despair that may be caused by the unfavorable 
conditions mentioned brings along the risk of mutiny, as well as loss of lives. In this 
respect, a difficult crossing is not only a test in the strategical skills of the commander 
but also represents the degree of authority he has over the men.1442 It is possible to trace 
this concept to pre-Islamic Turkic tradition which associated the successful crossing of 
a river with the permission of God. This was deemed especially noteworthy during wars 
because it reflected the commander’s ability to find some point to cross. This was based 
on the idea that even those rivers which were believed to be uncrossable could be 
crossed at some point. Once this point was found, the army would be led across where 
the enemy would have no preparations. As his inscription demonstrates, The Göktürk 
vizier Bilge Tonyukuk, for example, has taken pride in having crossed uncrossable 
rivers.1443 We have already mentioned that the bridges were built by Đbrahim at the 
orders of Süleyman, and that Đbrahim oversaw the crossing of the army. The fact that 
each crossing was successful, with the bridge at Belgrade, for example, “not falling 
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apart or even shake,”1444 demonstrates the skills not only of the Sultan, but pehaps even 
more that of his grand vizier. 
Subtitling this part of our discussion as “the march” might be misleading, as it 
might suggest a differentiation between the campaign and the marching of the army. In 
other words, the term “march” might imply movement towards a specifically pre-
determined spot which would determine the result of the “campaign”. However, we 
have argued for the non-existence of such a pre-determined spot and proposed a 
situational development for the final destination. In this respect, the march is actually 
the campaign itself which involves raids, sieges and territorial acquisition. In the 
proclamation of victory sent after the battle of Mohacs, this multiple nature of the 
campaign is reflected through the summarizing expression of “totality of conquests” 
[fütûhât-ı külliye].1445  
Throughout the march, we see two sorts of acquisition: by force of arms – which 
is not to be confused with forceful conquest, – and by will – which is not to be confused 
with peaceful surrender. The first sort of acquisition applies to those fortresses acquired 
after a siege like Petervarad, Eszék, Bács [Bač, Bâc], Szeged [Segedin, Szegedin, 
Shegedino] as well as others taken by the frontier commanders. The second sort of 
acquisition applies to those towns or castles which have voluntarily surrendered without 
resorting to aggressive means. These two sorts of acquisitions are interrelated, though. 
Throughout the campaign we see minor castles submitting their keys whenever a major 
stronghold nearby falls following a siege. Ultimately, the number of towns and castles 
acquired in this way exceeds by far those conquered through siege. For example, when 
Ilok [Ujlak] gave in after a siege on 8 August [29 Shawwal], other castles surrendered 
as well. In order to see how this works, we shall take a very brief look at the timing. 
While Petervarad was under siege, the commander of Bosnia Hüsrev Beg along with 
Mihaloğlı Mehmed Beg were sent further along the Danube for raid and they took some 
towns.1446 Petervarad asked for peaceful surrender on 27 July [17 Shawwal] and 
submitted next day. Ilok was besieged on 1 August [22 Shawwal], only a few days after 
the fall of Petervarad. On 7 August [28 Shawwal] Ilok asked for peaceful surrender, 
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X:313-4; Sanuto, 42:406-7. 
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 Münşe‘at, I:558; KPZ, X:256-7; Nasuh, 111b-112a. 
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followed by other castles handing their keys next day.1447 A reflection of the persuasive 
value of both forceful submission and peaceful surrender by example is found in 
Kemalpaşazade’s account. According to the author, as a result of the peaceful surrender 
cases during the raids of the frontier forces inhabitants of the conquered towns were not 
harmed.1448 When Đbrahim Paşa besieged Ilok, the commanders therein held a council. 
They argued that Đbrahim would not leave unless he took the fortress. They thought of 
Petervarad and decided to surrender in order not to end up like it.1449 
Two manners of movement are observable in these acquisitions. The army moves 
either raiding and pillaging, or observing the ban on pillaging. These manners again 
seem to be dictated by situational factors. Throughout the 1526 campaign, we see the 
army marching through two different paths. This strategy is linked to the two manners 
of movement mentioned. If the situation requires an aggressive approach to convince 
the enemy towns or castles to surrender through scaring them, seperating the army in 
two wings allows for extending the range of territorial damage and the chances for 
booty. This approach is exemplified in the return march whereby Sultan Süleyman and 
Đbrahim Paşa follow different routes back to Petervarad from Buda. Both pillage and 
acquire fortresses as they march.1450 On the other hand, some situations require a more 
peaceful way to advance. In this case, a ban is imposed to prevent harm to the 
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countryside. Such is the case when the Ottoman army advances on its own soil.1451 
Ottomans took the ban seriously and those who failed to observe it were punished. One 
soldier was beheaded, for example, because his horse stepped into somebody’s 
cultivated land; and two others because they stole horses.1452 Another situation which 
requires sparing the countryside is when surrounding towns or castles are inclined to 
submit. In this case, a ban on pillaging both prevents possible aggressive reaction and 
makes Ottomans appear as acceptable overlords, not to mention the protection of the 
potential agrarian base.1453 This approach is exemplified by the general ban on plunder 
and destruction between the conquest of Petervarad and of Ilok. The ban was announced 
more than once, especially when news came that nearby villages planned to 
surrender.1454 After the conquest of Petervarad, Bostan mentions the distribution of 
provisions to the soldiers and says all were happy with this. The author reports another 
such distribution on the way back.1455 Salih Çelebi, too, dwells on the difficulty of 
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execution of a judge on the route for abusing grain and funds reserved for the army 
camp. Münşe‘at, I:567. The Byzantine manual stated: “The commander who fails to 
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provisoning such a large army and thanks God for the plenty of crops on the cultivated 
fields on the route.1456 Although Bostan’s remark may give the impression of a gesture 
to boost up the motivation of the army, the distribution is in keeping with the ban of 
plunder. If the soldiers are not well provided for, they will have no choice but pillage. In 
this sense, distribution of provisions seems to be a deliberate logistic decision at this 
point of the campaign.1457 A similar distribution of flour is reported around the same 
region during the 1529 campaign. This was accompanied by a decree disallowing 
burning of villages and holding on to prisoners, though permitting confiscation of food 
items.1458 This kind of attitude is reported in a letter after the battle of Mohacs and the 
occupation of Buda. It is reported that the Turco announced that Christians residing at 
the conquered areas should not leave because they would be well-treated and not be 
charged more than one ducat per year.1459  
A major phase reflected in the chronicles is the conquest of Petervarad. The siege 
of Petervarad on its own was just like any other Ottoman siege, therefore there is no 
need to go into detail. The fortress is described quite conventionally as an unattainable 
stronghold.1460 Accounts emphasize its position as a block on the campaign route, more 
symbolically on the “path of ghaza.” 1461 Such expressions once again underline the 
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determination of Süleyman on pursing ghaza. On the other hand, the case of Petervarad 
raises questions on the nature of leadership which could enhance our understanding of 
both the role of the Sultan in general and the nature of the relationship between 
Süleyman and Đbrahim in particular. While some accounts give the credit of the 
conquest directly to the Sultan,1462 others leave the impression that the conquest was 
Đbrahim’s victory through attributing the military action, granting of the pardon and the 
following submission to the grand vizier.1463 These two seemingly conflicting points of 
view lead to questions such as: Was Đbrahim, as the general commander of the army and 
the siege, entitled to these privileges?  Or was he acting as proxy to the Sultan 
representing his will and authority? Or was he already a larger than life figure? 
Although the pro-Đbrahim accounts reflect a sense of the castle surrendering to Đbrahim 
at first sight, a reading-between-the lines suggests that it is the Sultan’s power that is 
reflected through the acts of deference directed at Đbrahim, as observed in his Egypt 
mission previously. Now we shall take a look at the accounts to figure out the dynamics 
underlying the process. 
Contemporary sources used in this study agree that it was the Sultan who decided 
on besieging Petervarad and sending Đbrahim to realize the deed.1464 But then we meet 
subtitles directly attributing the conquest to Đbrahim.1465 This tone is clearly evident in 
the accounts of Kemalpaşazade [completed in 1529] and Salih Çelebi [completed in 
1530], which read almost like a gazavatname of Đbrahim Paşa rather than an epic of 
Sultan Süleyman. This should not be surprising since Đbrahim was at the apogee of his 
power at the time. Both authors attribute not only success to Đbrahim, but a very 
aggressive sort of ambition. Salih Çelebi tells that Đbrahim wanted to “hunt down” the 
enemy on his own.1466 Kemalpaşazade explains that at Petervarad Đbrahim wished to put 
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up such a fight and make for himself such a reputation that the “epic in the pages of 
Şehnâme would lose validity.”1467  
On 17 Shawwal [27 July] Petervarad asked for peaceful surrender.1468 We again 
see the call for peaceful surrender in the case of Petervarad. Kemalpaşazade makes a 
specific note of the invitation basing it on the Quranic verse of “remove evil with 
goodness” [6:125] and on the practice of the Prophet. The refusal of the invitation, then, 
signifies “rebellion.”1469 Accounts on who granted the pardon and to whom the castle 
submitted remain ambigous. Kemalpaşazade directly attributes the pardon to Đbrahim 
Paşa basing his decision on the maxim that “pardon is the alms of victory” [el-‘afvü 
zekâtü’z-zafer]. The author justifies Đbrahim’s decision with three sources of 
legitimation: God’s decree, ancient sayings of the Prophet and ancient law of the 
Sultan.1470 The wording of the account in the campaign diary gives the impression of 
victory of and submission to Đbrahim:  
The commander of the janissaries came on behalf of the Paşa and announced 
the pardon. About thirty infidels came out and kissed the hand of the Paşa. The 
banners of the Paşa were immediately erected on the mentioned tower. 
Imperial band was sounded many times. Festivities were realized.1471  
Interestingly, the proclamation of victory differs from the campaign diary in 
attributing the pardon to the Sultan, as does Celâlzâde.1472 According to Lütfi Paşa, 
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when the Sultan asked for Petervarad; rather than submitting they challenged him to 
take it by sword if he could. In consequence the ghazis captured the castle upon the 
orders of the Sultan.1473 In Bostan’s view the castle “surrendered to the destroying force 
of the Sultan.”1474 In some foreign accounts, too, Đbrahim is on the foreground. A letter 
from Zagreb, dated 28 August, reports the fortress of Petervarad submitting to Đbrahim. 
Đbrahim, however, took the commander and the representatives of the town to the 
presence of the Sultan where they were given robes. The grand vizier, set them free to 
go after taking them to his camp. And these Hungarian officers went to the camp of 
King Louis.1475 A report from Buda, on the other hand, reports that the Sultan waited 
until less than a hundred people remained in the castle and then invited them to submit. 
Upon this invitation Petervarad gave in.1476 The expression which clarifies the situation 
comes from the account of Salih Çelebi: “The conquest-producing victory-proclaiming 
Paşa gave the noble pardon of the Pâdişâh, the refuge of the universe.”1477 Through this 
expression, we can uncover the intermediary position of Đbrahim Paşa through the 
process. Even though his active performance may imply direct attribution of victory, he 
seems to be acting on behalf of the actual power-holder rather than executing a right or 
duty of his own. Salih Çelebi’s evaluation of the peaceful surrender case of Ilok sheds 
further light to the issue as the author regards the granting of pardon as the performance 
of a requirement dictated by religion [muktezâ-yı şer‘-i şerîf], rather than a royal 
prerogative. In this instance, Salih also mentions that Đbrahim Paşa announced the 
pardon of the Sultan, as he entered Ilok, and had the banners of the Sultan erected on a 
tower.1478 
                                               
1473
 Lütfi Paşa, p.258.  
1474
 Bostan (MK), 68a: “kuvvet-i kâhire-i pâdişâhîye müsellem olub” 
1475
 Sanuto, 42:657. 
1476
 Ibid, 419. 
1477
 Sâlih (TSK), 36a. 
1478
 Ibid, 37b-38a. Salih Çelebi’s account of the conquest of Ilok provides another 
interesting case regarding Đbrahim Paşa’s position. According to the author, after 
Đbrahim entered the town, he sat on a golden throne [kürsi-i zerrîn-nihâd] with the 
inhabitants of Ilok surrounding him while he announced the pardon of the Sultan. For 
Ilok also see, KPZ, X:268-273. Nasuh presents Đbrahim Paşa as the hero in the conquest 
of Ilok. Nasuh, 117b: “Vezîr-i Asaf-ârâ-yı şâm meydan / Halîl-i halvet-i Sultân 
Süleymân.” The castle surrendered on 29 Shawwal, Sultan Süleyman arrived 5 Dhu’l-
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Some accounts relate that immediately after the surrender of the castle, the 
churches were converted into mosques, the call to prayer was voiced and Friday prayer 
was performed.1479 At first sight, this short account of post-conquest appropriation is 
perfectly normal. However, Süleyman is not there yet. In previous conquests we have 
seen that the Sultan entered the city for the first time for the Friday prayer. The 
performance of the Friday prayer without the presence of the Sultan complicates the 
symbolic picture. While Đbrahim Paşa was before Petervarad on 12 July [2 Shawwal] to 
start the siege, Süleyman arrived only on 22 July [12 Shawwal], to watch what was 
going on from a distance.1480 On 28 July [18 Shawwal], Đbrahim met and greeted the 
Sultan, presenting him both the severed heads and the prisoners. They came to the 
imperial tent with pomp and circumstance, after which the Sultan went to inspect the 
castle.1481 The presentation of prisoners and severed heads seem to signify a symbolic 
delivery of the victory to the Sultan. A similar instance can be found in the conquest of 
Sabacz in 1521, whereby Ahmed Paşa, as the commander of the siege, had the severed 
heads lined up on the road as he welcomed the Sultan, and kissed his hand.1482 
On 30 July [20 Shawwal], we witness a major ceremonial whereby many are 
rewarded for the conquest of the castle. Commanders of Rumelia who were entitled to 
more than an annual fief of 400,000 aspers were awarded 30,000 aspers in cash along 
with a gown [haftan]. Those with fiefs lower rewarded 20,000 aspers and a gown. The 
commanders of Smederevo and Zvornik were awarded 30,000 aspers in cash along with 
a robe [hilat]. The kethüda of Rumelia was awarded 12,000 aspers and a robe, the 
Rumelian defterdar 10,000 aspers and a gown.1483 This ceremony is again a dual-
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ceremony. While the Sultan awards those who have served well in the siege, they 
congratulate the Sultan for the conquest though hand-kissing. 
The siege of Petervarad appears to be one of the three major highlights of the 
whole campaign, others being Battle of Mohacs and the invasion of Buda. Ottoman 
chronicles dedicate pages to the conquest of this fortress, perhaps to the point that if the 
Sultan decided to end the campaign at this point, it would have been regarded as a big 
success considered along with the submission of surrounding towns and castles.  
5.3.3. The Reaction  
The situational character of the 1526 campaign calls for attention to the Hungarian 
reaction before and during the campaign. We can put forth two levels of reaction which 
adds to our understanding of the motives, opportunities and dynamics related to the 
campaign. The first level consists of three categories of diplomatic action: between the 
Ottomans and the Hungarians; between Hungarians and others; between others.  
The series of diplomatic attempts prior to the 1526 campaign bring to mind the 
question of whether military action was the final solution, through the Ottoman mirror, 
to the problem of subduing the Hungarian king to the will of the Ottoman sultan. 
Studies so far have established the presence of an Ottoman envoy at Buda in 1524. 
While Perjes argues that an Ottoman envoy was at Buda in February 1524, negotiating 
the proposition of tribute and right of transit,1484 Fodor finds it more likely that this 
envoy was the one sent in 1520. Fodor argues that since he had been detained for years, 
all he could do when he was called to Louis II’s presence in 1524 was to repeat the 
proposal of 1520 which did not necessarily reflect the Ottoman intentions in 1524.1485 
Whichever the case, an Ottoman envoy was at Buda and Louis II did not disregard the 
prospect of negotiation. A Venetian letter from Buda, dated March 1524, reports the 
presence of an Ottoman envoy who was there for an agreement. The envoy, however, 
was kept under custody while the King was negotiating peace because he saw that other 
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Christian princes were of no help to him.1486 Secretary Vicenzo Guido reports great 
confusion at Buda in his letter dated 29 March 1525. He mentions the arrival of an 
envoy of the Polish King who has already reached an agreement with the Turco. The 
mission of the envoy, as Guido has it, was to convince King Louis to do the same.1487 
The intention of negotiating with Süleyman on the part of Louis II is also apparent 
in his foreign correspondence. He seems to have used this as a bargaining chip as he, 
once again, pressed for help transforming the immediate territorial threat to one of 
religion. In February 1525, he sent Stephen Brodericus and Franciscus Marsupinus to 
the Pope with a letter whereby he warned that the Turk was preparing to attack him in 
the spring. He reminded that Hungary was “the bulwark of Christendom against the 
Turks” but the kingdom could not be saved without the help of the papacy. 
Furthermore, the king emphasized that the disputes among Christians was to the 
advantage of the enemy. He also moved forth the offers made to him by the Ottomans 
and his refusal on the expense of suffering the harassment for the last three years. A 
similar letter was sent to Charles V, whereby Louis II in addition reminded Charles to 
look after the interests of his brother by protecting his realm.1488 Thus, the letter to 
Charles V now introduced the dynastic card in addition to the theme of “faith 
endangered.” Reports from Rome, dated 13 May 1525, attest to the pressure Louis II 
must have felt on his shoulders. The report mentions a Hungarian ambassador at Rome 
protesting the lack of support Hungary received from the Pope or other Christian 
princes. The ambassador informed Rome that under the circumstances the King of 
Hungary was going to come to an agreement with Signor Turco and “become a 
tributary” [facendosi suo tributario].1489 A letter written in 1525 to Cardinal Sisto voices 
the opinion that the Turk would gladly make alliance with Hungary, but Hungary 
declined such offers. So the Sultan was expected to wage war on Hungary in person if 
he could make truce with the Sophi.1490 Piero Zen reports, on 16 April 1525, that news 
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arrived that the king of Hungary sent envoys to the Sultan to make peace.1491 
Ambassadorial visits and messages conveyed reinforce the idea that diplomatic attempts 
were taken seriously before resorting to aggressive means. 
A similar round of correspondence between Louis II, Pope and European 
monarchs is observed in February and March 1526.1492 This alarm stems from the 
reports of the papal legate at Buda, Burgio and letters from Louis II to all. Alarmed by 
his legate’s reports, the Pope made a meeting with six cardinals and sent letters to 
Christian princes for urgent assistance. In the letter sent to Henry VIII, for example, the 
Pope stated that his help was expected so that “the other Christian princes may know 
that he is truly called the Defender of the Faith.”1493 One such letter was also sent to 
Charles V, of course. His reaction to this request as reflected in a letter to his brother 
dated 25 March 1526 is noteworthy: “Such reports are so often spread; I know not what 
to believe.”1494 In either case, Charles probably did not want to take the risk of not 
realizing an immediate threat on time and wrote to the courts of England, Hungary, 
Poland, Denmark, Portugal, and Scotland as well as to the Swiss, the Italian princes, his 
aunt Margaret and his brother Ferdinand. He asked them to take action against the 
Ottomans.1495 As for Ferdinand, he brought up the issue at the Diet of Speyer which 
opened on 25 June 1526. The Ottoman army was already a few days away from 
Belgrade, and it was clear by now that Süleyman would not stop there. Ferdinand 
updated the German princes on Turkish news, and succeeded to secure a small subsidy 
from the princes against the Ottomans. However, German princes brought up the issue 
of religious concessions in return for promising aid to Hungary.1496 
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Hungarians were sure of an attack by the spring of 1526, though Süleyman’s 
target was again subject to speculation. Hungarian defense plans started to be formed in 
March 1526 as reports arrived from the ban of Transylvania Janos Szapolyai and the 
Archbishop of Kolocsa and the commander of the southern frontier Pal Tomori. Janos 
Szapolyai also seems to have warned Louis II in a letter dated 16 March. The voivode 
informed the King on Ottoman preparations and requested help both in terms of men 
and guns since he was sure of an attack on Transylvania. He expected Ottoman 
occupation of the Alps in a month.1497 Tomori also presented a report in March on the 
expected Ottoman invasion on 26 March at Buda. Upon this Louis II summoned the 
Diet. On 23 April, the date and place of the assembly of the army was voted on. 
Accordingly, noble levies as well as Moravian and Bohemian troops would assemble at 
Tolna on 2 July. Janos Szapolyai, the voivode of Transylvania, was ordered to cross the 
Carpathians and invade Wallachia. This was supposed to distract Süleyman’s attention. 
But this plan was never executed since Szapolyai was called to join the King before 
long.1498 Reporting from Buda as early as March, the papal legate Burgio wrote that the 
Turk was expected to approach Buda. Analyzing what he has been hearing and looking 
at the bridges being built, he suggests three points of entry: Transylvania, Petervarad 
and Slavonia.1499 Writing from Buda on 26 July, Antonio di Zuane still tried to guess 
the next step of the Sultan as the siege of Petervarad continued. One guess was that he 
would destroy Syrmia and then retreat for the time being. Another expectation was the 
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conquest of Petervarad after which the Ottoman army would leave the rest for later, as 
was done in the case of Belgrade.1500  
In March 1526, the general opinion on the capability of King Louis II to counter 
the Ottoman threat was under serious suspicion. Much of this suspicion was based on 
the discord between Hungarian nobility and their loyalty to the king, or rather the lack 
of his authority. Burgio reporting from Buda to Rome seems to be perplexed at the lack 
of organization and preparation. He is much surprised by the fact that although the army 
was supposed to assemble in 28 days, the place of assembly was still not deliberated. 
Besides, Hungary had a serious financial problem and those who saw no money coming 
resigned their offices. Another thing that greatly caused concern for the papal legate 
was that everyone spent all of their time in deliberation and mutual accusations, as well 
as accusing the king of not listening to their advice. All the king did in return was to tell 
them that he had already spent all he had. Burgio says that the king told him that he was 
“more afraid of the Turks of Hungary than of the Turks of Turkey.” Burgio’s final 
judgment on the condition of Hungary in March 1526 is: “The King is disliked by all. 
There is no preparation, no order, and what is worse, many have no wish to defend 
themselves.”1501 As the campaign progressed foreign observers gave no chance to 
Hungary. The Venetian ambassador at Rome wrote, at the end of May, that in June the 
Ottomans would have possession of Buda.1502 The precarious condition of Louis II is 
reflected in the words of the papal legate at Buda. In June 1526, as the campaign 
already advanced, seeing the dismal situation of Louis II, Burgio was at a loss on what 
to do: 
 As for me, God knows, my lord, I do not know what to do. If the King sets 
on the road, I do not know if it will be either honorable or safe following him 
throught the ride. It will not be honorable because they will say that I gave him 
unsafe advice, because without any doubt, whether the voivode has 
intelligence with the Turk or not, if the King does not end up secure, his 
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people will mistreat him because everyone blames the King and those who 
counsel him for the loss of the Kingdom. If His Majesty goes as far as the 
Drava, he can not leave without disorder. And I see another danger beside the 
enemy, there is the danger of an internal sedition because everyone is 
displeased with the King, and because of the suspects around the voivode, and 
because the King will be compelled to do there what he cannot here: escape. 
And either way, going with the King is going for the most apparent 
perdition.1503   
As Đbrahim Paşa reached Belgrade with part of the Ottoman army on 29 June [19 
Ramadan],1504 the prospect of the Sava crossing seems to have created some panic at 
Buda. The reports sent by the papal legate Burgio from Buda to Rome provide insight to 
the situation at the capital. Writing from Buda on 30 June, he informed of the arrival in 
Buda of news that the Ottoman army has passed the Sava and was now camped in 
Hungary.1505 The date of the letter provides an interesting clue to the sense of panic and 
despair in the face of Ottoman advance. Neither Burgio nor anyone else in Buda could 
have been informed on the actual transfer of the Ottoman army across the Sava because 
the actual crossing started on 30 June.1506 By contemporary standards not even the 
fastest messenger system could get the news from Belgrade to Buda on the same day. 
Furthermore, the river took days for the whole army to cross. In other words, the arrival 
of the Ottoman army at Sava seems to reflect the public opinion that they were going to 
cross the river anyway. According to Burgio, the hopes of resisting at the passing of 
Sava were gone. Hungarians were preparing ships and artillery to go against the enemy, 
                                               
1503
 Ibid, 42:239: “Di me, Dio sa monsignorche non so quel che fare. Se il Re si 
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fugire: et in ogni eventa andare cum il Re et andare in perditione manifestissima.”  
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but the King was still at Buda although four months had passed since he first intended 
to depart and camp.  He was still expecting for the funds acquired through the melting 
of churchbells around the country. Burgio also mentioned that peasants did not want to 
go to war and they would not be convinced to do so by the authorities either. The 
nobles, on the other hand, also refused to go unless the King went along. Burgio’s tone 
reflects dispair regarding Petervarad, even before the fortress was besieged. Given the 
current situation of King Louis II, Burgio personally expected everything between the 
Sava and the Drava to be lost to the Ottomans. According to Burgio, if the King had not 
been so late to depart, he could have defended the area at least for the time being. In his 
personal opinion, Burgio thought that if the King withdrew: “we shall lose what we 
have.”1507 Burgio pointed at the fact that all other princes have called their ambassadors 
back because they took the situation to be hopeless. He also believed that the Pope had 
done his share and there was nothing more that could be done.1508  
Burgio’s letter written ten days later is even more pessimistic. He reported that the 
King intended to depart but was afraid to do so; and the barons would not depart 
without him. He complained that in Buda there was not a single thing needed for war. 
According to Burgio, the enemy, however, had it all: captains, money, counsel, ships, 
order, and victuals. He noted that that the army had still not assembled. On the other 
hand, Burgio is quite pessimistic about the odds of success even if it did assemble, and 
set on the road; because he believed that not much could be achieved without money 
and sufficient provisioning. And this time we see the legate, having lost all hope, 
begging to be allowed to return to Rome. “In short,” the papal legate summarized, “the 
affairs in Hungary are most desperate; and Your Sanctity may be assured that this year 
there will be left in Hungary only what the enemy wishes to leave.”1509  
Burgio’s concerns are confirmed by the Archbishop of Kalocsa [Tomori] in his 
letter to Louis II, written in June. The archbishop informs that Süleyman was at 
Belgrade, and his camp consisted of 3,000 tents. He believed that it was now too late to 
stop the Ottoman army before it crossed the Sava, as the King planned to do. He also 
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 Sanuto, 42:238: “Io piu presto inclino in quello opinione che la Maesta Sua si 
risolverà ritrarsi, et noi perderemo quanto ci è.” 
1508
 For the letter, see ibid, 236-41. Also see, Letters and Papers, IV:1063-4.  
1509
 Sanuto, 42:270-1.  
392 
 
stated that there would be no resistance at Kalocsa due to lack of money and food to 
give the soldiers.1510  
A more optimistic resident at Buda, Ludovico Morello, hoped that “His Majesty 
will have victory with the help of God.” Neither the fact that the Turco was coming in 
person nor that “the unlimited number of men in his army” seem to have tarnished his 
hope. According to Morello’s letter dated 11 June 1526, the King would overcome the 
enemy because he was very brave and he was assembling a huge army. Morello was not 
only sure that the King and the barons were intent on going against the enemy, but he 
himself was quite enthusiastic about going along. He reported that they were all going 
to be at camp on the Day of the Visitation [2 July], because it was ordered so.1511 Less 
than three months later, the hopeful and enthusiastic tone of Morello has changed into 
one of gloom and frustration. In his letter dated 27 August, Morello now sounded 
convinced that the Turks had come to “destroy this poor kingdom” and that they had 
enough men to conquer the whole world. He informed that the King departed to 
challenge the enemy, but no action was yet taken because of the discord among the 
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 Letters and Papers, IV:1033. Post-Mohacs news circulating around informs 
that the head of the bishop of Kalocsa was put on a lance and erected in front of the 
Sultan’s tent. Ibid, 1147. 
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Mohacs, 1526,” p.193. Perjes introduces yet a different timing, arguing that Louis II 
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Hungarians. Morello believed that they were thinking of fighting each other before 
fighting the enemy. He also blamed the Venetians for secretly helping out the Turk.1512  
Hungarian preparations for defensive action also echoed in Ottoman chronicles, in 
terms of information received on the march. Throughout his account, Kemalpaşazade 
mentions the preparations of the King of Hungary, and Ottomans aware thereof through 
spies and prisoners. According to Kemalpaşazade, King Louis was informed by a spy of 
the advance of the Ottoman army, and assembled a council to discuss what to do. They 
decided to send envoys to the Poles and Czechs [Leh ü Çeh] to ask for help, in addition 
to that from Germany and Austria. Their plan was to block the rivers Sava and Drava to 
avoid a major Ottoman attack.1513 According to the author, the King had marched out of 
his capital only after he heard Sultan Süleyman’s crossing of the Drava.1514 According 
to Nasuh, when Louis II heard that the Ottoman army was already assembling at Sofia, 
he called all the nobles for a council. He announced that “the destroyer of heroes came 
with the soldiers of the seven climes and the army of seven-headed dragon.”1515 Upon 
this announcement, they decided to fight. According to Nasuh they were overcome by 
pride, thus were not able to think modestly.A general call-to-arms [nefir-i ‘amm] was 
announced. They also wrote for help to the Polish and Checks who agreed to help along 
with Austria and Germany. They assembled a huge army and prepared for war.1516 
Bostan adds to this information that the Hungarians decided to move to Mohacs with 
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the intention of fighting the Ottoman army.1517 Hungarian preparations reach the 
Ottomans through the prisoners taken by the raiders, of especially Bali Beğ, through the 
various stages of the march. One such instance is during the siege of Petervarad, for 
example.1518 
We shall now pass on to the ultimate reaction given by the Hungarians, namely 
the Battle of Mohacs. 
5.3.4. The Battle  
The battle of Mohacs is the only major open battle fought by the Ottoman army 
under the leadership of Sultan Süleyman personally; also the only instance we see 
Süleyman fighting in person. Now we shall take a look at some aspects of the battle to 
see the role of the Sultan and that of his adversary. 
The first issue of importance is how the decision to engage in open battle was 
made. The credit of the decision to engage in open battle belongs to Hungarian 
leadership. As we have seen above, Louis II left Buda after the fall of Petervarad to 
counter the Ottoman army and block its advance. Logically, this made an open 
confrontation inevitable on both sides. The final decision to fight at Mohacs was 
reached on 16 August at Bata following the debates at Tolna where the Hungarian army 
assembled in the beginning of the month.1519 By this time, Louis II probably was no 
other way out to simultaneously block Ottoman advance and internal strife, as his 
speech at Tolna as related by Brodarics demonstrates: 
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 I can see that everyone is using my person as an excuse… I accepted this 
great danger personally, exposing my own life to all the fickleness of fortune, 
for the sake of the country and for your welfare. So that none may find an 
excuse for their cowardice in my person and so that they would not blame me 
for anything, tomorrow, with the help of God omnipotent, I will accompany 
you to that place where others will not go without me.1520 
The Hungarian war council at Mohacs seems to have faced competing views. 
While some insisted on waiting for the forces of Szapolyai and Frangepán, others opted 
for peace in return for tribute to the Sultan. Yet those who argued for direct armed 
confrontation won over the argument.1521 An eyewitness reports that although Louis 
should have waited for German and Transylvanian support, the nobles did not want to 
share the glory.1522 Commenting on Louis II’s action a few years later, Giovio states 
that the King acted the way he did by necessity and not through any logic of war or any 
hope of actually winning. He thought by acting immediately he would lose some land, 
but if he waited for the troops of Szapolyai he could lose all he had.1523  
Chronicles dwell on the cautiousness of the Ottomans, and explain the decision to 
wait for a day to see what action the enemy would take. According to Lütfi Paşa, 
Hungarians mistook this precaution for fear and assumed that Ottomans would ask for 
pardon; so they grew “over-proud” and attacked.1524 Kemalpaşazade describes Ottoman 
hesitance, in the sense of not engaging in immediate attack, as a deliberate strategy. 
According to the author, during the pre-battle council Süleyman had with Đbrahim and 
Bali Beğ, Đbrahim warned against taking the enemy lightly. Bali Beğ explained the 
usual tactic of raids:  to wait, split when the enemy attacks and when they pass enter 
from the middle. But he warned that the situation was different now. Đbrahim, then, 
suggested simulating a fake camp settlement. When the enemy thought the Ottoman 
army settled, they would swifly enter the battle field and catch the enemy in surprise. 
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Kemalpaşazade mentions that Bali Beğ approved the plan.1525 According to Nasuh, Bali 
Beğ suggested the tactic of simulated retreat.1526 Salih Çelebi attributes Đbrahim’s 
decision to ancient custom.1527  
Another important decision was the choice of location for the encounter. Perjes 
argues the Hungarian army had the advantage of deciding on the battlefield, but not a 
plan.1528 It has been argued that the swamps, natural terraces and the streams 
surrounding the plain would give a hard time to the Ottoman army both during the 
march and the battle.1529 Mohacs seems to be the logical strategic choice of the place of 
confrontation if Louis II wished to block the advance of the Ottoman army to his 
capital. Potential advantages of the location for the Hungarian army appear in some 
Ottoman accounts as well. Nasuh, himself a soldier, thought that the Hungarian army 
could easily be victorious if they had been stationed right. He stated that the King 
should have positioned his army along the marshes to resist and defeat the Ottoman 
army. But then, according to Nasuh, “he lost his foresight.”1530 What Nasuh suggests 
seems to be a basic classical strategy, as Machiavelli suggests:  
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When you have few men in comparison to the enemy, you must search for 
other remedies, such as ordering your army so that you are covered on one 
side either by a river or by a marsh, so that you can not be surrounded.1531 
As far as location is concerned, Mohacs was not only the midpoint,1532 but had 
symbolic significance for the Hungarian army as the location of a past victory. 
Ottomans, too, seem to be aware of this. Kemalpaşazade mentions that Hungarians have 
defeated the Tartars there; thus believed in its auspiciousness, and thought they would 
be lucky there.1533 Celâlzâde introduces Đskender-i Zulkarneyn as the opponent of the 
Hungarian King in this legendary war.1534  While these accounts are clearly attempts at 
demystifying a myth, Kemalpaşazade’s introduction of the subject brings to mind the 
contemporary strategy of employing fear produced by past victories to break the 
determination of the enemy.1535 This strategy goes together with the idea that if the 
adversary is strong enough, such symbolic associations would fail, as Machiavelli sets 
forth through a Roman example: 
The Praenestines, having their army in the field against the Romans, went off 
to set up camp by the Allia River, the place were the Romans were defeated by 
the Gauls. They did this to inspire confidence in their soldiers and to frighten 
the Romans by the ill fortune of the place. Although this decision of theirs was 
appropriate for the reasons discussed above, the outcome of the affair 
demonstrates, none the less, that true ability does not fear every minor 
circumstance.1536  
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According to the campaign diary, on 29 August [19 Dhu’l-Qada], battle was 
announced for the next day. On 30 August [20 Dhu’l-Qada] Ottoman army marched in 
order to the plain of Mohacs. Đbrahim was leading, followed by Rumelian army, then 
the Sultan and Anatolian army, household cavalry and janissaries. The first cannon fire 
came from the Hungarians. Just as the Ottoman army was about to retreat to start afresh 
next day, Hungarians attacked in three wings, one against Đbrahim Paşa, one against 
Hüsrev Beğ and one against the Sultan. The Battle of Mohacs is the only military feat 
we see Süleyman actually active on the field, the one time we see Süleyman actually on 
the battlefield and actually fighting a King – his most cherished wish. According to the 
campaign diary, it was Louis II who initiated the attack on Süleyman and the Anatolian 
army. The campaign diary relates how janissaries succeeded in defeating them, with the 
help of God, grace of the Prophet, and the support of saints. The Hungarians were not 
able to attack again.1537  
Placing Süleyman on horseback on the field with 10,000 soldiers Salih Çelebi 
describes the Sultan as “soul to the body” [tenlere cân].1538 Bostan describes 
Süleyman’s position in the midst of his household troops likening the Sultan to “the 
moving soul at the heart of the army.”1539 Based on the soul analogy, it can be said that 
Süleyman is not the remote observer or the brain beneath the operation in this case. But 
he is now actively in charge of military action. Salih Çelebi’s account gets more 
interesting as the battle draws closer. As the author has it, Đbrahim Paşa approached the 
Sultan asking for permission to go first. He said that there was no need for Süleyman to 
be on the battle field, but the Sultan should remain behind as the “everlasting sun” [gün-
i pâyidâr].1540 This brief episode highlights the ambitious nature of Đbrahim, though in a 
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positive manner, as well as underlining the usual distribution of tasks. In other words, 
Đbrahim is suggesting that he do the figthing as Süleyman gives the commands. 
However, not even Salih Çelebi can deny Süleyman an active performance on the 
battlefield proper. He clearly relates an attack by Süleyman on the Hungarian army. He 
attributes Louis II’s desperation and flight to the appearance of Süleyman himself on the 
field.1541 According to Lütfi Paşa, the King himself marched upon Sultan Süleyman 
who stood at the center. When Süleyman saw this he engaged in the fight in person, 
Lütfi Paşa lets us know through a poem.1542 Nasuh mentions the Sultan marching along 
with the troops into the battlefield. Nasuh’s account shows that Süleyman stood on his 
horse all day along with the army the day before the battle.1543 Kemalpaşazade, too, puts 
Süleyman on the field.1544 Although foreign accounts do not mention Süleyman’s heroic 
participation in the battle field, rumors were already circulating in August that 
Süleyman meant to take the kingdom and would not retire until he fought the King.1545  
When talking about the battle, some observers have dwelled on the greed for 
rapine on the part of the Hungarian soldiers. They were accused of not pursuing victory, 
but robbing horses and taking captives instead.1546 A strategic mistake which is often 
attributed to Louis II concerning the battle is the haste in which he attacked. According 
to some accounts, the King actually wanted to wait until support arrived, either from 
Bohemia or Transylvania. The “greedy” nobles, on the other hand, wanted the “honor 
and glory” for themselves and refused to wait. Finally, the King who feared a mutiny in 
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the camp gave in to their wishes and ordered the attack.1547 Among the critiques is 
Christoph Frangepán himself. Lamenting the death of King Louis, he blames the 
ignorance of his captains and their lack of knowledge of the military arts. They were to 
blame, according to Frangepán, because they were unable to organize, unable to 
determine the right time; thus giving all the advantage to the enemy they were defeated 
without defending themselves.1548  
Ottoman chronicles associate the defeat of the Hungarian army with the fall of its 
leadership. Bostan explains that when the King was wounded and escaped, the enemy’s 
army was left without a head. Thus their flags fell, drums over-turned, artillery and 
cannons scattered, carts pillaged, chests and bundles sacked.1549 Contemporary 
mentality regarded the commander as the indispensible element of an army. Salih 
Çelebi, for example, describes Đbrahim’s arrival at Sofia to take charge of the Rumelian 
troops as the “arrival of the soul to the body."1550 Another contemporary asserts that “if 
the leader [re’is] is defeated, those attached to him are defeated by default.”1551 Salih 
Çelebi emphasizes in his account that Louis II paid care to fleeing without his army 
being aware of it and so the Hungarians kept on fighting.1552  
Not surprisingly, an elaborated ceremonial occasion followed the victory at 
Mohacs, on 30 August [22 Dhu’l-Qada]. According to the campaign diary, a golden 
throne, which was supposedly brought from Istanbul, was set for the Sultan. He sat on 
the throne as the viziers and commanders came to kiss his hand. This was followed by a 
general council whereby the decision to go to Buda was confirmed. The prisoners taken 
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were beheaded. The campaign diary notes that the “priest” and other notables were also 
brought in and executed.1553 This was to a public spectacle as well. 
5.3.5. The Capital 
After the military victory at Mohacs, the Ottoman march to Buda appears to be a 
rational choice in keeping with maxims of war. At this point, a decisive battle was won 
and the enemy army was crushed. 1554 In other words, the risk of marching further into 
hostile territory in terms of expected resistance decreased whereas the potential of 
expected gain increased. The prospect was of actually entering the Hungarian capital 
had never been so likely. Theoretically speaking, taking hold of the capital city, in other 
words “the seat” of the adversary would give Sultan Süleyman a strong hand if his 
intention was to bend Louis II into his will.1555  
Accounts suggest that Süleyman was not aware of the death of Louis II as he 
headed for Buda.1556 It is noteworthy that two official projections of the campaign 
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accounts assert that there were no more worthy strongholds left along the Drava and the 
Danube. See, for example, KPZ, X:274. Salih Çelebi explains Süleyman’s decision to 
move on to Buda after the battle of Mohacs based on the Sultan’s intention to give a big 
blow to the Hungarians so that they would not be able to recover enough to act against 
the Ottomans. Sâlih (TSK), 58a. 
1556
 Nasuh, 131a. In the proclamation of victory sent to Venice, there is no 
mention of the death of King Louis, but only of his escape and the destruction of his 
army. The document also mentions that Süleyman is on his way to Buda. Sanuto, 43:51-
2. The proclamation sent to domestic audience does not mention the death of the king 
either, but specfically mentions that “it is unknown whether he is dead or alive” 
[kendüsinin hayatı ve memâtı mal‘ûm olmayub]. If the date of the proclamation 
corresponds to the date given in the campaign diary, it should have been written on 9 
September [26 Dhu’l-Qada], Münşe‘at, I:562.   
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remain silent on the death of Louis II and lack any reference to Ottoman appropriation 
of his kingdom. While the proclamation of victory mentions that the fate of the 
Hungarian King was unknown, the campaign diary lacks any reference. A letter from 
Carlo Contarini, dated 8 September from Innsbruck [Yspruch], shows that even though 
the news of the defeat of Mohacs reached the Austrian court, they were not yet aware of 
the king’s whereabouts; at this point Ferdinand was still trying to find help for him.1557 
Foreign correspondence demonstrates that Louis’s death was confirmed as public 
knowledge only towards the end of September.1558 In a letter dated 15 September, the 
narrator himself at Udine believed that the King reached Buda by then.1559 Sanuto’s 
entry on 11 September seems to be the earliest news of Mohacs received in Venice. 
Initial information in this entry is based on a report from Petovia dated 3 September, 
through Udine. The merchant who was the source of information reported that the King 
had escaped, without mentioning anything about his death.1560 Another letter from 
Petovia, dated 20 September, however provided a detailed account of the death of the 
King at the marshes.1561 The Ottoman ambassador reached Venice on 28 September to 
announce the victory.1562 A letter from Friuli, dated 26 September, reports the various 
rumors regarding the fate of the King. According to this report, some believed that the 
King went to Germany, while others thought he died at the battle, yet others claimed 
that the voivode of Transylvania had him killed because he wanted the crown for 
himself.1563  
The date of Süleyman’s arrival at Buda ranges between 8 and 10 September.1564 
Both Ottoman accounts and Venetian correspondence display destruction and plunder at 
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 Ibid, 758. 
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 Ibid, 754 
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 For 8 September see, ibid, 43:58, 113, 227. For 9 September see, ibid, 42:754-
5; Letters and Papers, IV:1114. For 10 September [3 Dhu’l-Hijja] see, Münşe‘at, I:563; 
KPZ, X:316; Bostan (MK), 74a.  
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Buda and Pest,1565 as well as confiscation of the royal treasury and armory along with 
the appropriation of the royal palace and hunting grounds. Taking the city almost 
without any resistance at all and appropriating royal spaces, the Sultan left in less than 
two weeks without any sign of political appropriation. We shall now take a look at the 
various aspects of Süleyman’s stay at Buda. 
The news of the defeat suffered by the Hungarian army must have caused great 
panic at Buda. According to the Hungarian historian Szeremi, it was a merchant who 
asked for the Sultan’s “mercy for Christians” for handing in Buda and he was awarded 
with ten pieces of gold.1566 According to Kemalpaşazade, not only the Queen and her 
retinue but most of the inhabitants of the town were already gone as the Ottoman army 
reached Buda; only those who wished to become subjects of the Sultan remained in 
town. The author reports that Đbrahim Paşa arrived at Buda first, granted pardon to the 
remaining inhabitants, and presented the bolt of the castle lock to the Sultan. He later 
mentions that they were merchants and artisans.1567 According to Bostan, when 
Süleyman reached Buda, there were only Jews since the majority of the non-Muslim 
population of Buda had already left the city “not trusting the strength of the fortress.” 
The author explains that the request for peaceful surrender was directed to the Sultan by 
the Jewish population. Bostan gives the number of this population that was then sent to 
Istanbul as two thousand households.1568 A Venetian agent, Antonio Boemo, reports 
that the Ottoman army entered Buda on 8 September, and destroyed the city. He 
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 Münşe‘at, I:563; KPZ, X:316-7; Bostan (MK), 74a-75a; Nasuh, 131b-132a; 
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 Bostan (MK), 74a-b. Uzunçarşılı names the leader of the Jews as Salamanoğlu 
Yasef and says he was the one who handed in the keys. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 
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Sâlih (TSK), 58b, 60b. 
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mentions that the Sultan left for Constantinople with 8,000 captives of note, numerous 
children and 2,500 Jews, leaving 50,000 soldiers behind.1569 
Another aspect to dwell on regarding Süleyman’s stay at Buda is his appropriation 
of royal spaces. Despite the destruction and pillaging at Buda, it is worth noting that the 
Royal Palace was spared.1570 When Süleyman crossed to Pest, he ordered that the royal 
palace not be burned because he held court there.1571 Szeremi mentions a divan meeting 
to decide on the fate of Buda. Süleyman’s advisers told him to burn the city, but spare 
the castle “so that all nations remember that the emperor of the Turks was here.” 
Szeremi admits hearing from someone over dinner that the Sultan personally 
commissioned a man named Antal with the task of burning down the city.1572 Not only 
is the sparing of the royal palace rather illuminating, but also the alternating occupation 
of royal space. It is not only Süleyman’s presence in these spaces, but his performance 
of the kingly activities therein which underlines the appropriation process. On 14 
September [7 Dhu’l-Hijja] the Sultan went hunting in the King’s grounds. On 15 
September [8 Dhu’l-Hijja] he held a feast in the royal palace with music and 
conversation. He favored them with gifts. Next day, he again went hunting in the King’s 
grounds. On 17 September [10 Dhu’l-Hijja], they celebrated the religious feast. Viziers 
and commanders came to the “exalted throne” [serîr-i ‘ulya] and kissed the Sultan’s 
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 The provider of this information Antonio Boemo was sent to convey a letter to 
the Venetian ambassador Contarini who was supposed to be at Linz with Ferdinand I. 
Unable to find them at Linz, the agent followed them to Vienna. His report is based on 
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hand.1573 On 18 September [11 Dhu’l-Hijja], Süleyman again held a feast in the royal 
palace, and festivites in the King’s gardens.1574  
It is worth noting that “the exalted throne” is actually at the seat of Hungary in 
this case. Although the following attitude does not allow for suggesting political 
appropriation, the employment of royal space in its customary function can be taken as 
symbolic appropriation. In other words, Süleyman symbolically appropriates the 
rulership of Hungary through practicing royal courtly activites in the spaces that are 
assigned specifically as such. The elements of appropriation as recounted by the 
chronicles do not support an argument for political appropriation, because Süleyman 
seems to have taken over royal prerogatives without taking over royal duties as King of 
Hungary. The kingly activities performed on royal grounds attest to another symbolic 
transition, namely the transition from the zone of war to that of peace. We have already 
mentioned a transition at the Drava crossing expressed by the change of garments. At 
this point we see the reversal of that transition. “Fighting” [rezm] transforms into 
“feasting” [bezm]; the weapons and martial attire we saw being assessed at the Drava 
crossing, now become “equipment of joy and merrymaking.” The Sultan, too, goes 
through a similar transition as he comes to “scatter gold in the joyous halls” after 
“scattering heads” with the sword.1575 
The confiscation of the royal treasury and artillery at Buda appears to be a natural 
action by a conqueror. However, in this case the confiscation of the large cannons 
signify another highly symbolic claim. These particular pieces of artillery were believed 
to belong to Mehmed II. Kemalpaşazade, for example, explains that the two cannons in 
front of the palace were the ones Mehmed II had to leave behind when he besieged 
Belgrade. Following Mehmed II’s return, they were taken to Buda and placed in front of 
the palace as a reminder of the Hungarian victory. People would come to see them to 
take pride and talk about what happened back then. That is why Đbrahim had them 
removed.1576 The recovery of Mehmed II’s cannons, in a way, once more brings the two 
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Ottoman sultans in confrontation. Süleyman once again emerges as the superior one in 
the eyes of the contemporaries. 
Süleyman brought many trophies to Istanbul from Buda. Apparently, among 
functional arms and artillery some of the martial belongings of the King’s to Istanbul as 
well. A tournament helmet recovered in Istanbul in early 1900s, now at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, has been identified as belonging to Louis II.1577 Such 
trophies seem to have been favored after Ottoman victories. A late fifteenth century 
turban-shaped Akkoyunlu helmet, now at the Metropolitan Museum, bears the mark of 
the Ottoman arsenal, signifying that this Shirvan-manifactured helmet was acquired as 
booty during the Persian and Caucasus campaigns.1578  
The statues which decorated the Hippodrome in Istanbul in front of Đbrahim 
Paşa’s Palace were perhaps the most famous among the trophies brought from Buda. 
Kemalpaşazade mentions the three “awe inspiring and impressing figures” [sûreti 
garîb-heybet ü ibret-nümâ] and their being placed on a massive stone base at the 
Hippodrome in Istanbul.1579 Salih Çelebi provides a rather detailed description and 
explanation of these sculptures. He appreciates the artists who made these sculptures on 
the basis of exquisite handwork and huge size. Salih Çelebi also informs his readers that 
the sculptures were placed at the Hippodrome in Istanbul. Defining the Hippodrome as 
a “public route and promenade” [güzergâh-ı halk-ı ‘âlem and temâşâ-gâh-ı ben-i Adem] 
he asserts that they were displayed there for glory [nâm ü nişân].1580 Foreign accounts 
emphasize these and other royal artifacts as being Süleyman’s trophies of victory. 
According to Giovio, when Süleyman departed as “vincitore of Buda and Hungary” in 
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 Sâlih (TSK), 61a-62a. He also relates an ancient Hungarian myth of a king 
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1526, he took along some excellently-crafted bronze statues which belonged to the 
“splendid” King Matthias. The author emphasizes that these were intended to be 
trophies of the Hungarian victory.1581 Another set of trophies carried back to Istanbul 
were the couple of chandeliers from a church which were placed in Hagia Sophia upon 
the order of the Sultan. Salih Çelebi mentions that they were inscribed with the name of 
the Sultan.1582 The inscription seems to reinforce the act of appropriation. The 
relocation of the chandeliers from a church to a “mosque” also implies a symbolic 
claim.1583 Although, no reference is to be found in contemporary Ottoman accounts 
Süleyman also brought books from the library of Corvinus to Istanbul.1584 This brings to 
mind Selim I’s appropriation of books from Tabriz and Cairo as he acquired to 
cities.1585 Miklos Olah, Archbishop of Esztergom, who was at Buda during the battle of 
Mohacs, later related the pillage as follows: 
After the death of Louis on the field of Mohacs on 29 August 1526, the Turks 
occupied Buda the following September… [They] tore up some books, while 
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others they scattered far and wide, after stripping them of their silver and using 
it for other purposes.1586  
Buda seems to have formed some kind of a center of operation for numerous raids 
during Sultan Süleyman’s stay at the city. Ottoman chronicles state the range of these 
raids as “as far as the realm of Austria” [Nemse diyârına varınca]1587 and dwell on the 
destructive nature of these raids.1588 These wide-ranging raids also produced an 
expectation of an Ottoman attack on Vienna in September 1526.1589 The defeat of the 
Hungarian army at Mohacs and the occupation of Buda by the Ottoman sultan himself 
seem to have created a major commotion in the countryside. Italian observers describe 
large numbers of people on the run. The deputy of Udine Zuan Moro, for example, 
wrote in October, that many Hungarians were reported to be running to Vienna to 
escape the Turkish fury. Among them was one of the masters of the Queen. He reported 
that many families escaped to Vienna where they were maltreated. Moro emphasizes 
that the people were in fear.1590  
The raiding activity operating from Buda and the destruction of the city itself can 
be regarded as terrorizing activities to intimidate the enemy. In this respect, the lack of 
any long-term appropriation activity regarding Buda appears striking as even the 
conquest of the relatively minor stronghold Ilok was followed by the usual steps of 
appropriation: churches were converted into mosques, “devilish church bells” replaced 
by “sultanic drums.” Thus the castle was “cleansed.”1591 We need to wait until 1541 to 
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see Buda “the seat of the throne” [tahtgâh] becoming part of the Abode of Islam. This 
time, unlike in 1526, the city was “cleansed” through the conversion of the “grand 
church” into a mosque, addition of pulpit and niche indicating Mecca, performance of 
the Friday prayer and recitation of the Quran. As part of the Abode of Islam, Buda was 
now to be regarded as part of the “protected domains.” Only after the city acquired this 
status in 1541 did the Ottomans find it necessary to “appoint a great commander to 
protect and keep it” as Celâlzâde reflects.1592  
5.4. Projection and Reception 
5.4.1. Official Projection 
Unfortunately, an overall fetihnâme of the 1526 campaign has not been found yet. 
Neither contemporary Ottoman accounts nor foreign correspondence provide any clues 
suggesting the presence of such a document. However, a proclamation of victory was 
issued following the Battle of Mohacs. This text published in Feridun Ahmed Beğ’s 
Münşeat and the shorter Italian text published in Sanuto’s Diarii provide insight to the 
official reasoning underlying the campaign.1593 The composition of the Ottoman text is 
very similar to that of 1521. The text opens with legitimating war through Quran and 
dynastic example, goes on legitimating Süleyman’s action on personal basis, explains 
the choice of Hungary as target, relates the main phases of the campaign, reports the 
activity of the Hungarian king, describes the battle and finally orders festivities. 
The first part of the proclamation reflects a legitimation process. The first 
message in the proclamation is a dynastic one. Through stating that “acquiring heavenly 
reward through ghaza and jihad was the habitual custom of his ancestors to the path of 
Islam” based on the “covert and open” declarations in the Quran regarding “killing 
                                                                                                                                         
that Ottoman soldiers who were Muslims might have used some churches for personal 
worship. However, this would not be proper imperial appropriation without the Sultan 
performing the rite himself publicly. 
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pagans” and “tormenting unbelievers,”1594 Süleyman is posed as a link in this quasi-
sacred grand struggle. Following this, the text mentions that God’s grace always lays on 
Süleyman and assists him; claims that through this the banners of the Sultan are linked 
to “conquest and victory.” These first few lines of the text provide the general 
legitimation of war-making as well as presenting Sultan Süleyman as an ever-
triumphant ruler based on piety. Here we can sense a covert allusion to his previous 
victories. The picture of piety moves on with Süleyman putting his trust on God and 
having recourse to the miracles of the Prophet as he formally intends ghaza. In doing so, 
he has the personal expectation of “being worthy in both worlds.”1595 Similar to the 
1521 and 1522 proclamations, the text goes on to explain the choice of destination. As 
in the 1521 case, the choice of Hungary is defined based on its non-Muslim status. This 
reasoning is further explained through the conviction that Hungarians rejected the 
Prophet and that there was no hope of them finding the right path. Furthermore, 
Hungary was adjacent to the Land of Islam. Unlike in the case of 1521, the issue of 
continued rivalry is not present in this explanation.1596 The Sanuto text, on the other 
hand, contains none of these messages. It opens with a list of titles of the Sultan. 
Legitimizing elements are totally absent in terms of religion, dynasty and protection. 
The nearest expression that can be found to demonstrate some kind of legitimation 
involves the dispatch of Đbrahim Paşa together with the Rumelian army to Hungary 
“with the help of God, the omnipotent.”1597 Assuming that the text published in Sanuto 
is not an abridged version of the original text, we might suggest that the religious 
assocations were deemed irrelevant to a non-Muslim audience whereas they were 
significant in building and maintaining the domestic image of the Sultan.  
The second part of the proclamation is an account of the march introducing 
Đbrahim as leading the campaign based on the orders of Süleyman. The conquest of 
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Petervarad as well as the “cleansing” process following the conquest are explained and 
described in detail, as if it were the actual target. While Petervarad is defined as “a rock 
on the road of ghaza,” the Hungarian commander Pal Tomori is identified as the “priest 
who is a friend of the Devil.”1598 The following description of the military actions 
involved in the siege reads like a heroic story which dwells on the binary opposition of 
the soldiers of Islam versus the rebelling infidels. As would be expected in such an 
account, the fortress is acquired by the help of God. The Sultan grants pardon on request 
of peaceful surrender. The usual post-conquest actions of conversion of churches into 
mosques, performance of the call for prayer and the Friday prayer are listed as the 
fortress “is conquered and subdued” together with its surroundings.1599 This is followed 
by an account of the conquest of Ilok and twelve other castles each of which was “a key 
to Hungary” and “refuge of corrupt wicked men.” The same steps of granting pardon 
and “cleansing” are repeated.1600 These cases demonstrate that the campaign is projected 
as a mission to remove wickedness, in other words as a struggle between the good and 
the evil in which the good ultimately wins. The Sanuto text offers no such dichotomies, 
but summarizes briefly the activity up to the battle of Mohacs. We again see Đbrahim on 
the foreground. Being sent by the Sultan to Hungary, Đbrahim is given the credit of the 
conquests of Petervarad and Ilok as well as fifteen other castles. Only then does 
Süleyman enter the scene.1601 
The third part of the proclamation is an account of the Battle of Mohacs. This 
includes the preparation of the Hungarian army as well. Seeing that the Hungarian army 
is ready to fight, Süleyman once again resorts to God and the Prophet, and marches 
toward the Hungarians. We again see an almost epic account of war. Here the text takes 
the opportunity to praise Đbrahim through the attack by Louis II directly on Đbrahim who 
valorously fights back. Finally, the King escapes and the Hungary army scatters 
away.1602 The fleeing Hungarian soldiers are likened to the House of the Pharaoh. 
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Finally, in this part, the overall result of the campaign is expressed as the “banners of 
Islam” being victorious and the “enemies of the Religion” being defeated – a quite 
conventional expression. The text again takes the opportunity to remind the audience 
that such “praiseworthy conquests which were not granted to famous rulers and 
powerful monarchs, or even to the companions of the Prophet, fell to my lot with the 
help of God.”1603 In the Sanuto text, Süleyman sets on the road and goes against the 
King of Hungary after the above mentioned castles are taken. The Drava crossing and 
the destruction of the bridge are mentioned. Then the battle is briefly described with the 
result expressed as: “… we combated for two hours, and with the help of God almighty, 
we broke him [the king] and we sliced his army into pieces.”1604 The text employs first 
person plural, or rather the “royal we”, which suggests Süleyman’s presence on the 
battlefield. The Sanuto text diverges from the Ottoman proclamation as to the final 
result of the campaign. Whereas the victory of the “banners of Islam” was clearly 
announced in the Ottoman text, the Sanuto text heralds further movement. Süleyman 
hereby announces that he is going on to Buda. 
The last part of the proclamation typically states the order of the Sultan to the 
recipient. Once the receiver gets the proclamation, he is supposed to announce the news 
of victory all around, make festivities and pray for the “continuance of the daily 
increasing eternal state” [devâm-ı devlet-i ebed-peyvend-i rûz-efzûnım içün] of the 
Sultan.1605 This conventional expression seems to be a simple copy-and-paste task 
standardly applied in such documents. However, when we consider the choice of words 
and what they signify, this seemingly conventional expression becomes a powerful 
statement of status and expectation. While the “state” of the Sultan is confirmed, the 
underlying message reflects that it is growing and getting stronger. In other words, not 
only is Süleyman already powerful and fortunate, but he will be more powerful and 
                                                                                                                                         
to reinforce the idea of partnership between the two men. It also reflects the previous 
expressions attributing Đbrahim’s deeds to Süleyman as observed in the former’s 
dealings, for example, in Egypt and in the conquest of Petervarad. 
1603
 Münşe‘at, I:551. 
1604
 Sanuto, 43:52. 
1605
 Münşe‘at, I:551. I use the word “state” for “devlet” here not to mean state in 
the modern sense, but to include all aspects related to the sixteenth-century connotations 
such as fortune, prosperity, power and God’s grace as well as government. 
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fortunate. The Sanuto text ends by reminding that this “good news” was sent to Venice 
based on the mutual friendship and peace as well as pronouncing the final result: “with 
the help of God the army of the Muslims was victorious.”1606  
5.4.2. Domestic Reception  
The immediate domestic reaction to the outcome of the 1526 campaign was the 
festive mood as ordered by the Sultan. Piero Zen, the Venetian ambassador in 
Constantinople, confirms in his letter, dated 29 September, the information he wrote 
three days earlier. This information consisted of: the victory of the Gran Signor against 
the King of Hungary, the destruction of the latter’s army and the festivities held in the 
honor of the victory. This letter is interesting in terms of the information it provides on 
how the ambassador celebrated the victory: “In order to demonstrate his joy over the 
victory, he covered the back of his house with golden clothes, built a fountain which 
dispersed wine, and decorated  the courtyard with flags.” We also learn from this letter 
that Đbrahim Paşa’s mother sent someone to congratulate him and to tell him that “she 
prayed Virgin Mary for his safe return.” The ambassador was also invited by the captain 
to watch the horse races he organized. Zen tells that the festivities cost him 80 
ducats.1607 Zen’s report demonstrates how the festivities ordered by the Sultan through 
the proclamation of victory were handled in daily life. In this respect, Kemalpaşazade’s 
rather generic account of the festivities do not seem so generic after all: towns and 
fortresses were decorated, inside the walls there was joy, Constantinople was bedeckt as 
to turn into a wedding house, men and women laid their work aside and made merry for 
days.1608 Salih Çelebi also dwells on the nature of celebrations, in line with Zen’s 
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 Sanuto, 43:52. 
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 Sanuto, 43:150: “Scrive esso Orator, per dimostrar alegreza di la vittoria fece 
coprir davanti la sua caxa di panno d’oro et far una fontana che butava vin, et fece 
corte sbandita quel zorno. E la madre del magnifico Imbrain, mandò alegrarse con lui 
et li mandò a dir che la pregasse la Verzine Maria che’l tornasse a caxa sano; la qual è 
cristiana e stà lì a Constantinopoli in una caxa. Scrive questo capitanio ha fatto corer 
cavali, regatar fuste,  ha volesso esto Orator sia presente... scrive queste feste li costa 
80 ducati.” 
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experience. The author mentions that people displayed all their possessions [tasarruf] 
for the decorations.1609  
Celebrations of victory happened in many ways. A set of ceremonial military 
accessories, preserved at the Topkapı palace Museum, suggest commemoration of 
major victories through the crafting of such items. A sword [yatağan] in the Topkapı 
Palace (2/3776) by Ahmed Tekelü dated 933 [1526/7] was perhaps such a 
commemoration of Süleyman’s victory in 1526. Identified by Atıl as a display piece, the 
sword is decorated with animated scrolls and combats between mythical creatures.1610 
Such a commemorative dagger, dated 920 [1514], can be found in the Topkapı Palace 
(2/254) which celebrated Selim I’s “conquest of Persia” [feth-i ‘Acem].1611 As well as 
being commerative objects, such bejewelled weapons probably served to amaze visitors 
in special occassions such as ambassadorial visits.1612 
Ottoman accounts of the 1526 campaign reflect the official proclamation of 
victory almost verbatim for most part. Being larger scale narrative accounts, they do 
employ more details and symbolism. The general message is the same, though: ‘Islam 
won, infidels were destroyed.’ On the other hand, there are more specific gains as well. 
Kemalpaşazade, for example, provides more specific results already in the beginning of 
his account. According to the author, the campaign resulted in the destruction of 
Hungarian territory as well as its capital, the demise of the Hungarian King, and the 
clearance of the conquered lands from the presence of the enemy. Furthermore, it put a 
                                                                                                                                         
1608
 KPZ, X:312-3: “ ‘Umûmen şehirler ve hisarlar donanub surlar içi pür-sürûr 
oldı. Hümûm ü gümûmdan boşalub kurâ vü bilâdın sevâdı ferâh ü şâdla toldı, husûsâ 
mülk-i Kostantiniyye’nin içi pür-zînet olub beytü’l-arûsa döndi. Her kenârı pür- nakş ü 
nigâr âraste vü pirârste olub perr-i tâvûsa döndi.” 
1609
 Sâlih (TSK), 57a-b. 
1610
 Atıl, Age of Süleyman the Magnificent, pp.148-9, 152-4; Rogers and Ward, 
Süleyman the Magnificent, p.146. 
1611
 Rogers and Ward, Süleyman the Magnificent, p.144. 
1612
 For the opinion of Nizam al-Mulk, for example, see, Book of Government, 
p.94: “Twenty special sets of arms, studded with gold, jewels, and other ornaments, 
must always be kept and stored at the treasury, so that on feast days and whenever 
ambassadors arrive from distant parts of the world, twenty pages finely aatired can take 
these weapons and stand round the throne.” According to Nizam al-Mulk such displays 
were necessary because “every king’s elegance and finery must accord with his exaled 
position and lofty ambition.” 
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check on the strength of the “lord of Spain”. As a result, the “lord of France” who was a 
prisoner won his freedom and recovered his army. Thus, he reached the top once again 
after hitting the bottom.1613 
The Battle of Mohacs often figures as a battle between good and evil in 
contemporary Ottoman through the employment of established codes to reflect the 
binary opposition.1614 As such, Sultan Süleyman’s role of defender of not only the 
religion bur the good seems to be reinforced.One of the striking expressions of the 
binary opposition between good and evil is reflected in a poem in Lütfi Paşa’s account. 
The author introduces two huge and mighty armies confronting each other. He defines 
them in opposition to each other in spiritual terms. While one is “the ocean of darkness” 
the other one is “the ocean of faith.” One is the “army of the Devil” whereas the other is 
the “army of the All-Compassionate.” While one is already assigned the “curse of God,” 
victory for the other comes from God. While the soldiers in one are esteemed at the 
door of God through the virtue of being ghazis, the others are absolutely repulsed 
because they are infidels. While one wholeheartedly praises and glorifies God, the other 
is lost in sin and wickedness.1615 In a similar manner, Nasuh likens the defeat of Louis II 
and the drowning of many to the defeat of the Pharoah.1616 Thus, Süleyman and the 
Ottoman army are once again labelled “good” in opposition to the “evil” Hungarians.  
Unlike many non-Ottoman contemporary views, Ottoman accounts attribute much 
strength to Louis II and the Hungarian army.1617 Various authors described King Louis 
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 KPZ, X:222. 
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 For a cultural approach emphasizing ritual and semiotic structures related to 
war, see Philip Smith, “Codes and Conflict: Toward a Theory of War as Ritual,” Theory 
and Society, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Feb., 1991)pp.103-38. 
1615
 Lütfi Paşa, p.262: “Đki deryâ yüriyüb şevket ile / Biri birine darb u heybetiyle / 
Biri deryâ-yı zulmet biri imân / Biri ceyş-i Şeytan biri Rahman / Birinin mazhar [ı] 
kahr-ı celâli / Siyah-ı bahtını irmiş zevâli / Birinin sancağı “nasru mina’llâh” / Havâle 
birisine la‘netu’llâh / Biri gâzi vü makbûl der-i Hâk / Birisi kâfir ü merdûd-ı mutlâk / 
Birisinin zebânı zikr-i tevhîd / Dil ü candân ider tesbîh ü temcîd / Salib ü sencanı Hak-ı 
hem-râh / Đdüb almış yedi şirk ü gümrâh” 
1616
 Nasuh, 131a. Also see, KPZ, X:309; Sâlih (TSK), 53b. Ironically, in 1530 
Erasmus in his De Bello Turcico uses a similar means to emphasize the evil nature of 
the Ottomans likening the Turk to the frogs and lice God sent on Egypt as warning and 
punishment. Erasmus, “On the War Against the Turks,” in Rummel (ed), pp.316.  
1617
 This point has been emphasized by Bayerle, “One Hundred Fifty Years of 
Frontier Life in Hungary,” p.227. 
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II as one of the greatest of Christian kings. They also emphasized that he was a leading 
warrior who was known for his valor.1618 These comments may seem absurd when the 
various contemporary European views are taken into consideration. However, 
presenting Süleyman’s rival as powerful as possible enhances the achievement of the 
Sultan. Kemalpaşazade refers to Louis as “the damned evil-doing king” in the 
customary manner and also refers to him as “the much-hated ancient enemy” [hasm-ı 
kadîm-i pür-kîn].1619 Salih Çelebi emphasizes that the Hungarians never submitted in 
war and dwells on the the strength of the Hungarian army. The author asserts that 
through such invincibility they gained such strength that they came to be “the strong 
wall of unbelief” [sedd-i sedîd-i küfr].1620  
Lütfi Paşa’s account, on the other hand, reverses the hatred and revenge. 
According to the author, the Hungarian king was intent on “taking the nine hundred 
year-old revenge of the Christian people.”1621 As Lütfi Paşa has it, the King knew that 
Süleyman was coming onto him the moment he heard of the Sultan’s departure from 
Istanbul. He sent news to Frenk bans that “by the grace of Christ the man we want is 
coming to our feet!” The bans replied: “you are the hope of Christendom / you are the 
lock of the realm of unbelief.”1622 In the poem, the author emphasizes the firm intent of 
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 KPZ, X:202; Tabakat, 31a; Nasuh, 99b-100a: “Mezbûr Engürüs menhûsın 
kral-ı bed-fi’âli ki selâtin-i taht-nişin-i küffâr-ı füccârın mu‘azzamlarından idi, ve fevr-i 
‘aded ü huzûr-ı ‘udud ile zuhur bulub, ceyş-i bed-giş selâbet ü mehâbetle meşhûr olan 
dârü’l-küfr serdârlarının mukaddeminden idi. Hemişe ol bed-nihâdın gümrâh-ı emîrleri 
saydgah-ı gazâda mücâhidîn-i müslimîn ile buluşıgelüb, vilâyetlerine yagy ayağın 
basdırmazlardı.” While Kemalpaşazade praises King Louis for his valor and skills in 
the beginning of his account, he attributes the defeat of the Hungarian army on the 
inaptitude of Louis: “basireti bağlandı”. KPZ, X:284-5. Bragadin’s report from 
Istanbul, dated 9 June 1526, also demonstrates the strength attributed to the Hungarians 
by the Ottomans. The bailo mentions that the army departed for the campaign scared 
because they believed that the Hungarians were brave. Sanuto, 41:533. 
1619
 KPZ, X:210. A similar description is employed by Salih Çelebi: “ehl-i Đslama 
ezeli ‘adû-yı gîne-cûy.” Sâlih (TSK), 7b. 
1620
 Sâlih (TSK), 7b. Also see, Tabakat, 31a. 
1621
 Lütfi Paşa, p.259: “… tokuz yüz yıldan berü temâmet Nasara kavminin kinini 
alavuz.” 
1622
 Ibid, p.258: “Nasârâ kavminin sensin ümidi / Diyâr-ı küfrin olmuşsun kilidi.” 
This projection of Louis II corresponds to the various European comments on the role 
of Hungary in blocking Ottoman advance, cited throughout this study.  
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King Louis to fight Sultan Süleyman, and kill him or be killed himself.1623 Fashioning 
Süleyman as  Đslâm Pâdişâhı Sultân Süleymân,1624  Lütfi Paşa directs the “nine hundred 
year-old revenge of the Christian people” to Süleyman, and has him take all the weight 
and historicity of the conflict between Islam and Christianity on his shoulders. Thus 
when Süleyman hears of the preparations of the Hungarian army on the way, he 
assembles his viziers for consultation whereby they say to him: “Today you are the 
hope of the Muslims.”1625 In this account, each ruler is identified as the hope of their 
respective communities. Thus, in the mindset of Lütfi Paşa the opposition of Süleyman 
and Louis II becomes the struggle between Islam and Christianity through which Islam 
will ultimately be victorious.  
Referral to ancient enmity aggrandizes the mission of Süleyman as well as 
implying a covert reference of superiority to his predecessors. This covert effort is 
reinforced through summaries of past action relating to Hungary, especially in the 
accounts of Salih Çelebi and Kemalpaşazade. Both authors provide a historical 
summary on the situation of Hungary and what the previous sultans have or have not 
done about it, before they tell about the campaign itself. Salih Çelebi’s summary begins 
with the efforts of Murad II and Mehmed II, followed by factors which prevented 
Bayezid II and Selim I to accomplish the task.1626 In Kemalpaşazade’s summary, the 
reference to Mehmed II’s failure to subdue Hungary is noteworthy, because the author 
says that the Sultan worked for it all his life, but could not achieve it because Hungary 
had a very powerful king at the time.1627 In this respect, Süleyman seems to have set out 
to complete the unfinished business of his fore-bearers. Although both authors avoid 
presenting outright incompetency of the Sultan’s ancestors by providing each with an 
excuse; the final statement is that ultimately it is Süleyman who accomplished what 
none before him could. Through completing this task, Süleyman not only lives up to the 
memories of his predecessors, but proves his superiority over them, even tops those 
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 Ibid.: “Kral eydür ki, ol meydan benümdir / bugün cenk itmeğe cevelân 
benümdir.”  
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., p.260: “Ey pâdişâh-ı ‘âlempenâh, bugün müslimânların ümîdi sensin…” 
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 Sâlih (TSK), 8a-10b. 
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legendary figures like Mehmed and Selim. Here we see once again the rhetoric 
employed after the 1521 and 1522 campaigns. But this time, the achievement is perhaps 
even greater because the target reached is not a specific previous failure, but a 
furthering of an idealized continuity. This idealization seems to work in two ways. On 
one hand, the sense of dynastic continuity is reflected in the manner we discussed. On 
the other hand, the victory earned at the 1526 campaign forms a link within a chain of 
actions representing Süleyman’s own achievements. Reference to the personal past of 
the Sultan is exemplified in the reference to Slankamen. It is reminded that the castle 
was destroyed during the “Belgrade” campaign. Also found in Venetian accounts, this 
seems to be reminder of the previous feat of the Sultan.1628 An expression found in 
Kemalpaşazade’s account as he defines the conquest of Belgrade and the raids into 
Syrmia in 1521 as “engagement bracelet to the bride of conquest”1629 implies a linear 
and progressive chain of continuity of purpose, which contradicts, to some extent, with 
the situational motives provided in contemporary accounts. 
Ottoman accounts of the 1526 campaign employ the theme of Süleyman’s 
superiority over especially Mehmed II in a more subtle manner than accounts of 
Belgrade. Kemalpaşazade takes the opportunity to re-introduce Mehmed II’s attempt on 
Belgrade and the anecdote related to it. We have already talked about the legend of 
Mehmed II’s claim to get Belgrade by his sword alone.1630 After repeating a version of 
the story, Kemalpaşazade reports a conversation he himself had with Sultan Süleyman 
when the Sultan was back from the campaign in 1526. When Süleyman told 
Kemalpaşazade about the campaign, the latter said it was with God’s help and with the 
influence of His power. Süleyman approved this comment.1631 Considered along with 
the pre-departure visits to the tombs of Ayyub and the ancestors, the prayers to God and 
the Prophet, this quasi-instructive episode brings forth a dual nature of Süleyman’s rule. 
Whereas Süleyman is represented as the bestower of favors and rewards throughout the 
various phases of the campaign, through total submission to God he becomes the 
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 See, Chapter 3, pp.253-4. 
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 KPZ, X:319-20. 
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receiver. On the other hand, the fact that he receives not from any worldly authority but 
only from the celestial signifies his elevated status as Sultan.   
This dual notion can be observed in some imperial artifacts as well. A gold-inlaid 
sword and scabbard made for Süleyman, datable to the second quarter of the sixteenth 
century, exemplifies the point. While one side of the sword is inscribed with Quranic 
verses, the inscription on the other side reads: “ 
This weapon is entrusted to the will of God and to the guidance of the 
Prophet and his descendants, and that this noble hüsâm [sword] is for the 
protection of the Sultan of mankind, Sultan Süleyman bin Selim, may God 
grant him victory.1632  
The Quranic verses inscribed on a jeweled and gold-inlaid small sword [meç] 
made for Süleyman in 1531/2 have been identified to contain the same Quranic verses 
as the above-mentioned set.1633 The concern with consistency of message demonstrates 
how serious the concepts of God’s protection and the Sultan’s service in the name of 
God were taken. Yet another set consisting of sword and scabbard at the Topkapı Palace 
Museum (1/294), dated to the second quarter of the sixteenth century, has a Persian 
inscription which places Süleyman under the protection of God: “May the world be as 
you wish and heaven be your friend / May the creator of the world be your 
protector.”1634 A similar protective measure can be observed in talismanic shirts. 
Although there is no extant talismanic shirt of Sultan Süleyman dating to the time range 
of this study, a letter by Hurrem points at the belief in such attire. Supposedly a holy 
man from Mecca saw the Prophet in his dream. The Prophet commanded the man to 
make a shirt to be worn in ghaza. The man made it and brought it to Istanbul. The shirt 
was then sent to Hurrem who sent it to Süleyman who was away on campaign, “with the 
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 Atıl, The Age of Süleyman the Magnificent, pp.154-5; Rogers and Ward, 
Süleyman the Magnificent, pp.148-9. The sword is now in the Topkapı Palace Museum, 
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urgent request that he wear it for her sake, for it had sacred names woven in it and 
would turn aside bullets.”1635 
The element of past references abound in Ottoman chroniclers. These relate to the 
ancient past, the dynastic past and personal past. Among the references to the ancient 
past, Kemalpaşazade’s notes on the first three major stops worth mentioning. The 
author describes Edirne as the “capital of Bulgaria” [dârü’l-mülk-i Bulgâr]; Plovdiv 
[Filibe] as the land of Philip the Greek, the father of the mother of Alexander; and Sofia 
as a famous city of the Lâz.1636 Among the references to the ancient past, the Alexander 
analogy is a frequently employed device, as can be expected. Lütfi Paşa, for example, 
reminds the confrontation of Alexander and Darius in reference to the confrontation 
between Süleyman and Louis II.1637 References to the Turkic past are rather pronounced 
in the accounts of the 1526 campaign as compared to other ones. It is possible to 
highlight various references to the Oghuz warriors. Celâlzâde, for instance, relates how 
the ghazas of the Oghuz were told among the soldiers the night before the battle at 
Mohacs.1638 Furthermore, the author introduces Süleyman as “kâân”, along with other 
titles such as pâdişâh, hidîv, hüsrev, sultân, hâkân.1639 Kemalpaşazade often refers to 
the Rumelian troops as Turks, for example, when he talks about the assembly at 
Sofia.1640 Salih Çelebi who describes the Anatolian troops as heroes who were not 
afraid of death likens them to Oghuz ghazis.1641 Considered along with the symbolic 
significance of the plain of Mohacs and the expressions of ancient enmity, these 
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references point at a claim acceding dynastic continuity, expanding it to a wider claim 
of heritage. 
Salih Çelebi’s evaluation of the 1526 campaign is one of the most powerful 
reflections of the achievement attributed to Sultan Süleyman through this campaign. 
While exalting him over the rulers of the past, between the lines the text associates 
Süleyman with an almost universal heritage: 
It was such an excellent campaign that it effaced and embarassed the glories 
of past sultans and legends of previous pillars of state. The works of the 
Caesars of Rome remained deficient; the status of the Chosroes of Persia 
remained humble. The Buyid House could not match its scale; the Sassanid 
kings never heard the sound of it. Neither did such a thing occur to the minds 
of the Himyarite kings of Arabia, nor emerge in the minds of Hindu 
Rajahs.1642 
5.4.3. Foreign Reception 
Hungarian defeat at Mohacs and the following occupation by the Ottoman army 
caused grief in various European courts, but probably not much surprise. Among those 
who attributed the Hungarian defeat to the incapability of Louis II was Guicciardini. He 
believed that Hungarian temerity had as much to do with Süleyman’s victory as his own 
forces. Guicciardini’s view runs somewhat parallel to Ottoman arguments regarding the 
over-confidence of Hungarians in reference to the conditions of the past:  
For although small in numbers by comparison with so great a foe, the 
Hungarians placed more confidence in the victories which they had often 
achieved against the Turks in the past, rather than in the present situation, and 
they convinced the King, who was young in years but in counsel even younger 
than his age, that he should not dim the fame and ancient military glory of his 
people; and without waiting for help which was coming from Transylvania, he 
should confront the enemy, not refusing even to fight in the open countryside, 
wherein the Turks are practically invincible because of the great number of 
their horsemen. The outcome therefore corresponded to his rashness and 
imprudence; the army, gathered of all the nobility and brave men in Hungary, 
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was shattered, a great many killed, and the King himself was slain, together 
with many of the prelates and barons of the realm.1643 
Another contemporary, Giovio, on the other hand, argued that Louis II had no 
other option. According to Giovio, “poor” King Louis was abandoned by all Christian 
princes, except for Pope Clement. The King’s decision to go against to enemy, Giovio 
commented, was pressed by fatal necessity although without the hope of victory. The 
author also dwells on the poor condition of Hungary after the death of Matthias 
Corvinus, emphasizing the annihilation of military discipline as well as lack of practice 
in arms.1644 European accounts mention that even Süleyman was surprised that the King 
was mad enough to face such a huge army as his with so little men.1645 
Francis I expressed his grief over the death of the King of Hungary and the 
occupation of the country in a letter addressed to the Electors and other princes at 
Speyer. He also let them know about his concern that the Ottoman army would now 
move into Austria meeting no resistance. Such a move, according to Francis, would 
pose danger on Germany taking into consideration the religious strife going on there. 
Francis, too, takes the opportunity to justify himself through having offered Charles V 
peace with the latter not accepting his terms:  
Has exhorted the Emperor to lay aside private quarrels, and form a league of 
Christian princes, offering to resign his just rights in Italy that there may be no 
impediment to peace. The Emperor says that he will refuse no fair terms of 
peace; but while he is wasting the time by various delays Christian fields and 
cities are being devastated and burnt. Does not know what other proposals to 
make to the Emperor, for it is impossible to rouse him, if the danger of Austria 
and Germany, and the miserable condition of his own sister, do not excite him. 
Desires them to impress upon the Emperor the present danger. Promises the 
assistance of himself and his kingdom in a war against the Turks. Beaugency, 
6 Oct. 1526.1646  
 Henry VIII also seems to have grieved much over the loss of Hungary. In a letter 
dated 23 October 1526 to Pope Clement VII, Henry says that he “greatly regrets the 
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evils of the times” and that he “could not help shed tears” when he read the Pope’s letter 
dated 22 September. He attributes the loss of Hungary to the “dissensions of 
Christendom.” He repeats his pledge that “when other princes have agreed, he will not 
be behindhand in joining the crusade.”1647 Henry VIII’s reply to Ferdinand’s envoy in 
March 1527 was in a similar vein:  
… the king by the mouth of Sir Thomas Moore answered; that much he 
lamented the losse that happened in Hungarie, and if it were not the two great 
princes, he thought that the Turke would not have enterprised that acte: 
wherefore he with all his studie would take paine, first, to set an unitie and 
peace throughout all Christondome, and after that, both with money and men 
he would be readie to helpe toward that glorious warre, as much as any other 
prince in Christendome.1648 
Another griever was Pope Clement VII who reacted to Mohacs by convening a 
crisis meeting. He assembled the cardinals and ambassadors. As Gregory Casale has it, 
in tears he told them to convince their masters to a truce. In this meeting, Clement VII 
suggested a meeting between Charles V, Francis I and Wolsey to devise a plan to kick 
the Turk out of Hungary. He would be present in person to bless them. According to 
Casale, the Pope believed that unless the princes came up with a remedy soon, “we shall 
forthwith see the Turks in Rome spoiling his palace.”1649 According to Guicciardini, the 
Pope already foresaw the defeat of Hungary and tried to prevent it by urging peace 
between Christian princes. Guicciardini reflected the reaction of the Pope with these 
words:  
As a result of this victory the Pope was greatly disturbed, it being considered 
certain that the Turk would take permanent possession of the entire Hungarian 
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kingdom to the greatest detriment of all Christendom, for whom that realm had 
been a shield and rampart for many years.1650  
Charles V, as usual, seems to have lost no time to employ the Mohacs defeat and 
the death of Louis II for his own purposes. Venetian ambassador Andrea Navaier 
reported from Granada, in his letter dated 16 November, that the Emperor suffered a lot 
as he heard the loss of Hungary and the death of the King. He immediately wrote to the 
Pope that he would go there, let the Pope settle the differences between himself and the 
king of France, and make peace in order to make a campaign against the Turk.1651  In 
the meanwhile, Süleyman’s move into Hungary seems to have benefited Charles V as a 
legitimating cause for the performance of the Treaty of Madrid. The negotiations were 
justified with the need for “the Christian commonwealth” to unite in order to be able to 
take action against “the tyranny of the unbelieving Turks” and the “extirpation of the 
errors of the Lutheran sect.”1652  
The developments of 1526 also provided the opportunity to bring forth – or 
fabricate – an ancient prophecy discovered by the Chancellor to enhance the role of 
Charles V as the savior of Christendom. According to this prophecy the Turk would 
acquire Hungary, and march until the midst of Alemagna, only to be expulsed by one 
from the German nation. Apparently, this German was none other than Cesare [Charles 
V] himself.1653 On one hand, the loss of Hungary gave Charles V the opportunity to 
impose himself as the long-expected savior. On the other hand, it was also an 
opportunity to blame his arch rival Francis I and diminish the reputation of the rival for 
his own favor. Thus he instructed Mendoza, his ambassador at the English court, in 
November 1526: 
… You are to request the King and Wolsey, for the love of us, to hear the 
whole matter that they may understand who is to blame for these wars now in 
Christendom. It is strange that every time the Turk searches the entry and the 
destruction of Hungary, and when we and our brother the infant Archduke 
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have made preparations to resist the Infidel and suppress the Lutherans, we are 
forced to abandon so good business for our own defense…1654 
The shock of the fall of the Kingdom of Hungary seems to have transformed 
Sultan Süleyman to an actual person to be feared rather than the prototype of a distant 
threat. The English ambassador at Rome, Gregory Casale, wrote on 25 September about 
his fear that if the Turk gained a footing in Hungary, all Germany would go with him: “I 
never feared the Turk till now; but I shall fear him more if measures be not taken this 
spring which would make us secure.” Casale is one of the many who contemplated on 
how to get rid of the Turk and save Hungary. He suggested sending a large armada to 
Constantinople before the Ottoman army returned. Since Süleyman had no ships at 
Constantinople at the time, he would have to hurry back to save his capital. Thus both 
Hungary and Greece would be saved.1655 
A more favorable view comes from the chancellor of Hungary, in a letter dated 3 
October from Poszony, addressed to the palatine and captain of Poland. This letter states 
that Buda was burnt contrary to the wishes of the Sultan, and that those who were 
responsible were beheaded.  According to this letter, Süleyman did not think that the 
King was dead. Therefore he planned to offer an alliance, and keep Buda for Louis II – 
as a bargaining chip. According to this theory, the Sultan would keep Syrmia, and what 
is between the Sava and the Drava, for himself and give the rest back to Louis II. The 
letter also informed that important prisoners of war were well-treated, if they were 
recognized.1656 Another hopeful letter is dated 26 September 1526, written from Friuli 
reporting current rumors. According to this letter, the Turk told Christians in the 
occupied areas not to leave, promising not to tax them more than one ducat per house 
per year. He made sure that they would be treated well.1657 
Foreign accounts attest to a confused perception about Süleyman’s intentions after 
the Ottoman army briefly occupied Buda and employed it as a base of operation. The 
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departure of the Ottoman army from Buda without any sign of direct occupation 
confused some observers, giving them the idea that the Sultan was dead:  
… and this is taken to be certain because of the sudden retreat of the Turkish 
army from the Kingdom of Hungary, without taking anything other than 
Petervarad which he fortified. It is in Syrmia, meaning on the Drava; but there 
in Hungary he did not take anything, but only plundered the country.1658  
While some thought the Sultan would directly march on to Vienna as we have 
mentioned above, some thought he already got Vienna and would keep on going. Such 
are the rumors related by Wallop to Wolsey in a letter from Cologne, dated 16 October 
1526, as he heard that: 
…the seven electors, twelve earls and lords of the Empire or their 
ambassadors, and the spiritual lords will meet at Eslynge on December 1 to 
consider how to resist the Turk, who is reported have taken Vienna and will 
not cease from his invasion during the winter.1659 
While the major European courts reacted to the Hungarian defeat with grief and 
the usual talks of need for “universal peace” to face the “common enemy,” Ferdinand 
reacted by claiming the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary. He immediately divised plans 
to recover the lost fortresses. By mid-October, rumors started circulating that Ferdinand 
was on the road for this purpose.1660 
5.5. Conclusion 
For the Ottomans in 1526, the victory at Mohacs and the occupation of Buda do 
not seem to have had the same implication they have for modern historians. While we 
approach the issue as “the fall of the Kingdom of Hungary” they seem to have regarded 
it as no different from other conquests. The nearest implication to an end of a kingdom, 
that came up in the sources employed in this study, was one phrase in the campaign 
chronicle which mentions that “it has been 4700 years since Buda was established and 
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Hungarian kings reigned there until King Louis.”1661 Such absence of reference to an 
“end” along with the eventual support given to Szapolyai as king of Hungary suggest 
that Süleyman had no intention of putting an end to this kingdom, or to any other for 
that matter, yet. 
The accounts of contemporary Ottoman chronicles reflect an interesting case as 
far as the conquest of Buda is concerned. Although Sultan Süleyman emerges as an 
omnipotent royal figure with his destruction of the Hungarian army, and capturing its 
seat of government; the appropriation process at Buda lacks some of the most important 
elements of post-conquest actions such as the conversion of churches into mosques, 
calling of the hutba, performance of the Friday prayer by the Sultan, appointment of a 
judge, assignment of troops for post-conquest protection. Not only these actions are 
absent, but also the rhetoric that goes along with them. Ottoman chronicles do not talk 
about a “cleansing process” as we have observed in previous conquests. Even standard 
terms like “teshîr” [subjugation] or “muzâfât” [annexation] are absent for describing the 
post-conquest status of the city. Nowhere is it stated that Buda became part of the 
“Abode of Islam”. Süleyman seems to have occupied the city for a short while, 
appropriated the royal spaces and left without further consequences. Such absence of 
standard post-conquest rhetoric suggests not an intention of permanent long-term 
annexation, but an intention to weaken the opponent to accepting the will of the Sultan. 
This line of thought also suggests that conquest does not necessarily mean direct rule 
over a country, or even direct occupation. Among the honorifics Celâlzâde lists at the 
end of his account of the Mohacs battle is “the king of kings who conquered Hungary” 
[şehinşâh-ı Engürüs-sitân].1662  
If there is a need to place the immediate strategy following the 1526 campaign;  
that followed by Selim I after his brief occupation of Tabriz might be considered a more 
suitable model than the gradual annexation thesis.1663 In both cases, the capital was 
occupied without resistance. The riches of the city were captured, and brought back to 
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Istanbul. Neither defense forces nor administrative units were appointed in the name of 
the Ottoman sultan. Neither territory became a vassal or tributary as a direct and 
immediate consequence. The analogy differs in one important respect, though. Çaldıran 
was not catastrophic for the Safavis in the same sense, because they lost neither the 
cream of their army nor their ruler; thus there was no internal need to re-organize. In 
this respects, Safavis were not as vulnerable as the Hungarians were, and this 
vulnerability seems to have given Ferdinand I the chance and opportunity to pursue his 
claim on Hungary. Consequently, it was this difference that seems to have shaped 
Sultan Süleyman’s strategy and image, placing him in the midst of major European 
power politics. 
In a more general sense, this chapter constituted an exploration of the phases of a 
campaign to delineate ritual instances, symbolic devices, rhetorical conventions, and 
basic strategic concerns which functioned as interconnected elements in maintaining 
Sultan Süleyman’s image and reputation. In this sense, the campaign of 1526 has been 
investigated in four phases. The ceremonial departure involved two main messages 
marked with personal and collective ritual behavior. Süleyman’s personal acts of 
devotion before departure, tomb visits, and praying accompanying the procession 
convey a religious message denoting both the piety of the Sultan and the divine favor 
bestowed on him. The processional departure, in this respect, transforms the war 
enterprise into a sacred one, whereby all participants – including the audience – can feel 
as part. The second message involves the sense of order and authority conveyed by the 
event. The second phase of the campaign is the march whereby several ritual moments 
repeating the messages of similar instances performed in the Palace. Such instances as 
hand-kissing and rewarding at various points imply the continous re-enactment of 
mutual “contracts.” Ritual instances observed throughout the campaign also function as 
motivational tools to maintain and enforce the bond between the Sultan and his army, as 
well as that among the participants. The seemingly more strategic and practical 
concerns such as supplying victuals, crossing rivers, opting between violence, 
intimidation and persuasion have a function, even if indirect, in the maintenance of the 
image and the reputation of the Sultan in terms of the credibility of his authority. The 
third phase in the 1526 campaign is marked with the battle, whereby his personal active 
engagement is employed to emphasize the military prowess of Süleyman Süleyman. 
The final phase consists of the conquest of Buda, and its symbolic appropriation by 
Sultan Süleyman. His activity in Buda seems to be the simulation of typical courtly life 
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Süleyman would have pursued in Istanbul. As such, while his sojourn at Buda signifies 
symbolic appropriation of the city through temporary transformation into the “Abode of 
the Throne,” it also points at the uninterrupted nature of the Sultan’s “court” and all that 
it represents.   
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CHAPTER 6 
SHELTERING THE WORLD: PÂDĐŞÂH-I ‘ÂLEM-PENÂH 
“A defeated king with Turkish support was actually stronger than a victorious one 
with no support at all.”1664 
6.1. Defining the Problem:  
This chapter examines the campaign of 1529, widely known as the Vienna 
campaign. Sultan Süleyman’s 1529 campaign has been analyzed many times in many 
respects. This campaign has generally been coined the Vienna campaign for hundreds of 
years. Many of the scholarly and popular discussions have revolved around the military 
and political aspects of the campaign. It has been analyzed and contextualized within 
the framework of Ottoman imperial expansionist strategies. Contrary to the customary 
coining of the campaign, I argue that the campaign of 1529 entails issues more complex 
than the siege of Vienna or than the expansionist strategies of the Ottomans. When 
contemporary correspondence and comments are evaluated as a single bunch of 
information, the 1529 campaign appears to be a joint expedition rather than an 
ambitious attack on Vienna by Sultan Süleyman. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to 
examine the campaign within the wider context of Habsburg domination and reactions 
attached to it, as well as the role of the Hungarian issue in the image making process of 
Sultan Süleyman. Consequently, the campaign shall be analyzed through the lens of a 
joint venture between Süleyman and Szapolyai, along with lesser stakeholders such as 
Venice and France.1665  
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The campaign of 1529 has produced the radius of action theory. Based on 
statistical data such as distances, marching pace, seasonal conditions Perjes calculated 
what he calls the “radius of operation” of the Ottoman army. According to his 
calculations, “it was precisely in Hungary that the sphere of Ottoman machinery of 
conquest reached its outer limit.”1666 His calculated estimate for the actual radius of 
action regarding Süleyman’s army is around 900 kilometers during a campaign season 
which lasted for 180 days. While Belgrade was 460 kilometers from Istanbul, Buda was 
1450 kilometers, thus out of the range. Given the Habsburg rivalry and the proximity of 
Vienna, maintaining Buda by controlling directly from Istanbul was not a feasable 
option. Being 240 kilometers from Buda, Vienna could supply troops to Buda much 
faster than Istanbul could. Seen through this perspective, the Ottomans were faced with 
a dilemma. They could not annex all of Hungary, but could not leave it to the 
Habsburgs either.  Keeping Buda under some kind of control not only had several 
advantages, but was probably vital. Through Buda, Ottomans could control the Danube 
and Habsburg attacks thereon. Buda being midway between Vienna and Transylvania 
would serve as an obstacle to possible Habsburg advance to the Ottoman realm. As 
such, according Perjes, keeping Hungary as a buffer zone against Habsburg power was 
much more feasible than establishing direct control at Buda. 1667  
Vienna has generally been defined as marking the limit of Ottoman expansion as 
imposed by conditions of geography and climate. As the army moved further away from 
the center of operation, or usually Istanbul in the Ottoman case, the possibility of 
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procurement of supplies and labor decreased, as well as time.1668 Hess agrees that with 
Vienna the limit of expansion was realized and this caused a strategic re-orientation.1669 
Guilmartin argues that the household troops could be efficiently managed only by the 
presence of the sultan during land campaigns; the season set a limit to the duration of 
the campaign. The campaign season was limited from spring to fall. A campaign had to 
be completed before winter due to hardship in transportation. Another factor Guilmartin 
emphasizes is the concern with economical dislocation, in other words, fief holders had 
to be back at their posts. Once Vienna reached, in Guilmartin’s view there is no sense to 
go further. Up to Vienna, as far as the army could go, it was in Muslim hands and the 
rest was not viable for giving out as new fiefs.1670  
Many scholars have attributed the retreat from Vienna on miscalculation on 
Süleyman’s part. It has generally been acknowledged that the harsh winter conditions 
and shortage of food forced the Ottoman retreat.1671 Briefly analyzing the time needed 
by the Ottoman army to reach the southern borders of Hungary from Hungary as 
“twenty-three summer weeks” Gustave Bayerle dwells on the late departure of the 
campaign. As a consequence of such delay and the time spent by harsh marching 
conditions and dispowering of minor fortresses, Bayerle argues, Ottomans did not have 
the opportunity to prepare a systematic siege required for a stronghold such as Vienna. 
By the time the army reached Vienna, it was already short of provisions and had to 
suffer winter climate.1672 Rhoads Murphey defines the Vienna decision as: “His 
misguided and impulsive decision, as a young and overconfident commander-in-chief, 
                                               
1668
 Brummet, “The River Crossing: Breaking Points (Metaphorical and Real) in 
Ottoman Mutiny,” p.219: “Indeed, when one looks at the campaigns against the 
Hapsburgs, one is tempted to say that it was not superior forces or a lack of valor that 
kept the Ottomans from taking Vienna but a combination of water and mud.”  
1669
 Hess, “Road to Victory,” pp.185-6. The author adds that the conviction that 
land war was the best did not change. I tend to agree with Andrew C. Hess as he argues 
that “the Ottoman defeat of the Hungarian army committed the Turco-Muslim empire to 
a conservative pattern of terrestrial conquest at a time when Western Europe entered 
upon a more dynamic mode of economic expansion.” Ibid. p.179.  
1670
 Guilmartin, “Wars of the Ottoman Empire,” pp.733-4. 
1671
 Fichtner, Ferdinand I, p.84.  
1672
 Bayerle, “Frontier Life in Hungary,” p.229. Bayerle’s opinion about the minor 
fortresses consuming Ottoman time and retarding arrival at Vienna seems to be 
supported by a comment by Celalzade. See note 1915 below.  
433 
 
to launch a late season attack against Vienna in 1529 gave him a bitter but therapeutic 
lesson in the lessons of over-extension, a lesson he was not soon to forget.”1673 
Similarly, Sahin-Toth sees the 1529 campaign, like 1532, as a “fiasco of the Sultan” 
revealing the limits of Ottoman military potential which gradually led Szapolyai to 
loosen the ties with Süleyman.1674  
With do respect to the radius of action theory,1675 this chapter aims to demonstrate 
the dynamics of the 1529 which characterizes it as a joint anti-Habsburg venture with 
mission of stabilizing Szapolyai’s kingship as the vital element. This line of argument is 
very much linked with the Ottoman conception of Szapolyai, his claim to kingship as an 
Hungarian noble/lord and the legitimation of this claim by Ottomans.1676 Ottoman 
narratives reflect Szapolyai as “a legitimate king who comes to ask for support and help 
from the sultan in pursuit of his legitimate cause.” This conception works in two ways. 
On one hand, the “legitimate” king of Hungary becomes dependent on the Sultan. On 
the other hand, by undertaking to provide protection and support to the “legitimate” 
king of Hungary, the Sultan emerges as a king-maker, thus proving one of his most 
important honorifics: pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh – refuge of the universe. We shall examine 
contemporary Ottoman narrative sources to trace the reception and perception of 
Szapolyai in the minds of the Ottomans in 1529. While discussing how Szapolyai – “a 
nobleman” – was transformed into “the legitimate king of Hungary”, we shall try to 
contextualize the process within the framework of the Ottoman political discourse of the 
time. In other words, we shall attempt to explore the dynamics through which support 
and legitimation provided for Janos Szapolyai translated into a certain image reflecting 
the “omnipotence and justness” of Sultan Süleyman.  
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6.2. Controversies of Kingship 
The conflict leading to Ottoman offensive military action in 1529 stems from the 
controversy revolving around the kingship of Hungary after the demise of Louis II in 
1526. Sultan Süleyman’s involvement in the controversy and the manner in which this 
controversy was employed in the making of his image is closely linked to the 
contemporary perception of the identity of the “legitimate king of Hungary.” To 
uncover the dynamics leading to the 1529 campaign, some of which are often slighted 
by the involvement of Vienna in the picture, this section dwells on the background from 
the viewpoints of the parties involved. In order to arrive at a better understanding of the 
significance of contemporary debates on legitimacy in relation to the 1529 campaign, 
we need to understand the nature of the controversy which involves three main 
stakeholders. Ottoman viewpoint on the identity of these stakeholders is quite clear. 
Firstly, there is Janos Szapolyai who claims kingship of Hungary based on his 
Hungarian origin and his election by the majority of Hungarian nobles. And he appears 
as the victim in Ottoman chronicles. Secondly, there is Ferdinand of Habsburg who 
claims kingship of Hungary based on certain dynastic claims. And he appears as the 
villain who usurped a throne from a legitimate king. Thirdly, there is Sultan Süleyman 
who claims possession and power of disposal on Hungary based on the right of 
conquest. And he appears as the epic hero who fights for the legitimate cause of a 
rightful king, a cause directly linked to his own honor.  
The demise of Louis II hit a strong blow on the political balance in Hungary 
which was far from being stable even before Mohacs, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter. Immediately after the death of Louis II was heard, Ferdinand and Szapolyai 
both claimed the Hungarian throne. The struggle between these two factions to get hold 
of the throne and the inconclusive nature of the struggle caused constant military action 
after 1526, which Murphey refers to as civil war.1677 
There were about fifty families whom we tend to call the nobility. These barons 
were the major decision makers of the kingdom. They enjoyed land privileges, the right 
to collect taxes, influence in the administration of justice which made them powerful 
figures in the patronage network. More importantly for our discussion, they had the 
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privilege to name the king. As Peter Sahin-Toth puts it: “very quickly changing, 
amorphous aristocratic alliances or ‘parties’ ran the central government and not the 
royal authority which was a lot weaker than at the time of king Matthias.”1678 Along 
with the greater nobility, the role of the lesser nobility most of whom were part of the 
greater patronage network through service began to rise after mid-fifteenth century. As 
they got more involved in the decision making process, their influence and sense of 
identity grew; and they had sympathy for Szapolyai as opposed to the foreign 
interference personified in Ferdinand.1679 Only a minor sector of Hungarian nobility 
accepted Ferdinand as King of Hungary while the majority opted for Szapolyai. This 
sector saw no problem in going under the protection of the Ottoman Sultan in the face 
of Habsburg attack. As they observed in other Balkan regions, they would be permitted 
religious and political autonomy as well as being offered protection.1680 Some German 
princes, who were uneasy about Ferdinand extending his power, also seem to have 
favored Szapolyai’s kingship. The Landgrave of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony, for 
example, did not support Szapolyai directly but refused to support Ferdinand unless he 
convinced them that he would not employ their support to fight Szapolyai.1681 Francis I, 
hostile to the Habsburgs for well known reasons, accepted Szapolyai as King of 
Hungary as did the Venetians.1682  
Before we go on to examine the issue through the perspective of each stakeholder, 
a very brief summary of what happened between 1526 and 1529 would be useful. After 
Szapolyai was elected king of Hungary by the majority of the nobles, Ferdinand sent 
military forces to acquire Hungarian fortresses. Defeated at Tokai, Szapolyai retreated 
to Transylvania and sent an envoy to Süleyman to ask for his support. This was 
followed by Ferdinand’s envoy to the Ottoman court in 1528. Ferdinand’s envoy asked 
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for the castles recently conquered by Süleyman, including those such as Petervarad, 
Ilok, Slankamen, and allegedly even Belgrade. As rumor has it, Đbrahim Paşa was 
amused that he did not ask for Constantinople itself. While Ferdinand’s offer angered 
Süleyman because it defied his right of conquest, Szapolyai’s offer was accepted. In 
early 1528, Süleyman recognized and undertook to protect Szapolyai as king of 
Hungary in return for tribute. In the spring of 1529, Ferdinand’s troops invaded 
Buda.1683 
6.2.1. Janos Szapolyai: The Victim 
Janos Szapolyai was the greatest landowner in Hungary.1684 In this respect 
Szapolyai, Sahin-Toth argues, “simply was one of the most influential magnates who 
was able to mobilize great numbers of average noblemen in order to achieve his 
political aims.”1685 In 1526, Szapolyai was the chief candidate for the leading faction 
who insisted on native kingship.1686 One major demonstration of the influence enjoyed 
by Szapolyai would be the support of Nograd county in the Diet of 1505, when a decree 
was issued to the effect that from then on only Hungarians could be elected King.1687 
This decree was moved forth during the 1526 election in defense of Szapolyai’s claim 
on the throne.1688 
During the siege of Belgrade in 1521, hopes of many Hungarians had rested on 
Janos Szapolyai. According to a Venetian in Buda at the time, this was because 
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Hungary “had no greater captain.”1689 In the Diet of November 1521, one of the 
proposals accepted was the appointment of two captains-in-chief. Thus Janos Szapolyai 
was elected along with palatine Istvàn Bàthory. Though both had that office already, 
through this decree their restricted territorial authority now expanded to the whole 
country. In the Diet in 1522 they were given the title of “captains of His Royal Highness 
and the country.”1690 During the Diet at Buda which opened in May 1523, we see a 
conflict between Louis II and Szapolyai over the return of the alienated royal properties. 
The order was given in 1518. Szapolyai had not complied and refused to do so in 1523, 
which did not have any serious consequences.1691  
Following the death of Louis II at Mohacs, hopes still lay with Szapolyai. He was 
soon elected King of Hungary by the majority of the nobility, only days after Süleyman 
left Buda in late September 1526. Nicolo Ungaro, was was sent to Hungary to see what 
was going on after the arrival of Szapolyai, reported that Szapolyai ordered a diet to be 
held at Székesfehérvár [Alba Regia, Alba Regal, Đstolni Belgrad, Stolni Belgrad] on 5 
November. According to Nicolo Ungaro’s report, Szapolyai first sent 200 horsemen and 
then went personally. Meanwhile, Ferdinand sent two official ambassadors to ask 
Hungarians whether they wanted him to come and be crowned as their king. However 
the envoys were not allowed to talk before the voivode was crowned. The 
administration of the election was left to the palatine Stefano Verbecio, who according 
to the author, was a wise men and always “stood by the kingdom against tyrants.” He 
said: “Signori, you know that you do not have a head, and the Most Serene Archduke of 
Austria wishes to be your King; say your opinion whether you want him or not.” They 
all replied in one voice that they did not want the Archduke as their King. Upon this 
reply Stefano asked them who they wanted as their King. They all shouted that they 
wanted the Voivode. Then they ordered themselves for the funeral of the late King 
Louis. On 10 November, Szapolyai was elected king of Hungary, and was crowned next 
day. Only then did he admit Ferdinand’s ambassadors and asked them what they 
wanted. Replying that they had nothing more to say, they asked for license to leave. The 
author informs that Szapolyai gave them leave and honored them. Then he sent Bishop 
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of Segna as ambassador to the Pope and to France. This letter also lists the immediate 
acts that are related to the administrative affairs performed by Szapolyai; first 
Frangepán was declared ban of Croatia and Slavonia as well as his captain-general. He 
also attended to bishop and archbishop appointments. He exempted all villages which 
were destroyed by Turkish attacks from taxes for five years. He proclaimed that all 
Hungarian nobles and barons should present their obedience in fifteen days; otherwise 
they would be proclaimed rebels. This proclamation, according to the author, was a 
means to provide that those few nobles who sided with Ferdinand to come back to 
Szapolyai’s side, namely Stefano Bathor, palatine; Francesco Bachian, ban of Croatia; 
Alexio Turso, former treasurer; Thomaso, bishop of Vesprim. The author states that 
these nobles elected Ferdinand at Poszony [Bratislava, Pressburg] where the Queen was. 
Ferdinand now wanted to go to Bohemia and be crowned as king of Bohemia. After that 
he planned to come with a huge army and make himself King of Hungary if he could. 
Nicolo Ungaro also mentions an envoy by the signor Turco coming to Szapolyai to ask 
for a fifteen-year truce. The author believes that they would come to an agreement to be 
“friends with the other’s friends and enemies with the other’s enemies.” They would 
give support to each other when one of them needed it. The author reports that 
Szapolyai was not worried because he has the voivode of Wallachia and the Sultan on 
his side.1692 A letter from Zagreb dated 8 January 1527 confirms the appointment of 
Frangepán, and repeats many of the things said in Nicolo Ungaro’s letter. It conveys the 
popular opinion that there would soon be a great fight between Ferdinand and Szapolyai 
which would turn out to be a contest between the Germans and the Turks.1693 Public 
rumors on the road expressed great love for Szapolyai by the Hungarians and their wish 
to make him King. These rumors also showed that they would in no circumstance 
tolerate the Hungarian crown going to Ferdinand.1694  
The Bishop of Segna Francesco da Fiume, mentioned by Ungaro above, was 
apparently commissioned to visit Venice on the way. Arriving with six men, he had 
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audience in the Collegio on 14 December 1526. Sanuto’s account shows that he was 
treated as any ambassador in Venice, having been assigned lodgings and having been 
sent twelve gentlemen to accompany him.1695 Szapolyai’s letter to Doge Loredan was 
dated 16 November, Székesfehérvár “civitate nostra.” His titles echoed his claim: 
“Joannes Dei gratia rex Hungariae, Dalmatie, Croatie, marchio Moravie, Lusatiae, et 
dux Slesiae etc.”1696 Szapolyai is described as a 36 years-old man who never wished to 
marry, and who wanted to pursue the path of King Matthias.1697 We shall not list each 
and every envoy of Szapolyai’s, however, one envoy sent to Venice in March 1528, as 
Ottoman support to Szapolyai came to be more and more clear, is rather interesting in 
the sense of the international recognition sought by Szapolyai. This envoy asked for a 
Venetian ambassador to be sent to King Janos to enhance his reputation [darli 
reputation].1698 
In the beginning, Szapolyai thought that Ferdinand would accept his claim, and 
that an agreement with the Sultan would buy him time to organize his forces.1699 When 
Ferdinand was elected King of Bohemia, Szapolyai sent an envoy to congratulate him 
as well as offering to arrive at an understanding regarding the throne of Hungary. 
Among Szapolyai’s offers to Ferdinand was also cooperation against the Ottoman 
threat. For this end, he went as far as offering to give up his claims to Silesia and 
Moravia, and to marry Mary of Habsburg in return for Ferdinand’s recognizing him as 
King of Hungary. However, Ferdinand did not even give the envoy an audience.1700 
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Instead he resorted to military action in Hungary, invading even Buda itself, as well as 
diplomatic action presenting Szapolyai as an usurper and an accomplice of the Ottoman 
Sultan, as we shall see below.  
Realizing the uncompromising attitude, Szapolyai first engaged in diplomatic 
action to clarify his intentions and to defend his cause. In the spring of 1527, he sent 
delegates to German princes and estates to convince them of his intention and capability 
to fight the Turk.1701 Trying to clear his name and to prove his right to the Hungarian 
crown, Szapolyai sent envoys to major courts of Europe. In the letters he sent, he 
emphasized his legitimacy through election and explained his reason to approach the 
Ottomans for support against Ferdinand. An example would be his letter to Henry VIII, 
dated 25 September 1528, in which he explained that after the death of Louis II he was 
elected king by all the peers, except for three who were “tricked by Ferdinand.” 
Szapolyai defended his initiative to ask for Ottoman help on the grounds that Ferdinand 
“invaded the country with great cruelty.” He complained that Ferdinand did not accept 
negotiators, and furthermore that he put a death sentence on all who called Szapolyai 
“king.” Szapolyai also accused Ferdinand of trying to form an alliance with the Turk 
against him. In Szapolyai’s view Ferdinand lost castles to the Turk, let alone recover 
them as he claimed to do.1702 
On the other hand, Szapolyai was accused by many of not arriving on time to help 
the king in 1526. Almost immediately in the aftermath of the Battle of Mohacs, the 
word of his accord with the Turk kept circulating. Antonio Boemo, for example, was 
about to leave Buda when he saw Szapolyai’s men arrive on 27 October. He reports that 
Szapolyai himself was expected at Buda with the treasury soon. Antonio Boemo reports 
that there was going to be a diet at Székesfehérvár on 5 November. He tells that 
Szapolyai wanted the crown and he had supporters. This report also defies the rumors of 
Szapolyai fighting the Turks, but contrarily presents him in communication. This view 
seems to be based on the presence of the voivode of Wallachia with Szapolyai, the 
former already being a tributary of the Sultan.1703 By December, rumors extended to the 
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presence of an Ottoman envoy at the court of Szapolyai.1704 There were even rumors 
that Szapolyai killed King Louis for he wanted the Hungarian crown for himself.1705 Yet 
other reports mention that he was ready with 50,000 men, but “dares not leave his own 
country, for fear of the waywode of Wallachia, who, though a Hungarian, is half an 
Infidel.”1706 Carlo Contarini, the Venetian ambassador at the imperial court, reported, in 
his relation of 29 March 1527, that he has heard that “the voivode king of Hungary” was 
in accord with the Turk and that “when the Turk came to destroy Hungary, he 
[Szapolyai] did not come on time, therefore the King was defeated and killed.”1707  
Others were sure he came to support the King. The runaway slave Jurco 
Vladanovich, who swears that he is telling the truth because he has seen everything with 
his own eyes, reports that the voivode of Transylvania not only arrived the day after the 
battle with 10,000 men but that he scolded the king because he did not wait for him.1708 
Although there is no truth to Szapolyai arriving and scolding the King – since basically 
the king was nowhere to be found – there is evidence that both he and Frangepán sent 
messages to Louis II not to move into battle prematurely, but wait until they arrived.1709 
In his letter dated 5 September Burgio, who left Buda on 30 August to Poszony with the 
Queen, mentions the rumors that the voivode was already at Buda with the intention to 
resist.1710 Various reports in mid-July point at Szapolyai’s preparations to join the King. 
Some riders who came to Udine from Buda, for example, report that the voivode of 
Transylvania has called even the priests to war.1711 A merchant from Buda, who came to 
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Trevisa, mentions that Szapolyai was ready with sixty thousand men.1712 A report dated 
25 September by Fazio di Savoai, who left Graz a week before, mentions the 
expectation at Buda of Szapolyai. According to this report, the voivode was gathering 
the scattered men and was going to be king in Buda with the “consensus of the 
Hungarians.”1713 A letter dated 17 October by the deputy [locotenente] of Udine 
mentions that the voivode of Transylvania together with four barons who supported him 
was on the move with 80,000 soldiers.1714 On 23 October 1526, Wolsey wrote to Henry 
VIII: “…a nobleman of great power there (John Zapol) has gathered a large army to 
oppose the Turk.”1715  
The mixed nature of Szapolyai’s army in 1529 testifies to a lack of regional unity 
regarding the Hungarian army. It also reflects a sense of a greater picture of an 
eastern/central European unified attempt against Habsburg dominance. A letter by 
Gregory Casale to Wolsey, dated 9 July 1529, presents a survey of the current situation 
as seen from Rome. Among Casale’s informants are a secret agent of Szapolyai who 
often visits him, the Bishop of Zagreb and his servant in Buda. Casale reports that 
Szapolyai had a strong army including the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. He was 
also supported by the Marquis of Brandenburg Albert who was the great master of 
Prussia and the leader of German forces. Casale’s report also demonstrates the mixed 
nature of Szapolyai’s army which consisted of Hungarians, Transylvanians, Sclaves, 
Croats, Racians, Teutons, Moldavians, Wallachians, Polacks and Tartars. Casale’s 
report also demonstrates a series of shifting allegiances. Hungarians, Croats, 
Transylvanians and Sclaves who were subject to Ferdinand have now joined Szapolyai. 
Casale also mentions rumors that Ferdinand’s chief commander Cozianer, a Croatian, 
has gone over to Szapolyai’s side after being rejected by the people for his 
“mismanagement.” Among Szapolyai’s commanders we also see Bohemians.1716 
Written around the same time, on 27 June, a letter by the envoy of Szapolyai from 
Belgrade states that, “those lords who were initially with the archduke have come to 
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King John.”1717 These changing of sides are nothing new in 1529. The whole period 
between 1526 and 1529 appears to be defined by such shifts. Hungarian aid and support 
would tend toward Ferdinand when he made an attempt against an Ottoman stronghold 
or when Charles had success in his other military endeavors. This aid would then shift 
back to Szapolyai upon a failure of imperial troops in Hungary or upon French or 
Ottoman success over imperial troops.1718 A letter by a lieutenant of Christoph 
Frangepán [Cristoforo Frangipani], dated 22 October 1526, has a rather hostile tone 
regarding Szapolyai. The author of the letter introduces Frangepán as the savior and 
defender of Hungary, while presenting Szapolyai as “an unskillful coward who caused 
the fall of the Kingdom.”1719 In a letter to Antonio Dandolo, dated 1 September 1527, 
Frangepán himself refers to Szapolyai as “our signor and patron most serene Hungarian 
King John” and informs about those who went to Ferdinand’s side and others who came 
to Szapolyai.1720 By summer 1528, reports attest to confusion as to which side to take. 
The march of the Ottoman troops in defense of Szapolyai seems to have added to this 
confusion. The letter of the deputy of Udine, dated 1 June 1528, dwells on this 
confusion and mentions that the barons [signori] do not want to go against 
Szapolyai.1721 Perhaps it is György Szeremi’s words that best reflect the slippery 
grounds on which the theater of conflict was performed: “The Hungarians have reached 
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the point where if a family has two growing sons, they encourage one to join the cause 
of Ferdinand, the other the party of King Janos.”1722 
6.2.2. Ferdinand: The Antagonist  
Throughout the 1520s, Ferdinand is seen as trying to transform the defense of 
Hungary into a “cooperative venture” and a “universal cause.”1723 Up to 1526 we find 
him offering support and cooperation to Louis II, in a way assuming the role of 
defender of Hungary. In 1521, he sent word to King Louis II stating that he would do 
anything in his power to help Hungary against the Ottomans.1724 The fall of Belgrade 
probably provided him with an opportunity to press his point. It was around the same 
time that Ferdinand started to ask for anti-Ottoman help from Charles. In 1522, he 
negotiated with his brother to provide help to Hungary, arguing that assistance to 
Hungary was in fact assistance to his own lands.1725 In 1522, he sent an envoy to King 
Louis to assure him that next time he would come in person to help him.1726 Throughout 
the early 1520s, Ferdinand tried to reform the King’s court and administration though 
faced with resistance.  By 1525, Hungarians seem to have loathed the German influence 
in their court, and demanded that the Germans at court be replaced with “Magyars.” 
They blamed Ferdinand and Mary for the German presence in their kingdom.1727 In 
1525, Ferdinand already had much trouble in his hand. There was a Tyrolean uprising 
whereby the estates demanded their own to be appointed to administrative posts. They 
wanted Ferdinand to have native advisors. In the fall of 1525 they asked for a general 
diet. Ferdinand called their representatives to Augsburg, feeling the need to negotiate. 
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Furthermore, Charles recommended him not to antagonize with his subjects because he 
would need to ask for their help against the “Turks.”1728 Thus in 1526, when 
Ferdinand’s help was most needed by Louis II, he was in condition to help. He had to 
deal with peasant uprisings in Styria and Salzburg, as well as aid Charles in Italy. 
Ferdinand could only hope to convince the estates to send military assistance to 
Hungary, in return for freedom of confession in each estate until a decision was reached 
at the council. Upon this promise, on 18 August, the estates decide to send help.1729 
Throughout 1527-1528 Ferdinand tried to secure help from the estates. However, there 
were several reasons for their hesitance to accept Ferdinand’s pleas. Some did not trust 
him because they thought he would collect the money and transfer it to Charles’s Italian 
campaigns. Others regarded Szapolyai as a Christian ruler who could fight the Ottomans 
on his own.1730  
After the battle of Mohacs, Ferdinand regarded Hungary as his possession now 
that the King was dead.1731 His claim was not totally unfounded. The origins of the 
controversy can be traced back to 1463 when a treaty was signed between Emperor 
Frederick III [1440-1493] and King Matthias Corvinus [1458-1490]. According to this 
treaty, if Matthias died heirless either Frederick or his son Maximilian would inherit the 
Hungarian throne. When Maximilian claimed the right upon the death of King Matthias, 
Hungarian nobility opposed. Thus a new treaty was signed with Vladislas III in 1491 
renewing the previous one. After another renewal in 1506, the alliance was reinforced 
by the plans of a double marriage between Ferdinand of Habsburg and Anna of 
Hungary, and between Mary of Habsburg and Louis II of Hungary. Neither the treaty 
nor the dynastic alliance meant much for Hungarian nobility, however, since the only 
legitimate ruler of Hungary could be the one elected by the nobility.1732 In other words, 
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the hostility of Hungarian nobility towards the Habsburgs was present long before 1526. 
The Queen’s influence on the Hungarian court and Ferdinand’s immediate claims had 
reinforced this hostility. 
Ferdinand learned of the death of Louis II ten days after the actual battle. He 
reacted quickly by claiming the Hungarian and the Bohemian thrones as the husband of 
the deceased King’s only sibling. The claimed intention was to keep the “Turks” and 
potential “hostile rulers”, namely the Polish King Sigismund and Janos Szapolyai far 
from the borders of the kingdom. Since Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary had many 
common borders, Ferdinand saw them as a unity which could be defended in whole 
against the Ottoman threat. 1733 In this sense, it might be argued that Ferdinand’s claims 
were not based merely on dynastic ambition. The territorial take-over which entailed an 
economic take-over of the country would give Ferdinand the opportunity to defend 
Austria, in other words the patrimonial lands, from within Hungary and with Hungarian 
resources.1734 Although defending his patrimonial lands through keeping Hungary as a 
buffer zone under his own control might have been a logical strategy, it proved quite 
infeasible in economic terms. According to the figures given by Fichtner, in 1528 
Ferdinand’s income from Hungary was only 9,000 guldens whereas the army he kept 
there cost him 90,000 guldens until May.1735 In 1531, Ferdinand was to justify his 
motives to Charles in three strands. Firstly, he presented his adversary Süleyman as a 
tyrant, therefore a concord was impossible. Secondly, Hungary was important in the 
geo-strategic respect in terms of its resources. With its rich resources, it could either 
supply victuals and money to Christendom or enrich the enemy. In this sense, by 
acquiring Hungary Ferdinand would not only gain these riches for Christendom but 
prevent the enemy having more resources. In Ferdinand’s mind, Hungary was still the 
“wall and defense of Christendom.” Thirdly, his conscience and honor required that he 
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acquired the Hungarian throne because many Christians died protecting it against the 
infidels. Agreeing with the enemy now would be dishonorable.1736 
As much as Hungarians disliked Ferdinand, Ferdinand seems to have distrusted 
the Hungarians. The observations of a messenger sent by Marco Antonio Contarini to 
Vienna in August 1529 are rather interesting in this respect. The messenger observed 
that the army of Ferdinand’s chief commander Cozianer consisted of Bohemians and 
Germans only because “the prince has little trust in Hungarians, he even sees them as 
enemies, because the said Hungarians prefer the lordship of the Turks over that of this 
signor since it seems to them that they will be more secure under the said Signor 
Turco.”1737 Ferdinand was perhaps not mistaken in his assessment. In a letter as early as 
29 September 1526, Frangepán, a rather powerful Hungarian magnate himself at the 
time, mentions that “everyone, both the nobility and the people are of the same opinion 
that they would rather surrender to the Turk rather than be under the Alemani.”1738 This 
raises the question of how Hungarians were supposed to accept Ferdinand as their King 
when they could not even accept his advisors at the court of Louis II. Such attitude 
reflects a deep rooted anti-Habsburg sentiment. Furthermore, since the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, the leading faction in Hungary demanded a native king and in 1526 
Szapolyai was the chief candidate.1739  
On 17 December 1526, the pro-Habsburg party assembled by Mary to name 
Ferdinand King of Hungary. A few weeks later Crotia, Dalmatia and Slavonia chose 
him king on the promise of defense. There was now a serious problem: Szapolyai’s 
election had taken place before Ferdinand’s. The Habsburg brothers first tried to counter 
the problem through legal means. Through a mandate he issued at Granada, Charles 
made a pledge to protect his sister’s and brother’s rights in Hungary and attacked the 
validity of Szapolyai’s election on the grounds that the election could only be realized 
by a diet summoned by the Palatine. A counter argument was immediately put forth 
based on precedence; the diets which elected Matthias and Vladislav were not 
summoned by the Palatine. Understanding that the problem could not be overcome in 
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constitutional terms and he did not have the financial resources to attract support to his 
side, Ferdinand thought that military action to kick Szapolyai out of Hungary would be 
the most efficient way to solve the problem. However, neither Charles nor the estates 
favored such a solution.1740  
In the winter of 1527, Charles sent Ferdinand 100,000 ducas for Hungary; 
however he told his brother not to engage in war, but wait.1741 At the end of July 1527, 
Ferdinand began offensive action in Hungary. On 20 August 1527, the Austrian camp 
was at Buda. Having been defeated at Tokaj by Nicholas von Salm, Szapolyai first went 
to Transylvania and passed on to Poland.1742 Though Ferdinand held Buda in 1528, his 
reputation among the people had not improved. It was common gossip that he did not 
have a single duca. Even worse, the rumor circulated that the funds he created by 
melting the silver collected from the churches for anti-Ottoman defense was already 
spent to pay for the soldiers fighting in Italy. Ferdinand left Buda for Vienna to ask for 
money from his “terre franche” that had no intention to give away any more money 
under the cover of anti-Turkish help, to make war against the Hungarians.1743 
Furthermore, it was again common gossip that Ferdinand was not well-liked by the 
Hungarians.1744  
When Ferdinand was elected king of Hungary, his supporters expected him to 
reside at Buda occasionally.1745 The timing of his attacks on Buda does not seem 
coincidental. The Sack of Rome by imperial forces in 1527 provided Ferdinand the 
opportunity to re-direct his forces to Hungary since there was a temporary break in 
Italian wars. His armies won some victories in 1527 and 1528 which probably made 
him look as if he could stand against the Ottomans in defense of Hungary. Some of the 
nobles probably saw this as an opportunity and joined his side. His coronation at 
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Székesfehérvár on 3 November 1527 completed the so far missing symbolic 
demonstration of legitimation.1746  
After his coronation at Székesfehérvár on 3 November 1527, Ferdinand sent a 
proclamation of victory justifying his claim on Hungary. In this letter he declared 
Szapolyai as rebel and public enemy [nostrum public inimicum] and Süleyman as the 
“enemy of the Christian name and our faith” [inimicum nominis christiani et fidei 
nostrae].1747 Italian news reaching England in early 1527 reflects papal opinion on 
providing Ferdinand help against Szapolyai. General concern was that if Ferdinand 
received support from England, or elsewhere for that matter, or attacked him, Szapolyai 
would feel compelled to ask for Ottoman support. One suggestion was to intervene in 
counsel and persuade Ferdinand to give Szapolyai his sister in marriage like the latter 
has asked before.1748 
Although Charles saw Ferdinand’s claim to the throne of Hungary well-justified, 
he also believed that antagonizing Szapolyai at this point would push the voivode to 
cooperate with the Ottomans and invade Austria itself.1749 As soon as Ferdinand’s 
intentions on Hungary became clear in the aftermath of Mohacs, Charles seems to have 
raised his objections. By the beginning of November 1526, rumors were circulating that 
Charles had sent letters to Ferdinand telling to put off the Hungarian issue in order not 
to put his people in risk.1750 
In January 1528, France and England declared war on the Emperor. The war was 
projected as a struggle for the safety and the soul of Christendom, with Francis I and 
Henry VIII posing themselves as “saviors of the Respublica Christiana.” They argued 
that Charles brought suffering and bloodshed to Christendom. Therefore, they claimed, 
it was the duty of Christian princes to punish him and restore order. Furthermore, they 
claimed that Charles was unable to perform his primary imperial duty, namely that of 
safeguarding Christianity from infidels and heretics. It was because of his personal 
ambitions that Christendom was unable to set back Turkish attacks. Charles V replied 
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by putting the blame on Francis I because, he claimed, the French King was keeping 
him from dealing with the Turks. If it were not for this reason, he actually had a 
profound interest in a crusade. This interest he had demonstrated when he attached 
himself in the efforts of Pope Leo X in 1518. But with the intervention of the election 
and then the assaults of Francis he had to occupy himself with the protection of his own 
lands. Thus, according to Charles V, it was actually Francis’s fault that the Turks were 
victorious and that Rhodes was lost.1751 The mutual accusations which were current 
after the fall of Rhodes were reanimated, Sultan Süleyman once again became a 
powerful propaganda tool. 
Ferdinand not only resolved to armed contest, but diplomatic initiatives as well to 
reinforce his claim on Hungary. In a letter he sent to Henry VIII, dated 11 March 1527, 
from Prague, he asked for the support of the King of England in his cause, in other 
words in defending his rights. This support consisted mainly of recognizing him as the 
king of Hungary and providing him with consultation about “resisting the enemy.” 
Ferdinand based his claims on two main lines of argument. Firstly, he de-legitimized 
Szapolyai’s claims arguing his incapability and ill-will. He accused Szapolyai of 
unjustly invading the kingdom and of thinking nothing other than attaining the crown. 
Ferdinand blamed Szapolyai for the loss of the kingdom and the death of the king based 
on his “refusal” to help King Louis II first during the siege of Belgrade and then in his 
delay in sending forces to Mohacs, thereby causing the kingdom to fall. Secondly, he 
legitimized his own position through emphasizing his hereditary right on the kingdom 
through his wife and his capability of providing protection to the realm in question 
employing the help of both his numerous realms and his brother the Emperor.1752  
Ferdinand’s ambassadors arrived in England in March 1527. The envoy focused on the 
Süleyman’s capture of Belgrade and Rhodes, and his killing of the Hungarian king. The 
argument emphasized the dichotomy of the “good seeds sawn by Christ” versus the 
“evil seeds of Muhammad.” After the envoy informed Henry VIII on the power, 
military forces and captains of the Sultan, he dwelled on the necessity of a great number 
of people to be able to overthrow him. “Wherefore, he most humbly besought the king 
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as S. Georges knight, and defender of the faith, to assist the king his master in that 
godly warre and vertuous purpose.”1753  
Ferdinand’s diplomatic efforts to obtain support seem to have backfired in many 
instances. His requests of support to oppose the Turk were often regarded as a mask to 
finance his own agenda, as well as that of his brother. When ordered the silver in the 
churches to be removed to pay for the campaign against the Turk in October 1526,1754 
not everyone believed Ferdinand’s intentions. On the contrary, many believed that once 
he acquired the silver through this means, he would go to Hungary to be its king.1755 
Others accused him of spending one fourths of the funds, collected from the imperial 
lands as aid against the Ottomans for Italian wars. Therefore, they would refuse to 
provide aid because he used it against Christians.1756 Following Ferdinand’s coronation 
at Prague as king of Bohemia on 24 February 1527, English ambassador Wallop 
informed Wolsey that Ferdinand would be unable to wage war upon Hungary because 
“he was obliged to take away the jewels in all his churches in Ostryge and Teroll, to pay 
for his coronation, at which the people grudged sore.”1757  Not only his own subjects, 
but the rulers he approached doubted his purposes. In February 1527, Venetian 
ambassador in England reported that Henry VIII suspected that the funds gathered to 
make war against the Turk were being used for Charles’s war in Italy.1758 The envoy of 
the Duke of Ferrara in Venice reported the suspicions of the Duke on the request made 
to him by Ferdinand. Informing the Duke about his concern about the Turk coming to 
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“destroy him and Christendom, and to penetrate into Alemagna,” Ferdinand assured the 
Duke that he would do anything in his power to obstruct the threat. However, he needed 
help from Christian princes. The Duke, however, replied by saying that “his forces were 
not enough against the Christian whom he [Ferdinand] wished to offend, implying the 
Pope.”1759  
Ferdinand tried his hand in diplomatic efforts with the Ottomans to have Hungary 
for himself. The first diplomatic step of Ferdinand to this end following the occupation 
of Buda in 1526 was sending envoys to Upper Bosnia and to Belgrade to persuade the 
governors to refuse providing help to Szapolyai. He offered three to six thousand ducats 
for their alliance.1760 He sent a legate to Süleyman hoping to turn things to his favor. 
Fisher-Galati attributes this move to Ferdinand’s total lack of understanding the 
situation. Ottomans would naturally not recognize Ferdinand’s claims over a conquered 
land which they intended to keep as a “buffer between East and West which would be 
ruled by a puppet, not by a leading member of a powerful western dynasty.” His envoy 
returned in February 1529 with unfavorable news. His offer was not accepted, and 
furthermore an Ottoman campaign in favor of Szapolyai was on the way.1761 
Ferdinand’s envoys seem to have had a difficult time reaching Istanbul. Reports 
mention that they were held at the border until clear orders came from Süleyman to let 
them in. They are reported to have brought with them many gifts to the Sultan.1762 Piero 
Zen reported the arrival of two envoys by Ferdinand at Constantinople on 16 April 
1528. The party consisting of one German and one Croatian were accepted by Đbrahim 
Paşa to whom they presented a silver cup with gold worth 300 ducats. Along with them 
was a Hungarian whom Đbrahim seemed to know. The Hungarian was admitted to the 
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Sultan’s presence on 29 April. Zen mentioned Đbrahim’s fury over Ferdinand’s calling 
himself the King of Hungary.1763  
In July 1529, we see Ferdinand negotiating with Süleyman once more. In a way 
he tries to “buy off” Süleyman with a “pension”; the word “tribute” being carefully 
avoided. But the Sultan remains fixed in his intentions.1764 Ferdinand’s concern 
regarding the avoidance of “tribute” seems understandable by contemporary standards. 
Machiavelli, for example, explains that Venetians once thought they were so superior, 
but then had to make concessions to everyone and “they debased themselves to such an 
extent that they sent ambassadors to the emperor to become his tributary…”1765  
 Ferdinand’s letter to Süleyman from Linz dated 27 July 1529 was a 
recommendation letter for Nikolaus Jurischitsch. Ferdinand referred to Süleyman as the 
“Turkish Emperor at Asia and Greece,” as well as “our dearest friend.” His own titles, 
on the other hand, started with King of Hungary by God’s grace, among others.1766 
Ironically, his claim to Hungarian kingship was what angered Süleyman in the first 
place. 
6.2.3. Sultan Süleyman: The Protagonist 
In the immediate aftermath of Mohacs, Sultan Süleyman has adopted a wait and 
see attitude. This can be regarded as both natural and logical because he did not have 
the means or even the opportunity to rule directly through occupation, as briefly 
discussed above. As Rhoads Murhey argues, he acted like Charles V to the trans-
Danubian zone in staying at a distance to see what would happen. As Ferdinand stepped 
into the scene it was inevitable that Ottoman activity related to the region ran parallel to 
Austrian offensives.1767 If we agree that Ferdinand was trying to defend his patrimonial 
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lands from within Hungary, the same could perhaps be said for Süleyman as well in 
terms of containing Habsburg power remote from his core lands. In the meanwhile, 
Süleyman was expected to proceed to Vienna even in 1526 after he got Buda.1768 This 
expectation was probably related to the perceptions on Sultan Süleyman and his 
intentions.1769 In this sense, as much as Ferdinand’s aggressive moves into Hungary had 
to some extent to do with putting a check on Ottoman threat, the controversy of 
kingship of Hungary accompanied by Ferdinand’s aggressive military attempts seems to 
be a main factor underlying Süleyman’s 1529 campaign.  
Contemporary Ottoman sources identify the target of the 1529 campaign as 
Ferdinand I. According to the campaign diary, the aim of the 1529 campaign was “to 
drive Ferdinand away from Buda.”1770 Chronicles cite as immediate reasons of the 
campaign the occupation of Buda and invasion of Hungarian territory by Ferdinand. 
They condemn Ferdinand’s actions based on two reasons. Firstly, Hungary, especially 
Buda, belonged to the Sultan by the right of the sword. Secondly, the Sultan bestowed 
its kingship on “Yanoş Kral” [King Janos] who was already elected according to the 
Hungarian custom [10 November 1526],1771 and who had a right to the Hungarian 
throne by blood.1772 From the start chronicles associate the concept of “protection” with 
Sultan Süleyman. According to Lütfi Paşa, who was the governor of Damascus at the 
time, Szapolyai approached Süleyman after Ferdinand captured Buda and drove him 
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out. Upon this, Szapolyai sent an envoy to the Ottoman court offering the Sultan annual 
tribute [harâc] of one thousand pieces of gold in return for intervening on his behalf to 
drive Ferdinand out and giving the country to him instead. Süleyman was not pleased 
with Ferdinand’s presence in Buda, so he set off with his army.1773  
Celalzade explains the reason of the 1529 campaign with Ferdinand’s “invasion” 
[istilâ] of Hungarian territory [Engürüs vilâyetleri]. According to the brief background 
information given by the author, the Sultan “granted the kingship of Hungary to Yanoş 
Kral – who was the ban of Transylvania - after the battle of Mohacs.”1774 However 
Ferdinand, who is described as the possessor of the German and Czech territories 
nearby and the brother of the “Kaiser of Spain” [Đspanya çesârı], coveted the lands of 
Hungary, and attacked and captured many fortresses. “Yanoş Kral”, on the other hand, 
did not have enough power to resist him, so he had to let go of Buda. According to 
Celalzade, these actions signified Ferdinand’s open hostility toward Süleyman.1775 
While introducing Ferdinand, the author mentions that European rulers [selâtin-i Frenk 
ve havâkīn-i küfr-âyin] were proud of him and he was often victorious against his 
enemies. According to Celalzade, based on these he desired to be Emperor [Çesâr].1776 
As such, Celalzade asserted that “imperial protection” [hamiyet-i cihânbânî] required 
that Süleyman destroy Ferdinand’s “valor and might” [şevket ü şehâmet]. Secondly, 
Ferdinand’s actions could extend into the borders of Süleyman’s protected domains 
[memâlik-i mahrūse-yi hakâniyye]. Thus, Süleyman decided to proceed to Vienna.1777 
Celalzade’s explanations imply three main motives for the 1529 campaign: the violation 
of Süleyman’s right of sword; rivalry in terms of universal rulership; and the perceived 
need for pre-emptive strike. Celalzade uses the word “çesâr” which can be taken to 
mean Emperor. Taken within the context of Ferdinand’s insistent efforts to acquire the 
title of King of Romans at the time, the author’s argument sheds light on the 
contemporary power struggles and balancing attempts as well. 
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Bostan attributes Süleyman’s decision to take military action to the refusal of 
Ferdinand to offer tribute in return for the Hungarian territories he occupied.1778 This is 
again taken as a violation of Süleyman’s right of conquest. A soldier himself Nasuh, on 
the other hand, emphasizes that Ferdinand occupied Buda by force and forced “Yanoş 
Kral” out of the city. In a poem he adds to his account, the author focuses on the issue 
of “protection” [hamiyet] whereby providing protection is posed as a requirement of 
sovereignty and protecting Hungary also falls under this duty.1779  
Judging by contemporary standards, the appearance of “protection” as honorable 
motive is quite understandable. A similar instance of French occupation of Milan 
suggests that the reasoning provided in contemporary Ottoman chronicles was not mere 
words of justification but part of an established general code of honor. When Francis I 
triumphantly entered Milan on 26 October 1524, Ferdinand “reckoned the Emperor’s 
‘honor, authority and reputation’ was so seriously damaged by this that it required 
extraordinary measures.”1780 For Machiavelli, too, any attempt against the safety of an 
ally would be a cause that provoked a powerful state for war. A powerful state would be 
obliged to fight to protect its honor when an ally was under threat and asked for help.1781 
Süleyman seems to have been in communication with Szapolyai from early on, as 
foreign correspondence shows. The news from Hungary dated 20 June 1527 reports the 
presence of an Ottoman envoy at Buda. He is said to have dined with Szapolyai and the 
barons on his arrival. He is also said to have had conversed with Szapolyai in private 
and left immediately, which was taken as a sign that Szapolyai came to an agreement 
with the Sultan.1782 By June, both Zen’s reports from Istanbul and various rumors 
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demonstrate the intention on Süleyman’s part to support Szapolyai.1783 Zen reports on 
28 January 1528 that Szapolyai’s envoy arrived and asked for help against Ferdinand 
with the offer to become tributary to the Sultan. According to Zen, this was the fourth 
envoy sent by Szapolyai to Süleyman’s court. The first two were said to be robbed and 
the third killed. According to the arrangements made, Süleyman would first send 12,000 
mounted soldiers at the border zone, to be followed by the governor-general of Rumelia 
with 30,000 cavalry. Szapolyai was instructed not to engage in battle before the arrival 
of the Rumelian troops.1784 Zen’s reports until 27 April 1528 suggest an intention on 
Süleyman’s part to handle the situation in person. This letter makes it clear that the 
support plan includes the personal presence of neither Süleyman nor Đbrahim but 
involves Ottoman provincial troops marching in three strands up to the German 
borders.1785  
Zen’s letter from Constantinople in early June 1528 reports the audience given to 
Ferdinand’s envoys who asked for peace, or at least a truce. Süleyman, however, 
offered two conditions: to leave Hungary to Szapolyai and to have Charles make peace 
with France and Venice. Meanwhile, the Sultan sent decrees to the provinces to assist 
the “voivode.”1786 In early October, the envoys still could not obtain any favors from the 
Sultan. On the contrary, they were detained when they kept requesting the Hungarian 
fortresses, a request which evoked Süleyman’s fury. According to Zen, the Sultan was 
so furious that he did not even hide his intention of a Hungarian campaign whereby he 
aimed to penetrate far into Alemagna. Such openness of intention seems to have 
surprised Zen who emphasizes that this was contrary to the customs of previous 
sultans.1787 Piero Zen’s letters dated 6 and 11 May, as he saw the Ottoman army leave 
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Istanbul in 1529, report that the Sultan left the city with the wish of “putting King Janos 
the voivode in the kingdom of Hungary.”1788 
Venetian correspondence reflects total Ottoman awareness of the situation in 
Europe. Piero Zen’s letter from Constantinople, dated 11 March, demonstrates that 
Ottomans were closely informed about the coronation plans of Charles V and the 
tension caused by the Sack of Rome. Zen’s conversation with Đbrahim Paşa as he relates 
it, implies genuine curiosity. According to Zen, Đbrahim asked Ferdinand’s ambassadors 
whether their king was actually Christian. When the ambassadors replied in the 
affirmative, he said: “Why are you making war against your own Pope and make such 
great damage in Rome?” The ambassadors replied that the Pope should attend to 
ecclesiastical matters and leave the affairs of the state to the Emperor. Zen’s letter also 
demonstrates Đbrahim interrogating him about the power of European princes. He 
inquires about the forces of the French king and asks Zen, “who are the other emperors 
beside my Gran Signor?”1789 In a letter from the camp at Niš, Alvise Gritti reports 
having discussed with Đbrahim Paşa informing him of the developments and handlings 
with the Emperor regarding the peace and the negotiations of the “two ladies at Cambrai 
for discuss peace.”1790 
6.2.4. Supporting Actors: France and Venice and Poland 
Increasing Habsburg power was probably the most influential element in the 
political world of the 1520s in the decisions and strategies of various courts in Europe. 
Each power holder seems to have tried to resist this often aggressive power to protect its 
own interests. Although power can be useful in both war and intimidation, too much 
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power brings along its own risks to states just like lack of power does. Not having 
sufficient power may invite an attack, as we have seen in the 1526 case, whereas greater 
power could dissuade an adversary from direct assault. On the other hand, when a 
political player has or perceived to have excessive power, it may become a reason for 
others to ally against the dominant power, as seems to have been the case with anti-
Habsburg stance.1791  
Following Mohacs and the election of Szapolyai, a rather complex network of 
diplomacy is observable. Such traffic points at efforts of attracting allies for each party 
involved in the controversy. Poland seems to have acted as a major negotiator in trying 
to reach a solution to the conflict. In February 1527, there are reports about the presence 
of envoys of Süleyman, Ferdinand and Szapolyai at the Polish court simultaneously.1792 
It was around the same time when Francis I commissioned Antonio Rincon to win the 
support of King Sigismund of Poland for Szapolyai’s cause.1793 The English 
ambassador at Prague, wrote home to Wolsey on 12 March, that an ambassador of 
Poland arrived “to negotiate between the king of Bohemia and the king of Hungary.”1794 
As early as 1527, we see Francis I taking Szapolyai’s side. This should not be 
surprising since Ferdinand was no friend of the French King. In February 1527, Rincon 
was sent to offer French aid to Szapolyai. In Fall 1528, a Hungarian bishop came to 
Paris to sign an alliance with Francis. According to this alliance, Francis would provide 
financial aid to Szapolyai. In return, in the case that Szapolyai died childless, the 
kingdom would pass to the Duc d’Orleans. It is known that the French wanted the Turk 
to be powerful to undermine the power of Charles V.1795 As the 1529 campaign came to 
a close, we can observe other parties who see Süleyman as a counter-balancing power.  
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A letter dated 20 October 1529 from Florence reflects mixed emotions related to the 
advance of the Ottoman army:  
As for the ultimate remedy to the affairs of Italy we have come to the point of 
wishing for the prosperity and felicity of the Turkish affairs. Poor 
Christendom! Here and elsewhere we remain with our mouths open to see 
which great campaign of theirs will hopefully change the current evils.1796  
French-Ottoman relations seem to have continued through Venice during the 
1526-1529 period. In August and September 1528, we see Zen and Contarini talking to 
Đbrahim about Francis’s concerns about the priors of Syon. Finally, on 4 October, 
Contarini is given two letters, one for the Signoria and the other for Francis. He is also 
told that he should not wonder about the difference of the sacks containing the letters, 
because: “the King is mazor than the Signoria.”1797 
On 13 April 1529, J. Hacket wrote to Wolsey from Brussels about the mission of 
Ferdinand’s envoys to Constantinople. The ambassador requested that the Sultan give 
up the towns and castles which he held in Hungary to Ferdinand. But Süleyman replied 
by saying he had already made an alliance with Szapolyai and that Ferdinand should 
give up what he held: “The ambassador also said that there are ambassadors with the 
Turk of the French king, the Venetians and the Waywode, who have all made an 
alliance with the Turk; and if the Turk comes into Christendom this year, it will be by 
their instructions.”1798 On 25 September 1529, Gregory Casale, who informed Wolsey 
of the Ottoman advance toward Vienna after having captured Buda, expressed common 
opinion that “the Venetians have invited him.”1799 Perhaps what Casale kept hearing 
was not totally unfounded. Piero Zen’s conversation with Đbrahim Paşa, reported in a 
letter dated 11 March 1529, suggests the presence of Venetian involvement in the 
campaign decision. Đbrahim supposedly told the bailo that they were waging campaign, 
which was “more than what the Signoria urged for.”1800 Szapolyai himself, in a letter to 
Venice dated 15 June, thanked Venice for her friendship and expressed his hope that 
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they “continue to give him favors.”1801 A letter from Verona, dated 11 September 1529, 
displays the feeling towards Venetians in Europe seeing them as the cause of Turks’ 
coming to Europe. The response to such criticism was that everyone was obliged to do 
everything in his power not to lose and not be subjected. What Venice did was to defend 
itself as best as she can. And when the point came that she can not defend herself she 
would accept the Turk’s offers. When the author of the letter asked what these offers 
were, he replied that when the Turk heard of “our war” he offered to give 40,000 paid 
infantry and 20,000 cavalry as well as victuals and the amount of money required. His 
words to the critiques are illuminating: “Be sure, you gentlemen, that the Signoria shall 
apply to these if need be; and how sorry you (will be) if the Signoria wishes to give help 
to the Turk.”1802 Piero Zen’s chaplain wrote from Constantinople on 24 August that he 
wished God “grant him [Süleyman] victory according to our heart’s desire.” According 
to the chaplain, Süleyman was a just man and was a friend of Venice. He believed that 
Süleyman would be victorious and that none could expect otherwise.1803  On 26 
October, Szapolyai’s letter in Latin to the Signoria is read. It is dated 15 September 
from Buda. In this letter Szapolyai thanks the Signoria for all that they have done for 
him and informs them that he has recovered his kingdom “mediante il Signor 
Turco.”1804 On 2 November a reply is written to Szapolyai to congratulate him on the 
recuperation of his kingdom.1805 On 10 January 1530, another envoy came to Venice 
from Szapolyai. This envoy, too, stated that Szapolyai “has recuperated his kingdom 
with the help and favor of the serenissimo Signor Turco.”1806 
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6.3. Making a King 
The main argument of this chapter is that the campaign of 1529 mainly aimed to 
restore Buda under Janos Szapolyai’s rule, and make him “legitimate King of Hungary. 
In this section, we shall examine the phases of this process through the campaign.1807  
6.3.1. Reception at Mohacs 
Janos Szapolyai was already a familiar figure for the Ottomans by 1529, not 
only because he was a tributary by now but also because he was a well known 
commander earlier. He appears as an important magnate in the campaign diary of 1522 
as “Erdel bânı”, as messengers arrive at the Ottoman camp during the siege of Rhodes 
to inform the Sultan of a conflict between Transylvania and Wallachia.1808 
Kemalpaşazade, in his account of the 1526 campaign, talks about Szapolyai’s non-
participation at the battle. According to Kemalpaşazade’s version of the story, on the 
return march from Buda, Sultan Süleyman came by the region known as “Erdel.” The 
lords of this region, as the author goes on explaining, had been subjects of the 
Hungarian kings. At the time of Sultan Süleyman’s attack on Hungary, this region was 
under the rule of a “wise man of sound foresight” [pīr-i sâ’ib-tedbīr]. As the Sultan and 
the King prepared for the battle, this commander who tended toward prudence chose the 
proper course and did not respond to the calls of the King, unlike the rest of the over-
proud commanders. He sent his brother to the battle with some soldiers, while he 
himself remained peacefully on safe grounds. Kemalpaşazade explains Szapolyai’s 
decision not to present himself in battle on the grounds that he knew “he would not be 
able to match the ghazis on the battlefield.”1809 Kemalpaşazade’s account of the 1526 
campaign was completed in early 1529, before the Sultan departed for Buda but after 
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the decision of the campaign was made. In this respect, we may safely assume that he 
knew pretty well who Szapolyai was. However, he mentions neither the name of 
Szapolyai nor his claim on kingship. This should not be surprising since the author is 
relating a single campaign and probably is not interested in projecting the aftermath 
directly in this particular account. He drops a hint, nonetheless, perhaps because the 
campaign which is about to set out is directly related to him. What is worth noting in 
this account is the presentation of Szapolyai’s nature before he was made king. He is 
presented as a prudent and reasonable commander who knows his limits. While 
bringing forth his ability to foresee the future success of the Ottomans, Kemalpaşazade 
does not cross the thin line which could have made a traitor out of Szapolyai.  
We have already mentioned the accusations aimed at Szapolyai for abandoning 
Louis II and blaming him for the loss of the Kingdom in the first place. Such was the 
main tenet of Ferdinand’s argument in proving Szapolyai a traitor and usurper. Talking 
with the English ambassador in Prague in March 1527, for instance, Ferdinand called 
Szapolyai a traitor and told about how Szapolyai betrayed the King for the sake of the 
crown.”1810 Contrarily, in his efforts of legitimizing Szapolyai, Kemalpaşazade inverts 
the discourse of betraying one’s king. By informing his readers of the voivode’s sending 
his brother with an armed force Kemalpaşazade, between the lines, removes such 
suspicions and presents Szapolyai’s absence on the battlefield not as a treacherous act 
but as deliberate act prudence. 
 The first meeting of the Sultan with his Hungarian protégée took place on 19 
August 1529 at Mohacs. The manner of holding the ceremonial reception was discussed 
at the council meeting two days before the actual event. The main focus of the meeting 
was how to organize the hand-kissing ceremony of “Yanoş Kral.”1811 On 18 August [13 
Dhu’l-Hijja] Süleyman and the imperial army landed at Mohacs. The campaign diary 
takes the opportunity to remind that the plain is “where the battle with King Louis took 
place.”1812 Mohacs, the scene of Ottoman victory three years ago, seems to be an 
appropriate location not only symbolically, but also geographically since Szapolyai 
arrived from Transylvania. Ottoman accounts imply that Szapolyai was already nearby 
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when the Ottoman army arrived, thus he came to greet the Sultan.1813 According to Lütfi 
Paşa’s version of the story, Szapolyai’s men came to Süleyman as the Ottoman army 
marched toward Buda and asked for his orders on behalf of their master. Süleyman told 
them that he was on the way to Buda and asked Szapolyai to meet him on the way.1814 
Süleyman arrived at Belgrade on 6 July. He wished to have a general army inspection 
after the Sava crossing.1815 The campaign diary, as well the chronicles, refers to 
Szapolyai [Yanoş Kral] as the former voivode of Transylvania who turned king of 
Hungary. According to the text, “the Grand Vizier together with 500 household troops 
and janissaries rode and met the King who also rode his horse on the way in the 
afternoon.”1816 The importance given to Szapolyai or to what he represented is 
demonstrated by the fact that the famous grand vizier Đbrahim Paşa himself went to 
meet and accompany him to the Ottoman camp. 
The reception took place next day on 19 August [14 Dhu’l-Hijja ]. The diary 
refers to the reception as “the matter of King Janos’s hand-kissing.” Two ceremonial 
tents were erected between the council tent and the army tents. The company was first 
admitted into the courtyard of the council tent. Beside them stood the servants. Next to 
the servants stood the fully equipped janissaries, lined up in two wings right and left. 
Behind the right wing of the janissaries stood the household cavalry. Next to these was 
the right wing of the Rumelian army.  Behind the household cavalry stood the Anatolian 
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army surrounding the imperial tent. Behind the janissaries on the left wing stood the 
senior household cavalry regiment, next to them was the left wing of the Rumelian 
army. They waited in an orderly fashion until the King arrived in the afternoon. 
Rumelian commanders and distinguished court officials greeted the King and 
accompanied him for a while until aghas standing further escorted him to the council 
hall. When the King approached, the Sultan stood up, took three steps and greeted him. 
Szapolyai kissed the Sultan’s hand. Then he was seated on a chair along with Đbrahim 
Paşa; while the other viziers Ayas Paşa and Kasım Paşa stood on foot. When he was 
taken outside, he was presented with four ceremonial gowns and three fully caparisoned 
horses with golden harness and trappings, after which he re-entered and kissed the 
Sultan’s hand again.1817 The presence of 300 cannons, 12,000 janissaries, 20,000 
household cavalry, 30,000 Anatolian troops, 60,000 Rumelian troops, and 40,000 
frontier troops adding up to an army of 162,000 in ceremonial order – as listed by 
Bostan1818 – must have been arranged to make a lasting and powerful impression.   
Ottomans themselves were probably pleased with the impression of this specific 
ceremonial arrangement. During the 1532 campaign, we find reference to this reception 
during the discussions of the reception of the French envoy at the camp at Belgrade: 
“The arrangements were made according to the manner in which King Janos formerly 
kissed the [sultan’s] hand at the plain of Mohacs during the Vienna campaign. The 
French envoy came and kissed the [sultan’s] hand. The envoys from Ferdinand were 
also given permission and they, too, kissed the [sultan’s] hand.”1819 This reference is 
worth noting especially because Habsburg envoys were already received at Niš during 
the march in 1532 and were present at the reception of the French ambassador. Through 
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showing the French envoy the best possible reception to honor him – more accurately 
his master King Francis – Ottoman intention was to degrade the Habsburg envoys to 
demonstrate their conception of friendship and hostility. 
Ottoman sources associate the hand kissing ceremony with the bestowal of 
kingship upon Szapolyai. A typical account follows as:  
After the ban of Transylvania King Janos came to the court of the shelter of 
the world and was gratified with the honor of kissing the ground; since it was 
perceived that there was a lack of friendship between the despicable infidels of 
the region and the Muslims, the kingship of the province of Hungary was 
bestowed upon the afore-mentioned on the condition of sending tribute.1820  
The culminating point of the reception seems to be the ceremony of ground-
kissing [bisât-bûs] or the hand-kissing [dest-bûs] which involves a very specific act of 
deference, namely a bodily act which requires the participant to kneel down before the 
recipient. The participant is not merely stating his subordination in words, but is 
physically displaying/visualizing it without leaving room for ambiguity; as R.A. 
Rappaport asserts “[he] identifies his inseparable, indispensable and enduring body with 
his subordination.”1821 The kissing ceremony in the Ottoman case can perhaps be 
compared to the homage ritual observed in Western feudal political systems. In the 
feudal homage/vassalage context, kissing the foot implied the severe subordination of 
the inferior party especially in the case of armed persons who were previously enemies. 
This was a way to establish a hierarchy whereby the victor compelled the defeated to 
become a “man of his own.”1822 
When Szapolyai kneels before Süleyman and kisses his hand, we can identify a 
dual submission being demonstrated. On one hand, he as an individual becomes the man 
of Süleyman, in other words he becomes a client of Süleyman if we were to see the 
bond as equivalent to suzerainty and vassalage in European terms. On the other hand, 
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his authority is placed under that of the Ottoman Sultan. He is perceived as 
demonstrating his allegiance as well as his acceptance of the set of ties and obligations 
that the Sultan represents. He demonstrates this allegiance not only to the Sultan, but 
also to other participants. Thus, while on the first level this act of deference indicates 
the acknowledgment of Sultan Süleyman’s superiority on the part of Szapolyai, on the 
second level it is the confirmation and reproduction of a set of obligations. The whole 
process is a public act of acceptance of a public and political order visible both to the 
witnesses and to the performer himself – which is not to be confused with the 
participants’ private states of belief.1823  
The employment of the conventional term of müstes‘ad in all accounts needs to be 
underlined in order to understand the contemporary significance of the act. While the 
“bisât-bûs” is an act of deference signifying severe subordination of the inferior party 
on one hand, it is also clearly defined as an “honor” which gives a distinguished status 
to the recipient. In this sense, submission and allegiance becomes a privilege rather than 
a humiliation. The gifts and robes presented also emphasize this point. In the words of 
Nasuh: “the worth of his moon reached the skies.”1824 In an account of the 1526 
campaign, a member of the Ottoman religious establishment Celalzade Salih Çelebi 
provides insight to the empowering nature of hand-kissing as perceived by 
contemporary Ottomans. Within the context of post-Mohac ceremonial, the author 
describes Đbrahim Paşa performing the hand-kissing ritual. The hand of the Sultan is 
described as the claw of the world-conquering lion as well as a hand which is the 
“granter of prosperity/felicity.” Thus, as Đbrahim Paşa kissed and put on his head the 
hand of the Sultan, fortune and felicity was placed on his head through the hand of the 
Sultan. Furthermore, this was regarded as evidence of his valor and greatness.1825 The 
ceremony goes on with other commanders performing the same action and receiving 
gifts and favors in return. Salih Çelebi, at this point, describes the hand of the Sultan as 
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“bounteous as the sea.”1826 This episode clearly reflects the mutual nature of the ritual. 
Even though the kisser seems to be the active performer and the Sultan the passive 
receiver at first sight, the expressions that follow show that once the kissing act is 
performed the kisser becomes a receiver whereas the seemingly passive receiver, the 
Sultan, transforms into the active performer through his “giving.”  When seen through 
this perspective, the hand-kissing ceremony performed by Szapolyai appears not merely 
as a display of subordination, but also a demonstration of inclusion, recognition and 
even exaltation to some extent.  
Some Christian observers seem to have been scandalized by this hand-kissing 
ceremony. A rather interesting anecdote attributes Ferenc Frangepán, a member of 
Szapolyai’s retinue at the time, with the defense of Szapolyai’s act in the face of the 
Bishop of Ravello: 
You say, he kissed the hand of the Turkish emperor. Well, what is wrong 
with kissing the hand of a ruler? If we may kiss the foot of Christ’s lieutenant 
for but small consideration in return, why should we not kiss the hand of the 
lieutenant of Mehemmed, if so doing we can save many souls?1827 
6.3.2. Enthronement at Buda 
The second phase in our process is the enthronement of Szapolyai at Buda. But 
before that could happen, Süleyman had to free Buda – the capital [taht-gâh] – from 
Ferdinand’s “forceful occupation.” Ottoman army arrived before Buda on 3 September 
[29 Dhu’l-Hijja]. After a siege of five days, the castle asked for terms for peaceful 
surrender on 8 September [4 Muharram].1828 Buda had been an easy target for the 
Ottoman army once again. Casale’s report to Wolsey, dated 9 July, suggests that Buda 
was already evacuated, since he informs that Ferdinand’s forces and his guns were 
taken to Vienna.1829 Ottoman chronicles refer to the capture of Buda as “re-
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conquest.”1830 Four days later, on 12 September [8 Muharram], Süleyman himself 
entered the city. The diary mentions that this was the date when the sultan entered the 
city previously.1831 The governor of Elbasan [Ilbasan] and 50 janissaries were stationed 
to stay at Buda until the end of the campaign. On 14 September, a janissary officer and 
selected troops put “Kral Yanoş” on his throne. The King gave the leading official of 
the company 2,000 pieces of gold and 1,000 pieces of gold to the accompanying 
troops.1832 According to Celalzade, at this point: “He became king of Hungary; thus his 
wish came true.”1833 The gifts of gold to the Ottoman officials and soldiers could 
perhaps be seen as a kind of enthronement gratuity [cülûs bahşişi]. That Szapolyai’s 
enthronement was taken seriously is reflected in the bi’at-like ceremony performed at 
Buda with the presence of elected janissary troops. Hungarian historian Szeremi 
provides an eyewitness account of the actual ceremony, though rather awkwardly. 
According to the author, Szapolyai and his party were put on a ship of the Sultan’s from 
Pest after the Sultan departed for Vienna. The Ottoman troops accompanying him were 
ornately dressed and they escorted Szapolyai and his retinue to Buda very respectfully, 
although Szeremy admits to suspecting that they were all going to be killed. As the 
whole party entered the castle, Szapolyai was taken into the dining hall and told to sit on 
the chair which was prepared for him. The chair is described as a highly valuable and 
beautiful one, though rather different from the usual Hungarian high chairs. The 
commander of the troops told him to “sit down on that seat, because just as the emperor 
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[the Sultan] ordered us, so we must install Your Majesty in your royal office.” After 
grabbing and having him sit, they told him three times in Slavic language: “May the 
Most High God give you good luck and bravery in governing Hungary and in subjecting 
other provinces and estates to your rule.” This done, they knelt before him and said: 
“May the Almighty God permit us all to die under the hooves of your horse.” Then 
raising themselves, they cried Allah Allah Allah and left Buda to join the Sultan.1834 
While Celalzade bases the granting of Buda on request by Szapolyai, Bostan 
simply says that when Buda surrendered it was given to King Janos.1835 Nasuh, on the 
other hand, further explains the reason of this grant. According to the author, Szapolyai 
was judged to be more informed about the condition of the enemy than other 
commanders and thus he was better equipped to block potential attacks. This was why 
he was appointed king to Buda. Nasuh also mentions that a sufficient number of 
Hungarian commanders were left with him. According to his version of the story, 
Szapolyai comes once again to kiss the hand of the Sultan to demonstrate his 
subordination in return for the generosity Süleyman showed him.1836 The campaign 
diary mentions that on the same date Rumelian commanders and officials were 
rewarded with robes.1837 In this sense, we can perhaps see a double-ceremony. 
Szapolyai actually becomes king of Hungary through enthronement, while his 
dependent status is once more confirmed.  
In Nasuh’s story, once enthroned Szapolyai encourages Süleyman to attack 
Ferdinand. Ironically, the speech Nasuh places in the mouth of Szapolyai is full of 
Islamic references or codes. For example, he makes the Hungarian king address the 
Sultan as the “shadow of God” [zıll-ı zalīlullah] and talks about “divine confirmation” 
[te’yīd-i rabbânī]. Added to these are praises based on military strength.  He addresses 
Süleyman as the “king of the seven climes” [pâdişâh-ı heft-kişver]. He assures the 
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Sultan that if he favors him, these lands would be well protected, so he can go and take 
revenge from the enemy by attacking the capital of the “German” king, Vienna.1838  
Foreign observers seem to be puzzled by Szapolyai’s enthronement. A letter dated 
2 October from Šibenik [Sebenico] reflects the disappointment of a priest Piero over 
Szapolyai’s kingship. According to this informant “the voyvoide of Transylvania 
became Turk and the Sultan left him as governor [sanzaco] of Buda.” He believed this 
news to be bad for Christendom, and he worried that all would turn Turk if not for 
divine assistance.1839 
6.3.3. In Search of the Villain at Vienna 
The Ottoman offensive against Vienna in 1529 appears to be a punitive or even 
vindictive move rather than a firm attempt to actually take the city. Ottoman chronicles 
imply that the target of the march following Buda was Ferdinand’s person, rather than 
the conquest of Vienna. According to Bostan, for example, Süleyman desired to punish, 
or even kill, Ferdinand in this campaign. By marching to Ferdinand’s capital to destroy 
it, the Sultan would have accomplished damaging his power and giving him a lesson.1840 
According to others, it was Szapolyai who provoked Süleyman to attack Vienna to take 
revenge.1841 Accounts of the devastating effects of the surroundings before, during and 
after siege of Vienna support contemporary claims of intended destruction and harm 
rather than outright conquest. Relating how the surroundings of Vienna were destroyed 
violently, Bostan evaluates the devastation as “revenge taken from the mentioned 
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accursed [Ferdinand].”1842 According to Celalzade, not a single infidel could have 
survived after these raids if it were not for continuous castles.1843 
In order to trace the devastation and fear caused by these raids and the siege of 
Vienna itself on the inhabitants of these regions, we shall now look at some on-the-road 
observations of Western travelers. These observations reflect a genuine sense of terror 
and the scale of destruction experienced as the Ottoman army marched to and from 
Vienna, convincing one that Ottoman chronicles were not simply exaggerating.  
The feeling of terror caused by the expected penetration of the Ottoman army into 
Austrian territory mainly revolves around women and children. This terror probably 
stems from the rumors recently in circulation in Vienna about the Turks killing 
everyone but women and children following the occupation of Buda in 1526.1844 The 
general opinion in the immediate aftermath of the occupation of Buda in 1526 was that 
great atrocities were committed by the Turks. One reporter said that the Turk entered 
Buda on 9 September and killed everyone over the age of fourteen, keeping no 
prisoners. Children were sent to Turkey and many cities were burnt down.1845 Women 
and children were usually spared and taken prisoners to be sold as slaves. They would 
also be transferred to Istanbul either to be sold or to be relocated. Salih Çelebi, for 
example, gives a rather detailed account on the abundance of beautiful girls and boys 
who were sold in the army camp following the battle of Mohacs. The author talks about 
how these prisoners satisfied the desires of the soldiers at the camp, how they lined up 
along road sides because they were so many, how a soldier left a prisoner on the road 
when he found a better one.1846 Apparently regarded as mere commodities in 
contemporary standards, women and children figure as the most vulnerable and 
endangered potential victims in such times of commotion. Therefore, it should not be 
surprising to see eyewitness accounts and rumors demonstrating that women and 
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children were sent away from Vienna starting at least in early August.1847 The account 
of a messenger who left Vienna on 17 August mentions that in Vienna some people 
were afraid and some were not, and he finds this to be typical. Although many in 
Vienna believed that Ferdinand would soon arrive, he reports that people were secretly 
sending away their wives and children.1848 One such woman whose story resonates in 
Venetian by-passer accounts is the wife of Raymondo Rodumbergi counsellor of the 
Prince [Ferdinand] in Vienna. She left Vienna on 17 August and came to Friuli. Her 
status is further reflected through the visit made by general Cozianer to her house on the 
day she left to inform them on the loss of Buda. She escaped from Vienna with her only 
daughter, with an agile wagon and three mounted servants. Her sister was married to a 
citizen of the region. She told that all women were escaping from Vienna, taking with 
them whatever possessions they can. She also told that there were neither men of war 
nor provisions in Vienna. Her account also puts Ferdinand at Linz at the time and 
reflects the common expectation in Vienna that he would be there soon with German 
soldiers.1849 A Venetian explorer who left Wiener-Neustadt on 22 September describes 
the various sorts of people he met on the way. At some point having trouble going 
further the Venetian attached himself to a company of two men and a woman who left 
Vienna two days ago, the woman being the wife of one of the men. Together they 
traveled to Trevisa. The account suggests that in Vienna although there were some 
number of armed men and victuals, people were in great terror and women and children 
were sent away.1850  
Not all women and children were as lucky. By October, we come by Venetian 
accounts talking about beautiful German girls being sold for fifty aspers.1851 Brutal 
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 See for example, “Maneggio della pace di Bologna tra Clemente VIII, Carlo 
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behavior as this although identified with the Turks1852 was not otherwise alien to the 
Europeans of the time. Only a few years earlier, the sack of Rome by the imperial 
troops had created a similar scandal. Not only contemporary reports and public 
rumors1853 reflect genuine terror in the face of atrocities committed in Rome, but 
learned authors such as Guicciardini dwell on the violence of the imperial troops toward 
women:  
Hearing the cries and miserable shrieks of Roman women, and nuns led in 
droves by the soldiers to satisfy their lust, one could not but say that God’s 
judgments were beclouded and concealed from mortal men, inasmuch as he 
allowed the renowned chastity of the Roman women to be so miserably and 
brutally violated.1854 
An assault on Vienna was expected even by the early phases of the campaign. In 
his letter dated 9 July 1529, for example, Casale informed Wolsey that the Ottoman 
army crossed the Sava and was marching along the Drava. It was expected that the army 
would march to Vienna with the fleet following on the Danube.1855 On a letter dated 24 
August, the chaplain of Piero Zen, reported from Istanbul that  an agent  of Alvise Gritti 
who left the Ottoman camp for Constantinople at the end of July reported that the Sultan 
was about to cross the Drava. He also mentioned that from that point it would take 
twenty-four days to reach Vienna. It is assumed in the letter that the Sultan would have 
reached there around the time this letter was written. The letter is dated 24 August 
1529.1856 This piece of information suggests that targeting Vienna must have come up 
as an issue in the camp along the march. 
While the Ottoman army was advancing to Vienna from Buda, Ferdinand was still 
trying to put together a plan. According to Venetian reports, he planned to plant a large 
garrison in Vienna. He would then come himself with the rest of the army which was to 
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consist of 40,000 people stationed at Wiener-Neustadt between Buda and Vienna. 
Through this strategy he intended to block Süleyman’s way to Vienna. Ferdinand 
depended on the marshy territory to hinder Ottoman cavalry’s function. He hoped that 
this would buy him some time so that with the coming of winter the siege would be 
inoperable.1857  
Vienna certainly waited quite a long time for Ferdinand to come and defend the 
city. In August many a Viennese believed that Ferdinand would arrive soon.1858 By late 
September, inhabitants of the city were greatly disappointed that Ferdinand was not 
coming as he promised. This non-show started to dishearten them.1859 As the siege 
continued, information pouring from Neustadt, where Ferdinand’s army was assembling 
convey common rumors that there was no valiant general at Vienna and that the 
Germans defending the city could abandon the city any time since they usually escaped 
from war.1860 By 10 October there were even rumors that Vienna already fell.1861  
Ottoman accounts regarding the lifting of the siege of Vienna on the absence of 
Ferdinand attest to the target of the attack being Ferdinand. Bostan, for example, 
attributes the siege decision on the presumption of Ferdinand’s presence in the castle, 
and the lifting of the siege to the awareness that he was not. Winter does not seem to be 
a reason for retreat in Bostan’s account, which mentions that the city was “granted 
pardon” as the inhabitants already requested it.1862 The campaign diary also attributes 
the lifting of the siege to the absence of Ferdinand. Although a final assault was planned 
and announced, according to the diary, on the designated day Süleyman learned that 
Ferdinand was not in the fortress; therefore he decided to grant pardon to the city and 
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have the soldiers retreat. The diary does not mention any request by the Viennese for 
peaceful surrender at this point, which is rather unusual since in the previous examples 
we have seen pardon was always granted upon request. However, the text reports a 
more proper process of pardon two days later, whereby the inhabitants of the fortress 
sent for peaceful surrender and Süleyman accepted.1863 This piece of information 
regarding the pardon should of course be taken with caution. The episode of the fortress 
requesting peaceful surrender as told in the campaign diary does not make much sense, 
since the Ottoman army already started evacuation at this point. Logically, no defender 
would decide to submit when the attacker gave up. Even though withdrawal in the 
absence of the possibility of direct engagement with Ferdinand himself might be a 
reasonable action, not entering a subdued capital does not make much sense. 
Furthermore, by September it was common knowledge that Ferdinand was not at 
Vienna. Marco Antonio Contarini, deputy of Udine, wrote on 13 August that Ferdinand 
was back at Linz from Bohemia and that many German nobles volunteered to join a 
campaign against the Turks. So far 1500 men had assembled. According to Contarini 
Ferdinand did not expect so much support and was somewhat relieved.1864 The captain 
of Venzon wrote on 29 July that four Bohemians who came from Baviera and Salzburg 
told that Ferdinand was at Linz and was heading for Prague to assemble the Diet for the 
Hungarian issue. They said the Turk was coming to Hungary, but they were not sure 
because Prague was far from Hungary. He asked for Bohemian help but they seem to 
have declined what he asked for.1865 An account from within the Ottoman camp on 
Ferdinand’s moves is the report of Alvise Gritti’s men sent to Constantinople in late 
July. It shows that Ottomans were quite informed about Ferdinand’s actions. They knew 
he left Vienna for Germany to procure help and was planning to return with a huge 
army.1866 Taking into account the prisoners taken along the way to Vienna, Süleyman 
was most probably aware of the situation, as various Ottoman accounts also show. 
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According to Nasuh, for example, Ottomans were informed by some prisoners taken on 
the way to Vienna that Ferdinand was at Prague.1867 According to Nasuh, it was 
Yahyapaşazade Bali Beg’s idea to actually take Vienna once the siege started. Nasuh 
mentions that as the castle did not fall after nineteen days, the siege was lifted. The 
author does not see this as a failure on the grounds that “German” territories were 
destroyed and burnt down in the meanwhile.1868 In this sense, the aim was fulfilled.  
Another major reason for retreat provided by the Ottoman sources is the harsh 
weather conditions. Celalzade states that the soldiers could not endure such conditions 
and the Sultan caring for the well-being of his servants decided to return.1869 Lütfi 
Paşa’s approach is similar in the sense of moving forth the caring nature of the Sultan. 
According to the author, seeing the hardships the Sultan thought that it was not worth 
“losing even a single man for ten such castles” and decided to return.1870 The words 
Lütfi Paşa attributes to Süleyman as he decided to lift to siege are almost identical to 
those the author attributes to Murad II when he decides to lift a siege during the 
Albanian campaign in 1449: “I would not lose a single man for fifty such castles.”1871 
Examples of this phrase can be found in any Ottoman source, for this or that campaign 
in various reigns.  
The retreat decision was accompanied by a divân which is just like any other post-
victory occasion. Along with this decision, the janissaries were also rewarded thousand 
aspers each. The commanders kissed the Sultan’s hand and awarded robes. Đbrahim 
Paşa was rewarded with a sword, four gowns, and five sacks of coins. The other viziers 
were presented with two gowns each.1872 
 Initial accounts of foreign observers of the retreat are neutral reports just 
informing that somehow the Ottoman army left Vienna. They are not sure what to make 
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of the sudden lifting of the siege.1873 Several different assumptions are found in 
correspondences. While some see the retreat as a doing of God, some attribute it to 
Süleyman’s fear of Ferdinand’s preparations, yet others associate it with the arrival of 
winter and lack of victuals. An eyewitness account from Vienna, dated 18 October, 
relates that when they saw the Ottoman camp on the morning of 14 October, they 
thought there would be a great battle that day. But then as they saw the army start 
retreating, this eyewitness attests to wondering whether God did not wish for the battle 
to happen.1874 A doctor in Augusta [Augsburg], reporting the news he had on 21 
October about the last phases of the siege, informs that the Ottoman camp was removed 
on 13 October but he mentions that it was not known if the Turk left Vienna all 
together. Describing the lifting of the siege as “a miracle of God,” his opinion is:  “If 
God was not on our side, it should not be possible to keep the land.”1875 A letter from 
Bologna, dated 1 November, reflects the opinion at Bologna concerning Süleyman’s 
retreat: He heard of Ferdinand coming from 50,000 Bohemians and that of the duke of 
Bavaria and decided to lift the siege.1876 A letter dated 10 November from Friuli, based 
on the information by an eyewitness who left Vienna on 24 October, reports that 
Süleyman lifted the siege due to the lack of victuals, men and horses.1877 One letter from 
Gradisca dated 30 October adds the cold to the reasons of retreat.1878 
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6.3.4. The Crown of Hungary 
The next mention of Szapolyai is on 26 October [22 Safar] on Süleyman’s arrival 
at Buda on the way back as “Kral Yanoş came to greet the Sultan the refuge of the 
world. All the viziers went to him and escorted him to the Sultan. He greeted the Sultan 
as the Anatolian army crossed the bridge on the Danube until midnight.”1879 On 29 
October [25 Safar] Süleyman held court at Buda. Szapolyai came and kissed his hand, 
saying “May your holy victory be blessed” [Gazânız mübârek olsun] as Ottoman 
tradition requires. He was awarded ten robes of honor and three fully equipped 
horses.1880 The performance of this typical post-victory ceremony expected of high level 
Ottoman officials and commanders reflects the inclusion of Szapolyai among them.1881 
This visit to Buda marks the last phase of our discussion: the coronation. 
Although Yanoş Kral was enthroned, he was not crowned yet. Just like Süleyman had to 
retrieve Buda first in order to put Szapolyai on the throne, he had to retrieve the Crown 
in order for the coronation to be performed. Previously on 20 August [15 Dhu’l-Hijja] 
as the Ottoman army moved on to Buda from Mohacs, the governor of Zvornik Küçük 
Bali Beğ was sent with 500 household cavalry in addition to his own men to retrieve 
Peter Pereny, the guardian of the Crown. The campaign diary also mentions that Pereny 
was a prominent lord and that he was the one who put the Corona on the heads of kings. 
According to the campaign diary, Küçük Bali Beğ returned from his mission together 
with Pereny on 4 September [30 Dhu’l-Hijja].1882 Apparently, Bali Beğ was not only 
responsible for retrieving Pereny, but the Crown as well.  
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On 31 October [27 Safar], Grand vizier Đbrahim Paşa gathered the commanders on 
horseback, had the crown of Hungary brought and displayed, saying it dated back to the 
time of Nuşirevan – which denotes a reference to the ancient custom which is a basic 
legitimating concept for the Ottomans. Alvise Gritti, Peter Pereny and Archbishop of 
Esztergom Pal Varday were then sent to Buda to crown the King.1883 Pereny’s presence 
in this company can also be viewed in terms of the shifting allegiances throughout the 
post-Mohacs period. While he seems to be captured on a special mission by Bali Beğ, 
earlier correspondence suggests that Pereny was not sure which side to take. John Lasco 
in his letter to Antonio Rincon dated 18 November 1528, mentions that although Pereny 
gave the crown to Ferdinand, he tended toward Szapolyai.1884 A similar case is observed 
with the Archbishop of Esztergom, who is reported to have submitted on his own when 
the Ottoman army besieged the city on the way to Vienna.1885 Varday mentioned in a 
letter that “Süleyman gave him a better welcome than one might expect even from a 
Christian ruler and promised mercy to all those who shifted their allegiance to John.”1886  
Although narrative accounts pose some degree of confusion as to when and how 
the crown was retrieved, Ottomans seem to be well aware of the conditions of 
ceremonial legitimization of the Hungarian king. The efforts taken to provide the crown 
and the archbishop of Esztergom – who had the sole right to crown Kings of Hungary – 
prove the point. Ottoman sources name the Archbishop as “Arşik.” The sounding of the 
name is reminiscent of St. Stephen’s Astrik. Considered along with the previous 
reference to Anushirvan, the ancient heritage of the Crown and the significance of 
coronation in legitimation are emphasized. The only condition not achieved was 
performing the rite at Székesfehérvár.1887  
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Although Ottoman succession itself is defined by accession to the throne rather 
than coronation, contemporary Ottoman perception of Hungarian succession seems to 
regard the throne incomplete without the actual crown. The significance attributed to the 
Crown by the Ottomans also shows the concern with the legitimacy of Szapolyai. 
Celalzade provides the contemporary Ottoman understanding of the Crown: 
Those who are kings of the Throne of Hungary have a crown called the 
Korona. It is bedecked with various jewels and rubies; it is a priceless diadem. 
It had been taken from the treasury of Buda and kept at the imperial treasury 
of the Sultan. If he who became King did not have it in his possession, he 
would not be able to keep the realm under his rule, none of his subjects would 
obey his orders. According to their custom, respect came with the crown, 
validity of the king’s orders depended on the crown. Therefore, Yanoş Kral 
humbly requested from the exalted threshold that the joyous crown to be 
granted to him. The generous benevolence of the Sultan was displayed. The 
bejeweled crown and the artfully crafted diadem were sent to him with the son 
of the Doge of Venice [Gritti], Peter Perenyi and the Archbishop, so that now 
of his royal majesty would be complete and he would become glorious and 
outstanding among rulers by following their tradition.1888 
Celalzade’s opinion about the legitimizing character of the crown was not without 
foundation. Charles Robert I of Anjou had to be crowned three times until his rights 
were recognized through the right crown. He was first crowned as a claimant to the 
throne in 1301 by the archbishop elect of Esztergom but the crown was not the right 
one. Then in 1309 he was crowned with a crown tailored especially for the occasion 
when he was consecrated by the papal legate to Hungary. And finally in 1310, the 
traditional ‘Holy Crown’ was recovered from the adherents of other pretenders, because 
                                                                                                                                         
first law is that which says the king of Hungary has to be crowned with the Holy 
Crown. The second is that he must be crowned by the archbishop of Esztergom (head of 
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the mighty barons of the realm refused to recognize the validity of either previous 
coronations.1889 When the male line of the Arpads came to an end in 1301 with the 
death of Andrew, Venceslas III who was related to the dynasty through the female line 
was approached by the barons. However, being unable to stabilize his position, he left in 
1304 taking the crown with him. The Archbishop elect of Esztergom excommunicated 
his followers because they helped carry away the “coronam sacram beati regis 
Stephani.”1890 The first Christian King of Hungary, St. Stephen was crowned on 
Christmas day in the year 1000 AD. As tradition goes, the crown sent by Pope Sylvester 
II was used in the coronation ceremony which started the reign according to chancery 
records. In 1440, the legendary crown of St. Stephen, or crown of Hungary which was 
already a sacred property of the “nation” as Fügedi comments, was stolen. Ladislas V 
was crowned with this crown as a 12 week old baby. Only a few weeks after, Vladislas 
I, King of Poland, was elected by the majority of barons and his reign inaugurated.1891 
But the absence of the Holy Crown created a big problem for Vladislas I back then too. 
Although he was elected king, he could not be considered legal sovereign until he put 
on the Holy Crown which was in the possession of the opposing faction. The solution 
was found in reproducing the crown based on the image of the reliquary of St. Stephen. 
A declaration was issued to support the reproduction announcing that the newly 
produced crown would have the same “signamentum, mysterium et robur” as the Holy 
Crown itself. According to the declaration the Holy Crown represented the whole nation 
and belonged to the whole nation. It also represented the nation’s right to find a suitable 
person to rule the country and wear its crown. On the other hand, the tension created by 
the conception that the Holy Crown was actually sent to St. Stephen by the Pope 
prevented full content with the reproduction. Therefore, the aim was to transfer “the 
virtues and the mystery” of the original crown to the new one. For this end, the new 
crown was modeled on the crown on the reliquary which actually touched the body of 
the saint.1892 
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Kings of Hungary were crowned at Székesfehérvár ever since the coronation of 
St. Stephen. Most of the kings were buried in the Basilica of the Holy Virgin in the city. 
Székesfehérvár was the center of the ruling dynasty’s domains ever since the Hungarian 
conquest and until 1527 all coronations were held there except two.1893 According to 
Nasuh, the castle submits of its own on the way to Vienna. Nasuh mentions that this is 
where the Corona is held as customary.1894 But then he says the lords of Küçük Belgrad 
brought the Korona to the Sultan and presented it by kissing his hand. The Sultan sent it 
to Szapolyai with a chief sergeant.1895 
6.4. Projection and Reception 
6.4.1. Official Projection 
The proclamation of victory sent to Venice projects three main messages.1896 
Firstly, it reminds Süleyman’s right on Hungary on the basis of his having previously 
defeating and killing the king of Hungary and thus acquiring his country. Once the right 
of disposition on Hungary is thus established, the proclamation goes on to explain that 
based on this right kingship was conferred on Szapolyai who requested it from the 
Sultan. The second point made in the proclamation is Ferdinand’s usurpation of the 
country and the crown, thus defying the rights of conquest of Süleyman. Such a 
presentation legitimizes the campaign providing Süleyman not only valid reason for 
aggressive action but an honorable one too. The third message made very clear through 
the proclamation is Süleyman’s granting kingship to Szapolyai. All three phases of the 
process of making Szapolyai king of Hungary, as we have discussed above, are 
reflected in the proclamation: the Mohacs meeting whereby Süleyman grants the 
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kingdom of Hungary to Szapolyai as he comes to the Sultan’s threshold; the 
appropriation of Buda and the chasing away of Ferdinand the usurper; the retrieval of 
the “ancient crown of Hungary” with the help of God since “nobody could be king 
without putting the said crown on his head.” Written in the first person, the 
proclamation reads: “And I have donated the kingdom of Hungary to the prefect 
(prefato) John, according to the custom of my very great Majesty with all its places and 
lands, azio el daga carazo a la Porta di la Maesta mia.” While the proclamation poses 
Süleyman as the supreme suzerain over Hungary and Szapolyai as the legitimate king of 
Hungary, it also moves Ferdinand out of the picture. The whole legitimation scheme for 
Szapolyai can be read in reverse as a de-legitimation of Ferdinand. Firstly, since the 
right of Hungary belongs to Süleyman by virtue of conquest, his granting the kingdom 
to Szapolyai and not Ferdinand alone could void Ferdinand’s claims. Secondly, 
Ferdinand is chased out of Hungary which automatically voids his territorial claims 
based on military action. In other words, it is not Ferdinand who holds the capital now. 
Thirdly, Ferdinand is stripped off the powers of the legendary Crown of Hungary which 
could have supported his claims symbolically. After making all these points very clear, 
the proclamation states that the main intention of the Sultan was not to run after these 
things, but to find Ferdinand who tried to usurp Hungary and then ran away. He says he 
followed Ferdinand with his army, taking all the strongholds on the way up to the 
German border. He attests to reaching Vienna on 25 September [22 Muharram]. When 
he heard that Ferdinand had escaped to Bohemia, not knowing whether he was alive or 
dead Süleyman sent his men to devastate Ferdinand’s realm, which they did.1897 And he 
himself destroyed the rest through moving along the Danube. The Vienna episode 
passes with one sentence mentioning that the Sultan stayed before Vienna for 20 days. 
On the way back, he came to Buda, John kissed his hand, the crown was given to him 
and Süleyman was now on the way back to his imperial seat. 
The main point of the proclamation of victory which is the “right of sword” 
should have been legible enough by Ferdinand as well as to others. In a letter he wrote 
to Portugal after the Battle of Pavia in 1525, Charles V laid similar claims on his right 
to decide on the fate of France since it “had been left ‘orphaned, without its king and its 
armed forces,’ and therefore he could as he willed with her.”1898 
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Janos Szapolyai was not the first to be confirmed and “made” king by Süleyman. 
As Kemalpaşazade has it, in 1521, on the return from Belgrade, Süleyman received the 
news of the death of the voivode of Wallachia, a “province/state under the protection of 
the sultan.” After electing the deceased voivode’s son as their ruler, the people of 
Wallachia sent for the approval of Süleyman. He received the request while at 
Smederevo, and ordered Mihaloğlu Mehmed Beğ to bring him to his presence. Tribute 
would be designated and he would be authorized as ruler of Wallachia upon his arrival. 
Only then would he go back to his throne and rule. Kemalpaşazade defines this 
authorization process with two symbolic actions: “wearing the robe of state” [hil‘at-ı 
emâret] and “girding the belt of the sword of execution” [kemer-i şimşir-i siyâset]. This 
is to say, the new voivode was authorized to rule by the permission and the 
confirmation of the Ottoman sultan. 1899 Confirming kingship of Wallachia was not an 
action started by Süleyman. In 866, we see Mehmed II giving the rule of Wallachia to 
Radul, the brother of the executed voivode. Along with the confirmation Mehmed sent 
him sancak, tığ and kemer.1900 
Süleyman does not list Hungary among his long list of possessions usually 
included in proclamations or letters addressed to foreign princes. Even in his letter to 
Ferdinand dated 17 November 1530, although he emphasizes having subjected and 
subdued the Kingdom and the King of Hungary with his own person and his own 
sword, Hungary is not mentioned in the titulature.1901 
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6.4.2. Domestic Reception 
As we have tried to underline so far, Ottomans employed every ceremonial and 
symbolic means to provide utmost legitimacy to Szapolyai’s kingship. When Süleyman 
was ready to return, Szapolyai had everything he needed to be King of Hungary. He had 
the capital, the throne and the crown. He had all of these through legitimate and 
recognized means. As far as the Ottoman mind was concerned, Szapolyai’s “public 
investiture of authority” was complete through the performance of the ritual instances 
required for the symbolic process of this investiture.1902 Thus, contemporary Ottomans 
had no doubt that he would be regarded as the rightful King of Hungary in the Christian 
world. There is one contemporary Ottoman, though, who seems to have felt the need to 
legitimize Szapolyai, or rather the support given to Szapolyai by Süleyman, in the eyes 
of the Muslim world. Lütfi Paşa relates a rather interesting conversation between 
Szapolyai and Süleyman. Whether such a conversation ever took place is rather 
questionable.  
According to Lütfi Paşa, during the meeting at Mohacs Süleyman put forth the 
difference of religion between himself and Szapolyai. The Sultan wished to know why 
Szapolyai approached him for assistance while there was no friendship and affection 
between them due to this difference. Szapolyai supposedly replied: “Refuge of the 
universe has numerous servants both Muslim and Infidel. I come to join those servants. 
And I have a request to make him. I shall utter it, if allowed.” Süleyman told him to 
utter his request assuring him that he would do his best to fulfill it. Szapolyai 
summarizes the conflict between himself and Ferdinand on the kingship of Hungary: 
“As to now, the Kingdom of Hungary has been vacant. I have blood ties [karâbet] to the 
Hungarian kings, I am not an obscure man, I have a right to the throne. Thus, I request 
that the pâdişâh drive Ferdinand’s men out of Buda, give me the city and make me its 
lord in return for an annual tribute of one thousand pieces of gold. Furthermore, Vienna 
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[Beç] is close to Buda, if you could take that, too.” Süleyman promises to see to it once 
they get to Buda.1903 
This alleged conversation harbors several issues. The first issue it raises is the 
justifiability of a Muslim ruler helping out a non-Muslim one. Under normal 
circumstances, Szapolyai would be regarded an enemy by default because he is a 
Christian and has no intention to convert. This would normally require an action of 
jihad. On the other hand, he is willing to submit in return for tribute. This mode of 
negotiation is in keeping with the notion of peaceful surrender. The most widely known 
and most frequently employed Quranic verse related to jihad says: “Fight those who do 
not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor do they prohibit what Allah and His 
Messenger have prohibited, nor follow the religion of truth, out of those who have been 
given the Book, until they pay the tax in acknowledgment of superiority and they are in 
a state of subjection.”1904 In Lütfi Paşa’s account, through pledging himself a servant of 
Süleyman, Szapolyai acknowledges the Sultan’s – the Muslim ruler’s – superiority; 
through the promise of one thousand pieces of gold he demonstrates his state of 
subjection. In this sense, Süleyman’s intervention on behalf of a non-Muslim upon 
request is justified and legitimized. Szapolyai’s mention of Muslims and non-Muslims 
among the servants of the Sultan, on the other hand, poses Süleyman as a universal 
ruler. As such, Süleyman not only needs to confer with the Islamic rules in accepting 
Szapolyai’s allegiance, but has to make sure that he is the right candidate for the throne. 
Thus, a second issue of the episode has to do with legitimizing Szapolyai in the dynastic 
sense. The author needs to demonstrate Szapolyai’s right to the throne of Hungary in 
order to prove the justness of Süleyman’s cause. This is achieved by the emphasis on 
blood ties to the kings of Hungary.  
Ottoman authors emphasize Süleyman’s position as king-maker frequently in their 
accounts. A couplet in Nasuh’s account, for example, summarizes the issue. Defining 
Süleyman as “the king of kings, world conqueror and bestower of the world,” he asserts 
that Szapolyai achieved “glory, prosperity, good fortune” as he was made King by the 
Sultan.1905 
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Süleyman’s role as the “shelter of the universe” is further emphasized by the 
alleged reaction of submitting towns. The case of Pest in the account of Nasuh is an 
illuminating example. Whereas in his account of the 1526 campaign, the fear factor in 
the voluntary submission of various castles,1906 the decision to submit in the case of Pest 
in 1529 reflects a yearning for order and security rather than fear.1907 In this sense, 
Süleyman emerges as the one who will make sure that his subjects live in peace and 
order. 
In the previous chapters we have regarded the campaign diaries as official sources 
which tended to be relatively neutral accounts. The campaign diary in 1529 reflects a 
somewhat different tone in comparison with the previous ones. Hardships suffered 
because of climatic and natural circumstances reflect in this particular campaign diary 
along with a harsh sense of suffering. A similar, yet much softer, attitude is vaguely 
sensed in the chronicles as well. One very clear change of tone is visible in attitudes 
toward the rain. The campaign diary of 1526 from time to time mentions instances of 
trouble caused by heavy rain as the roads were harmed as the Ottoman army 
advanced.1908 These hardships due to weather conditions mentioned in passing in the 
campaign diary are employed by the chroniclers to the Sultan’s advantage. 
Kemalpaşazade, for example, argues that the clouds were there to protect the Sultan 
from excessive sun and it rained to calm down the dust of his horse’s feet.1909 The rain 
also figures as a celestial purification symbol in the accounts of the 1526 campaign. 
Salih Çelebi mentions that a rain shower started on the instant when victory became 
clear at Mohacs. According to the author, this was “to wash away the dust of the battle 
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field from the ghazis.”1910 This brief expression of purification suggests a reverse 
transformation. We have already mentioned in Chapter 3 that war is a violent activity 
which required an altered state of mind. In this case, the rain washing away the dust of 
the battlefield brings to mind a re-alteration of state of mind for the moment. 
Contrarily, the rain in the 1529 accounts appears to be a hostile force of nature 
rather than a celestial blessing or a benevolent force of nature. Accounts show that rain 
caused serious problems throughout the campaign.1911 The campaign diary starts 
reporting the hardships caused by heavy rain from the first day of the march from 
Istanbul. On the second stop, we see 30,000 aspers distributed to the imperial guards for 
the trouble they took through rain and harsh weather.1912 Another disaster tale comes up 
at the Drava crossing at Eszék. The campaign diary reports several rain showers and 
thunder storms causing great damage. In one case, nine hundred janissaries are said to 
be hit by lightening.1913 The scale of showers which had to be faced is evident in 
accounts of soldiers who had to climb trees to survive.1914 Nasuh, too, notes the severe 
weather conditions and the snow, and mentions the “endless hardships” endured by the 
soldiers.1915 Celalzade talks about the “annoyance” [infi’âl] caused among the soldiers 
by heavy rain and harsh weather conditions. The author adds that “the Abode of Islam 
being far away, the victorious soldiers became uneasy on infidel territories.”1916 This 
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uneasiness seems to have caused a sort of dissolving in the quasi-usual order of the 
Ottoman army. An episode in the campaign diary reflects even before the arrival before 
Vienna, Süleyman getting furious to see that not enough men assembled at one of the 
stops on the way to Vienna. He ordered the register of troops. The campaign diary notes 
that he was so angry that he decided to execute troop commanders. But they brought in 
the register and were saved.1917 Through these hardships we even find soldiers fleeing 
the Ottoman army. Nasuh provides an episode on the chase after these renegades, 
whereby they were caught and later pardoned by the Sultan upon their asking for 
forgiveness.1918 The tone of the diary gets even harsher on the return journey. It is 
possible to observe a constant emphasis on the snow and the troubles taken to march. 
Through the march we come by many instances where sacks, victuals, various sorts of 
equipment, artillery, tents, even horses and cannons being stuck in the marshes and 
lost.1919 The ultimate demonstration of the dissolving order in this account is probably 
Süleyman getting lost as soon as he left Buda on 30 October [26 Safar]. Apparently, 
there was no guide with the army, therefore the troops were not able to find the stop on 
their own and their wagons did not arrive. Süleyman himself passed the camp without 
realizing it. He went further for a while until Đbrahim Paşa sent men to take him back. 
Meanwhile, the imperial tent was taken somewhere else and the Sultan had to wait for 
the tent to arrive. After this incident Đbrahim Paşa who was supposed to watch the rear 
was assigned to lead.1920 The campaign diary keeps reporting problems. A few days 
later, the imperial tent was lost once again. On the Drava crossing around Petervarad, 
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the possessions of the “Muslims” were plundered.1921 Bostan attributes the problems 
faced around the Drava crossing to the insufficiency of victuals based on the prior 
destruction of the area and the unfavorable weather conditions.1922 All of these instances 
point at a confusion and loss of order which the chronicles either do not reflect or do so 
rather mildly. While the chronicles usually follow the campaign diaries in their 
narratives, in 1529 the case seems to be a little different. If we regard the contemporary 
authors as a receiving party, who simultaneously take on themselves a task of 
projecting, we are faced with a process of selective reception/projection. 
One peculiar feature of the 1529 campaign diary is the referral to the 1526 
campaign at certain points. We have already mentioned that Süleyman’s first entry into 
Buda in 1529 was reported to be the same date of entry in 1526 in the diary. Such are 
references are found further in the text, especially after the army leaves for Vienna. It is 
noted, for example, that  25 September [21 Muharram] was the day when the order to 
return from Buda to Istanbul was given in the previous campaign. 30 September [26 
Muharram] was the day when Đbrahim Paşa reached Szeged in 1526.1923 The text 
specifically notes that these dates were based on the solar calendar. This suggests due 
care to a seasonal concern rather than symbolic attribution. The mentioning of such 
notes as the army is about to start a very large scale siege operation under the given 
weather conditions imply an intention of guiding future operations. In other words, the 
author of the diary seems to have chosen these specific dates to compare with the return 
of the 1526 campaign to demonstrate that the operation in 1529 was too late.  
6.4.3. Foreign Reception 
Süleyman’s march into Hungary once again heated the debates over the urgency 
of peace among European powers. By the end of May, Rome seems to be in panic 
already. A report from Rome to Cardinal Campeggio, who was in England at the time 
for Henry VIII’s divorce, on 29 May underlines the perceived vulnerability of Europe 
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against an Ottoman offensive: “This enemy is to be dreaded, especially as he finds the 
body of Christendom weak and bloodless, and Germany divided.” As the informant 
emphasizes Süleyman’s marching in person, he also reflects his fear through expressing 
that no sultan has ever made greater preparation for war than this: “I foresee ruin, unless 
God helps us.” 1924 
Gregory Casale, who believes that peace among the Christians is the only remedy 
to stop Ottoman advance, voices his hopes that “perhaps this sudden movement of the 
Turk will cause Christian princes to make peace.” However, he is worried that the 
Emperor’s “obstinacy” will prevent such an option. He also links the situation to the 
Lutheran conflict referring to the Lutherans in arms to assist Swiss Lutherans. This is 
confirmed by the efforts of Ferdinand’s ambassador in Rome who is trying to raise 
troops. The ambassador’s efforts are based on the fact that the approach of the Ottoman 
army leaves no time to wait for an army from Germany.1925 
Neither the recuperation of Buda nor the siege of Vienna along with the 
destruction of its surroundings, seem to have affected Charles’s coronation plans.1926 
However, Charles’s circle was pretty sure that Süleyman would leave some forces with 
Szapolyai who would then keep destroying the land. Gasparo Contarini reported from 
Bologna, on 9 November, that due to this expectation “the Emperor showed a great 
desire for the peace of Italy.” Contarini’s personal opinion was rather pessimistic as he 
thought that the Turkish matter signified great danger and ruin for all Christendom.1927 
Pope Clement VII heard the lifting of the siege at Bologna. On 1 November, the 
Ognisanti Day, he did a solemn mass and performed Te Deum laudamus for the lifting 
of the siege.1928 In December, he excommunicated Szapolyai for his alliance with the 
Sultan. This was probably a political necessity as the Pope was still a hostage of Charles 
V. Szapolyai, in return, defended himself arguing that he had no intention to hurt 
anybody, but wished to be allowed “to live in this much abused country of mine and 
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serve God and Christianity.” He asserted that if he were not allowed to do that, he had 
to do his best to defend his country.1929 
By December 1529 rumors around Europe were that the Turk did not actually 
have with him the kind of artillery needed to destroy the city of Vienna. It was also said 
that the defenders of Vienna never lost the confidence that Ferdinand would come to 
help. But since all Germany turned away from their promises Ferdinand also left Vienna 
to the benevolence [misericordia] of God. In Vienna, when the capturing of Buda by 
Süleyman was heard they hoped: he lost many captains at Buda; he would not leave the 
city to conquer Vienna city in such a restricted time since winter was approaching.1930  
Foreign accounts emphasize the destruction of the Austrian countryside in the 
1529 campaign. An anonymous compilation of the events of Süleyman’s reign till 1533 
reports that Süleyman “ruined the province of Austria using all possible cruelty,” and 
turned it into a dessert.1931 
In 1529, as Pope Clement VII tried to work out a peace treaty between Charles 
and Francis, many people expressed their opinion through various channels. One such 
expression was an oration delivered by Claudio Tolomei. Tolomei repeats the same old 
argument that the division between Christians has rendered the Turks more powerful. 
He describes the Turks, in a conventional manner, as “most cruel and ferocious enemies 
of our name and faith.” And he goes on:  
The most impure empire of Mahomet rises higher day by day; to our great 
damage and pain his borders extend further, clearly because of the little accord 
between the Christians. Just like this, due to the discord between Boemundo 
and Tancredo firstly, and between others thereafter Saladin drove our people 
out of Asia, and the immaculate/pure sepulcher of our true Savior Jesus Christ 
turned into the forces of the infidels. Just like this, when Paleologi and 
Cantacusini were fighting, a good part of Greece entered the possession of 
Murad I. just like when the princes of the West did not come to an agreement, 
it was left to Sultan Mehmed to win Constantinople and the name of the 
oriental empire extinguished with it. Just like this, other things happened, and 
the present Süleyman, most powerful and most superior Signore has won 
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Belgrade, conquered Rhodes, sacked and destroyed Hungary, and now is 
plundering the “fortissimo” Ghiaiaza.1932   
Chapuy’s report to Charles V from London dated 25 October 1529 reflects the 
view of Henry VIII on the Ottoman intervention in Hungary and Charles’s attitude 
toward the matter. According to Chapuy’s report, Henry saw the Ottoman issue as 
Charles’s affair, which he could only be accomplished through a peace with the princes 
of Italy: “Between ourselves [said he] I think it is a great shame that whilst the Turk is 
in Austria, the patrimony of the Emperor, he should not rescue it, but make war upon 
Christians.”1933 
The period between 1521 and 1529 has been identified as a transformative period 
in regards to European theological approach to war.1934 The 1529 campaign influenced 
the seemingly pacific men like Erasmus to modify their views on the war against the 
Turks. Erasmus wrote his treatise De Bello Turcico on the eve of the Diet of Augsburg 
in 1530 and it was published immediately. Erasmus’s pacific stance previously was 
based on his firm belief that God frequently sent Turks to warn the Christian community 
to amend their ways. Therefore, the problem could not be solved by military action, but 
through spiritual betterment. In De Bello Turcico, although Erasmus still does not 
encourage outright war, he does not condemn military action as strongly either, 
provided that it is accompanied by genuine spiritual effort. In this treatise, Turks emerge 
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as “barbarians of obscure origin” who keep snatching away more and more. Without 
God’s help, warns Erasmus, that the remainder of the Christian world would soon be 
absorbed by them. The author blames the sins of Christians rather than the merit of the 
Turks in winning themselves an immense empire. Erasmus warns his readers that 
grieving for the lost portions of Christendom is not enough, but that they needed to 
provide two kinds of assistance: military and spiritual. Erasmus criticizes the manner of 
fighting saying, “we fight the Turks like Turks,” because it was guided by lust of power 
and riches, not in the name of Christ.1935 At this point, Erasmus asserts that extreme 
views on war against the Turks were acceptable. He did not agree neither with those 
who wished to fight for all the wrong reasons nor with those who refused to fight when 
one had no other option: 
Of course, not all wars against the Turks are legitimate and holy, yet there are 
times when failure to resist the Turks simply means the surrender of part of 
Christendom to these barbaric enemies, and the abandonment of those of our 
brethren who are already enslaved beneath their foul yoke. On the other hand, 
whenever the ignorant mob hear the name ‘Turk’ they immediately fly into a 
rage and clamour for blood, calling them dogs and enemies to the name of 
Christian; it does not occur to them in the first place that, the Turks are men, 
and, what is more, half-Christian; they never stop to consider whether the 
occasion of the war is just, nor whether it is practical to take up arms and 
thereby to provoke an enemy who will strike back with redoubled fury. They 
do not realize that the Church has no more dangerous enemies than sinners in 
high places, especially if they are in holy orders; finally, they do not 
understand that God, offended by our wickedness, from time to time uses the 
outrages committed by these barbarians to reform us.1936  
After criticizing the craze of fighting the Turk for no good reason, Erasmus goes 
on to challenge Luther for rejecting any kind of military action.1937 He explains that war 
is a judicial retribution on large scale in the absence and or exhaustion of any 
alternatives to punish a crime. Thus, Erasmus now allowed for armed action against the 
Ottomans as long as several conditions were met. Firstly, such a war should be for the 
peace of Christendom, not for desire of power. Secondly, any such military effort 
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should rely on God’s protection and not one’s own strength. Thirdly, such a war should 
be fought with regard for Christian principles. Fourthly, sins such as the corruption of 
the Church and the Italian wars should be corrected, as well as those like fraud, 
violence, rapine and imposture.1938 This part of the treatise reads more like a criticism of 
the political arena of the time rather than a reaction against the Ottomans. Reminding 
that the aim was “to extend the kingdom of Christ rather than our own,” Erasmus 
believed that killing the Turks only meant “increasing the kingdom of the dead.”1939 If 
we leave aside the pacifist stance of Erasmus for a moment, we can see a very clear 
picture of the contemporary problem. Erasmus also suggests an optimistic alternative, 
namely a hope that the Turks could be convinced through persuasion. His hope relied on 
three things. Firstly, Turks did not worship idols – in this sense, they were not absolute 
pagans. Secondly, their beliefs were half-Christian. Thirdly, the apostles had spread 
Christianity without using the sword – which implied that they could, too.1940 
Erasmus was neither the first nor the only person to criticize Luther for his passive 
stance. Luther was harshly criticized in 1521 for opposing armed action against the 
Turk. Luther’s original argument was based on two elements. Firstly, armed action was 
contrary to Christ’s teaching. Secondly, Luther saw the Turks as the “scourge of the 
Lord” who were sent to punish corrupted Christians. In 1529, Luther elaborated on the 
matter explaining that he disapproved religiously motivated crusades, he suspected that 
the papal calls for a crusade were a pretense for raising money for other purposes, and 
he did not believe in the efficiency of military efforts without a general repentance. On 
the other hand, he now approved of military action provided that it was led by the 
Emperor himself.1941  
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Some writers of the time assessed the situation through a more earthly 
perspective. Aventinus [d.1534] was one of those who blamed the Pope and the 
Emperor for the advance of the Ottomans. But rather than only blaming them in 
religious and political terms, Aventinus approached the matter in more practical military 
terms. “If only our soldiers had as many privileges and as much money as the priests 
and clerks,” he said, “the Turk would not be standing before Vienna.”1942 Aventinus 
saw the problem as one of misconception and mis-strategy. He evaluated the factors 
under the success of the Ottoman army. He saw that the success of the Ottoman army 
was due to its organization for permanent war. The border skirmishes weakened the 
border zones and compelled people to give in. Through such organization and strategy, 
the Ottomans did not take whole countries at a time, but subdued them piece by piece. 
The misconception of European power holders was in assuming the danger passed each 
time the Sultan went back. Aventinus’s suggestion is a standing army and a centralized 
organization. He suggests organization of military colonies on the border zones 
modeling on the Roman pattern. These colonies would serve as “advance guard of an 
offensive against the infidels.”1943 
In the aftermath of the 1529 campaign, while the “Turkish threat” was a 
bargaining chip in highest level European politics and subject to heated debates among 
the learned circles, interesting rumors circulated in the popular level. Some of these 
rumors, though they were amazingly far from reality, attest to the wishful thinking of 
more pacifist and optimist by-standers. Apparently, Europeans of various social levels 
were trying to come to an understanding of the “foe” who managed to penetrate right 
into the core of Christendom, but somehow stepped back. Publication of a letter 
allegedly by Süleyman to Charles V, dated 12 October 1530, is an example of many 
such attempts.1944 The letter is addressed to “dear and beloved Emperor Charles” from 
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the “Gran Signor Emperor of Constantinople and Trabzon,” in other words to an 
emperor from another. The choice of Constantinople and Trabzon among a whole list of 
places Süleyman usually attached to his titulature probably served to add to the 
impression to the legacy of the Roman Empire. Süleyman emphasizes that God granted 
him a vast dominion to rule over and that from the beginning of his triumphant reign to 
the present day he has not brought shame to his power or lacked fidelity. However 
Süleyman believed that “humility was the true scale which made the magnificence of 
princes greater” and his humility was at the maximum. He then goes on to state that 
Christ is not hated by the Muslims but the sanctity of his doctrine is believed partly. At 
this point of the text, Süleyman tells about a dream he had for three nights, in which a 
lady dressed in white with a flaming sword in her hand appeared to him. She offended 
Süleyman’s power and defended justice. Süleyman takes this to be a celestial sign for 
him to hand over Jerusalem to Charles, based on the prophecies of sages and 
astrologers. But before presenting his interpretation of the dream, he mentions his 
conquests of Rhodes and Hungary. Contrary to contemporary views on the violent 
manner attributed to the Ottomans, the text claims that Süleyman intended to keep these 
places with the justice of the Roman Empire. Then he goes on to mention that under his 
territories Süleyman has many Christians as servitors and vassals whom he governs 
with justice. However they hope of Charles’s visit (venuta) and his union with the King 
of France. He also mentions the obstacle of the Lutherans of which the Sultan had many 
subjects. Süleyman proposes a mutual visit, Charles should visit Jerusalem and 
Süleyman Rome. Then he parallels baptism with circumcision both to wash away the 
original sin. No matter how absurd the text is, it reflects a hopeful set of mind. While 
the whole text reflects a deep sense of a longed-for peace, it poses Süleyman as a 
benevolent, wise and God-abiding man who is ready to compromise part of his worldly 
power to attain beneficence for the thereafter. He is projected as a powerful monarch 
who is ready to accept Charles V on equal basis. His treatment of Christians living 
under his government is projected as being just. Above all, the text is the projection of 
the possibility of peace, which must have seen quite impossible in 1530. 
The campaign of 1529 seems to have influenced many opinions, but not 
Ferdinand’s. While we can talk about some sort of reception by everyone else, for 
Ferdinand the more appropriate term seems to be reaction. Appearing unaffected by the 
“lesson” almost immediately after Süleyman’s return, Ferdinand re-enters Hungary to 
re-collect the Hungarian territories. He seems to have decided recuperating Hungarian 
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territory as soon as he learned of the removal of the siege. His letter dated 21 October 
from Linz to Charles at Bologna mentions that he will send 60,000 cavalry into 
Hungary who will make great damage.1945 News from Antwerp dated 23 October 1529 
suggests that Ferdinand’s march towards the Turk was not given much credit for success 
for his forces were small and the places Ottoman army left were well-fortified.1946 There 
were reports that by December 1529 Ferdinand already re-captured Strigonia and 
Altimburg and was proceeding to Buda.1947 Charles advised Ferdinand to make a truce 
with the Turk to buy time. Yet he had to be discreet about it and send a secret messenger 
and make it appear as if the Sultan started the negotiations. In this way, he would 
prevent the Turk from thinking that he was afraid and people would not see him as 
negotiating with the Turk.1948 
The 1529 campaign also gave pace to peace initiatives among European powers. 
On 29 June 1529, the treaty of Barcelona was signed between the Emperor and the 
Pope, whereby Charles recognized papal claims to Ravenna, Cervia, Modena, Reggio 
and Rubiera in return for the kingdom of Naples. This treaty was based on the mutual 
intention to unite against the Turk and against heresy. The Peace of Cambrai, often 
called Ladies’s Peace, was signed on 3 August 1529 by Margaret of Austria, who was 
Regent of Netherlands and Charles’s aunt, and Louise of Savoy, Francis’s mother. With 
this peace, Charles renounced his claims to Burgundian lands, while Francis recognized 
Charles’s rights to Flanders and Artois and renounced his own on Milan, Genoa and 
Naples. A marriage was negotiated between Francis and Charles’s sister Eleanor.1949  In 
October 1529, Francis laid out an anti-Ottoman war plan before Charles’s ambassadors, 
offering to support Charles. The plan involved 60,000 men, cavalry and artillery. The 
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natural commander of the offensive would “of course” be the Emperor while Francis 
himself would lead the vanguard. Though he would not be able to provide financial 
support since he owed a lot to England, as imposed by the Treaty of Cambrai, he would 
be happy to meet Charles in Italy and help plan the campaign.1950 On 21 January 1530, a 
commission was given to a group of English envoys “to treat with the Pope, the 
Emperor, the kings of France, Portugal, Denmark and Scotland, the doge of Venice, and 
the dukes of Milan and Ferrara, for a general peace, and for resisting the Turk.1951 
German princes so far aloof to the issue, seem to have decided to give some attention to 
the calls for support after 1529. In the Diet of Augsburg, the Hungarian issue was one of 
the three main issues in the agenda recorded in the Summons dated 21 January 1530, 
along with the religious question and the government of Germany.1952 
Although by the end of the 1529 campaign, Ferdinand seems to have transformed 
his designs in Hungarian territories into a universal cause – and not without foundation 
as we have tried to argue – soon he was to be blamed for provoking the Turk. Many 
contemporaries thought Ferdinand stirred up the Hungarian issue to further his own 
interests. In De Bello Turcico, even though Erasmus acknowledged that Ferdinand was 
the one most closely threatened by “these barbarians,” his tone in the quote above 
implies some blame on Ferdinand for provoking Süleyman.1953 In March 1531 even his 
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brother urged Ferdinand to negotiate with Szapolyai and Süleyman. Even Charles could 
not help but wonder whether it was actually Ferdinand’s fault to attract the Turk, putting 
Christendom into danger for his own interest.1954  
By 1529, Ferdinand seems to have succeeded in transforming the Hungarian issue 
into a “common cause of Christendom” in some contemporary minds, at least.1955 Some 
contemporary observers expressed that Ferdinand had the right to the Hungarian throne. 
One such observer, though by no means objective/unattached, was Paolo Giovo. 
Praising Ferdinand after he was named successor to Emperor, Giovo asserts that 
Ferdinand truly had the hereditary right to the Hungarian kingdom: 
You have truly seized the heredity of the Kingdom of Hungary, which was 
yours by right, because that Kingdom when deprived of its King belonged to 
the House of Austria both through ancient and new laws of agreements. 
However, the cruel Barbarian broke all rights, which were clearly yours. With 
the adulation of certain Hungarian barons he lifted a “new man” and made him 
King of Hungary with the condition that he recognized to be his tributary.  
Being defeated by you, he took on himself to defend and to give back the 
dishonor. While it seemed to him that keeping a vassal of his in state signified 
maintaining the honor of the House of Osman, at the same time it meant 
disdaining Christian armies which were vanquished many times by his 
elders.1956 
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6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have tried to demonstrate that the 1529 campaign was a 
consequence of the controversy of kingship of Hungary after 1526. Throughout the 
campaign, we have identified three steps towards the legitimation and 
acknowledgement of Szapolyai as King of Hungary as confirmed by Ottoman authority: 
the reception at Mohacs, enthronement at Buda, the retrieval of the Crown and 
coronation. The first phase demonstrates a mutual acceptance through the bestowal of 
the land. The second phase theoretically gives the rule of the land to Szapolyai and the 
third phase completes the symbolic endowment of sovereignty.1957 The care taken to 
legitimize Szapolyai in terms legible to the Hungarians and other Christian audiences 
demonstrates Süleyman’s usual concern to do everything by the book, as we have seen 
in various instances up to this point. In this case, this concern involves even alien 
customs to be fulfilled. While legitimating Szapolyai through these acts, Süleyman 
legitimizes his presence in Hungary as well. By making Szapolyai a powerful figure, his 
position becomes even more stressed. 
The case of 1529, when put into the context of the Habsburg rivalry, produces one 
ironic dichotomy on the international scene. While Ferdinand tried to take control of 
Hungary through transforming the issue to a “universal cause”, Szapolyai’s efforts had a 
“nationalist” tone to it. In this sense, the campaign reinforced the “protector of the 
universe” [‘âlem-penâh] theme as far as Süleyman and his allies were concerned.  
Interestingly, we see Charles V distributing kingship in Italy at around the same 
time. In 1529, he restored Milan to Francesco Gonzaga, which became a Habsburg 
dependency after his death in 1535. Charles also created the Gonzaga family dukes of 
Mantua in the same year. Two years later, in 1531, he put the Medici in Florence back 
as dukes. Writing in the context of Charles’s imperial entries, Roy Strong asserts: “We 
are in the age of princes who, almost without exception, owed their domains and their 
titles to the Holy Roman Emperor.”1958 In this regard, too, we might say the Habsburg-
Ottoman rivalry for universal kingship increasingly crystallized. 
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CONCLUSION 
... ne creda V.M. che Soltan Solimano pensi in altro che di occupare li Regni 
vostri per esser di natura cupido di gloria, et fattosi ardito, et audace per le 
tante vittorie sue, et grandezza de l’Imperio.1959 
This study has been an exploration of the multi-layered process of the “making” 
of Sultan Süleyman which involved the formation of his image, the projection of the 
formed image, and its reception. This process inevitably involved the performance of 
deeds and choices by Süleyman which gave credibility to his image and reputation. As 
such, this dissertation has followed these layers through first the making of a Sultan out 
of a prince, followed by the making of an established ruler.  
Sultan Süleyman’s image was grounded on an intertwined set of concepts and 
values legible to contemporary audiences, in other words on an already established 
shared vocabulary. This vocabulary was used to create messages which were reinforced 
through repetition and consistency. By conforming to these messages in his actions and 
decisons, to a large extent, Sultan Süleyman seems to have contributed to the credibility 
of these messages. In other words, through playing by the book he seems to have 
achieved a balance between the image and the act. 
Contemporary audience can be categorized in two main groups as domestic and 
external. The domestic audience consisted of sub-groups as far the dissemination of 
messages is concerned. The household of the Sultan, provincial military-administrative 
officials, and the provincial army in general seem to have formed the primary target 
audience. While this sector was the recipient of the projected image through various 
means, it also had a major part to play in the making and maintenance of that image 
through participation and representation. Members of the religious establishment can be 
considered to constitute a second group of audience. The cooperation of this sector was 
an important element of the rule of the Sultan since religious approval and acceptance 
lay beneath many of the elements and concepts legitimizing Süleyman’s decisions and 
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deeds. Furthermore, this group stood between Sultan Süleyman’s imperial 
administration and his subjects through its function of disseminating imperial messages 
to the general public by announcing the content of documents such as proclamations of 
victory and law codes. The third group of domestic audience was the subject population. 
The level of participation and influence of this group on the image of the Sultan is hard 
to assess; however protection and equitable government of the subjects figures as a 
major legitimating element in the maintenance of Süleyman’s reputation. Not only 
written sources, but also various ritual instances demonstrate the presence of this sector 
throughout the process.  
External audience can be categorized in two groups as friendly and hostile. 
Proclamations of victory, agreements, and ambassadorial visits relating to foreign states 
which were considered friendly involve more secular elements of the image of the 
Sultan. In this sense, it seems that the aim was projecting the image of a powerful ruler 
with whom they should keep good relations. A sense of veiled intimidation can also be 
discerned toward this group of audience. Although the divine favor on Sultan Süleyman 
is emphasized in the messages, the religious aspects of his deeds are not expressed. 
Ghaza, for example, does not figure as a legitimating element in proclamations sent to 
Venice. As for the rivals, who constitute the hostile group of audience, the messages are 
intended for direct intimidation.    
The dynastic concept was one of the most important elements of the image of the 
Sultan. As a member of the Ottoman dynasty, he had a legitimate claim on the throne as 
all other members of his generation. The legimating aspect of dynastic claim aside, this 
signifies that his “making” started long before he ascended the throne. The dynastic 
concept had yet other functions in the process. After his accession, Süleyman’s 
relationship with the dynasty appears to have a dual nature. On one hand, he is reflected 
as acting to glorify the Ottoman dynasty as its latest representative. On the other hand, 
he is seen challenging his predecessors, especially Mehmed II. This claim is apparent 
not only in the writings of contemporary Ottomans, but also in his choices of Belgrade 
and Rhodes as first targets. His completion of “unfinished business” of his predecessors 
simultaneously enhances the reputation of the Ottoman dynasty and raises Sultan 
Süleyman above his predecessors. 
An equally important element employed in the process is the concept of divine 
favor. This is a multi-faceted concept as well. As the reigning Sultan, Süleyman’s rule is 
first and foremost justified through his being appointed by God. The point is made over 
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and over again in narrative sources through citations of the relevant Quranic verses. It is 
not only his divinely ordained appointment that plays a major role in his image, but also 
the sense of divine favor that is bestowed on him by God through his various deeds. In 
this sense, his military victories, for example, reflect as proof of divine favor. 
Considering the fatalistic tendencies of contemporary Ottoman chronicles, Sultan 
Süleyman’s military feats were employed to project him as God’s chosen to realize 
these deeds. Along with the advantages related with the favor of God, the issue also 
entailed a complex sense of responsibility imposed on the Sultan. In other words, divine 
favor bestowed on Süleyman was to be maintained through his actions. The basic 
condition to maintain the favor appears to be the protection of the subjects who were 
deemed to be entrusted to him by God. This notion of protection entailed the safety and 
security of the people through the maintenance of the “order of the world” by means of 
the application of justice and punishment. The other main notion to this end appears to 
be personal devotion to God which manifests itself in the concern to adhere to the 
“commands of God.” This concern can be observed in both rhetorical explanations of 
decisions and ritual behavior. Ranging from solemn expressions of ghaza intention to 
praying to God for assistance, from legitimating grand vizieral appointment on God’s 
command to justifying peaceful surrender as thanks-giving to God such behavior is 
emphasized throughout the narratives.  
If dynastic claim and divine favor are the two main over-arching concepts in the 
“making” of Sultan Süleyman, the concepts of “justice” and “ghaza” appear to be the 
main building blocks employed in the process. Supporting and feeding both of the over-
arching concepts, concepts of justice and ghaza are not mutually exclusive either. 
Justice is mainly defined as the anti-thesis of oppression. In this sense, the removal of 
oppression from the face of the earth appears as a common theme linking the individual 
concepts of justice and ghaza in the image of Sultan Süleyman. Taken as an individual 
concept, the function of “justice” has been traced in each phase of the process explored 
in this study. The theme of Süleyman’s “just rule” has been employed in contemporary 
narratives starting with accounts of his princehood at Caffa. As he ascends the throne, 
the conventional rhetorical emphasis on “justice prevailing throughout the realm” is 
consolidated through specific deeds explained by the ultimate consideration Sultan 
Süleyman paid to the concept. The removal of the ban on Persian trade, the permission 
accorded to the exiles from Egypt to return, and the execution of the oppressive admiral 
transform the rhetorical presentation into individual instances of Sultan Süleyman’s 
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personal intervention on behalf of justice. As such these instances help transform the 
generic image of the “just sultan” to the image of Sultan Süleyman. On one hand, these 
deeds convey the message that the Sultan is capable of fulfilling God’s command “to 
judge between men in truth and justice”1960 and thus function as a supporting element 
regarding the issue of divine favor. On the other hand, the first two deeds being 
reversals of Selim I’s decisions pose a veiled challenge which points at Süleyman’s dual 
relationship with the dynastic image. While the first two deeds seem to dwell on the 
immediate interests of a portion of the people, the removal of the oppressive admiral 
suggests a grand example to prevent future instances of oppression in administrative 
levels. As such, this instance may perhaps be regarded as the first demonstration of 
Sultan Süleyman’s “intention to remove oppression from the face of the world.” Yet 
another aspect through which the concept of justice is presented as a main building 
block of the Sultan’s image is observed through the decrees and diplomas granted to 
various officials – as exemplified by those to Hayrbay, Ahmed Paşa and Đbrahim Paşa – 
whereby they were commanded to administer the affairs with justice and impartiality, as 
well to remove oppression.  
The theme of removing oppression can be traced in the functioning of the “ghaza” 
concept, as well, as exemplified by the explanations of the motives of the 1522 
campaign which entailed harm and oppression by Rhodian corsairs. Sultan Süleyman’s 
firm resolve in the pursuit of ghaza in person figures as a vital element in the making of 
his image during the first decade of his reign. The concept functions through a fusion 
contemporary values and notions in a multi-layered context. Firstly, ghaza is projected 
as a religious duty which the Sultan was required to undertake and lead as the ruler of 
“the” Muslim community.1961 As such, through ghaza he fulfills a religious duty which 
is also a way of demonstrating his devotion to God. Secondly, performance of ghaza 
consolidates Sultan Süleyman’s position within the dynastic chain since precedence 
presents ghaza as one of the main identity markers of the Ottoman dynasty. As such, 
Süleyman fulfills a dynastic role in consolidating the established identity and reputation. 
Thirdly, ghaza gave him the opportunity to demonstrate his military capability in a 
                                               
1960
 Quran, 38:26. 
1961
 Although the terminology employed in Ottoman chronicles might suggest 
leadership of one single Muslim community, this does not translate into political 
sovereignty over all Muslims in the world. 
507 
 
world where military skills mattered a lot. This demonstration functioned in his making 
in at least three levels; namely in positioning him in the face of dynastic precedence, in 
marking his status among contemporary rivals, and in consolidating his authority on his 
own army. Fourthly, ghaza provided a pretext for pursuing an aggressive expansionist 
policy.1962 
As the concept of “ghaza” figures as one of the major building blocks of the 
“making” of Sultan Süleyman; it also appears that the mode in which ghaza was 
pursued contributed to the process. Various major and minor issues involved in war 
making have been referred to throughout this study in order to trace the dynamics 
underlying the issue. Starting with justifications of decisions to wage war, it is possible 
to trace “correct” behavior on the part of the Sultan in each phase of a campaign. The 
“correct” way to proceed with military action seems to be guided by various sources of 
reference such as jihad formulations of Islamic political thought, conventional war 
strategies, and practical concerns.  
The strategies employed in this respect can be categorized in relation to three 
main audience groups. Concern for abundance of food supplies, occasional distributions 
of largesse, ritual celebrations of religious days, concern for safe river-crossings, 
inspections at critical points, and hand kissing ceremonies on various occasions during 
the campaigns – and often the combination of these in a single occasion – are directed at 
the members of the Ottoman army. Such aspects of the campaign both impose the 
authority of the Sultan over and over again; they also ensure the loyalty and confidence 
of the army toward the Sultan. A second audience, in this respect, is the subject 
population residing on the campaign route. The marching of the Ottoman army could 
have devastating effects on the local population if the Sultan did not ensure order to 
prevent harm to cultivated lands. Besides practical economic concerns, the marching 
order had to do with Sultan Süleyman’s claim to remove oppression since any harm 
done by the Sultan’s soldiers to the subject population would be regarded as oppression. 
It is also worth noting that the campaign routes during the period under study were 
home not only to Muslim subjects but largely to non-Muslim ones. In this sense, 
Süleyman’s role as leader of ghaza is fused with his role of protector of the people 
regardless of religion. The third group of audience involved in campaign strategies is 
                                               
1962
 I use the term “expansionist” not in terms of strict territorial expansion, but 
rather to mean expansion of influence and resources. 
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the conquered populations. The violent and peaceful modes of behavior toward these 
populations are often justified according to Islamic political theory. Although 
intimidation frequently appears as a strategy to bend the will of the opponent, the 
majority of the conquests during this period reflect as instances of peaceful surrender. 
Such instances also provide an opportunity to demonstrate “correct” behavior on the 
part of the Sultan.   
Frequent use of analogies figures as a vital device enforcing the image of the 
Sultan. Two main types of analogy can be discerned both in verbal and ritual 
projections. Firstly, references to the ideal kings of biblical and Shahnama traditions 
delineate the main elements of the image of Sultan Süleyman. His sense of justice is 
reflected through identification with Anushirvan. His military endeavors and the scale 
of his realm are emphasized through analogy to Alexander and Darius. His general 
majesty, wisdom, as well as the divine favor he enjoyed, are reflected through 
identification with Solomon. The name of the Sultan also proves to be an additional 
advantage in this sense. While he is often reflected as surpassing these ideal types, such 
identifications also reflect a sense of expectation. The second major type of analogy 
involves celestial or natural phenomena. The most frequently employed analogy of this 
type seems to be the sun analogy. This analogy, on one hand, projects the celestial order 
on to the rule of Sultan Süleyman. On the other hand, it imposes on him the duty of 
“illuminating” the world. A third kind of analogy brings forth stories of biblical history 
such as that of Moses and the Pharaoh. Such analogies emphasize both the divine favor 
bestowed on Sultan Süleyman and his position on the side of the “good” and the “right” 
while his adversary of the moment is vilified as “evil” and “wrong”. 
The image thus formed was disseminated through established channels, or media, 
of presentation. In the rhetorical sense, the main media of official projection seem to be 
proclamations of victory, official documents such as decrees and diplomas, and law 
codes. The main arguments promoting an idealized image of the Sultan were publicized 
through these documents. As these documents were meant to be read in public signified 
that the messages they contained were often intended for a general audience. Campaign 
chronicles, not intended for the general public, seem to have been more neutral 
documents to record individual campaigns for future reference rather than aiming to 
enhance the reputation or glory of the Sultan. On the other hand, recording campaign 
decisions and behavior of the Sultan these documents also have a role to play, especially 
since many chronicles seem to follow them in varying degrees. Chronicles themselves, 
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on the other hand, not only reflect the elements making up the image of the Sultan but 
often exaggerate them almost to the point of turning them into clichés. However the 
consistency of the concepts employed in both the official and narrative projections, 
along with repetitive usage, seem to have served a performative function. In other 
words, rather than merely reflecting an idealized monarch prototype – or current “truth” 
– the consistent and recurrent messages functioned to enhance the authority and 
reputation of Sultan Süleyman.  
The same performative function emphasized by consistency and repetition of 
message is observed in the second major channel of communication, namely ritual 
events. Various ritual occasions have been discussed in this respect throughout this 
study. These occasions targeted the various groups of audience either individually or in 
combination. The public greetings of Süleyman as he entered Istanbul or other cities in 
various instances, his father’s funeral, processional campaign departures along with the 
preceding mosque visits made him visible to all sectors of contemporary audience. The 
presence of town residents and foreign observers among the audience seem to have 
given these occasions a highly public character. It can also be assumed that such 
occasions produced the material for word-of-mouth dissemination of the Sultan’s 
image. Such occasions showcased not only the majesty of the Sultan himself, but that of 
his household as well the sense of order and authority he represented. Through acts of 
largesse involved in these events, such instances reinforced the element of liberality as 
an important aspect of image of the Sultan, through symbolically demonstrating that he 
provided for his people. Other ritual events such as the bi‘at, hand-kissing and gift-
presentation on various occasions, and ambassadorial audiences targeted a more 
restricted audience. Such ritual occasions were marked with acts of deference by the 
participant and acts of largesse by the Sultan. Such instances reenacted the bond and the 
relationship between the Sultan and the participants, almost as a reconfirmation of a 
silent contract based on mutual expectation and responsibility. Sources dwell on a 
variety of ritual instances to various extents; however one occasion is largely absent in 
the accounts, namely the entry in Istanbul after the campaigns. Given that the ritual 
involved in campaign departures gave a collective character to these enterprises, the 
silent return is puzzling. The silence of earlier sources on the behavior of earlier sultans 
returning from campaigns suggests the absence of ritual return greetings. However, the 
issue remains to be investigated within the context of later periods. 
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It is important to note some relative absences in the process of the “making” of 
Sultan Süleyman during the period under study. These are absences with respect to later 
employment of these “missing” aspects. The absence of large scale employment of 
visual media during the period under study is surprising for a modern student of history. 
Given the wide range of verbal and ritual channels of communication, as well as the 
presence of a well developed corps of salaried court artists and artisans, the absence of 
visual representations of the Sultan’s image is rather confusing. One exceptional project 
would be the Selimnâme of Şükri-i Bidlisi [TSK, H.1597-1598] presented to Sultan 
Süleyman around 1525. However, this work containing twenty-four  illustrations can be 
regarded as emphasizing one aspect of Süleyman’s image, namely the dynastic concept. 
On the other hand, this work has been defined as “the first attempt at documenting 
historic figures and events.”1963 As such, it could be speculated that the need for large 
scale projects involving visual representations was a later development, and the absence 
of such projects during the earlier years of Sultan Süleyman’s reign was perhaps not a 
“missing” element yet. The lack of large scale architectural activity raises a more 
puzzling issue, given the already well established tradition of huge imperial mosque 
complexes. Both issues remain to be further investigated in the context of the entire 
reign of the Sultan.  
Another such “missing” aspect of Sultan Süleyman’s image during this period is 
the Sultan’s positioning vis-à-vis the Safavi Shah. Although contemporary sources refer 
to the Safavis from time to time, these references do not translate into the direct 
confrontation between Süleyman and Tahmasb observed in later periods nor do they 
assume the character of binary opposition between Selim and Ismail. Self-positioning in 
the context of Sunni-Shi’a rivalry seems to be a later addition in Sultan Süleyman’s 
image. On the other hand, Sultan Süleyman seems to be positioned vis-à-vis his 
Christian rivals during this period. Contemporary conflicts in Europe especially in the 
context of the Habsburg-Valois struggle, Hungarian internal strife, and Lutheranism 
appears to have provided Süleyman with both opportunities and elements of image-
making. Careful observation, employment, intervention, and even manipulation relating 
to current power balances contributed to the “making” of Sultan Süleyman.  
                                               
1963
 Atıl, Süleymannâme, p.46. Also see, Atıl, The Age of Süleyman the 
Magnificent, p.81. 
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By the end of the year 1529, Sultan Süleyman had actualized the meanings 
implied in the most frequently used Ottoman royal honorifics through his own 
performance. Throughout this study we pursued the phases of Süleyman’s becoming the 
Sultan he was, through his deeds and reflections thereof. The process of the “making” 
of Sultan Süleyman began on the day he was born, as a “felicitous prince” [şehzâde-i 
civân-baht] by default. By virtue of legitimate accession and his first acts of justice, he 
became the “blessed sovereign” [hüdâvendigâr-ı kâm-kâr]. Through his military 
enterprises, as ambitious challenges both in the face of the world at large and in the 
context of Ottoman dynastic precedence, he merited being the “conqueror of the world” 
[cihân-gîr]. Not only his intervention on behalf of Janos Szapolyai, but his confirmation 
of the rulership of tributary states, and actions justified with the protection of ruled 
populations including non-Muslims, fulfilled the implication of the title “refuge of the 
world” [‘âlem-penâh]. Throughout these years, his concern of justice and righteousness 
were emphasized by contemporary observers, both foreign and native, as well as the 
revision of regulations in various regions of his realm, thus earning him the definition of 
[‘adâlet-şi‘âr]. In the process of proving himself “Solomon of the Age” [Süleymân-ı 
zamân], even the one move he did not play by the book completed the claim by 
introducing the figure of the “perfect vizier” [vezîr-i Asaf-nazîr] in the person of 
Đbrahim Paşa. By 1529, Sultan Süleyman had become confident enough to rise above 
everything through delegating fully the sovereign authority invested in him.  
The multi-layered image of Sultan Süleyman, in its fully formed structure, owed 
not only to his perseverance and law-abiding nature, but also to the contribution of a 
group of well-informed Ottomans, as well as the appropriate and efficient employment 
of an established repertoire of values. In this study, we have delineated the various 
phases and aspects involved in the making of this multi-layered image. We have argued 
that Süleyman started his sultanic career with the inherited elements of dynastic and 
divine legitimation. He took over an already established model, and put deliberate effort 
in the actualization of this model. While his ritual accession marked the inherited 
elements legitimating his sovereignty; the first acts of justice and the suppression of an 
immediate rebellion affirmed his power as reflections of the two customary building 
blocks of sovereign power: justice [‘adâlet] and punishment [siyâset]. We have argued 
that his ambitious military endeavors consolidated and maintained his authority and 
personal reputation. With these enterprises Sultan Süleyman challenged himself, his 
predecessors, and  “invincible” rivals. We have discussed further imposition of his own 
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rule through composing his own ranks and regulations during the course of the period 
under examination. We have suggested that a saturating point can be observed in 1529 
with the diploma of general-command granted to Đbrahim Paşa, in terms of self-
affirmation and self-imposition, whereby Sultan Süleyman’s image ascends to its peak 
point in relation to his performance.   
This study demonstrates that Sultan Süleyman pursued an active and visible 
mode of sovereignty in the 1520s. This seems to have evolved into an even more 
ambitious character in the 1530s with more emphasis on an ideological claim on 
universal monarchy, supported through campaigns directed both to the East and the 
West. Starting with mid-1540s, although universal sovereignty remained a discursive 
claim, Sultan Süleyman became more and more detached from the dynamic elements of 
rule. This detachment brought about a transformation in regards to both the elements 
emphasized and the tools employed in his presentation. Writers during his later years 
and after that often fused the different elements of the Sultan’s image which actually 
pertained to different phases of his life; thus creating the impression of a monolithic 
forty-six years of glory which came to be regarded as an idealized “golden age” for 
centuries. In this sense, this study has aimed to delineate the major elements making up 
the image of Sultan Süleyman as he became an established Sultan in his own right, as 
well as the dynamics of the underlying process. As such, this study can be regarded as 
ground work for further research and analysis on the impact of these elements during 
the rest of the reign of Sultan Süleyman as well as their influence on later image-making 
processes of his successors. In a secondary sense, this study can be regarded as an 
experiment on the employment of theoretical approaches and perspectives borrowed 
from various disciplines to arrive at a better understanding of the concepts, values, 
elements, and underlying dynamics involved in the making of Sultan Süleyman.  
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APPENDIX 1: OFFICIAL VENETIAN OBSERVERS IN ISTANBUL1964 
 
 
 
                                               
1964
 Alberi, Relazione, III:III:XXII-XXIII. 
Person Office Election to Office Reason 
Andrea Foscolo Bailo 9 March 1507  
Nicolo Giustinian Vice-bailo 22 January 1512 Vacant bailoship 
Antonio Giustinian Ambassador 23 April 1513 Accession of Selim I 
Leonardo Bembo Bailo 24 August 1513  
Alvise Mocenigo Ambassador 11 December 1516 Victory 
Bartolomeo 
Contarini 
Ambassador 11 December 1516 Victory 
Tomasso Contarini Bailo 9 January 1519  
Daniele Ludovici Secretary to bailo 15 January 1519  
Marco Minio Ambassador 7 November 1520 Accession exaltation 
Andrea Priuli 
[d.1523] 
Bailo 3 October 1521  
Pietro Zen Ambassador and 
vice-bailo 
4 March 1523 Conquest of Rhodes 
Pietro Bragadin Bailo February 1524  
Pietro Zen Vice-bailo 30 October 1525 Vacancy in bailoship 
Marco Minio Ambassador 1 October 1526 Hungarian victory 
Tomasso Contarini Ambassador 12 December 1527 Envoy for grain issue 
Francesco Bernardo Bailo 30 December 1529  
Tomasso Mocenigo Ambassador 30 December 1529 Circumcision of the 
princes 
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APPENDIX 2: PRINCELY SANCAKS, 1509-1513 
1 Kefe   5 Amasya 9 Çankırı 12 Istanbul 
2 Trabzon  6 Osmancık   13 Edirne 
   7 Çorum 10 Manisa 
3 Sinop  8 Bolu 
4 Kastamonu    11 Konya  
 
BAYEZID 
 
Alemşah [d.1502]     Mahmud [d.1507]     Şehinşah [d.1511]              Ahmed              Korkud             Selim 
      [Konya]         [Amasya]                 [Manisa]         [Trabzon] 
 
 
 
Osmanşah Orhan          Musa    Mehmedşah   Osman  Murad Alaeddin Süleyman      Süleyman 
  (Çankırı)           (Sinop)    (Kastamonu)                               [Osmancık] [Bolu]    [Bolu]   [Çorum]          [Kefe]   
 
 
                                                                                                          Mehmed  Mustafa 
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APPENDIX 3: TSA. E. 6185/18 
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APPENDIX 4: TSA. D.10052, MANISA REGISTRY, 919 [1513] 
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TSA. D.10052 
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TSA. D.10052 
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APPENDIX 5: ARTISANS 
 
NAME FEE ARTISAN REGIMENT 
 (aspers)  
Karagöz b Abdullah* 3.5 Cameşuyan (laundryman) 
Kasım Arnavud* 4 Kazganyan (caster) 
Kasım Çerkes* 4 Zergeran (goldsmith) 
Kasım Rus* 6 Kazzazan (silk manufacturer) 
Behram Rus* 6 Tirgeran (arrow maker) 
Ferruh Çerkes* 6 Tirgeran (arrow maker) 
Bayezid Rus* 6 Zergeran (goldsmith) 
Đlyas bin Ahmed* 6.5 Kazzazan (silk manifacturer) 
Bali bin Mahmud* 6.5 Muzeduzan (boot maker) 
Mustafa Boğdan** 6.5 Nakkaşan (painter) 
Hızır Bali* 7 Külahduzan (hat maker) 
Simon Gürci-i Gebr*** 7 Siperduzan (shield maker) 
Mehmed bin Hamza* 7 Şemşirgeran (sword maker) 
Kemal Acem* 8 Küştegeran (wrestler) 
Yusuf Arnavud* 9 Cameşuyan (laundry man) 
Ali Rus* 9 Külahduzan (hat maker) 
Pervane-i Ungurus* 10 Külahduzan (hat maker) 
Hasan Lec* 11 Şemşirgeran (sword maker) 
Nasuh Bin Uveys* 11 Zergeran (goldsmith) 
Ahmed Kuş* 11.5 Harratin (metal lathe workers) 
Hüseyin bin Ali* 12 Çilingiran (locksmith) 
Yahya Trabzon**** 12 Kazganyan (casters) 
Toroz Gürci-i Gebr*** 12 Siperduzan (hat maker) 
Kasım Rus* 13 Tirgeran (arrow maker) 
Ahmed bin Mehmed* 14.5 Muzeduzan (boot maker) 
Kasım Ungurus* 14.5 Zerduzan (gold embroiderer) 
Mehmed bin Haydar* 15 Kazzazan (silk manifacturer) 
Ali Mahyacı* 16 Kazganyan (caster) 
Celal bin Nevruz* 16.5 Şemşirgeran (sword maker) 
Hacı Yusuf* 18 Cerrahin (operator physician) 
Hasan Rus* 18.5 Postinduzan (boot maker) 
Taşzade Kopuzî* 19 Sâztraşan (maker of musical instruments) 
Murad Bosna* 24 Zergeran (gold smith) 
 
* Hazret-i pâdişâh-ı ‘âlempenâh birle gelmiş [he came with the Sultan]. 
** Üstâdzâde kûl olub, Hüdâvendigâr hazretlerine (şehzâdeliğinde) virilüb cihet olunmuş. Fi Zilkade 
929 (1523). 
*** Sultan Selim Han zamanında Gürcistan'dan çıkmış. 
**** Sultan Selim Han birle Trabzon'dan gelmiş. 
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APPENDIX 6: IMPERIAL MOSQUES 
 
522 
 
APPENDIX 7: TSA. E.845/19 
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APPENDIX 8: LIST OF POSTS (1521-1524) 
 
NAME Initially PRE-1520 1520 
POST-
BELGRA
DE 
POST-
RHODES 1524 1525 Ultimately 
Kasım 
Paşa1 Scribe Lala Vizier Retired     
Piri 
Mehmed 
Paşa 
Religious 
establishment 
Grand 
Vizier 
(1517) 
Grand 
Vizier 
Grand 
Vizier Retired    
Mustafa 
Paşa2 
Head 
Gatekeeper 
Vizier 
(925) Vizier Vizier 
Vizier / 
Egypt Vizier Vizier 
Vizier 
(d.1529) 
Ferhad 
Paşa3 
Janissary 
Commander Vizier  Vizier Vizier Smederevo Executed   
Ahmed 
Paşa4 
Janissary 
Commander Rumelia Rumelia Vizier Vizier 
Egypt / 
Executed   
Ayas Paşa5 
Janissary 
Commander 
(1517) 
 Anatolia Rumelia  Vizier  
Grand 
Vizier 
(1536) 
Güzelce 
Kasım 
Paşa6 
Agha of the 
stirrup   Anatolia  Egypt Captain 
Vizier 
(1528/9) 
Sinan Paşa7    Rûm Discharged Rûm   
Behram 
Paşa8    Captain Rûm Anatolia   
                                               
1
 Son of Nişancı Mehmed Çelebi; other posts include Anatolia and Rumelia 
treasury. See, SO, 3:875-6. 
2
 Other posts include general governorship of Rumelia. See, SO, 4:1192. 
3
 Other posts include general governorship of Rumelia. See, SO, 2:517; Celalzade, 
Selimname, p.214. 
4
 See, SO, 1:211. 
5
 See, SO, 2:341-2.  
6
 Other posts include governorship of Adana and general governorship of 
Rumelia; he is said to be the son of one Bayezid II’s men. See, SO, 3:875. 
7
 See, Bostan (MK), 46a. 
8
 See, Bostan (MK), 45b. 
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Đskender9 
Paşa     Trabzon Karaman
10
 
Rûm/ 
Trabzon   
Hürrem 
Paşa11 
District 
Governor   Trablus Damascus
12
 Discharged   
Lütfi Paşa13 District governıor    Captain Karaman Damascus 
Grand 
Vizier 
(1537/8) 
Süleyman 
Paşa14 
Chief of 
Inner 
Treasury 
    
Captain / 
Damascus Egypt 
Grand 
Vizier 
(1540) 
Đbrahim 
Paşa15    
Chief 
Falconer 
and 
Hasoda 
başı (?) 
Grand Vizier 
and Rumelia 
Grand 
Vizier and 
Rumelia 
Grand 
Vizier and 
Rumelia 
Executed 
(1536) 
 
                                               
9
 See, Bostan (MK), 50a. 
10
 Upon death of Şadi Paşa. 
11
 See, SO, 2:678; Bostan (MK), 50a. 
12
 Upon death of Ferhad Paşa. 
13
 See, SO, 3:903; Bostan (MK), 57b. 
14
 See, SO, 5:1548; Bostan (MK), 57b. 
15
 See, SO 3:777. 
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APPENDIX 9: FREQUENTLY REFERRED PLACES 
 
1. Plovdiv   17. Székesfehérvár 
2. Sofia   18. Buda 
3. Niš    19. Esztergom 
4. Smederevo  20. Poszony  
5. Belgrade   21. Vienna 
6. Zemun   22. Linz 
7. Novigrad   23. Zagreb 
8. Sabacz   24. Friuli 
9. Ilok   25. Udine 
10. Vukovar   26. Treviso 
11. Eszek   27. Venice 
12. Mohacs   28. Zadar 
13. Pécs   29. Šibenik 
14. Tolna   30. Split 
15. Kalocsa   31. Ragusa 
16. Szeged 
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APPENDIX 10: TSA.E.6146/2 
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APPENDIX 11: LIBRARY OF CORVINUS 
The library of the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus was the most celebrated 
library of Europe in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. The library is estimated to 
have contained around 2,000-2,500 volumes in Greek and Latin. The Papal collection in 
the 1480s had 3,600 books in 1480s. Milanese ducal library at Pavia had 988 volumes in 
1426. Compared to these, Corvinus’s library probably deserved the fame.1 Many 
volumes were taken out of the library after the death of Corvinus, and by 1526 the 
library probably already lost its former splendor. Visiting the library in 1520, the 
Venetian ambassador Lorenzo Orio, for example, reported that all the good books were 
gone.2 By the end of 1530s, volumes from the Corvinus Library could be found to be 
bought in Istanbul. One volume in the British Library [Lansdowne, 836] bears a note 
stating that it was brought back from Istanbul by Antonius Verantius [Vrancic] Bishop 
of Pecs [Fünfkirchen].3  
In 1877, Abdülhamid II donated thirty five volumes to the newly founded 
Budapest University. The correspondence related to the donation is preserved in the 
Ottoman Archives. The number of original Corvinian manuscripts among the volumes 
has been identified between eleven4 to fifteen.5 The Ottoman agent Tahir Bey, who was 
assigned to deliver the books to the Rector of the university in person, was not allowed 
to pass to Budapest from Vienna by Austrian authorities. However, the books were sent 
with a delegation, and were  ceremonially received on 29 April 1877.6 
                                               
1
 Marcus Tanner, The Raven King: Matthias Corvinus and the Fate of His Lost 
Library, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp.8-9. 
2
 Tanner, The Raven King, pp.157-9, 171-2. 
3
 Rogers and Ward, Süleyman the Magnificent, p.101. Rogers and Ward suggest 
that since it would have been impossible for such an item to be on the market, it should 
have been a gift from the Sultan on the bishop’s departure from his ambassadorial 
mission, around 1555-1557. For other examples of mid-sixteenth century purchases, 
see, Tanner, The Raven King, pp.172-3. 
4
 I. Berkovits, The Illuminated Manuscripts of Matthias Corvinus, S. Horn (trans.) 
(Budapest: 1964), p.9. Berkovits provides a catalogue of the manuscripts as well. 
5
 Tanner, The Raven King, p.204. 
6
 Tanner, The Raven King, pp.204-6. For Ottoman correspondence see, BOA, 
Hariciye Nezareti, Siyasi, 176:1-18. 
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Theophratus, De historia plantarum, fol.1a. (Budapest University Library, Cod Lat. I) 
“Devlet-i ‘Osmânî’nin pâdişâhı şevketlü Abdülhamid Hân-ı sânî hazretlerinin 
Macaristan  Dârü’l-fünûnına hediyeleridir, 25 Rebiyyülevvel 1294 [9 April 1877].”7 
                                               
7
 From I. Berkovits, The Illuminated Manuscripts of Matthias Corvinus, S. Horn 
(trans.) (Budapest: 1964), Plate I. 
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